James M. Acton
A perennial feature of life as a nuclear-armed state is worry for the survivability of its nuclear forces. China and Russia, for example, worry that the United States is developing capabilities that would allow it to conduct ‘disarming strikes’.Footnote1 While U.S. concerns are less acute, Washington nonetheless worries about technological ‘breakthroughs that would render U.S. nuclear forces … highly vulnerable to attack’.Footnote2 Many analysts believe these fears are well-placed. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, for example, argue that technological developments are ‘making nuclear arsenals around the world far more vulnerable’ to the point that states may plausibly acquire ‘disarming strike capabilities’.Footnote3
Survivable nuclear forces are necessary – but not sufficient – for a nuclear-armed state to retaliate against an attempted disarming strike. It also requires a survivable nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system. Depending on the state’s doctrine, that system must be capable of initiating a nuclear strike either before its nuclear forces are destroyed by an incoming attack or after absorbing the full weight of that attack – or, perhaps, both.
Attacks on nuclear forces and attacks on their C3I system would be synergistic. A state that sought to disarm another would almost certainly try to enhance the effectiveness of strikes against its adversary’s nuclear forces by simultaneously trying to undermine that adversary’s ability to wield those forces. In fact, any decision to attempt a disarming strike would likely be based on the would-be attacker’s assessment of the combined effects of counterforce operations (that is, strikes against nuclear forces) and counter-nuclear C3I operations.Footnote4
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