Nick Childs
The shores of Europe and beyond continue to be buffeted by the disruptive shockwaves of the new Trump administration’s bludgeoning approach to ending the Russia–Ukraine war and its call for Europe to take primary responsibility for the defence of the continent.
As Europe’s governments scramble to step up on defence, there is sure to be a focus on the deficiencies in European naval capabilities in the absence of US support. These include offensive lethality, defensive capacities and the ability – if necessary – to sustain operations.
A naval broadside
Europe’s leading navies have shrunk dramatically since the end of the Cold War while retaining small numbers of high-capability platforms and assets. Even so, European NATO navies collectively possess a much greater number of principal surface combatants than the Russian Navy. But whether they can deliver a credible deterrence and defence posture without the US is another matter.
The US Navy’s forward presence in Europe has also been a shadow of its former self for much of the post-Cold War period. While it has been boosted in recent times by the revival of regular deployments and surges of carrier strike groups (CSGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs), the US Navy is stretched thin, with no such formations currently in the region.
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