Alexander Taranov
On December 6, 2024, during a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State in Minsk, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the deployment of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (Kremlin.ru, December 6, 2024). This deployment is planned for the second half of 2025 on Belarusian territory. As in the case of the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, this decision was purportedly made in response to a request from Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (Belta.by, January 26). Putin justified his decision by referencing Russia’s obligations under the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the Union State, positioning it as a measure to ensure Belarus’s security against potential North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aggression (see EDM, February 12, 13).
In March 2023, Lukashenka mentioned the possibility of Russian strategic missile systems being placed in Belarus. He stated that discussions were ongoing with the Kremlin regarding the potential deployment of Russian strategic nuclear weapons, specifically the RT-2PM2 Topol-M ground-based missile systems (GBMS) (President of the Republic of Belarus, March 31, 2023). In April 2023, Belarusian Armed Forces undertook first measures to restore and modernize Soviet-era infrastructure in Brest oblast, specifically the launch sites for the RT-2PM Topol GBMS (Telegram/@modmilby, April 23, 2023; (Telegram/@Hajun_BY, April 24, 2023).
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