Pavel K. Baev
U.S., European, and Ukrainian peace-making policies are now aligned at a possible breakthrough point, as differences in means and methods transmute into complementarities. This fast evolution starkly contrasts with the immobility of Russia’s position. This resolve, so long as it exists, prohibits any discussion of possible compromises for peace (see Strategic Snapshot, February 24). Russian President Vladimir Putin declares readiness to end the war, but uses every occasion to assert that no concessions are under consideration. Putin’s most recent effort at this was when meeting with women of the foundation, “Defenders of the Fatherland.” During the meeting, Putin claimed, “We do not need what is not ours, but we will not give up what is ours. We need an option that ensures the stable development of our country in terms of peace and security” (Kremlin.ru; Meduza, March 6).
This insistence on a peace arrangement that would fully conform with Russia’s interests, and essentially amount to a victory, clashes with U.S. President Donald Trump’s stance on the peace deal (RBC, March 2). In this case, all parties would leave somewhat dissatisfied. Trump’s promise to help Ukraine regain as much territory as possible is particularly disagreeable for Moscow. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pre-emptively ruled out any discussion on territorial concessions (Kommersant, February 17; Vedomosti, February 27). To make the demand for full control over four Ukrainian regions annexed in September 2022 more plausible, Moscow has redoubled its military efforts aimed at expelling Ukrainian troops from Kursk oblast (The Insider, March 7). The casualties are devastating, but the Kremlin is firmly set on denying Ukraine the trump card of holding Russian territory during the bargaining on an armistice (Re: Russia, March 4).
No comments:
Post a Comment