Paul Goble
At the Riyadh talks between Russia and the United States on February 18, U.S. representatives reportedly raised the possibility of expanding U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic (see EDM, March 3; Vedomosti, Meduza, February 27). According to Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) who was involved in the talks, the two had a “general discussion–maybe joint projects in the Arctic. We specifically discussed the Arctic” (Interfax, TASS, February 19). This is intended by the United States as a “way to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing,” particularly given their deepening partnership since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began (Bloomberg, February 26; Meduza, February 27).
Moscow welcomes cooperation with the United States for two main reasons. First, Russia has been facing problems in attempting to develop the Northern Sea Route (NSR) on the cheap due to sanctions restrictions, which U.S. cooperation may help to resolve (see EDM, May 6, 2021, February 18). Second, activities conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Arctic exploit Russia’s financial weaknesses and have created concerns in Moscow that Beijing may attempt to become the dominant power in the region (see EDM, February 18). Moscow may view U.S. cooperation as a mechanism to counter Beijing’s activities in this respect. The Kremlin also views such cooperation as part of its larger effort to deepen the divide between the Trump Administration and European leaders committed to the long-standing idea of keeping the Arctic out of international geoeconomic, geopolitical, and especially military competition (NG.ru, February 27). Additionally, any change in the United States’ approach to the Arctic would likely serve as a precedent for Moscow to seek a transformation to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (The Antarctic Treaty, 1959 (also available with the British Antarctic Survey, accessed March 6).
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