Siamak Naficy
Introduction
A persistent argument has resurfaced in Western foreign policy circles—one that suggests Russia’s pattern of aggression in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022) resulted from Western weakness and appeasement. Advocates of this view assert that stronger, more immediate responses to Russia’s earlier incursions could have deterred future aggression. However, history suggests a more nuanced interpretation, one that aligns well with a framework of command, management, and leadership in addressing different types of problems. Rather than viewing Russian expansionism through a narrow lens of strength and weakness, a more adaptive approach—one informed by the realities of wicked problems—may be necessary.
The conceptual distinction between command, management, and leadership has roots in both military and business traditions. But, its conceptual separation evolved over time through various disciplines, including military strategy, organizational theory, and leadership studies. Command is the oldest of the three, originating in military history. It refers to authority to give orders and enforce obedience. Ancient military theorists like Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and Carl von Clausewitz (On War) emphasized command as the ability to make decisive orders in combat. Leadership in a military context emerged as distinct from command, as effective generals not only commanded but also inspired and led their troops (e.g., Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar). Management in the military developed later with the rise of large bureaucratic armies, particularly in the Napoleonic era and beyond, focusing on logistics, planning, and organization (e.g., Prussian military reforms under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder). The U.S. military and organizations like NATO formalized the distinction between command (authority in structured environments), management (resource allocation and planning), and leadership (inspiring and guiding people).
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