Rupert Schulenburg
The Trump administration, as Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth put it, is ‘prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific’. A factor in this effort is the United States’ regional force posture. The Trump administration inherited an Indo-Pacific posture that was shaped by its predecessor’s efforts to reinforce, reform and redistribute forces to make them more lethal and survivable. The Biden administration pursued a range of initiatives, leading then assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, Ely Ratner, to boast that 2023 was the ‘most transformative year in a generation’ for US force posture.
While progress has been made to bolster US presence, forces in the region still face vulnerabilities. The extent to which the Trump administration will uphold or emulate its predecessor’s posture decisions remains to be seen.
Responding to the threat environment
The continuing modernisation of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) across all domains has altered the military balance and priorities in the region. The PLA is capable of threatening US power-projection infrastructure and capabilities in the region, such as air bases, ports, and carrier strike groups, as well as important enablers like airborne early warning aircraft and aerial tankers. The PLA has enhanced its long-range strike capabilities, with notable increases in the PLA Rocket Force’s inventory of the DF-26 (CH-SS-18) intermediate-range ballistic missile – which can target Guam – and an extension in the engagement range of the PLA Air Force’s J-16 Flanker N aircraft through the PL-17 (CH-AA-12) air-to-air missile.
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