Masayoshi Dobashi and Rena Sasaki
On February 26, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense reported that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fighters and warships had set up a zone 40 miles from the island’s southwestern coast to conduct “live-fire drills” (射击训练) without providing customary notification (Military News Agency, February 26). The following day, a spokesperson for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Ministry of National Defense rebuffed this as “pure hype” (纯属炒作) but did not comment on the substance of Taiwan’s reports (MND, February 27). Part of the reason for the alarm was that it followed on the heels of a live-fire drill conducted by a PLA Navy task force in the Tasman Sea, for which the PLA also did not provide appropriate warning (China Brief, March 11). Both instances were legal under international law but constituted unusual and aggressive actions by the PRC. Military pressure on Taiwan has been acute in recent years. In the last twelve months, the PLA conducted “Joint Sword” exercises in May and October and an unprecedented large-scale winter naval training in December (China Brief, July 26, 2024, November 1, 2024, December 20, 2024). These simulated aspects of a blockade suggest that this could be Beijing’s preferred course of action in an operation against Taiwan.
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