No Substitute for Victory: How to Negotiate from a Position of Strength to End the Russo-Ukraine War

Robert G. Rose 

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When I was in NATO’s headquarters in Kabul, a belief emerged that negotiations with the Taliban would inevitably produce a lasting peace deal. That deal never emerged. The Taliban knew they had the momentum. They had completely undermined the state apparatus in rural Afghanistan. Negotiations just served as a tool for their final victory. We were negotiating from a position of weakness.

As we enter into negotiations to end the Russo-Ukraine War, we need to negotiate from a position of strength. With the appropriate support, Ukraine still has the opportunity to achieve a decisive victory. For too long, Ukraine’s supporters have provided enough for Ukraine to survive but not enough for it to win. As General Douglas MacArthur declared, “War’s very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory.”

Unless Vladimir Putin faces defeat, he will not be pressed into a reasonable peace. Any deal he would accept would serve only as a means for the eventual subjugation of Ukraine. He already violated the Minsk I and II agreements. Just as the Taliban used negotiations to secure their final victory, when Putin decides Russia’s grinding offensive has culminated, he can seek a ceasefire to solidify his lines, obtain sanctions relief, rebuild his forces, and then fabricate an excuse to launch a sequel to his special military operation. To achieve a lasting peace that puts to an end Russia’s attempts at imperial conquest, Putin needs to see that continuing the conflict with Ukraine will exhaust Russia and risk the collapse of his regime.

How Theodore Roosevelt Negotiated an End to Russian Expansion

Over a century ago, an American president successfully negotiated the end of centuries of Russian expansion in Asia. In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt orchestrated the Portsmouth Peace Conference to conclude the Russo-Japanese War.

Russia’s empire building in Asia concerned Roosevelt. In 1900, Russia had seized control of Manchuria. In 1904, at the outbreak of the war, he worried that “Russia’s course over the past three years has made it evident that if she wins she will organize northern China against us.” After Japan’s initial success at the Battle of Mukden in March 1904, Roosevelt wrote that he was “thoroughly . . . pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.”