Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Ukraine’s battlefield transformation shows how fast a military can adapt when it stops trying to predict the future. After less than two years at war, Ukraine ditched a clunky, centrally-planned acquisition system and replaced it with a weapon delivery pipeline driven by real-time operational feedback, commercial partnerships, and direct engagement with frontline operators. The Pentagon should follow suit.
The top-down requirements process Ukraine’s military inherited from Moscow in the 1990s kept headquarters analysts employed but left 87 percent of needs unfulfilled. Today, warfighters get the final say in what gets built. Drones that once relied on GPS and luck now use automated navigation and targeting algorithms to overcome operator error and Russian jamming, raising success rates from 20 percent to 70 percent. The newest generation uses fiber-optic cable for communication to eliminate the threat of electronic interference.
The Pentagon’s approach to weapon development looks more like the one used by Soviet apparatchiks. Requirements officers in the Joint Staff and military services try to guess capability gaps and potential solutions years in advance. By the time these analyses emerge from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) two years later, the threat has changed, technology has marched on, and a different solution is likely needed.
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