Stefanie Kam Li Yee
A man in black pants, a black turtleneck, and a gray blazer stands onstage and gestures with one hand while holding a microphone in another. Company names are displayed English and Chinese text on a large screen behind him; they include OpenAI, ChatGPT, and DeepSeek.Qi Yuan, the director of the Shanghai Academy of AI for Science, speaks during the opening ceremony of the Global Developer Conference in Shanghai on Feb. 22.
As U.S.-China tech competition heats up, Washington is slowly recognizing that gaining a first-mover advantage in critical technologies may be more vital than protecting its existing edges. At present, the U.S. national strategy aims to slow down its competitors and look to the effectiveness of stronger export controls, stricter enforcement, and measures to block strategic transfers to rivals. Yet as supply chains become more diverse and complex, the range of options to evade such sanctions grows—and the role of third-party intermediaries becomes more critical.
Since 2018, under both the Trump and Biden administrations, the United States has imposed sweeping restrictions on China, including Commerce Department “entity list” designations on certain companies (Huawei, SMIC, etc.); semiconductor export controls (announced in October 2022); and bans on some of the advanced chips needed for artificial intelligence technology, such as Nvidia’s A100 and H100 (imposed in October 2023).
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