Indicators an Invasion Is Unlikely in the Short Term
There are several elements of China’s behavior that support our assessment that a Taiwan invasion is unlikely before 2027. These include China’s almost certain continuing preference for “peaceful reunification”, indicators that it very likely continues to pursue a dual-track approach to Taiwan, economic challenges that very likely take priority given China’s other ambitions, shortfalls in PLA capability, and limited indication that China has begun mobilizing its populace to brace for wartime hardship. Additionally, public opinion polling results in Taiwan since 2020 likely suggest to China’s leadership that its coercive strategy is working to deter independence in the short term. In totality, we assess that — absent a specific catalyst that leads to war (such as if Taiwan declares formal independence or China assesses foreign military interference in Taiwan) — the CCP leadership is very likely, in the short term, to remain focused on improving domestic conditions and strengthening preparations for navigating tensions with the US, a potential invasion, or other conflict with a foreign power (for example, over the South China Sea).
No comments:
Post a Comment