Mark B. Schneider
In 2024, Russia published a new version of its nuclear doctrine entitled “Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence.” It was universally recognized that Russia had lowered its nuclear weapons use threshold.[1] This is very significant because even before this new doctrine was made public, Russia already had the lowest threshold for nuclear weapons use in the world.
Some (but not all) of the “new” elements of the 2024 doctrine probably are from the earlier classified versions. A full depiction of Russia’s nuclear doctrine has never been made public. Moreover, statements by Russian officials and generals frequently go beyond the published doctrine, particularly with respect to Russian plans for preemptive or preventive nuclear strikes. For example, in 2009, Lieutenant General Andrey Shvaychenko, then-Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, outlined the role of the nuclear ICBM force in conventional war. He said, “In a conventional war, [the nuclear ICBMs] ensure that the opponent is forced to cease hostilities, on advantageous conditions for Russia, by means of single or multiple preventive strikes against the aggressors’ most important facilities.”[2] In 2014, General of the Army Yuriy Baluyevskiy, former Chief of the Russian General Staff and Deputy Secretary of the Russian National Security Council, stated that “…conditions for pre-emptive nuclear strikes…is contained in classified policy documents.”[3] According to state-run TASS, there are “…completely new updates in the [2024] doctrine, which also has the confidential part where the situations for the use of nuclear weapons are described in detail.”[4]
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