George Friedman
From 1945 until the early 1990s, the global order was based on the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was an order filled with conflict, danger and ideological discord, as all such orders are, but there was at least a system of organization based around the two powers. After the Soviet Union fell, Russia, though intact, was in a state of disarray in no small part because it had lost the satellite states that had insulated it from its enemies in Europe – NATO and the United States. The war in Ukraine was initiated largely to reclaim these buffer states. But it was also undertaken to resurrect the Russian state and rehabilitate it as a global power.
The war has been a failure. Moscow has taken only about 20 percent of Ukrainian territory, thus failing to rebuild a decisive buffer. It has weakened the Russian economy. And it imperiled the regime by sparking unrest and coup attempts, which Moscow successfully suppressed. Russia has done what it does best: It has failed but survived. It must now devise a strategy for the future that is more than just survival.
On Feb. 11, the U.S. and Russia exchanged prisoners after President Vladimir Putin said U.S.-Russia relations were in danger of collapsing. For his part, President Donald Trump said phone calls between them were constant. Rumors of summit planning were in the air and have since been validated by reports that Trump and Putin spoke on the phone, with both agreeing to start negotiations to end the war. (Trump spoke later with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.) This is all a fairly normal negotiation process: One side threatens to leave the table, the other side displays patience, and both sides ultimately reach small agreements. In order to understand the geopolitical meaning of all this, we must consider the positions and strategies of both Russia and the United States in these negotiations.
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