Anthony Davis
In the wake of the fourth anniversary of Myanmar’s military coup, prognostications on the civil war in the year ahead have been notably broader than usual: the State Administration Council (SAC) junta lurches toward inevitable collapse; decisive China intervention rescues the regime and its off-ramp strategy for elections; resistance factions, ethnic and Bamar, sour on each other; and dizzying combinations of all the above.
If then one word encapsulates the war in 2025, it’s “fluidity” – the unpredictability of a precarious balance of mutual weaknesses and antagonisms that offers no room for confident prediction. Save, that is, for the certainty of the country’s accelerating economic decline and humanitarian disaster.
But against this shifting backdrop, two starkly contrasting ground realities stand out. How they interact in the coming months will almost certainly shape the future of the war, potentially decisively and in a manner likely to circumvent Beijing’s efforts to impose a Pax Sinica across Myanmar.
The first and most loudly acclaimed has been the success of ethnic armies – so-called ethnic revolutionary organizations or EROs – in using regular forces and maneuver warfare to largely secure their own homelands.
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