8 February 2025

Israel’s Operational Success and Strategic Shortcomings in the Gaza Strip

Brian Carter

The Israeli campaign into the Gaza Strip was a military success but has fallen short thus far of setting conditions to replace Hamas as a governing entity. The Israeli government enumerated three objectives at the beginning of the war: destroy Hamas’ military, return the hostages, and destroy Hamas’ government.[1] These objectives—though expansive—were achievable through a combination of military and political action. The Israeli campaign succeeded in destroying Hamas’ military and securing a ceasefire that would release the hostages. The campaign has also isolated Hamas in the Gaza Strip, though Israel and its partners will need to ensure that Hamas remains contained. But neither Israel nor the United States has tried seriously to achieve a political end state that would build upon this military success and permanently replace Hamas as a governing entity in the Gaza Strip. Israel’s failure to achieve this final war aim means that the strip will remain without an alternative governance structure and security broker, and Hamas remnants will inevitably try to fill that role again, especially as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraw. Hamas will use this space to reassert its political authority and reconstitute its forces—unless the United States and Israel take further steps to prevent those things from occurring.

The IDF destroyed Hamas’ military through systematic clearing operations and targeted raids. The IDF isolated and then degraded Hamas units until they could not operate without being fully rebuilt, the doctrinal definition for destroying a military force.[3] Hamas could not impede any Israeli operation by late 2024, which demonstrated Hamas’ weakness. The IDF established two operationally significant corridors during its clearance operations that isolated Hamas forces in the north from their counterparts in the south and isolated Hamas from external resupply.[4]

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