Bob Deen, Tim Sweijs, Roman de Baedts & Nora Nijboer
Introduction
Eventually all wars must come to an end – including the war between Russia and Ukraine that began nearly eleven years ago with the Russian annexation of Crimea. President-elect Donald Trump has claimed to ‘end the war in 24 hours’ after his inauguration and his transition team is already floating peace plans, nominating envoys and reaching out to political leaders around the world.1 Despite scepticism about Trump’s ability to deliver a deal at short notice, the clock until January 20 runs out fast. Both Ukrainians and Europeans are apprehensive about the contours of a Trump-brokered deal.2 A quick fix might seem tempting to end the bloodshed, but it could present problems of its own if it is incomplete, ill-conceived or otherwise unpalatable to Ukraine as well as to European allies. It also remains an open question whether Trump can convince a confident Russia to cease hostilities when it has the upper hand on the battlefield and how any deal could be more than merely a temporary armistice.
Regardless, the outcome of a possible ceasefire-agreement will have sizeable implications for the future of European security and prosperity for decades to come.4 Europe needs to be involved if the parties involved reach such an agreement, not in the least because it will have profound repercussions for a post-war security architecture for the continent.5 The European Union as an actor in its own right, as well as European NATO member states need to carve out their own position and objectives – and implement policies to attain these accordingly. This paper serves as input for a discussion on the European position on war termination agreement negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.
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