Seth G. Jones and Seamus P. Daniels
Introduction
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the ongoing war that has followed, have dramatically shifted the strategic landscape in Europe, triggering the most devastating war on the continent since World War II. More Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine than in all previous Soviet and Russian wars since World War II combined, including Russia’s bloody wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya.1 The Ukraine war has caused the most significant refugee crisis in Europe since World War II, driving over 6 million Ukrainian refugees to Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, and other countries.2 The war has also had substantial humanitarian implications, causing widespread civilian deaths and destruction in Ukraine and disrupting public access to water, electricity, heating, health care, and education.3
Despite Russian aggression in Ukraine and increase in gray zone activity across Europe, there has been a robust debate about whether the United States should focus its defense priorities and military posture on the Indo-Pacific to counter China. While the Indo-Pacific is a strategically important region, the United States needs to be prepared to deter two major theater wars—one in Europe and the other in the Indo-Pacific—as well as ensure readiness for contingencies elsewhere, such as in the Middle East and Korean Peninsula. After all, Russia has invaded one country (Ukraine) and waged war in several others, such as Syria. China has not—at least not yet. In its approach to defense planning, the Trump administration should ensure that the allocation of limited forces between the two theaters is tailored to match the unique demands of each region while carefully managing risks and trade-offs.
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