James Micciche, Jahara Matisek
Institutional strategy in a post-information age cannot solely focus on platform development and employment but rather must emphasize ensuring a force has the right connections to operate and rapidly adapt to a flat and transparent operating environment. The three dimensions of interoperability outlined in Allied and Joint doctrine, technical, procedural, and human, provide a framework for force and concept developers to follow ensuring a modern force is connected and adaptable enough to meet the unforeseen demands of tomorrow’s conflicts.
When pressed on force design shortfalls in the first year of the Iraq War, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld infamously quipped, “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” While a wide swath of the American media landscaped disparaged Rumsfeld for the tone and setting of his comment, his logic was not flawed. In fact, the “countless duels” Carl von Clausewitz defined as war, expand far beyond the battlefield and include research and development investments, doctrine and concept development, and choices in force structure all occurring long before hostilities begin. J.F.C. Fueller’s concept of Constant Tactical Factor expands on this idea describing how battlefield advantages derived from industrial and technological innovation are often short lived and cyclical due to adversarial counters and innovation. In the end, Rumsfeld was describing the underlying problem institutional strategy seeks to solve, building a military as close to the army you want, while allowing the flexibility to overcome adversarial counteractions and rapidly changing environments to field the army you need, before the enemy does.
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