Brent A. Lawniczak
To the renowned scholar Thomas Schelling, the central aspect of nuclear deterrence is being believed. It is essential that an adversary believes the threat of force is real and that the threat will be carried out. Schelling makes an extremely important observation that “saying so, unfortunately, does not make it true; and if true, saying so does not always make it believed.”2 Of course, Schelling was talking about the threat of force with the intent to deter, but the statement may be applied to the use of the narrative form of communication across the competition continuum in terms of information being believed by various target audiences. A narrative does not merely convey truths. One may have a truthful narrative that is not persuasive. One need only examine current political rifts to ascertain that truth does not always prevail. While the joint force must always be truthful, the truth must also be put forward in a manner that increases its persuasiveness.
This article briefly defines the narrative form of communication; highlights the influence of narratives in military operations; provides and describes 10 variables that contribute to the persuasiveness of narratives; and concludes with several recommendations for the joint force to improve the persuasiveness of its narratives.
Defining the Narrative Form of Communication
Joint doctrine simply defines narrative as “a short story used to underpin operations and to provide greater understanding and context to an operation or situation.”4 Narratives create meaning and affect perceptions and subsequent actions. Joint doctrine also states that the “narrative can be thought of as a unifying story that acts as an information control measure to avoid conflicting messages and promote unity of effort.”
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