Nour Eid
Saudi Arabia's first nuclear research reactor (center) in King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology in the outskirts of Riyadh is nearing completion but has yet to be started. In September 2024, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al-Saud announced the kingdom would sign the full Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Small Quantities Protocol—the most basic safeguards agreements the International Atomic Energy Agency has been asking for years. However, the kingdom continues to refuse to sign the Additional Protocol, which would allow the agency to conduct a more thorough oversight.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House could mean the end of the nonproliferation regime: As the Iranian-Israeli confrontation intensifies, and the threat of an Iranian nuclear breakout looms, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could see in a second Trump administration an opportunity to finally get the nuclear cooperation the Saudis have been yearning for.
Riyadh has been very clear on the kind of nuclear partnership it expects, and it is no secret that its favored option is cooperation with South Korea, similar under a 123 agreement (a nuclear cooperation document that establishes the legal basis and prerequisites for nuclear deals with the United States) allowing it to enrich uranium domestically. The problem, however, lies in the last bit of the sentence. The United States currently insists on an agreement that requires the Saudis forgo enrichment and reprocessing capabilities—two pathways to building a bomb. The reelection of Trump might be the Saudis’ chance to tip the balance in their favor.
Saudi Arabia’s nuclear rationale. Many reasons explain the kingdom’s desire to develop its nuclear know-how.
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