Jacob R. Bright
Since its publication in 1832, Carl von Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege (On War) has been an academic pillar for Western military strategists, influencing military doctrine and shaping the debate on power relationships. Clausewitz, a Prussian military officer, fought against the French during the Napoleonic Wars and participated in the Waterloo campaign, which culminated in the surrender of Napoleon Bonaparte. His firsthand experience in these battles provided him with valuable insights into the nature and character of war. In addition to his combat experience, Clausewitz spent considerable time in staff roles within the Prussian Army, affording him the intellectual space to examine the complexities of conflict.[i] This unique blend of theoretical investigation and battlefield experience lends authenticity to “On War,” solidifying its high status in the intellectual study of military theory and making it a seminal text that continues to be studied and debated.
Central to Clausewitz’s theory is the argument that defensive operations hold an inherent advantage over offensive operations[ii]— a proclamation this article argues resonates in contemporary armed conflicts. The aim is to confirm the credibility of Clausewitz’s assertion by examining its relevance through four core tenets of warfare that undergird his philosophy: resource supply, psychological influence, public support, and fortifications. This article first discusses Clausewitzian theory in relation to defensive operations, a brief history of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and then considers the strategic implications of the culminating point of the attack. The bulk of this article’s analysis defines each tenet according to Clausewitz’s writings, then describes how these four tenets provide defensive advantages to both Ukrainians and Russians amid the ongoing conflict. [iii] The aim of this article is to affirm Clausewitz’s assertion that “defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.”[iv]
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