Andrei Kolesnikov
Three years after launching his “special military operation” in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin faces a looming choice. In public, he exudes optimism. He has pulled his country back from the abyss and, with military means, defended its sovereignty, or rather what he calls sovereignty. Had he not done so, he asserts, Russia would have ceased to exist. Meanwhile, Russia’s GDP is growing—it increased by around four percent in 2024, according to official figures—and wages are not only rising but also apparently keeping up with prices despite an annual inflation rate now running at more than nine percent. Behind this façade, the military budget has doubled in three years and growth is overwhelmingly being driven by the military economy; the consumer sector, where inflation is even higher, is stagnant.
Yet so far it all seems tolerable to ordinary Russians. The Kremlin has gained further control over society, even as it allows several aspects of private life to continue undisturbed. And the war, although its costs keep going up, is apparently going Russia’s way: by Putin’s telling, Russian forces “liberated” at least 189 settlements in Ukraine in 2024, and Western air defenses have no chance against Russia’s newest missile. The population shows signs of war fatigue, but in general all the happy reports of military successes are taken for granted: according to survey data from the independent Levada Center, performative or genuine support for the special operation has plateaued at around 75 percent of the population, including 45 percent who say they are definitely in favor of military action and 30 percent somewhat in favor. (Although more than a third of Russians also say that the return to the White House of Donald Trump, who has vowed to quickly end the war, might be good for Russia, even more think it will make no difference.)
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