Delaney Soliday and Shivane Anand
The sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024 has led many to focus on Russia, and its inability or unwillingness to prioritize Syria due to the conflict in Ukraine. But focusing too much on Russia understates the role that Iran, and more specifically Tehran’s proxies, played in propping up Assad. After all, Russia has been at war for almost three years, but it was only when Hezbollah was preoccupied with its war against Israel and Iran was no longer willing to spare resources to prop up the failing dictator that Assad’s regime finally crumbled.
Under the proposed “comprehensive strategic partnership” between Moscow and Tehran, we are likely to see the Iran-Russia relationship strengthen over time, not just on a conventional level but in terms of Moscow’s support for Iran’s proxy forces. A renegotiated defense treaty is likely to result in Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias playing a more outsized role in the Iran-Russia relationship.
With a renewed “all-encompassing” Iran-Russia defense agreement, Iran is likely to budget more funds for its overseas proxies and increase weapons shipments, creating new opportunities for Russia to tap sources of black-market weapons and skirt sanctions. Russia has started doing this already on a small scale; in March and April 2022, Iran-backed Hashd al-Sha’bi militants shipped Iranian rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-tank missiles, and Brazilian Astros II rocket launchers to Russia by sea, which were later used in Ukraine.
No comments:
Post a Comment