Dhruv Gadhavi
Contributing significantly to the literature focusing on the functioning of intelligence outside the Anglosphere and shedding light on the ‘missing dimension’ of the Cold War as it had played out in the Indian subcontinent, Paul M. McGarr’s new book is solidly grounded in primary resources from archives in the United States, United Kingdom and India. An experienced intelligence historian, McGarr traces the characters, events, institutions, policies, publications as well as the perceptions spread across continents, which shaped the contours of covert intervention by British and American intelligence and security agencies, in the face of looming shades of red (Soviet and Indian communism), and the covert cooperation with Indian agencies. At a time when there is domestic scrutiny and global curiosity regarding Indian intelligence agencies, this book essentially explores the historical experiences in their own sovereign territory with British and American intelligence and security agencies as well as its lasting influence.
The core argument which cuts through McGarr’s book is that the interventions undertaken during the Cold War by the British and American intelligence and security agencies in India proved to be ‘misguided’ and ‘largely self-defeating’ (p.3). This argument is situated in the context, and McGarr’s question: why do South Asians associate intelligence with covert action, grand conspiracy and justifications for repression, as opposed to the Western notions about surveillance? While the first half of the book reflects how such associations and notions were the making of the activities of foreign intelligence agencies, the latter half of the book highlights how such notions were reinforced by Indian politicians for electoral gains. It is towards the conclusion that one would realise that the chapterization of the book follows not just a sequential timeline but also a consequential one. Even today, the effects of using the preserved mystique and the secrecy hold much sway in the domestic political discourse. Those currently amused by allegations of the ‘malevolent foreign hand’ meddling in domestic politics would find it interesting to note that such smearing dates back to the Nehruvian era and has endured through a number of succeeding governments. Similar nuances situate the book in a welcome shift from the conventional East-West binary of Cold War intelligence studies and offer a fresh North-South perspective.
No comments:
Post a Comment