Joseph Roger Clark
Colin Gray, the late scholar of strategy, was correct — politics is master. War is a political event. Although this observation is most often attributed to Carl von Clausewitz, it can be traced back to Cicero. It can also be found in the military texts of ancient China.[i] Nonetheless, the political dynamics of war often fail to be fully appreciated by military strategy. This condition helps explain a recent inability on the part of nations to wield military force to secure their political objectives. It suggests a need for military strategy predicated on a more nuanced understanding of the political dynamics of war.
War is a simultaneous collection of political and military events. The political milieu that catalyzes war shapes the belligerents’ strategic centers of gravity and forges the strategic logic of the war. However, the political dynamics responsible for war continue after the exchange of fire. Military events and their interpretation continue to affect political dynamics, which in turn affects military efficacy. Military strategy must appreciate — and be responsive to — these recursive relationships. The consideration of political dynamics cannot be cleaved from military strategy without placing the objective of the war in serious jeopardy.
This article posits the following argument: military strategies must fully appreciate the political dynamics of war. To be clear, political dynamics are not synonymous with political conditions. It would be difficult to find practitioners or scholars arguing that military strategy need not consider the political context. It would be equally difficult to find examples of military strategy devoid of political considerations. Yet, what is often missing is consideration of the evolving recursive relationships — the political dynamics — that exist between the political and military aspects of war.
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