Cheng-kun Ma & K. Tristan Tang
Incursions by military aircraft from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) reached unprecedented levels in 2024. Beyond measuring the total number of sorties, the frequency of these incursions and the circumstances surrounding specific missions are also important for assessing the characteristics and implications of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft activities targeting Taiwan. This article utilizes publicly available data on PLA aircraft operations released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense.
In 2024, the overall number of sorties and days on which incursions took place continued to rise. However, the percentage of sorties crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait and the frequency of peak incursion periods were not markedly higher than those in 2023. This suggests two things. First, the operational capacity of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command Air Force, which is mainly focused on Taiwan, may have reached its limits; and second, the intensified incursions against Taiwan were conducted not solely to target President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) but also to increase the intensity of trainings.
Incursions by Chinese Military Aircraft
We use three indicators to analyze the incursions: the frequency of crossings over the Taiwan Strait median line, the number of sorties crossing the median line as a percentage of the total, and the number of peak incursion periods.
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