14 January 2025

HOW TO TRANSFORM THE ARMY FOR DRONE WARFARE

Neil Hollenbeck 

That the U.S. Army needs to adapt to drone warfare is obvious. The best institutional mechanism to do that is not.

Since 2022, Ukraine has led the world in the integration of aerial drones into large-scale ground combat operations. Unfortunately, Russia has been a fast follower. Both armies are using drones within traditional infantry, tank, and artillery formations, while also creating new drone warfare organizations. That the U.S. Army needs to adapt to drone warfare is obvious. The best institutional mechanism to do that is not. But there are some in Congress who are ready to make the decision for the Army now.

U.S. House Resolution 8070, passed in June 2024, included a provision establishing a Drone Corps as a basic branch of the U.S. Army. Chief of Staff of the Army General Randy George expressed opposition, arguing drones should be integrated into existing formations, not consolidated in a separate branch. The provision was not included in the final version of the bill.

How to organize the Army for adaptation to drone warfare could be the most important decision Army senior leaders make in the next few years. There are two ways to get it wrong. One would be to treat drones as an entirely new arm, to be developed and employed independently. The other would be to treat drones as tools to help other arms do what they already do better. With the airplane and the tank—the most disruptive weapons that were maturing during this same decade in the last century—the Army got it wrong in both ways.

The U.S. Army purchased the world’s first military aircraft in 1909. By the 1920s, the Army had established aviation as a separate arm, which, with strong congressional support, grew increasingly independent. As a result, air capabilities developed quickly, according to entirely new warfighting concepts. But airpower became unmoored from land power, if not from reality. Army aviators came to view airplanes as war-winners in their own right. That vision was never realized, and poor air-ground integration plagued the Army throughout World War II.

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