‘First, we will defend the homeland’: The case for homeland missile defense

Robert Soofer with contributions from Kari Anderson, James McCue, Tom Karako, Mark J. Massa, Alyxandra Marine, and Jonathan Rosenstein

Source LInk

Threats and challenges

First, the expansion of North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal will likely drive an increase in the number of deployed US Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) as the United States tries to stay ahead of the threat. The Biden administration’s intent to increase the number of GBIs by twenty starting in 2028 will spark a debate about whether US homeland missile defenses could upset strategic stability with Russia and China as these countries grow concerned about rising levels of US homeland missile protection, albeit intended against North Korea. Some analysts judge that the United States can rely on nuclear deterrence against North Korea, arguing that staying ahead of the North Korean threat is unaffordable—and will upset strategic stability with Russia and China.3 Other analysts find that reducing US vulnerability to rogue nation missile threats is essential for a US grand strategy reliant on allies.4 Allies might perceive a United States unwilling to protect itself against North Korea as unwilling to take risks on their behalf.