Natalia Kearney Fang
Since November 2023, ships crossing the Red Sea have found themselves at risk of attacks from Iran-backed Houthi militants, attacks made in retaliation for Israel’s ongoing war against Hamas (Cooban, 2024, para. 2). The Houthis, Shia rebels who have fought Yemen’s government for almost two decades, are supposedly part of Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel and the US (Hall, 2024, para. 4-5). This conflict has been considerably disruptive towards world trade. The Suez Canal, connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, accounts for 10-15% of world trade and 30% of global container shipping volumes (Cooban, 2024, para. 5). In response, on January 11, US and UK forces launched airstrikes against dozens of targets across Yemen (Hall, 2024, para. 1). While the conflict has brought the US and many of its allies into the conflict, there is another major regional player whose attitude and actions (or lack thereof) should be considered: the People’s Republic of China.
In this brief article, I seek to explain Chinese foreign policy regarding the Red Sea crisis. I will do so by taking a dual-prong approach: First, I will establish a baseline based on neoclassical realism and role theory; secondly, this analysis is expanded upon with more precise tools, namely the rational actor model, poliheuristic theory, Xi Jinping’s operational code, and public opinion. Finally, using these theories, I will evaluate three foreign policy options for China. I ultimately conclude that China has chosen inaction because it maximises its opportunity to criticise the US, while the PRC also lacks any better alternative course of action.
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