Nathan D. Levy
Across the US joint force’s global footprint, terms like “interoperability” and “build interior lines” are commonly heard. In Army service component commands and geographic combatant commands, these terms burst forth as clarion calls, concise expressions of what US forces must achieve in their areas of responsibility. After a tactical-level unit completes a task, commanders often state that they’ve built interior lines and developed interoperability with partnered nation X. Yet, in many cases, there is no metric by which to measure progress or success. Interoperability is not an end-state, but rather a means to an end. Operations that aim to improve interoperability should not do so with that as their final objective; they must also assist us in understanding posture requirements and, subsequently, help set priorities for infrastructure investments.
Too often, the US military—across all services—participate in combined (nation-to-nation) exercises with our partners, yet fail to extract the maximum value. The cycle is familiar: we conduct the exercise, exchange high-fives, swap patches, and depart. We do not maintain enduring relationships. The communication network built for each event is temporary, often leaving the partner nation without access to key information afterward. This often makes US presence a requirement for success in the exercise. We aren’t meeting our partners where they are, asking what they need, or working collaboratively to build lasting interoperability or interior lines. An annual exercise simply doesn’t achieve lasting impact. In many countries, there must be more continuous investment between exercises that helps inform our posture initiatives and prioritize infrastructure development.
No comments:
Post a Comment