Indian Strategic Studies: 2025

3 December 2025

The Great Energy Transformation in China

Ligang Song, Yixiao Zhou

In 2020, China started the drive to commence a reduction in carbon emissions by 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060, setting in motion a transition to a green, sustainable and clean economy. China has ambitiously developed clean energy alternatives to coal. This transformation encompasses multifaceted strategies ranging from investment in renewable energy and the development of low-emission technologies to more stringent policy regulations on emissions. Renewable energy sources like hydroelectric power, wind, solar and biomass have received substantial attention and investment, with China emerging as a global leader in renewable energy capacity.

In the technology space, China’s transitioning to electric vehicles (EVs) has catalysed the development of a robust EV market, fostering innovation in battery technology and charging infrastructure. China has now become the largest exporter of EVs in the world market. These developments have the potential to materially help curb the world’s carbon footprint and mitigate environmental degradation.

Don't Fight the Whites

Anushka Saxena

Source Link

The State Council has unveiled a new White Paper on China’s vision for arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and global security as a whole. I have taken to a broad translation into English for the brief breakdown that follows.

To start off, there are new and interesting articulations of China’s views and perspectives on the world today. In the past, Chinese documents have often argued that the world is undergoing “profound changes unseen in a century.” That is missing from this White Paper. The change in said view and perception is now being articulated as:

Two things are essential to note here: a) that China unequivocally advocates for a multilateral world order, and b) it believes itself to be a power nearing equivalence with the US, and would very much so like to be one of the powers in pole position (metaphorically, and also literally, if you’re an F1 fan!).

In that sense, China obviously sees itself as playing a central role in the new world order being constructed, moving from being a mere “participant” in international arms control to a would-be “architect” of new global norms. For this reason, one can concur that the central thesis of the White Paper is as follows: The current international order is being eroded by “hegemonism” (by the US) and “small yards with high fences” (i.e. technological containment and self-reliance). China hence proposes an alternative order based on the “Global Security Initiative” (GSI) and a “Community of Shared Future,” framing access to technology as a “development right” that supersedes Western non-proliferation concerns.

A Fresh Chinese JF-17 Fighter Jet Export Deal, Signed In The Desert Heat

Guy D. McCardle

China’s bargain bin JF-17 is less about dogfights than deals, binding cash strapped air forces to Beijing with cut rate firepower, easy credit, and long term political leverage.A Pakistan Air Force JF-17 Thunder cuts across clear blue sky, the export fighter at the center of Islamabad and Beijing’s growing global pitch. Image Credit: Simple Flying

In Dubai this month, while India’s Tejas fighter cartwheeled into the sand in front of cameras and would-be buyers, Pakistan quietly walked into the chalet row and walked out with a new export memorandum of understanding for the JF-17 Block III fighter jet. The announcement came from Islamabad’s Inter-Services Public Relations and named the customer only as a “friendly nation,” but it marks the latest win for a jet China helped design, build, and market as an export workhorse for the developing world.

The numbers from earlier this year show why that matters. Azerbaijan has already signed a contract for 40 JF-17 Block III fighters at around 4.6 billion dollars, tied to a broader package worth billions more, making Baku the largest foreign operator and giving Pakistan its biggest defense export in history. Iraq has inked its own deal for a dozen aircraft, while Myanmar and Nigeria formed the first export club for the type.

Has China’s Power Peaked in Asia?

Bilahari Kausikan

By virtue of its size, contiguity, economic weight, and crucial role in the world economy, China will always enjoy considerable influence in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. But for those same reasons, China will also always arouse anxieties in Asia and indeed the world. Deng Xiaoping’s approach of hiding China’s power and biding time stems from his awareness of this paradox. Big countries need to reassure small countries on their periphery. Deng recognized this and acted on it.

But by the end of the Hu Jintao era, Deng’s wisdom was either forgotten or ignored, perhaps because Beijing over-read the implications of the 2008 global financial crisis and, just as the United States had over-read the end of the Cold War, invested it with a universal significance as heralding Karl Marx’s long-predicted decline and eventual collapse of the West, specifically the United States.

What is Hezbollah and why has it been fighting Israel in Lebanon?

Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim political and military group in Lebanon which has been involved in a series of violent conflicts with Israel.

It has strong backing from Iran and opposes Israel's right to exist. The group is considered a terrorist organisation by Israel and many other nations, including the UK and US.

The latest Hezbollah-Israel conflict erupted in October 2023, when Hezbollah began firing rockets over the frontier after the start of the Gaza war, in solidarity with its ally Hamas. Israel responded with strikes.

The conflict escalated further in September 2024, when Israel said it wanted tens of thousands of people forced from their homes by Hezbollah rocket attacks to be able to safely return. It began a campaign of wide-ranging air strikes against Hezbollah, followed by a ground invasion of southern Lebanon.

Criminal Drone Evolution: Cartel Weaponization of Aerial IEDs

Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Editors

This Small Wars Journal-El Centro Anthology contains a preface on criminal drone use by journalist David Hambling followed by a foreword describing drones within criminal orders-of battle (OOB) by Lisa J. Campbell. After and introduction by the editors , the text contains 22 chapters documenting the evolution of drone use in Mexico’s competitive narco-conflict ecology. It closes with a conclusion by the editors, an afterword by Conrad ‘Andy’ Dreby and Scott Crino on UAS potentials, a postscript by James T. Torrance on future unmanned systems threats, and five appendices.

Criminal Drone Evolution is the companion to the earlier curated collection Illicit Tactical Progress: Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes 2013-2020 , also edited by SWJ-El Centro Senior Fellows Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan. Together these two works provide valuable insight into the development of criminal armed groups and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) they employ.

How Trump's 28-point plan for Ukraine shocked the world

Barak Ravid,

President Volodymyr Zelensky listened on speakerphone one week ago as President Trump's advisers Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner read, line by line, from a 28-point plan to end the war in Ukraine.

Why it matters: The existence of the plan would emerge two days later on Axios. By Friday, Zelensky was warning the Ukrainian people that Trump's plan — and the pressure he faced to sign it — had plunged Ukraine into one of the most difficult moments of its existence.

Zelensky's participation by phone in the meeting last weekend between his national security adviser, Rustem Umerov, and Trump's team has not previously been reported, and offers more clarity on when he was brought into the talks.

The process that led to that dramatic meeting, and to the 28-point plan, began around a month earlier on a flight back to Miami from the Middle East.

This account is based on interviews with six U.S. officials, two Ukrainian officials and another source with knowledge, most of whom were directly involved in talks on the plan.

Deeper, Strategic Collaboration in the Securities Sector

Sonia Khosa

In an era of globalised finance and increasing cross-border activity, regulatory cooperation has become essential for market integrity and development. This book examines the potential for strategic collaboration between India and Australia in the securities sector—two nations with distinct but complementary economic and legal frameworks. Through a comparative analysis of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), it evaluates alignment with International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) principles, focusing on supervisory powers, enforcement mechanisms and compliance effectiveness. The analysis identifies shared regulatory goals and governance principles, highlighting opportunities for bilateral cooperation.

Offering a roadmap for capital market integration and regulatory innovation, the book makes a timely contribution to international financial scholarship. It delivers practical insights for policymakers, legal scholars and regulators interested in forging resilient cross-border partnerships—both within the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

I Went to an Anti-Vaccine Conference. Medicine Is in Trouble.

Rachael Bedard

Peter Hildebrand choked back tears as he told the crowd about his daughter, Daisy. She was 8 years old when she died in April, one of the two unvaccinated children lost in the measles outbreak that tore through West Texas. “She was very loving,” he told the audience.

It was Day 2 of the annual conference of Children’s Health Defense, the organization of vaccine critics previously led by Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who is now the U.S. health secretary. Mr. Hildebrand had been asked to speak on a panel titled “Breaking the Mainstream Media Measles Narrative” at the conference, which brought 1,000 people to an event center in Austin, Texas, this month.

Mr. Hildebrand spoke about mistrusting Daisy’s hospital doctor, who he said talked to his wife about measles when he was out of the room. “You know, just whenever I wasn’t around, he would sit there and be political about it,” Mr. Hildebrand said.

Shorter Days, Signs of Fatigue: Trump Faces Realities of Aging in Office

Katie Rogers and Dylan Freedman

Katie Rogers is a White House correspondent who has covered both of President Trump’s terms. Dylan Freedman analyzed Mr. Trump’s public schedules and social media posts.Nov. 25, 2025

The day before Halloween, President Trump landed at Joint Base Andrews after spending nearly a week in Japan and South Korea. He was then whisked to the White House, where he passed out candy to trick-or-treaters. Allies crowed over the president’s stamina: “This man has been nonstop for DAYS!” one wrote online.

A week later, Mr. Trump appeared to doze off during an event in the Oval Office.

With headline-grabbing posts on social media, combative interactions with reporters and speeches full of partisan red meat, Mr. Trump can project round-the-clock energy, virility and physical stamina. Now at the end of his eighth decade, Mr. Trump and the people around him still talk about him as if he is the Energizer Bunny of presidential politics.

The reality is more complicated: Mr. Trump, 79, is the oldest person to be elected to the presidency, and he is aging. To pre-empt any criticism about his age, he often compares himself to President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who at 82 was the oldest person to hold the office, and whose aides took measures to shield his growing frailty from the public, including by tightly managing his appearances.

From Kabul to Kyiv, Trump’s

Mick Ryan

The past week’s events surrounding the new Russian-American plan to end the war in Ukraine provide an opportunity for America’s friends, allies and adversaries to reflect and learn about how much the US view of its role in the world has changed. The dedication of previous American administrations to preserving a world where the strong did not prey on the weak, and where changing borders by force was deterred by democracies with the Leader of the Free World at the forefront, is in its twilight.

During the first Trump administration, the United States conducted secret talks with the Taliban to end the Afghanistan war. The deal was negotiated without input from the Afghan government at the time. The final deal, known as the Doha Accord, had its ultimate manifestation in the humiliating, chaotic and tragic evacuation of troops and civilians in late August 2021. While blame was laid at the feet of the Biden administration, the foundations were cast by Trump.

Now, with the Russian-American 28-point peace plan for Ukraine, there is a similar demonstration of perfidious behaviour by Trump’s representatives to secretly negotiate a war termination deal with an enemy behind the backs of friends and allies. The demonstrated behaviour of Trump in two different administrations towards two different wars provides insights into how the Trump administration thinks about its relationships with foreign nations.

No, Germany is not getting the Bomb. Why should it?

Philipp Rombach

A quarter century ago, German political scientist Harald Müller observed that “the very basic question of whether … Germany should rethink its renunciation of nuclear weapons has a very odd circumstance [attached] to it, namely that it tends to be posed mostly outside Germany and almost never within the German debate.”

Germany hasn’t had an indigenous nuclear weapons program since 1945. In Berlin, nobody is asking for a German bomb. Not the government, not the public. Still, the idea of an independent German nuclear weapons program refuses to die in US policy circles. In recent months, scholars and analysts have warned that Germany was “now thinking about acquiring” nuclear weapons and that “states such as Germany and Finland” were discreetly debating the need for their own nuclear weapons. A common feature of this narrative is that countries like Japan, South Korea, and Germany are lumped in with a revisionist Iran. The total plausibility of Germany pursuing a domestic nuclear weapons program—no questions asked!—has made it into closed high-level policy workshops and was even recently advocated for in Foreign Affairs.

A.I. and the Trillion-Dollar Question

Katrin Bennhold

An A.I. boom or bubble?

In 2014, I read “The Second Machine Age,” a book by two M.I.T. economists. The authors offered a sort of utopian vision of A.I.: The technology would lead to an age of hyper-productivity and plenty, where the only question was how to distribute its gains fairly.

We could still get there, but it seems fair to say the road to utopia, if that is our destination, won’t be smooth. Current anxieties around whether A.I. has become too dominant in the global economy — what happens if it’s not all it’s cracked up to be? — sit alongside competing ones: What happens if A.I. is all it’s cracked up to be, and can replace all those humans after all? Would that really be a good outcome?

I spoke to my colleague Cade Metz, who writes about artificial intelligence. He told me every technological revolution has created anxiety during the transition from the old to the new, when jobs are destroyed, money is lost and companies go bust. The question is what emerges on the other side.

France Creates Voluntary Military Service as Europe Faces Russian Threat

Ségolène Le Stradic

France on Thursday announced the creation of a paid, voluntary military service for young adults, becoming the latest European country to beef up its armed forces in the face of perceived threats from Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The move sharpened a growing debate in France, which has enjoyed decades of stability since the end of World War II, about how to prepare a population no longer accustomed to war for a new era of increased military peril.

The announcement by France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, came days after the French Army chief set off a national uproar for saying that the country must accept the possible loss of its children in a potential future conflict.

Japan's high-stakes gamble to turn island of flowers into global chip hub

Suranjana Tewari

The island of Hokkaido has long been an agricultural powerhouse – now Japan is investing billions to turn it into a global hub for advanced semiconductors.

More than half of Japan's dairy produce comes from Hokkaido, the northernmost of its main islands. In winter, it's a wonderland of ski resorts and ice-sculpture festivals; in summer, fields bloom with bands of lavender, poppies and sunflowers.

These days, cranes are popping up across the island – building factories, research centres and universities focused on technology. It's part of Japan's boldest industrial push in a generation: an attempt to reboot the country's chip-making capabilities and reshape its economic future.

Locals say that beyond the cattle and tourism, Hokkaido has long lacked other industries. There's even a saying that those who go there do so only to leave.

But if the government succeeds in turning Hokkaido into Japan's answer to Silicon Valley - or "Hokkaido Valley", as some have begun to call it - the country could become a new contender in the $600bn (£458bn) race to supply the world's computer chips.

In Ukraine's 'kill-zone', robots are a lifeline to troops trapped on perilous eastern front

Abdujalil AbdurasulovIn

In the dead of night, he and his partner move quickly to roll out their cargo from a van. Speed is crucial as they are within the range of deadly Russian drones. The fifth brigade's new "toy" is an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), a robot that provides a lifeline for Ukrainian troops at the front in Pokrovsk and Myrnograd, a strategic hub in eastern Ukraine.

Russian forces are relentlessly trying to cut off Ukraine's supply routes in the area. Without fresh food and ammunition, Ukraine's frontline soldiers would face a choice of either surrender or a costly retreat. Kyiv has sent special forces, elite assault units and drone groups to reinforce its troops in and around Pokrovsk, but Russia's grip on routes into the city means going in with armoured vehicles would bring almost certain death. Transporting heavy supplies on foot would be just as dangerous. This is where the robot, also known as a land drone, comes in place of traditional troop deployments.

America’s Multi- Domain Operations at 250: A Strategy, Concept or Mirage?

Ms Khyati Singh

The United States (US)Army marks its 250th year in 2025, and places Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as the vision for warfighting in the future. Despite this, MDO remains more of a concept than a concrete strategy, filled with aspirations but enmeshed with institutional constraints and the abstraction of doctrines. Hence, unless the Military grounds MDO in strategic clarity, joint operational design, and realistic resources, it risks repeating the mistakes of earlier doctrinal overreaches that weighed form over function.

General Mark Milley heralded the US Army’s conceptual pivot toward the MDO with his remarks that the future conflict will be “fundamentally different” because of the convergence of informational, cognitive, and physical domains.[1] The doctrine of MDO was officially codified in the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s documents in 2018, and aims to address the loopholes in the existing legacy concepts like Air-Land Battle and the counterinsurgency-centric doctrine.[2] With the Army celebrating its 250th anniversary, MDO reflects a mix of strategic anxiety and institutional ambition, namely the hope of remaining relevant in an era of great power competition, hybrid threats, and technological upheaval. However, despite its elaborate, conceptual promise, it falls short of structural and operational merit, raising speculations about its viability.

America’s Quasi Alliances

Rebecca Lissner

During his successful 2024 U.S. presidential campaign, Donald Trump assured voters that he would end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, perhaps even before taking office. But both conflicts dragged on at great human cost, and diplomacy proceeded only in fits and starts. Nine months into his presidency, Trump finally brokered a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas—but only after presiding over the breakdown of the truce he inherited from President Joe Biden and an escalating humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The war in Ukraine, meanwhile, continues unabated.

A Grand Bargain With Venezuela

Francisco Rodríguez

President Donald Trump, it seems, has it out for Venezuela. Over the summer, his administration began massing naval power in the Caribbean, largely near the country’s coast, and striking ships soon after they exit its territorial waters. In October, he authorized the CIA to carry out operations within Venezuela’s borders. And Trump has repeatedly railed against President Nicolás Maduro, accusing him of emptying Venezuelan prisons into the United States and saying that his days in office are numbered. This week, Washington moved an aircraft carrier group to the Caribbean, and Trump was briefed on possible military options,

Things were already grim for US farmers, then China tensions worsened – again

Khushboo Razdan

Randal Shelby planned carefully and waited years to ditch a career spent in hospitals and medical centres to chase a dream in which he traded antiseptic hallways full of sick patients for the great outdoors.

His new life started six years ago, after he secured about US$1.3 million in financing for a Case combine and other equipment, fertilisers, seed and labour needed to produce soybeans and rice, staples that enjoyed strong demand overseas, primarily from China.

High fuel costs, rising interest rates, falling crop prices and depressed Chinese demand amid geopolitical tensions had already eroded farm profits during the previous Joe Biden administration.

Then came a seismic shift in US politics that brought a tariff-loving president back to the White House, further rattling an industry still struggling to recover from market convulsions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the surge in fertiliser prices triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Today, Shelby faces the possibility of returning to a life he thought he had left behind, just to make ends meet.

Drone Warfare in Ukraine: The Interplay of High- and Low-Tech Solutions

Olena Kryzhanivska

Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the role of unmanned systems in land, air, and naval operations has grown significantly. While drones have not yet produced a decisive military breakthrough—such as the achievement of a war aim or outright victory by either side—they have been essential to Ukraine’s primary objective of national survival. At the same time, they have become a force multiplier on the battlefield, substituting for such traditional capabilities as artillery and reducing the direct exposure of soldiers to frontline combat.

The use of unmanned systems made the frontline deadlier. It has expanded the kill zone along the frontline to 20 km, with both sides now specifically targeting drone teams of the enemy.

Despite expectations that drone warfare would quickly progress toward more advanced solutions, increasingly integrating technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), developments in both Russia and Ukraine demonstrate that this transition has been slower than anticipated. While several innovations have emerged in both countries, as of summer 2025, neither has achieved mass production of such advanced systems.

Winning the Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike Fight: Lessons from Centaur Squadron

George Pavlakis and Randall Towles

Picture kilometer-long columns of destroyed tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Drones fly overhead while electromagnetic sensors silently parse through frantic radio transmissions. Thousands of soldiers are massed for an attack, only to stall under pummeling indirect fires. This scene could easily describe contemporary combat as warfare’s changing character makes reconnaissance and strike platforms available to any potential US adversary. But rather than an anecdote from a distant conflict, this scenario is what the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment “Blackhorse”—the National Training Center’s (NTC) resident opposing force unit—has begun to inflict on rotational training units (RTUs). At NTC, the realities of reconnaissance-strike battle are painfully present, posing a challenge for RTUs that can prepare them to face the real threat on future battlefields.

Centaur Squadron, Blackhorse’s purpose-built reconnaissance-strike complex, organically combines wheeled antitank and armored transport vehicles, scouts, unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operators, and electronic warfare (EW) assets. These platforms offer a combination of high tactical mobility, long-range observation, and dense firepower that feeds directly into the regimental targeting and integration cell to complete the kill chain. Centaur can also expand depending on mission variables to include light infantry, mortar carriers, and engineers.

Iskander: An Improved Russian Missile Tests Ukraine’s Air Defence

Sam Cranny-Evans and Dr Sidharth Kaushal

Recently, there have been a series of reports that Ukraine’s ability to intercept the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missile with Patriot interceptors is deteriorating. Given the sensitivities around the subject, precise reasons have not been provided although several reports have alluded to software upgrades which have allowed the Iskander to manoeuvre more effectively in its terminal phase, thus evading Patriot interceptors. This article seeks to evaluate the plausibility of both this and other competing hypotheses regarding the seeming increase in the performance of the 9M723. It does not provide conclusive answers but rather an assessment of the relative weight which researchers might attach to competing explanations.

It is worth beginning by noting that one should be cautious in interpreting data regarding intercept rates. The use of percentages predisposes readers to assume that there is, all other things being equal, a given likelihood of any missile being intercepted by a particular defensive system. In reality the data is marked by discontinuities and largely driven by specific high impact events.

There Is Only One AI Company. Welcome to the Blob

Seven levy

It all began, as many things do, with Elon Musk. In the early 2010s he realized that AI was on a track to become perhaps the most powerful technology of all time. But he had deep suspicion that if it were to fall under the control of powerful profit-driven forces, humanity would suffer. Musk had been an early investor in DeepMind, the UK-based lab that was ahead of the pack in pursuing artificial general intelligence. After Google bought DeepMind in 2014, Musk cut ties with the research organization. He felt it was essential to create a counterforce incentivized by human benefit, not profits. So he helped create OpenAI. When I interviewed Musk and Sam Altman at the company’s unveiling in 2015, they were adamant that shareholder profit would not be a factor in their decisions.

Do anti-personnel mines still have military utility in modern warfare?

Erik Tollefsen

Five States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention have recently submitted instruments of withdrawal, citing national security and military necessity, while at least one other has taken steps to “suspend” the Convention. These developments raise important questions about whether anti-personnel mines retain any meaningful military utility in contemporary conflict.

In this post, Erik Tollefsen, Head of the ICRC Weapon Contamination Unit and Pete Evans, Head of the ICRC Unit for Arms Carriers and Prevention examine this question from an operational perspective. They argue that advances in technology and the realities of modern warfare have significantly reduced the military relevance of anti-personnel mines, while their humanitarian consequences remain severe. They outline why some of the most frequently cited justifications – border security, the supposed benefits of “smart” mines, or perceived low cost – no longer withstand scrutiny, and why renewed interest in these weapons risks reversing decades of progress. The authors call on states to base decisions on rigorous, transparent assessments of current military relevance weighed against humanitarian and legal obligations. In a security environment defined by rapid innovation, they conclude that, now as at the Convention’s adoption 30 years ago, anti-personnel mines have no place on the modern battlefield – and that reaffirming the norm against their use is more urgent than ever.

2 December 2025

India’s Strategic Autonomy Is Now Reading as Aloof

Chietigj Bajpaee,

Nothing captures India’s long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy more than the country hosting the leaders of three major global powers—Russia, China, and possibly the United States—in short succession. Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit India in December, making it his first visit to the country since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to be in India next year when the country hosts the BRICS summit. This year’s summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a grouping that includes the United States—was scheduled to take place in India this month but was postponed amid the downturn in India-U.S. relations. If the meeting is rescheduled to next year, U.S. President Donald Trump could also visit India.

There is a flip side to this narrative, however. India’s equidistant foreign policy is often perceived as distant or aloof. This became apparent when Trump levied 50 percent tariffs on India, punishing the country for its trade imbalance and purchases of Russian crude. Meanwhile, other countries that maintain a larger trade surplus with the United States or a significant dependence on Russian crude were not targeted to the same degree because of their importance to global supply chains (e.g., China) or their status as U.S. alliance partners (e.g., Japan, Turkey).

Domestic Military Manufacturing Is Essential for National Security

Scott Vadnais

For nearly a century, America’s military strength has come largely through self-reliance. We not only made the ships, airplanes and tanks, our country supplied the parts and materials for these complex systems. But a lot has changed in recent times.

Unfortunately, our military has increasingly relied on sourcing parts globally -- including from possibly unreliable places like China. It’s a disastrous side effect of globalization.

For example, while modern jet engines may typically include between 30,000 and 50,000 parts, ensuring they are “China-free” has proven to be incredibly difficult. We’ve already seen deliveries of F-35s delayed over this issue, revealing that supply chain risk and delays remain in the post-COVID era. For instance, in 2022, a magnet in the turbomachine used in engine start-up was discovered to contain a China-produced alloy of cobalt and samarium – figuratively becoming a “non-starter” for using the jets.

The real reason behind China’s fury toward Japan’s Takaichi

Simone McCarthy

Weeks into the job, Japan’s new leader has come face-to-face with what it means to cross China’s red line on Taiwan.

In the days since Sanae Takaichi suggested her country could respond militarily if China were to move to take control of Taiwan by force, Beijing has pulled out its economic pressure playbook: warning its citizens against travel and study there, suggesting there’ll be no market in China for Japan’s seafood exports, and unleashing a wave of wall-to-wall nationalist fervor pointed at the prime minister.

The furor appears carefully calibrated to send a warning to Japan – and other countries in the region – of what could happen if they even consider taking a stance at odds with China on Taiwan, the self-ruled democratic island that Beijing claims as its own territory.

Space-Guided Supremacy: How China’s Satellite Systems Strengthen its Missile and Hypersonic Forces

Tahir Azad

A decade ago, talk of “space dominance” meant the United States and, increasingly, Russia. The strategic picture is now clearly three-polar, and in many mission areas, it’s even two-polar. The U.S. and China are now in a fast-paced race to control the high ground of orbit. Beijing’s growing satellite networks, which include navigation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and missile early warning, are creating a “kill web” in space that makes it easier for the PLA’s missile and hypersonic forces to find and shoot down targets.

Beijing views space integration as the key to achieving information dominance and missile precision, giving it a decisive edge in both deterrence and strike capability. This matters because space superiority now underpins strategic stability, early warning, and real-time targeting, allowing China to combine cyber, electronic, and kinetic domains into a unified warfare network. The United States increasingly fears that China’s space-enabled precision warfare could neutralize traditional U.S. advantages in command, control, communications, intelligence, and missile defense. Top officials in the U.S. Space Force have warned about a “mind-boggling” Chinese military buildup that could upset the balance of deterrence and shorten decision-making times in a crisis.

China's Demographic Dilemma

Henrietta Levin

In this episode of Pekingology, CSIS Senior Fellow Henrietta Levin is joined by Philip O’Keefe, Professor of Practice at the University of New South Wales Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research and one of the world's leading experts on demographic trends in China and across Asia. They unpack the rapid aging of Chinese society, exploring the impact of a shrinking population on China's politics, economy, and innovation ecosystem, as well as its trade imbalances and Beijing's global ambitions.

Has China’s Power Peaked in Asia?

Bilahari Kausikan

By virtue of its size, contiguity, economic weight, and crucial role in the world economy, China will always enjoy considerable influence in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. But for those same reasons, China will also always arouse anxieties in Asia and indeed the world. Deng Xiaoping’s approach of hiding China’s power and biding time stems from his awareness of this paradox. Big countries need to reassure small countries on their periphery. Deng recognized this and acted on it.

But by the end of the Hu Jintao era, Deng’s wisdom was either forgotten or ignored, perhaps because Beijing over-read the implications of the 2008 global financial crisis and, just as the United States had over-read the end of the Cold War, invested it with a universal significance as heralding Karl Marx’s long-predicted decline and eventual collapse of the West, specifically the United States.

The New Cold War is here

David Roche

The New Cold War is not a forecast. It’s here and now. Where the conflict takes us does need forecasting, however. For our destination I shall set out some scenarios for you to choose from. But first a bit of history.

We had a few misconceptions in 1989, when we welcomed the ‘end of history’, meaning the end of systemic confrontation between hegemonic great powers, after the Berlin Wall fell. And also in 2001, when we invited China to participate in the free world economy by joining the WTO. The idea was that the richer China got, the more Chinese society would become like us, espousing our democratic niceties. China actually became more dictatorial the more it succeeded in becoming a poverty-free, middle-income economy. A few bouts of liberalisation and social eruptions came to nothing. Since President Xi Jinping came to office in 2013, societal control and conformity have become increasingly systemic and ubiquitous. Anecdotally, a decade ago, China had a security camera for every ten citizens. Now there is one for every two.

Military forecasts went similarly awry. Accepted wisdom was that China would never seek to grow its military in step with its booming economy. One reason for this was the typical Marxist-Leninist fear that a big army could threaten the Party’s grip on power as much as protect it. China was expected to opt for a relatively modest military, heavy on boots and light on tech. The PLA would only develop a limited range of key weapons systems to keep foes like the Russians and the US at bay. But China would not rival or threaten them militarily, so the thinking went. Now, China’s military seeks to match that of the US both in mass and sophistication in the air, on sea and on land. China has all but succeeded in this goal – except for nukes. And China is rushing to close that gap. That is what lies at the heart of the New Cold War.

How the Army’s most tech-forward units are practicing for war

JENNIFER HLAD

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii—Inside a mud-splattered tent, the Army’s vice chief and the commander of the 25th Infantry Division watched on two giant TV screens as the division attempted to repel an enemy attack from the sea. Just outside, the service’s first launched-effects battery used an unmanned reconnaissance glider that arrived about a month before to provide a picture of the simulated assault, while the division’s new HIMARS rocket launchers shot down “enemy” drones.

“We have old stuff, we have new stuff, and we’re fighting in a new way,” said Col. Dan Von Benken, the division’s artillery commander.

It was the last day of a two-week Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center exercise, and this constructed amphibious battle was the end of a scenario in which the soldiers worked with partner forces to defend an archipelago and take back islands seized by the enemy.

The exercise involved 75 experiments and incorporated every U.S. service branch plus seven partner nations. It kicked off with soldiers from the 11th Airborne Division’s 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team flying from Alaska to the island of Hawaii, where they parachuted into a training area with close-air support from the Hawaii Air National Guard. It included a nighttime long-range maritime air assault mission and another mission that flew four HIMARS aboard C-17s from Hawaii to Wake Island, unloaded them for a simulated raid, and then flew them back again.

Moscow’s Offshore Menace

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

ANDREI SOLDATOV is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Co-Founder and Editor of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of the Russian secret services’ activities.

At the October meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, an annual forum for Russian policy talks that has in recent years become a platform for Kremlin ideology, Russian President Vladimir Putin was asked an unusual question. “Mr. President, why are you sending so many drones to Denmark?” Putin initially dismissed it, joking that he would not send drones to “France, Denmark, or Copenhagen.” But the Russian leader did not stop there. He went on to say that “many eccentric characters,” especially young people, were capable of launching those drones over Europe—an enigmatic assertion that recalled his veiled comments about

Air Force Confirms SEAD Role of F-35s in Midnight Hammer

John A. Tirpak

The Air Force F-35As that participated in Operation Midnight Hammer—the June 22 strike against Iranian uranium enrichment and nuclear research facilities—conducted both suppression of enemy air defenses, also called SEAD, and provided fighter cover for the strike force as it departed Iran, the service acknowledged Nov. 24.

The SEAD aspect of the F-35’s role in the operation was implied but not officially detailed previously.

Fighters of the 388th Fighter Wing based out of Hill Air Force Base, Utah, “paved the way” for the flight of seven B-2s that dropped 14 GBU-57 bunker busters that penetrated the hardened, deeply buried targets in Iran, the wing detailed in a pair of press releases. The Air Force said the jets flew from several locations, implementing the Agile Combat Employment model.

The 388th and its reserve associate unit, the 419th Fighter Wing, deployed to the Middle East under U.S. Central Command in March and returned to Utah in September after a history-making six-month deployment

The Surge of Latino America And What It Means for the Country

Maggie Miller & The Miller Report

In this episode of The Miller Report: Real Clear Journalism, Maggie Miller sits down with Joel Kotkin and Jennifer Hernandez to discuss their new RealClearInvestigations piece based on their comprehensive report from the Civitas Institute examining one of the most significant demographic and economic shifts reshaping the nation: the rise of Latino America.

Latinos now make up about 20% of the U.S. population — up from just 5% in 1970 — and are responsible for more than half of all population growth. By 2060, they’re projected to drive nearly all of it. But the investigation shows this story isn’t just about demographic momentum; it’s about economic influence. Yet it also highlights real challenges getting in the way of the American Dream.

We explore what’s driving these trends, how concerns around immigration enforcement intersect with belief in the American Dream, and what their findings mean for policymakers and the country’s future. Their full investigation can be found here.

Europe divided as US pushes Ukraine-Russia peace deal

Ian Bremmer

In this Quick Take, Ian Bremmer breaks down the controversy around Trump's 28-point Ukraine-Russia peace plan.

He says the proposal was “mostly drafted by the Russians” and loaded with “complete non-starters” for Ukraine, from ceding more territory to reducing troop levels and granting blanket amnesty for war crimes.

Ian explains that while allies publicly “appreciate the American effort,” he notes that few are buying the plan’s substance. With Europe divided and Russia sensing momentum, he warns that “the war is not close to over,” and that the next phase will likely be shaped by battlefield realities, not diplomacy.

The next MAGA divide is Chinaby

Ransom Miller

It’s not the first time MAGA has turned on itself over U.S. support for Israel. In June, clashes over Trump’s Mideast policy pushed him to speak out, declaring: “I’m the one that developed America First. I’m the one that decides that.”

Trump still drives conservative politics, but his movement is no longer a monolith. Nor is Israel the only international policy issue that threatens the movement’s unity. The next fissure may be China.

On Israel, figures like Carlson, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) and other right-wing media personalities are calling for a restrained U.S. presence. Now, pressure is building from those who want a more aggressive approach to China.

More Trump voters disapprove of the president’s handling of China than any other foreign policy issue, according to a new public opinion poll by myself and my team at the Institute for Global Affairs.

Europe’s peace plan oozes with reliance on the US

If you’ve been on X over the past few days, and your algorithm is as politics-filled as mine, you may have seen an old video being passed around. The clip in question, which has garnered millions of views, is of now-former Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin being asked by a reporter what the way out of the Russo-Ukrainian War was. Her answer – “The way out of the conflict is for Russia to leave Ukraine” – was accentuated by a little giggle, as if she was proud of her foreign policy, as if her insight was self-evident.

I write this not to pick on the former prime minister, who is currently, in the midst of a book tour, lamenting to The New York Times about how difficult her life is. I do so because the clip of Marin, who governed Finland during the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, was almost perfectly timed for a resurgence this past week.

That is because, after President Trump’s proposed 28-point Russo-Ukrainian War peace plan was released, the European Union released their own. And while it has more points than Marin’s single way out of the war (theirs has 24), it is spiritually identical to her pithy response. The document both underlines how badly the European Union still needs the United States and how totally fresh out of ideas Brussels really is.

EU countries seek urgent plan B to fund Ukraine

Tim Ross, Gregorio Sorgi and Bjarke Smith-Meyer

BRUSSELS — European countries are working on an emergency plan B to stop Ukraine running out of money early next year in case they cannot reach a deal on raiding Russia’s frozen assets to fund Kyiv’s war effort.

At a summit a month ago European Union leaders hoped to agree on a proposal to use Moscow’s immobilized reserves for a €140 billion “reparations loan” to Ukraine but the idea ran into fierce opposition from Bart De Wever, the prime minister of Belgium, where the money is held.

Now, with peace talks intensifying, and Kyiv running short of cash, the question of what to do with the Russian assets has taken on a new urgency. “If we don’t move, others will move before us,” said one EU official, granted anonymity like others cited here, to speak freely.

Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran

Evan Morgan |

In recent years, declarations like “no-limits partnership,” “comprehensive agreement,” and “security partnership” between the United States’ adversaries have become increasingly common. On May 16, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party Leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed their comprehensive partnership during their historic 43rd meeting. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian-Iranian collaboration has reached new levels, with Iranian drones becoming a familiar site over the battlefields. North Korea too, has upped its cooperation with Russia, working closely on schemes to avoid Western sanctions and even signing a mutual defense pact on June 19, 2024. The extent to which America’s adversaries cooperate on cybersecurity remains less understood but is a growing concern.

However, as unified Western actions against rogue and adversarial states have increased (e.g., sanctions, public shaming, etc.) and hot wars roil Ukraine and Israel, the agreements and cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have similarly grown stronger and more unified. In this context, the cybersecurity strategies of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have emerged as significant and irregular threats to global stability, threatening the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, each nation has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities designed to asymmetrically attack the international security frameworks established by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Western powers. It is, therefore, important to assess how US adversaries collaborate in cyberspace and are using asymmetric and irregular tactics to undermine the liberal world order

The Inevitable Logic of a Japanese Nuclear Weapon

Bilahari Kausikan

It is no longer a question of if but when Japan and South Korea will acquire independent nuclear deterrents within the U.S. alliance system. That system would otherwise loosen in East Asia as the United States’ extended deterrence—the so-called nuclear umbrella—erodes due to China’s and North Korea’s acquisition of second strike capabilities targeting the U.S. mainland. To acquire nuclear weapons will be a politically difficult and highly fraught decision—much more so for Japan than for South Korea, where opinion polls already show considerable support. But regardless of public opinion, changes in the global and regional strategic environment are inexorably pushing both countries in this direction. Resisting the logic of these changes could lead to very grave geopolitical consequences.

In democracies, security policy must rest on a foundation of public support. Such a foundation does not yet exist in Japan on the nuclear question. It is therefore imperative that Japan engage in an open, realistic, and timely public debate to build a national consensus on this vital issue. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi took a first step in this direction earlier this month, when she announced that her government is considering a review of Japan’s long-standing policy on hosting nuclear weapons.

The Wobbling of King Trump

Michael Hirsh

For an American, touring the grandiose monuments of ancient Rome and Renaissance Italy—as I did recently—is an oddly relatable experience these days.

From the triumphal arches of Constantine and Titus to the soaring St. Peter’s Basilica to the stunning Medici palaces of Florence, one sees a clear through line: a parade of giant egos down the centuries. For princes of the past—even many popes—self-glorification was the norm.

How Beijing Views Trump

Ravi Agrawal

Last week’s meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping was the most-anticipated summit between two world leaders this year. The presidents of the United States and China seem to have come away with things they can both describe as wins—and certainly, the two avoided their trade spat getting worse. But according to Elizabeth Economy, a China scholar and former advisor to the Biden administration, the agreement between the two sides was not only limited to just one year but also skirted around the more fundamental structural issues plaguing the relationship.

Economy is now a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the author of, most recently, The World According to China. I asked Economy to join me as a guest on FP Live, and we discussed takeaways from the summit, how Beijing is navigating Trump’s second term, and how, on balance, countries in Asia are viewing the biggest superpower showdown this century. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.

The United States Is Moving Through the Stages of Grief Over China’s Rise

Robert A. Manning,

By most accounts, the outcome of the 90-minute meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in October was little more than a one-year truce in the trade war, rolling tariffs back to Jan. 19 levels, though final details are still being sorted out; a rare Xi-initiated phone call to Trump on Nov. 24 underscored his desire to implement the deal (while also raising the Taiwan issue). But what if the Washington cognoscenti and much of the press have it wrong? What if the meeting signaled the beginning of a new phase in U.S.-China relations?

Why? One metric I use to gauge U.S.-China relations is the five stages of grief—traditionally framed as denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. After passing through the first two, Washington is hitting the third. These have unfolded in direct proportion to China’s emergence on the modern world stage, as its GDP grew from $310 billion in 1985 to $18.8 trillion in 2024 and it moved up the ladder of civilian and military technology to challenge U.S. global primacy.

House Republicans Slam Witkoff Over Handling of Russia-Ukraine Talks

Rachel Oswald,

Republican opposition continues to grow to the Trump administration’s handling of the chaotic Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations, with two senior House members heaping opprobrium on the lead U.S. envoy to the talks, Steve Witkoff, and slamming what they characterized as a lack of a professional and unified interagency process from the U.S. side.

On Tuesday, Bloomberg published a leaked transcript of an Oct. 14 call between Witkoff and Yuri Ushakov, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s top foreign-policy advisor, in which Witkoff suggested coming up with a 20-point peace plan to end the Russia-Ukraine war and offered advice on how Putin should pitch the idea to U.S. President Donald Trump.

The Yellow Line in Gaza Is Supposed to Be Temporary. Israel Is Digging in

Steven A. Cook

What is that old saw? Put two Israelis in a room and you get nine opinions on any given issue. This alleged truism, wrapped up in marginally amusing Borscht Belt humor, is intended to convey something both exasperating and heartwarming about Israeli society.

It is true that Israel is a polarized country and social trust has deteriorated, but on a variety of issues, from the prosaic to the consequential, Israelis seem to agree on quite a lot these days. Based on the 12 days that took me back and forth between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem recently, and to several points in between, here’s my non-scientific read on Israeli public opinion: Everyone hates the endless road construction in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; most people believe that the Haredim (or ultra-Orthodox), who have traditionally been exempt from enlisting in the Israeli army so they can devote their lives to religious studies, must start serving or get off the government dole; and a consensus has formed around the so-called yellow line in Gaza and why Israeli troops are likely to stay on that line for a while. More on that in a

A Self-Defeating Reversal on Ukraine

Thomas Wright

The Trump administration’s new plan for Ukraine is apparently to reverse all the progress it has made there in recent months. And not just that—to create a much bigger strategic problem that will bedevil the administration for the next three years. The strangest part of all of this is that the plan emerged at a moment when Donald Trump’s Ukraine policy had finally found its footing after a very turbulent start.

Over the past 24 hours, multiple media outlets, citing several administration officials with direct knowledge, have published details of a new U.S. peace proposal that is tantamount to a Ukrainian surrender. As drafted, the plan would require Ukraine to give up territory and fortifications in the parts of the Donbas that it still controls, cut the size of its armed forces by half, abandon weaponry that Russia deems to be offensive (including long-range missiles), accept an end to U.S. military assistance, and agree to a ban on foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. The Trump administration is dangling a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine in the event of future Russian aggression, but what that would entail is unclear and would almost certainly fall far short of a NATO-style mutual-defense commitment. The plan actually guts the one security guarantee that would make a real difference, namely a strong and capable Ukraine.

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