A Sleeping Semiconductor Giant Awakes: India

Christopher Cytera

Source Link

When Asia is mentioned in the context of semiconductors, the usual suspects dominate: Taiwan at the cutting edge, South Korea’s memory chip giants, Japan’s all-around capability, and China as the looming threat. But India? The subcontinent rarely registers.

That could be a mistake. With a massive population, deep engineering talent, and multi-billion-dollar government investments, India is building a dynamic semiconductor hub. Unlike China, India is not pursuing a goal of national self-sufficiency and independence from US and European technology. India does not want to replace existing chip hubs. Instead, it aims to complement them.

India enjoys deep semiconductor DNA. For decades, it excelled in chip design services and embedded software, contributing to a massive share of global engineering talent. But the country remained stuck downstream in the value chain. Unreliable utilities, a shortage of skilled chip talent, and missing links in the supply chain for chemicals hobbled efforts to build volume manufacturing.

It now sees an opportunity to try again. The COVID-19 pandemic produced massive chip shortages. Taiwan’s dominance at the leading edge looked dangerous. China’s massive push in basic chips raised alarm bells. In 2021, New Delhi budgeted $9 billion to launch a Semiconductor Mission aiming to move from “design and assembly” to full-spectrum production.

Delhi blast underscores India’s escalating terror threat despite security gains

Michael Rubin 

Source Link

The blast tore through a car waiting at a traffic signal close to the Lal Quila metro station, setting nearby vehicles on fire and sending people running for cover. PTI

On November 9, 2025, the Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad arrested three suspects, including one educated in China, for allegedly plotting a chemical weapons attack. Security forces arrested five others from Jaish-e-Mohammed and Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind in Kashmir and Haryana, seizing 2,900 kg of explosives. These counterterror successes followed the September 15, 2025, arrest of an Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) operative in September in Uttar Pradesh. It was not enough. An explosion rocked Delhi on Monday evening not far from the Red Fort, killing at least 13; the death toll may even rise.

The attack in Delhi was not the first, nor will it be the last. On May 13, 2008, multiple bombs ripped across Jaipur, killing dozens and injuring more than 200. Later that year, gunmen rampaged through Mumbai, hunting both tourists and Indians. The number of terrorist attacks India suffers today is more than an order of magnitude higher than it experienced in the early 1980s. India weathered many attacks, but the 2019 Pulwama bombing and the 2025 Pahalgam attacks stood out for the shock to society and the nature of India’s response.

Former Middle East Envoy: A Renewed US-Saudi Alliance for a Changing Middle East | Opinion

Jason D. Greenblatt

Source Link

The upcoming visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to the White House is more than a diplomatic occasion—it is a pivotal moment for U.S.–Saudi relations and the future of the Middle East.

At a time of global tension and regional uncertainty, this meeting reaffirms an alliance vital to America, to Israel, to our regional partners and to a more stable and prosperous world.

President Donald Trump looks on as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman greets the crowd during the Saudi-U.S. investment forum at the King Abdul Az...Read More

At the heart of this relationship lies a simple truth: The United States and Saudi Arabia need each other. In a region threatened by the Iranian regime’s aggression, terrorism and instability in states like Syria and Lebanon, America’s strength depends on capable, like-minded partners. Saudi Arabia has long been one of the U.S.’ most important allies. A strong U.S.–Saudi defense partnership helps deter hostile actors, protect shipping lanes and secure global energy supplies that sustain the world economy.

Together, the two nations safeguard the Red Sea and Arabian (Persian) Gulf, counter drone and missile attacks from Iran-backed militias and help prevent nuclear proliferation. A formal defense pact—linking U.S. technology and intelligence with Saudi reach and resources—would cement this cooperation for the long-term. It would show that Riyadh is ready to share the burden of regional security and that Washington remains a reliable ally.

China’s New Aircraft Carrier Just Got Its Home Port

Peter Suciu

Source Link

The Type 003 Fujian, commissioned into the People’s Liberation Army Navy earlier in November, will be stationed at China’s Yulin Naval Base in southern Hainan—overlooking the South China Sea.

Despite a 2016 international tribunal ruling against China’s claim to the near-entirety of the South China Sea, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made it clear that it views nearly all of the sea as its own sovereign territory. This has predictably resulted in tensions with China’s neighbors, and has even led to clashes between the Chinese Coast Guard and neighboring navies—particularly the Philippine Navy.

A game of brinksmanship has continued as China’s rivals have responded to Beijing. The Philippines has upgraded its military capabilities and fortified island outposts with anti-ship missiles. At the same time, Vietnam has continued to increase its presence in the South China Sea by transforming numerous small, previously uninhabited islands with new fortifications, buildings, and other facilities to support its claims to the waters.

Hanoi’s efforts have not yet reached the scale of the military bases that China has built on its artificial islands, but the island buildup continues. Vietnam has nearly 70 percent as much reclaimed land in the Spratly Island chain as China has—and it could surpass Beijing’s presence in short order if current trends persist.

China Has Multiple Aircraft Carriers in the South China Sea

Beijing will have a critical advantage over the Philippines and Vietnam: it has a brand-new aircraft carrier, and its various regional adversaries do not.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) now has three aircraft carriers, but it is the Type 003 Fujian (18) that could be a game changer. This second domestically-produced flattop, which was commissioned into service last week, is far more advanced than the preceding Type 001 Liaoning and Type 002 Shandong. The new carrier is equipped with a flat flight deck as well as electromagnetic catapults, which can both increase the number of sorties that can be launched from the carrier and the size (and loadout) of the planes involved. This technology can also allow for heavier fixed-wing manned aircraft and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to operate from the warship.

Beijing’s War on ‘Negative Energy’

Shijie Wang

Source Link

On September 22, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) announced that this year’s “clean and bright” (清朗) campaign would focus on the theme of “rectifying the problem of maliciously inciting negative emotions” (整治恶意挑动负面情绪问题). [1] The campaign targets four categories of online speech: “inciting extreme group antagonism” (挑动群体极端对立), “promoting fear and anxiety” (宣扬恐慌焦虑), “stoking cyber violence and hostility” (挑起网络暴力戾气), and “excessively amplifying pessimism and negativity” (过度渲染消极悲观) (CAC, September 22). By cracking down on speech that falls under these categories, the Party’s discourse apparatus seeks to alleviate social antagonism and the “lying flat” (躺平) subculture, and more specifically fan culture, online fraud, and conspiracy theories.

The CAC announcement followed closely after the release of a Xinhua Institute report arguing that U.S. cognitive warfare was colonizing the minds of people around the world, as well as the CAC’s decision to penalize social media platform Xiaohongshu (known overseas as Rednote) on the grounds that it was “undermining the online ecosystem” (破坏网络生态) (Xinhua, September 7; CAC, September 11; China Brief Notes, September 12). The specific targets of the “clean and bright” campaign are not identical to those detailed in the “colonization of the mind” (思想殖民) report, but they are similar. Official media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) often frame these phenomena along similar lines as manifestations of Western cultural infiltration.

Is China’s Defense Industry Actually Outcompeting the United States?

James Holmes

Source Link

That startling claim came up some years ago during the Q&A following a China talk I gave at a gathering of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Executive Panel down in Washington. This philosophical query entails colossal practical import for the course and outcome of what some now call a second Cold War.

Dr. Steve Wills of the Navy League’s Center for Maritime Strategy raised this question obliquely in replying to my column on the US Navy’s 250th birthday. Steve maintains that open societies such as the United States—where all segments of society excoriate their institutions for subpar performance—enjoy better prospects than authoritarians in strategic competition and warfare.

The syllogism is straightforward. Discussion and debate, hallmarks of a liberal society, beget wiser policies over time, including those touching the naval service. Debate fuels public and elite pressure on institutions to improve. Accountability results. QED.

The postulate that criticism gives rise to improvement should be true. I hope it is true. But I’m not sure how much confidence it merits these days. To date the results of the US-China competition—the defining challenge before our navy and joint force—have done little to bear out the notion that an open society is more dynamic than a closed one.

The Executive Panel was a body of advisers to Admiral John Richardson, then serving as the CNO, the US Navy’s top uniformed officer. The drift of the conversation seemed to say Yes: today’s authoritarian regimes, China’s in particular, command both the advantages that go to closed societies and those typically ascribed to open societies. They can act swiftly and decisively because, by definition, authoritarians give orders and their subjects carry them out.

Dictators Get Fast Results—but Often Can’t Think Creatively

The greats of strategy agree. In his works on sea-power theory and history, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan affirms that “despotic power, wielded with judgment and consistency, has created at times a great sea commerce and a brilliant navy with greater directness than can be reached by the slower processes of a free people.”

China’s EV Market Is Imploding

Michael Schuman

Source Link

In China, you can buy a heavily discounted “used” electric car that has never, in fact, been used. Chinese automakers, desperate to meet their sales targets in a bitterly competitive market, sell cars to dealerships, which register them as “sold,” even though no actual customer has bought them. Dealers, stuck with officially sold cars, then offload them as “used,” often at low prices. The practice has become so prevalent that the Chinese Communist Party is trying to stop it. Its main newspaper, The People’s Daily, complained earlier this year that this sales-inflating tactic “disrupts normal market order,” and criticized companies for their “data worship.”

This sign of serious problems in China’s electric-vehicle industry may come as a surprise to many Americans. The Chinese electric car has become a symbol of the country’s seemingly unstoppable rise on the world stage. Many observers point to their growing popularity as evidence that China is winning the race to dominate new technologies. But in China, these electric cars represent something entirely different: the profound threats that Beijing’s meddling in markets poses to both China and the world.

Bloated by excessive investment, distorted by government intervention, and plagued by heavy losses, China’s EV industry appears destined for a crash. EV companies are locked in a cutthroat struggle for survival. Wei Jianjun, the chairman of the Chinese automaker Great Wall Motor, warned in May that China’s car industry could tumble into a financial crisis; it “just hasn’t erupted yet.”

China’s moment: When Washington and Moscow both bow to Beijing

Linggong 

Source Link

Recently, the Xi–Trump summit in South Korea drew significant attention. While there’s been much debate over who came out on top, one thing is clear: China’s influence on the global stage has reached an unprecedented level.

Decades ago, China was a country caught between the two poles of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, forced to survive by playing a delicate balancing act. Today, times have changed. China now holds critical leverage over both Washington and Moscow, with the power to make each side take its cues from Beijing.

During the Soviet era, China looked up to its “Big Brother,” admiring and respecting the Soviet Union as the powerful leader of the socialist camp. Blocked by the United States and the West, China relied heavily on Soviet economic and military assistance, and Moscow wielded significant influence over Beijing’s politics.

Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, still regarded as the world’s second-strongest military power, continued to wield considerable influence over China, particularly through Beijing’s reliance on Russian arms imports to modernize its military.

However, as Russia’s economy continues to deteriorate under long-term Western sanctions and its national power declines, especially since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the country has suffered an unprecedented blow to both its economy and military. As a result, Russia has become increasingly dependent on China to keep its system running.

Rethinking Nuclear Radiation

William D. Budinger, Ray Rothrock, and Paul Bauman

Source Link

Rethinking nuclear radiation and its dangers is critical if the world is to turn away from hydrocarbon sources of energy.

Many of us are seeing unwelcome spikes in our electric bills. This is due in large part to the fact that the demand for electricity is rapidly increasing and the supply is not. To meet this growing demand, utilities will have to massively increase their supply from all sources, including nuclear power. In fact, many experts believe it will be impossible to meet this demand without many more nuclear plants, both traditional large reactors and smaller modular ones (SMRs). To build these plants at a reasonable cost, we will need to address the public’s fear of nuclear radiation.

Since the dawn of humanity, life has flourished in a sea of natural radiation — from cosmic rays, from rocks beneath our feet, and even from the food we eat. Every human being carries traces of naturally radioactive potassium and carbon. In short, radiation is part of life itself. Yet, for most of the past century, we’ve been taught to fear it.

Is that fear of radiation justified?

For decades, science could not answer that question with confidence. The effects of low doses of radiation were simply too small to measure against normal variations in human health. So, out of an abundance of caution, scientists and regulators had adopted a simple assumption known as the Linear No-Threshold (LNT) model. It held that any dose of radiation, no matter how tiny, carries some risk of harm — and that those risks increase with every additional exposure. The LNT has provided the basis and a guiding principle for all uses of radiation. Radioactive material users must reduce radiation to levels known as “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA). Even though the science behind LNT and ALARA is over 90 years old, it is still the operating policy covering all uses of radioactive materials.

That “safety” assumption has had sweeping consequences. For three-quarters of a century, the LNT has governed how radiation is taught, studied, regulated, and feared. It has shaped policies in energy, medicine, and research. One unfortunate result has been to convince the public that all radiation is dangerous and must be avoided at any cost. That fear, amplified by sensational headlines, stories, and speculation, has distorted our understanding of nuclear risks and thwarted the opportunity to produce a huge amount of clean energy from nuclear power.

Are US Special Forces Getting Ready to Attack Venezuela?

Brandon J. Weichert

Source Link

A recent C-146A Wolfhound flight near the Venezuelan coastline has raised suspicions of covert activity, even though the Wolfhound had its transponder on.

The Trump administration continues its buildup along the coastline of Venezuela, despite rumors abounding that the 47th president is backing away from his original decision to escalate his administration’s attacks against the regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela.

Reports have been coming in over the last week that American special forces units were spotted in the areas near Venezuela. This comes on the heels of the Trump administration authorizing the CIA to conduct covert operations in the country.

What’s Going on in the Skies Near Venezuela?

A C-146A Wolfhound, which is a specialized transport plane used by the United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), was tracked on a route near Venezuelan airspace while en route to Colombia. This comes after several American bombers, such as the B-1B Lancer and B-52H Stratofortress, also flew missions in the Caribbean Sea close to the Venezuelan coast.

What’s more, helicopters associated with US Special Operations aviation (such as MH-6 Little Birds and MH-60 Black Hawks) were spotted operating in Caribbean waters less than 90 miles away from Venezuela. It is assumed that these elements were conducting training or mission-preparation flights (or both).

Defence Blog, which was among the first to report the aforementioned C-146A Wolfhound flight, described that flight as being “low-profile” and on a route that brought it along the northern coastline of South America, passing very near to Venezuelan territory (while still maintaining its flight over international waters). The C-146A is the perfect vehicle for the kind of stealthy missions that American special forces operators routinely engage in, especially when the country is on the brink of a potential war—such as we appear to be as of this moment.

What Does the Army Use the C-146A For, Exactly?

Future Combat Jet Turbulence? FCAS Team Says ‘Don’t Believe It’

Maya Carlin

Sourec Link

Only time will tell if the disagreements currently halting progress on FCAS will impact its delivery.

While reports over the last year have indicated infighting between the partners behind the next-generation Future Combat Air System (FCAS), apparent design disagreements have not been as debilitating in reality. According to a leading French air force official, FCAS will continue to progress through the development/concept phase as planned. Brig Gen. Phillipe Suhr noted that although “there are differences” between the team backing the upcoming fighter program, “don’t believe all you are reading.” Suhr added that “We are still fully committed to this program with our partners and we will do our best to find a solution to move forward because we have to. It is important to deliver in the 2040s.”

In October, an expected meeting between French, Spanish, and German officials to rectify disagreements was halted, suggesting that the program may be impacted due to unsolvable obstacles. Referring to the delay, a spokesperson for Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defense explained that despite the postponement, “The Federal Government continues to strive for the successful implementation of the project. We are in close contact with our French and Spanish partners to determine a new date for this meeting.”

The Future Combat Air System

When FCAS does come to fruition down the line, the sixth-generation fighter series is intended to replace all of France’s Rafales and Germany’s Eurofighters. The cutting-edge program was conceptualized more than two decades ago, originating from the European Technology Acquisition Program. Like the American-made F-35 Lightning II platform, the new FCAS will feature a “combat cloud” that will enable it to transfer real-time intelligence across a host of networks and domains. These secure data link transmission capabilities will ensure that relevant data can be easily accessed among fighters. “The concept based on the air cloud is that all elements must con­stantly interoperate with each other to form a cohesive system that is informed as one and combat as one,” explained the program manager of FCAS Combat Cloud, Mark Paskowski.

Trump’s Year of Living Dangerously

Peter D. Feaver

Source Link

PETER D. FEAVER is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University and the author of Thanks for Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the U.S. Military. From 2005 to 2007, he was Special Adviser for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform on the staff of the National Security Council.More by Peter D. Feaver

Both supporters and critics of U.S. President Donald Trump agree that the first year of his second term has been an extraordinarily disruptive one. But for all its significance, this disruption wasn’t entirely unexpected. Even as the final votes were being tallied, enough was known about Trump’s intentions to make some relatively confident predictions about the shape of his second term, as I did one year ago for Foreign Affairs. Many of these predictions have already manifested. For example, Trump’s most senior advisers are, as he promised they world.

Talks On Peace Deal for War Against Ukraine Can Still Rebound

Pavel K. Baev

Source Link

The fallout from the failed Russian plan to organize a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump in Budapest was so significant that any prospect of bringing the war against Ukraine to an end any time soon appeared to disappear. Trump’s statement that a follow-up summit would be a “waste of time” seemingly negated the “Anchorage Impulse,” to which Putin had referred up to mid-October, implying that Trump acknowledged at the Alaska summit the Russian interpretation of “root causes” of the war (Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 10; TASS, October 22). Putin subsequently resorted to nuclear posturing, a move he had uncharacteristically abstained from for most of the first year of Trump’s presidency (Meduza, October 30; see EDM, November 3). Some new currents in the political atmosphere have, nevertheless, rehabilitated resilient hopes for a new round of results-oriented talks.

Nuclear brinksmanship has not delivered the results that Putin expected. Trump’s vague order to resume nuclear testing immediately, on par with other great powers, has left Russian experts puzzled and worried (RIAC, October 31; TopWar.ru, November 6). Putin convened an emergency meeting of his Security Council on November 5, which, contrary to usual protocol, was open to the media. In the orchestrated debate on the proposal for preparing the Novaya Zemlya test site for underground nuclear explosions, the predictably hawkish voices advocated instead for a wait-and-see approach (Kommersant, November 5). The Russian autocrat can still claim to have gained a new position of strength and deterred the U.S. attempt to put pressure on Moscow (Novaya Gazeta Europe, November 5). Russian-style nuclear deterrence is not exactly a “mind game” with calculated moves, but rather a vanity fair for demonstrating hugely expensive weapon systems of dubious military value (Meduza, November 5).

Will Russians continue to support the war? Will 2026 be a crunch year? Possibility of Ukrainian counter-attack?

Lawrence Freedman

Source Link

There were many questions on the Russo-Ukraine War and the prospects for an early conclusion. Carol Gramm asks how long Russia (and the Russians) can support the war. Martin Treacy notes that 2026 will be a crunch year for Putin, when economic constraints and only very slow Russian progress (at great cost) plus increasing impacts on the Russian people (drone hits on power production, petrol shortages etc). Will this finally create some real pushback against his regime? Or will he just be able to continue to grind forward for years to come? Ben noted that in a recent post I mentioned Ukraine taking back some land could have a disproportionate impact, buy how likely is that ‘given Ukraine’s manpower shortage?’

Most Russians, relying on what they are told by state media, accept Putin’s rationale for the war – that this is a consequence of hostile attitudes by NATO countries combined with a Russophobe and illegitimate government in Kyiv. They find it hard to accept that the war might end other than with a Russia victory. Yet they would still be relieved if it ended soon. Much of the pain of the war up to now – in terms of manpower for the army and consequential deaths - has been felt largely in outlying regions and not Moscow and St Petersburg. Even those distant regions have been compensated as the war has boosted local economies. Almost four years on there is no clear victory or end in sight, with hopes for a peace deal dashed, and the adverse economic and social effects are starting to be felt. (I discussed this recently here).

The Partner’s Partner: Exploring Proxy Security Cooperation Efforts

James Micciche

Source Link

The ongoing transformation of the United States’ foreign policy has led to many of its supporting apparatuses to adapt, reorganize, evolve, or even cease operations. Security cooperation, which has been an institutionalized instrument of the United States’ foreign policy since the end of World War II, is one such capability that requires the adoption of new strategic concepts to better align with current executive direction and guidance. Specifically, the Department of Defense should integrate the core concepts of offshore balancing into the planning and execution of US security cooperation efforts by selecting and sponsoring key regional bilateral partnerships. Such a strategy overcomes ongoing service reorganizations, strengthens bilateral ties between the United States and key regional powers, advances US security interests at reduced costs, and improves the effectiveness of security cooperation efforts.

A Changing Environment

The United States’ foreign policy and its supporting apparatuses are undergoing a fundamental shift away from the multilateral foreign policy that guided America since the early 1940s. The Trump administration’s focus on homeland and hemispheric defense, bilateral engagement, and increased demands for burden sharing is a far departure from the liberal internationalist policy that guided America for the last seventy-five years. Under the current realist approach to foreign policy, the executive branch has instituted sweeping changes ranging from closing the country’s primary instrument of non-defense foreign assistance (USAID) to renaming the Department of Defense the Department of War. Concurrent to reimagining foreign policy, the administration is emphasizing increased government efficiency and is actively promoting cost-saving and dismantling of bureaucratic structures.

America’s Tech Future Is Not a Game—But We Played One to See What’s at Stake

Source Link

In today’s edition of our newsletter, SCSP’s David Lin and Nyah Stewart unpack insights from our recent collaboration with Lux Capital, where we teamed up to run one of their immersive Riskgaming scenarios. The exercise forced participants to navigate the tradeoffs between advancing America’s national tech ambitions and managing the local realities of finite resources like water and energy.

When we think about America’s technological competitiveness, we tend to focus on federal funding, private capital, and breakthrough innovations. Yet there’s an even more critical and fundamental resource that doesn’t always make headlines —and it’s not energy: it’s water.

Just as electricity powers our digital infrastructure, water is becoming equally central to AI progress and tech development and, by extension, to America’s geopolitical strength. The semiconductor industry, now racing to meet the rising computational demands of advanced AI models, faces a stark truth: like other AI-infrastructure, such as data centers, semiconductor facilities are extremely resource-intensive.

Semiconductor manufacturing requires ultrapure water—thousands of times cleaner than drinking water—to rinse away every trace of residue, pollutant, or mineral from silicon wafers that could damage delicate chip structures or impair performance. Producing 1,000 gallons of this kind of water takes 1,400 to 1,500 gallons of municipal water, purified through intensive deionization and reverse osmosis. Additionally, a single semiconductor manufacturing facility can consume up to 10 million gallons of ultrapure water per day, roughly equivalent to the daily water usage of 33,000 households.

A-29 Super Tucano Light Attack Aircraft Being Pitched As Drone Hunter

Joseph Trevithick

Source Link

Current and future operators of A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft could use them to shoot down incoming drones, according to manufacturer Embraer. There is already something of an emerging trend when it comes to the idea of employing light attack planes in the drone hunting role. This has been enabled, in large part, by the combat-proven effectiveness of specially-configured laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rockets in the air-to-air role against drones, developments that TWZ has been first to report on in many cases.

Embraer outlined the potential of the A-29 as a flying drone-killer in a press release today. The Super Tucano is a two-seat single-engine turboprop aircraft in widespread service globally, both as a trainer and a light attack platform. The aircraft’s standard configuration includes two .50 caliber machine guns, one in each wing. The plane also has the ability to carry various guided and unguided munitions, and other stores, on up to four underwing hardpoints and another one under the center of the fuselage. A-29s can be equipped with one of several sensor turrets containing a mix of electro-optical and infrared cameras, as well as laser spot trackers and/or designators, under the forward end of the fuselage, as well.

A New Path to Middle East Security

James F. Jeffrey and Elizabeth Dent

Source Link

On September 9, Israel shocked the world by bombing a villa in a residential neighborhood of Doha in an attempt to kill senior Hamas officials. It was the second time Qatar was struck this year. (In June, Iran launched missiles at a U.S. air base in the emirate in retaliation for U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran). As an important U.S. ally and a key conflict mediator, Qatar has generally been considered off-limits to the region’s belligerents. Moreover, Qatar has hosted Hamas leaders for years, with tacit American and Israeli approval, as part of its mediating role; the targeted officials were, in fact, negotiating, through Qatari channels, a potential hostage and cease-fire agreement for Gaza. If the strikes had resulted in more casualties or damage to Qatar, it might have destabilized the whole region, expanding the war to the Gulf and likely destroying any near-term prospects for a cease-fire.

Israel’s strike on Qatar was not successful, and this didn’t happen. But the attack did inadvertently achieve something equally consequential: it opened the door to what could be one of the most important shifts in U.S. Middle East policy in decades. Not only was U.S. President Donald Trump sufficiently angered that he pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into agreeing to a cease-fire in Gaza. He also took the unprecedented step of issuing an executive order to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to its Gulf ally, asserting that an armed attack against Qatar will be considered “a threat to the peace and security of the United States.” This full-throated assurance of U.S. support is likely to set a new benchmark for security relationships between the Gulf countries and the United States.

How Pakistan’s Spending Blitz Helped Win Over Trump and Flip U.S. Policy

Pranav Baskar

Source Link

Pakistan signed a series of high-priced contracts with prominent Washington lobbying firms this spring, just weeks before the White House announced favorable new policies that gave the country one of the world’s more enviable tariff rates and an edge over its archrival, India.

The policy changes heralded a turnabout in Pakistan’s previously rocky relationship with the Trump administration and have largely been attributed to shrewd diplomacy by Islamabad, which has lavished President Trump with the kind of public accolades and big-ticket business deals he relishes.

But the lobbying contracts, which totaled millions of dollars and held out the promises of lower tariffs and access to Mr. Trump, suggest an additional reason for Pakistan’s improved standing: a campaign to influence the president, which included employing some of his closest confidants.

In April and May, as Pakistan ramped up its charm offensive, it spent at least three times as much as India on lobbying in Washington, according to contracts filed with the Department of Justice. As Islamabad rapidly hired lobbyists, including Mr. Trump’s former business partners and bodyguard, its relationship with the United States blossomed and India’s deteriorated.

Israel jolted by ‘shocking’ settler violence

Rafi Schwartz

Source Link

Israeli President Isaac Herzog this week condemned the latest outbreak of settler-instigated violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, decrying a recent arson attack near the city of Tulkarm as “shocking and serious” in some of his most high-profile public statements on the longstanding trend to date. Herzog’s comments come during the seasonal olive harvest that brings Palestinian farmers into their neighboring fields, often setting the stage for attacks from groups of Israeli settlers. According to United Nations monitors, settler violence against Palestinians has reached a record high, with some 1,500 incidents recorded this year.

‘Act decisively to eradicate the phenomenon’

While the olive harvest has always been a time for heightened settler violence against Palestinians, this year’s “situation on the ground is out of control,” said Anton Goodman, Partnership Director of Rabbis for Human Rights, to the Haaretz podcast. The group, which monitors rights abuses in the occupied territories, has never seen “such a peak moment of violence” impacting “so many communities” in the West Bank as they have this season, said Goodman. In the latest of such instances, “dozens” of Israeli settlers attacked the Deir Sharaf Bedouin village and Al-Juneidi dairy factory near Tulkarm on Tuesday, “brandishing clubs and setting fire to parked vehicles,” said CNN.

Türkiye Plans Canal That Could Undermine Montreux Convention

Paul Goble

Source Link

Since the 1990s, Turkish leaders have called for the construction of a canal to the west of Istanbul between the Mediterranean and Black seas to take pressure off the Bosphorus Strait, which passes through the middle of Istanbul. The proposed canal would also circumvent the limitations on the passage of ships established by the Montreux Convention in 1936. In 2011, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made the construction of the canal a centerpiece of his national policies. The enormous costs of this enterprise (estimates now exceed $10 billion), environmental concerns within Türkiye, and security concerns from other countries, most notably Russia, have thus far hindered the construction of the canal (Kazinform, May 7). Last month, the Turkish government launched a new initiative to build the canal, having arrested some of its most prominent opponents and claiming that Ankara will secure funding from private sources, as the canal is expected to facilitate increased trade (Türkiye Gazetesi, October 10).

Moscow views this new push as having little to do with expanding commerce between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It instead sees it as an attempt to annul the Montreux Convention’s limitations, which would allow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) warships to enter the Black Sea and challenge Russia (Voenno-Politicheskaya Analitika, November 6). Russian analysts have signaled that the Kremlin will try to prevent the construction of the canal by playing up Turkish environmental concerns and stressing the consequences of circumventing or annulling the Montreux Convention (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, October 16). Moscow and its allies inside Türkiye have seemingly been successful in blocking the construction of the canal up to now, they appear to expect that they will be able to do so again, an attitude that may increase tensions between Moscow and Ankara in the coming months.

Drone warfare in Ukraine: Ukrainian Mavics and Russia’s Rubikon

Olena Kryzhanivska

Source Link

While Ukrainian military units remain heavily dependent on the Chinese Mavic drones, supply limitations have led to persistent shortages of these systems. It is logical that Ukrainian manufacturers have begun producing Mavic analogues and have already fielded 1,000 domestic systems.

However, this is still far from meeting frontline needs — and it highlights an important difference between Ukrainian and Russian realities. While Russia has a massive inventory of all types of drone systems, Ukrainian solutions remain limited in number, forcing Ukrainian personnel to use these scarce resources with extra care.

In this edition:

Ukraine Starts Mass Production of Domestic Mavics

Ukraine is launching mass production of drones that will serve as an alternative to the popular Mavic models, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky.

“In addition to the contracts we already have, which are funded and operational, we have been looking for alternatives. Those alternatives have been found,” he said.

During the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, the DJI Mavic has become one of the most common reconnaissance tools on the frontline. It is used for surveillance, artillery fire adjustment, and the delivery of improvised munitions.

Toward Humanist Superintelligence

MUSTAFA SULEYMAN

Source Link

REDMOND – For decades, the Turing test was AI researchers’ North Star. Today, it’s been quietly surpassed. With reasoning models and agentic capabilities emerging, and with the pace of AI infrastructure build increasing, we have crossed an inflection point on the journey to superintelligence: the point at which AI exceeds human-level performance at all tasks.

Indeed, the most consequential question for our time is not whether AI will surpass us, because in some ways it already has (try beating an AI at general knowledge), in many other ways, it will, and in some ways we will always be unique. The real question, then, is whether we can shape AI to advance human flourishing rather than undermine it. That is the most important challenge of our time.

To be sure, everyone is primed by now to roll their eyes at AI hype. I get it. But the stakes could not be higher. Science and technology have always been humanity’s greatest engine of progress. Over the last 250 years, that engine has doubled life expectancy, lifted billions of people out of poverty, and given us antibiotics, electricity, and instant global communication. AI is the next chapter in this story. It represents our best shot at accelerating scientific discovery, economic growth, and human well-being. Whenever you hear about AI, this potential is worth keeping in mind.

Vietnam The Fulcrum Of India’s Defence And Strategic Policy Towards ASEAN – Analysis

Dr. Rajaram Panda

Source Link

India and Vietnam held the 15th Defence Policy Dialogue in Hanoi on 10 November. While India’s Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh represented India, Vietnam was represented by Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien, Deputy Minister of National Defence. Both co-chaired the dialogue session. In the dialogue, both sides took significant steps to reinforce their defence partnership with the signing of two major agreements.

At the dialogue, the two sides exchanged views on regional and global situations and issues of shared concern. Lt. Gen. Chien underlined that the traditional friendship and multifaceted cooperation between Vietnam and India have been deepened. Since the establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016 during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Vietnam, bilateral ties have grown increasingly substantive across all pillars, particularly in politics, diplomacy, and defence-security.

Both the countries have deepened defence collaboration between the two countries in various areas, including delegation exchanges and high-level contacts, dialogue and consultation mechanisms, young officer exchanges, training and education, cooperation among services and arms, UN peacekeeping operations, and defence industry development. Vietnam’s foreign policy has remained fiercely independent with focus on self-reliance, peace, friendship, cooperation, and development, diversification and multilateralisation of external relations. Vietnam is ready to cooperate with all countries and international organisations for peace and development.

There are “Four No’s” in Vietnam’s defence policy that underlay in the country’s defence strategy. These are not participating in military alliances, not affiliating with one country to oppose another, not allowing foreign countries to establish military bases or use Vietnamese territory to oppose other countries, and not using force or threatening to use force in international relations. Its stance on resolving disputes in the South China Sea by peaceful means based on international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains firm.

How India’s Himalayan Frontier Lost Faith in Modi’s Rule

Tarushi Aswani

Sourec Link

LEH, LADAKH: Prayer flags flutter under clear skies, in the winter breeze that wraps Ladakh – India’s northernmost frontier. Instead of loud laughter and trailing tourists, an ominous silence lurks around the lanes of Leh, the capital of Ladakh.

Over a month ago, the unimaginable happened in Leh; since then, the cold desert region barely speaks and shrinks at the thought of asking questions and demanding rights.

On September 24, police opened fire on protesters demanding statehood and constitutional safeguards, killing four people and injuring more than 90. The demonstration had begun peacefully, led by activists, students, and other locals, but ended in chaos, as the crowd scattered under gunfire. A curfew and internet bans followed.

Ladakh’s location, wedged between India, China, and Pakistan, makes it one of the world’s most strategic yet fragile frontiers. Local feels that the September 24 incident in Leh has transformed their struggle for constitutional rights into a flashpoint between the people and the state, unsettling a border zone already shadowed by militarization and mistrust.

Demanding Democracy

Six years ago, in 2019, the Modi government revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy. It also bifurcated the erstwhile state into two new Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and a newly separate Ladakh. In Leh, many residents rejoiced, imagining liberation from Kashmir’s neglect. But soon they realized that though they had gained a separate administration under the Union Territory mechanism, they had lost even the limited self-governance once enjoyed by their local councils.

Chhering Dorje Lakrook, former minister and president of the Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA), recounted how the last six years of unemployment, false promises, and robbed rights hardened into resistance. On September 24, when two elderly locals had to be hospitalized after 10 days of hunger strikes, the local youth intensified protests outside the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) office in Leh. Then, stone pelting began, with security forces lobbing tear gas bombs on protesters. After this, vehicles were set on fire and security forces allegedly fired rounds of bullets to dispel the protesters.

The Folly of India’s Illiberal Hegemony

Muhib Rahman

Source Link

In September 2025, tens of thousands of young protesters poured into the streets of Kathmandu and stormed Nepal’s Parliament. They were furious about entrenched corruption and opposed recent attempts to clamp down on free speech and dissent through a social media blackout. Although the authorities killed numerous demonstrators, the uprising forced the resignation of Nepalese Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli and the installation of an interim government. Nepal, however, is only the latest example of a broader trend in South Asia. In 2024, a youth-led uprising ended the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina as prime minister of Bangladesh. Sri Lanka witnessed repeated waves of mass demonstrations, most dramatically in 2022, resulting in the ouster of a corrupt government. And in the Maldives, discontent over corruption, democratic backsliding, and polarizing foreign entanglements have led to similar protests demanding political change.

The uprisings across the region stem from domestic grievances, but that isn’t the whole story. For years, India has embraced the notion that it is the world’s largest democracy. It has championed liberal values and accepted the role—bestowed by the United States—of the Indo-Pacific’s democratic linchpin. Yet when it comes to dealings in its own neighborhood, India has often behaved in decidedly illiberal ways, propping up autocratic regimes and meddling in the affairs of other sovereign countries. New Delhi has treated democratic ideals and human rights as expendable whenever its own strategic interests are at stake.

The United States, wary of alienating its key Indo-Pacific partner, rarely challenges India on how it manages its backyard. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would defer to India in most matters to do with South Asia. Every U.S. administration since has echoed that policy of deference. New Delhi has propped up neighboring governments by bankrolling them, lobbying the West on their behalf, or deploying its security forces. In return, Washington has often stayed silent about any indiscretions it sees, retreating from the promotion of democracy when such an effort might clash with India’s preferences.

Pakistan’s Afghan Retaliation Imminent After TTP’s Twin Attacks

Umair Jamal

Source Link

A suicide bomber strapped with explosives blew himself up outside the District Judicial Complex in Islamabad on Tuesday afternoon, killing 12 people and wounding at least 36, including police officers. This was the first such attack in the Pakistani capital in over three years and points to a sharp escalation in militancy in the country in recent weeks.

Police confirmed that the militant outfit Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack. Investigators in Pakistan are examining how the bomber bypassed multiple checkpoints to reach the heavily guarded judicial area in the capital.

The blast occurred at a time when Islamabad is hosting many international events, including a Pakistan-Sri Lanka cricket match in nearby Rawalpindi. For many Pakistanis, the incident revived painful memories of the 2009 militant assault in Lahore that targeted the Sri Lankan cricket team and local players.

The suicide bombing in Islamabad bombing follows another major TTP attack on the Cadet College Wana in South Waziristan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on Tuesday, when TTP-affiliated militants stormed the military-run school. Around 650 people, including 525 cadets, were present at the time of the attack. Security forces reportedly killed all the attackers. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi told reporters that the operation succeeded without cadet casualties.

The attack in Wana has revived memories of the 2014 Army Public School (APS) massacre in Peshawar, where TTP militants killed over 130 children. The military’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) condemned the militants for attempting to repeat the “barbaric” APS attack.

Pakistani officials have accused Afghanistan of direct involvement in the Wana attack. Naqvi stated that the Wana attackers were Afghan nationals who maintained contact with handlers across the border throughout the night. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif pointed out that such terrorist operations require external support and sanctuaries.

Pakistan’s Generals Are Marching Toward Another Disaster

Aziz Amin and Atif Mashal

Source Link

For the first time, Kabul has come under aerial attack not by a superpower, but by its neighbor, Pakistan. In early October, Pakistani fighter jets struck Afghan territory, including Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktika, claiming to target militants from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In reality, the strikes killed civilians, among them women, children, and three young cricketers. It prompted Kabul to condemn the attack as a blatant violation of national sovereignty and to launch retaliatory attacks that killed 58 Pakistani soldiers.

The irony is unmistakable. A country that once portrayed itself as a sanctuary for Afghan refugees fleeing foreign invasions has now assumed the role of aggressor. For Islamabad’s military establishment, these strikes were meant to project strength. Yet they revealed fragility – a state increasingly trapped in the consequences of its own strategic contradictions.

Mirage of Strength

The Pakistani military’s approach reflects a familiar pattern: projecting external aggression to mask internal disarray. For decades, generals in Rawalpindi have externalized domestic insecurity, blaming instability on Kabul, New Delhi, or Western conspiracies. But the truth lies closer to home. The TTP, which Pakistan now seeks to eliminate through airstrikes and cross-Durand Line operations, is not an imported menace. It is the by-product of Islamabad’s own long-standing policy of nurturing militant networks as instruments of regional influence.

Groups once described as “strategic assets” and “good Taliban” have metastasized into uncontrollable insurgencies that now threaten Pakistan’s own citizens. The military’s double game has come full circle; it is now battling the very forces it helped create.

The latest air campaign, then, is not a show of dominance but an act of desperation. By exporting conflict across the Durand Line, Pakistan’s military hopes to reassert control at home, distract from economic collapse, and re-engineer a sense of purpose amid growing dissent. The tactic is old, but its effectiveness is waning.

A State in Search of Legitimacy

Pakistan’s Afghanistan Policy: From Strategic Depth to Deadlock

Saher Liaqat & Abu Hurrairah Abbasi

Source Link

The Pak-Afghan border skirmishes on the volatile Durand line in early October represent one of the most active confrontations between the two neighbors since the Taliban returned to power in 2022. What started as a border conflict has evolved into a question about the long-standing Pak-Afghan policy, as well as a potential trigger of future instability across the region. Pakistan’s strategic depth has now become its most lethal liability. It has become painfully clear since the recent attacks.

For nearly two decades, the Pakistani policy on Afghanistan was based on the strategic depth, i.e., maintaining a friendly or at least amenable regime in Kabul to cushion the western frontier of Pakistan. The doctrine was based on two key concerns: the threat of militant Islamist organizations, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Indo-Pak rivalry. An amicable or compliant Afghan Taliban was meant to contain both. In the 1990s, Islamabad viewed the Taliban as a means to achieve both objectives, even extending political and diplomatic support to ensure a congenial neighbor. Pakistan continued to maintain ties with the Afghan Taliban after 9/11, while aligning with Washington’s war on terror.

The Taliban regime that came back to power in 2021 turned out to be far more aggressive than expected. The new regime in Kabul has lost the stigma of being a client force and, instead, has been emboldened by its victory over the Western powers, becoming an active defender of Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Despite Islamabad’s pressing for action against the TTP, Kabul terms it an internal issue of Pakistan. Deep ethnic and ideological links between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP have rendered meaningful cooperation.

The situation was further heightened by Pakistan’s fencing of the Durand Line, an act to protect its border, but one that Kabul views as a one-sided institutionalization of a colonial-era cleavage separating Pashtun tribes. The result is a growing mistrust in bilateral relations. Pakistan feels that Afghanistan is a refuge for militants that attack its territory, and the Taliban denies Pakistan’s claims to its sovereignty. Pakistan’s long-cherished notion of strategic depth has now devolved into a strategic deadlock, with both parties increasingly viewing each other as threats rather than allies.

Recent Pak-Afghan Clashes in Perspective

Taiwan moves to counter China’s drone dominance

Brandi Vincent

Source Link

The Albatross II attack and surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drone developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) and its American partner, is on display at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition 2025 (TADTE), in Taipei, Taiwan, on September 19, 2025. (Photo by Daniel Ceng/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Taiwan is strategically moving to expand its arsenal of military and commercial drones, as China mobilizes and modernizes its forces with aims to be ready to seize its smaller, self-governing neighbor as early as 2027.

During a panel hosted by the Center for a New American Security on Tuesday, defense experts discussed Taiwan’s unfolding plans to grow its domestic production pipelines for unmanned aerial systems and its military’s adoption of associated, emerging weapons technologies. They also shed light on ways recent U.S. initiatives, as well as the Russia-Ukraine war, are informing those pursuits.

“China now has the dominance of the supply on a lot of different components that are used in drones,” said Hong-Lun Tiunn, a nonresident fellow at the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology.

“So that is very critical for Taiwan, for us to actually start gradually building up a non-reliant supply chain [and] to basically make sure that — way before the contingency happens — we already have the capacities to manufacture enough and good quality components and drone models that can be integrated into our layered defense strategy,” Tiunn noted.

Although the Chinese government sees the island as a piece of its territory, Taiwan has been self-ruled for more than 75 years.

Tensions between Beijing and Taipei have intensified in the last decade, and particularly since Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled his intent to ensure that the People’s Liberation Army would be prepared and equipped to “unify” or invade its smaller neighbor by 2027.