29 December 2024

Riding With a Trucker, Witnessing India’s Past and Potential

Peter S. Goodman and Hari Kumar

Ragib Khan is a man of impeccable patience. On a sweltering morning at a truck yard in the northern Indian state of Haryana, he climbed into the cab of his 10-wheel tractor-trailer, started the engine and rumbled slowly onto the highway. Over the day, he clung to the slow lane, never exceeding 35 miles an hour, while keeping watch for hazards: animals wandering the road, motorbikes darting in front and holes in the pavement large enough to swallow an axle.

Mr. Khan, 49, is a driver for Chetak Logistics, a major Indian trucking company. He was starting a weeklong journey hauling eight Suzuki cars freshly produced at a nearby factory to a distribution center more than 1,300 miles away in Bengaluru, in the south of the country. He stopped every couple of hours at roadside tea stands and restaurants, devouring snacks and chatting with other truck drivers.

“I drive in a very leisurely manner,” Mr. Khan said. “I don’t mind spending extra time. Half the month, we are on the road. What’s the hurry?”


India should do more than just watch US-China chip war. It’s a strategic opening - Opinion

Swasti Rao

The outgoing Joe Biden administration has been unusually active in recent weeks, making significant decisions with long-term implications. These include lifting certain restrictions on Ukraine and imposing stricter trade measures on China. The structural effects of these moves will become evident in 2025 and beyond. As recently as early December, the administration delivered its third major blow to China’s semiconductor industry. This effort seeks to curtail China’s ability to access and produce advanced chips that could support artificial intelligence for military purposes or pose risks to the United States’ national security.

For India, these developments are not merely a geopolitical spectacle but hold direct strategic relevance. Beyond observing this unfolding competition, New Delhi has an opportunity to assess its role in helping the US build resilience in semiconductor production and supply chains amid the intensifying “chip war.”

A global tug-of-war

The US has maintained dominance in the semiconductor industry since Silicon Valley pioneered the technology. Over time, however, East Asian nations such as Taiwan and Japan emerged as key manufacturing hubs, incentivised by government subsidies. As Chris Miller highlights in his book Chip Wars: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology, this evolution allowed the US to establish critical business and strategic alliances in a region vulnerable to Russian influence during the Cold War. In the current Cold War-style rivalry between the US and China, these alliances remain crucial in countering Beijing’s ambitions for a unipolar Asia.

Thailand’s Defective Democracy Under Elite Control – Analysis

Paul Chambers

Thailand’s political landscape in 2024 continued to reflect a deeply compromised democratic system — characterised by human rights violations and persistent authoritarian tendencies. While the country maintained a superficial pluralism through elected institutions, real power remained concentrated between the royal palace and the Shinawatra political dynasty.

The Pheu Thai–led coalition government demonstrated some progressive impulses. It improved social equality by introducing legislation to legalise same-sex marriage and granting citizenship for 483,000 long-term migrants and children born in Thailand. It also attempted to increase government control over the military, though this initiative ultimately failed due to opposition from coalition partners.

But human rights violations have remained appalling in Thailand. According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, from 18 July 2020 to 31 August 2024 at least 1956 individuals were charged for participating in public assemblies or expressing political opinions across 1302 cases. Of these, 273 individuals in 306 cases have been charged with lese-majeste — insults to the monarchy punishable by up to 15 years in prison.

Myanmar’s Poverty Trap: Inflation And Unemployment Collide – Analysis

Windia Soe

Progress and Setbacks in Poverty Reduction

Myanmar, one of the least developed countries, has significantly reduced poverty over the last decade. Myanmar began a political and economic transition in 2011 under a controversial elected government led by a retired military leader, which led to its first semi-democratic transition in 2015. The 2017 Myanmar Living Conditions Survey (MLCS) reports that the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line decreased significantly, dropping from 48.2% in 2005 to 24.8% in 2017. Between 2011 and 2019, the country achieved significant economic growth, averaging 6 percent annually, and notable reductions in poverty. This progress was driven by economic reforms, increased foreign direct investment, the lifting of sanctions, and growing optimism for stability.

However, Myanmar’s development journey is complex, with the positive trends observed in 2017 were soon disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent political instability in 2021. By the end of 2020, the poverty rate was projected to rise from 6 to 11 percent, driven by declining incomes and limited coping mechanisms among vulnerable households. The 2020 Household Vulnerability Survey revealed that 83.3% of households reported income losses, particularly those reliant on small-scale family businesses.

Central Asia as emerging crucible of a new Great Game - Opinion

MIRAS ZHIYENBAYEV

The specter of great power rivalry, thought by some to be a relic of the 20th century, has been vividly resurrected by the war in Ukraine.

As the dust starts to settle on the immediate repercussions of this conflict, a new, perhaps more nuanced, theater for this competition is taking shape in Central Asia.

While observers have long noted the region’s strategic importance, the anticipated post-Ukraine normalization – a period of recalibration and re-engagement – positions Central Asia as a potential focal point where the interests of Russia, China and the United States are increasingly converging with often palpable tension.

Crucially, unlike other contested spaces, two of these powers share extensive borders with the region, adding a layer of geographical proximity that intensifies the stakes.

Central Asia, comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, finds itself at a critical juncture.

Preparing for Great Power War with China


President Xi Jinping addressed the National Security Commission of the Chinese Communist Party in 2023. According to state news agency Xinhua, he said: “The complexity and difficulty of the national security issues we now face have increased significantly. We must adhere to bottom-line thinking and worst-case-scenario thinking and get ready to undergo the major tests of high winds and rough seas and even perilous, stormy seas.”

As much as the Biden administration’s strategy of “integrated deterrence” attempted to dissuade China from its more aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific region, the crucial question is, what happens if deterrence fails?

In this respect, the strategy proves limited in its ability to address this and related questions if a great power war were to start. While having more forward deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific and bolstering those forces would make a war with China somewhat easier, there are several other aspects of great power war that need to be addressed, especially if integrated deterrence were to fail: preparing for great power war; building a resilient homeland for sustained conflict; rolling back China’s global influence; and preparing for a post-Xi China.

China: Regaining Growth Momentum after the Pandemic

Ligang Song, Yixiao Zhou

Introduction

The growth performance of the Chinese economy since the early 1980s has been historically high, with an average annual growth rate of more than 9 per cent for more than three decades. No other large economies like China’s have ever expanded continuously at such rates for so long. China’s miraculous growth began with productive reforms in the rural sector in the 1980s and accelerated with reforms in urban areas, including, among others, ownership reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and taxation and exchange rate and trade management system reforms in the early 1990s. This was accelerated in the early 2000s by China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), after which goods made in China had more open access to global markets, paving the way for China to become the largest trading nation and a global factory of manufactured products.

China’s domestic reforms go hand in hand with the opening of the economy, each reinforcing the other along the way. The deepening of its integration with the global economy has brought tremendous benefits to the Chinese economy, as evidenced by rapid growth in foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and flows of technology and knowledge. These linkages with the global economy facilitated China’s unprecedented levels of rural–urban migration, enabling the labour force to move from low-productivity work in the rural sector to urban employment with significant efficiency gains at higher income levels.


Trump World Has Trust Issues With Qatar

Nahal Toosi

For more than two decades, Texas A&M University has had a campus here. The facade of its main building carries hints of Aggie maroon and its students say “howdy” per college tradition. But soon, the university will bid farewell to Doha, a break-up apparently caused by the strange politics that mark the U.S.-Qatar relationship.

A&M’s Board of Regents voted in February to phase out the Doha campus. The decision stunned its hundreds of students, along with faculty and others in Doha, who say it came with no real warning or consultation. A&M’s top brass said they were leaving Qatar because the university needed to focus its resources closer to home and because of instability in the Middle East.

I’m skeptical of those reasons. The ultra-wealthy Qatar Foundation — a state-supported non-profit — covers A&M’s operational costs and those of other U.S. campuses in a state-of-the-art neighborhood known as Education City. And the Middle East isn’t exactly a stranger to instability; the A&M campus, which is focused on engineering, launched in 2003, the year the U.S. invaded Iraq. Qatar itself is a safe zone in a restive region.



What Assad’s Fall Means for Israel and Its Regional Relations

Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen

From an Israeli strategic calculus, the unexpected and precipitous fall of Assad at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a simultaneous cause for cautious optimism and concern. Assad’s fall removes the final keystone of Iran’s arc of proxy and allied resistance through which it was able to engage Israel across its borders. With Hezbollah decapitated and depleted in Lebanon, and Iran’s resupply land route through Syria gone, Israel has removed a significant threat to its security.

However, what comes next from Syria is unknown. In keeping with the pragmatism that has characterized his messaging to the outside world, Syria’s de facto new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (more popularly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) reportedly told Palestinian factions in Syria that they must disarm, and has stated that they are not seeking conflict “whether with Israel or anyone else and … will not let Syria be used as a launchpad for attacks.”

These words and Jolani’s vow to uphold the 1974 disengagement agreement that saw a buffer zone established between Israel and Syria may be cautiously welcomed by Israel. But its experience of being blindsided by Hamas on October 7 will keep it skeptical of the largely untested al-Qaida offshoot. These calculations prompted Israel to take rapid military action — within days destroying Syria’s military capabilities, seeking to neutralize the capacity for HTS or other groups to pose a military threat. Al-Jolani has accused Israel of using “false pretexts” to justify their actions, given the exit of Iran and Hezbollah from the scene.

Ex-Mossad Agents Reveal Details Of How They Turned Hezbollah’s Communications Devices Into Bombs

Thomas Newdick

Key details of the Israeli intelligence service’s operation targeting members of Hezbollah with exploding pagers and walkie-talkies in September have been revealed. You can read our reporting of the first wave of explosions here, and the second wave here. Israel didn’t initially admit responsibility for the blasts but was always acknowledged to have been behind them — although exactly how it orchestrated them had remained mysterious.

The new information about the campaign was provided by two recently retired senior Mossad agents, who spoke with the 60 Minutes news magazine broadcast on the CBS television network. Both wore masks while interviewed and gave false names.

First, it’s worth recapping how the operations played out.

The first wave of explosions, on September 17, targeted pagers used by Hezbollah.

At around 3:30 p.m. local time, it seems the pagers were triggered simultaneously, by a specific message. The message was one that looked, at least, as if it was sent by Hezbollah leadership. The detonation then happened with a slight delay.

The second wave of explosions, on the following day, targeted walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah.

No sure or easy path to peace in post-war Syria

Chelsea Johnson

Images emerging from Syria over the past week have shown jubilation on the streets, as millions celebrate the end of 24 years of repression under Bashar al-Assad.

It is rare for rebels to manage to tip the scales in their favor and win a war outright after such a long and protracted stalemate. But the obvious next question is: what comes next? Looking at the handful of similar examples, history suggests that new forms of violence could continue to threaten Syria’s political future.

In Libya, an umbrella coalition of rebel forces known as the National Transition Council defeated Muammar Gaddafi’s government in 2011. Meanwhile, in South Sudan, victory against Omar al-Bashir came in the form of a successful referendum on independence that same year.

Looking further back, in Idi Amin’s Uganda, an alliance was brokered by neighboring Tanzania between two rival rebellions in 1979. Their joint military campaign ended in Amin’s defeat soon after.

The immediate aftermath of rebel victory in each of these cases points to one common lesson. Where a fragmented coalition of armed groups finds itself in a political vacuum, more violence – not less – is probably on the horizon.

How Tariffs Can Help America

Michael Pettis

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has promised to implement a suite of aggressive tariffs on American trade partners, including a blanket 20 percent levy on goods from abroad. Although his supporters claim that these tariffs will strengthen U.S. manufacturing and create jobs, critics contend that they will fuel inflation, suppress employment, and perhaps tip the economy into a recession. As a demonstration of what will go wrong, many cite the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised U.S. tariffs across a variety of imports. “Judging by his proposed import tariff policy,” wrote the American Enterprise Institute economist Desmond Lachman, “it is evident that Donald Trump does not remember our country’s disastrous economic experience with the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Trade Act.”

But these claims only show how confused many experts are when it comes to trade—on both sides of the tariff debate. Tariffs are neither a panacea nor necessarily injurious. Their effectiveness, like that of any economic policy intervention, depends on the circumstances under which they are implemented. Smoot-Hawley was a failure at its time, but its failure tells analysts very little about the effect that tariffs would have on the United States today. That is because now, unlike then, the United States is not producing far more than it can consume. Ironically, the history of Smoot-Hawley says a lot more about how tariffs today would affect a country such as China, whose excess production more closely resembles that of the United States in the 1920s than does the United States of now.

The Year of Populism

Frank Furedi

While watching farmers protest in Belgium, France, Netherlands, and Germany during the early months of 2024, I was reminded of Wordsworth’s words: “Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive!” Tom, a Flemish farmer who drove his tractor to Brussels in February to protest against proposed environmental laws, told me that the media tried to scare off the public from supporting his cause by calling his movement far right and populist. He smiled and said, “They call me a populist—fine, I’ll take that!”

Tom has never been interested in politics, but like hundreds of thousands of people, he decided that he wanted his voice to be heard. In the course of 2024, populism demonstrated that it had a formidable staying power. In the European Union, populist parties put the political establishment on the defensive. In the United States, it was the sprawling MAGA movement and not the old Republican establishment that bore responsibility for the victory of Donald Trump.

Yet the populist moment of 2024 was a long time coming. Its influence has been growing in Europe since the turn of the century. According to a 2022 study conducted by more than 100 political scientists for the security firm Solace Global, around 32 percent of Europeans had voted for anti-establishment parties. This was a significant increase from 20 percent in the early 2000s and 12 percent in the early 1990s. Since the publication of this study, the influence of populism has continued to expand, leading to its impressive surge this year.

A Newly Declassified Memo Sheds Light on America’s Post-Cold War Mistakes

Fred Kaplan

Once in a great while, a diplomatic memorandum—the outline of a proposed change in policy sent from a foreign service officer to his political masters back in Washington—has momentous impact. The most famous of these is George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” of February 1946, which urged “a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

Kennan, who was chargรฉ d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, wrote the 5,000-word memo while debates raged at home over how to deal with the Soviet Union’s turn from wartime ally to Cold War adversary. The memo made a huge dent in this debate when Kennan published a shortened version of it, under the title “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. (The journal identified the author only as “X,” but word spread that he was Kennan.)

Now a similarly long memo, written nearly 50 years later, in the early days of the post–Cold War era and post-Soviet Russia, raises questions about how the world today might be different if Bill Clinton had heeded it as much as Harry Truman heeded Kennan’s.

Big Oil backtracks on renewables push as climate agenda falters

Ron Bousso

Major European energy companies doubled down on oil and gas in 2024 to focus on near-term profits, slowing down - and at times reversing - climate commitments in a shift that they are likely to stick with in 2025.

The retrenchment by oil majors comes after governments around the world slowed the rollout of clean energy policies and delayed targets as energy costs soared following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Big European energy companies that had invested heavily in the clean energy transition found their share performance lagging U.S. rivals Exxon and Chevron, which had kept their focus on oil and gas.

Against this backdrop, the likes of BP and Shell this year sharply slowed their plans to spend billions on wind and solar power projects and shifted spending to higher-margin oil and gas projects.


PLA Steps up Security Cooperation With Russia in 2024

Yu-cheng Chen

On November 29, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia conducted their ninth “Joint Strategic Air Patrol (่”ๅˆ็ฉบไธญๆˆ˜็•ฅๅทก่ˆช),” their second of 2024 (People’s Daily Online, November 30). During the operation, the PRC deployed its H-6N bomber, the first time the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has introduced a bomber with nuclear capabilities into such patrols. The flight traversed the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea without entering Japanese or Republic of Korea’s airspace, though it still garnered attention from the United States and regional actors (Global Times, November 29; Reuters, November 30). This patrol was the first such military cooperation conducted following the US presidential election, though it was not necessarily unusual—the seventh joint strategic air patrol took place at a similar time in 2023 (MND, December 14, 2023).

The patrol is part of increasing Sino-Russian military cooperation, which seeks to increase deterrence against the United States and its allies, as well as seeking to more proactively assert the two countries’ rights and interests. Over the past few months, the two countries have coordinated in two maritime exercises, as well as joint maritime law enforcement activities in the Arctic Sea. This latter exercise indicates the PRC’s growing interest in using Russia to expand its presence in the Arctic.

A baseline scenario for the global economy in 2025 - Opinion

Mohamed A. El-Erian

It is something of a tradition every December to take stock of the year that is ending and consider what might lie ahead. This is true on a personal level: in my family, we tend to do this around the dinner table. But it is also true more broadly, with the time of year inviting an examination of the intersection of economics, national politics and global geopolitics.

You would be forgiven if, as a starting point, you expected these three areas to be in alignment. After all, they are deeply interconnected, which suggests self-reinforcing dynamics. But 2024 brought some unusual dispersion in this relationship that actually widened, rather than narrowed, over the course of the year.

Begin with geopolitics. In 2024, Russia secured a greater advantage in the war in Ukraine than the consensus forecasts of a year ago anticipated. Similarly, the human suffering and physical destruction resulting from the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip exceeded most observers' already grim expectations and spread to other countries, such as Lebanon. The apparent impunity of the strong, together with the absence of effective means of preventing dire humanitarian crises, has deepened the sense for many that the global order is fundamentally imbalanced and lacks any enforceable guardrails.

The Perils Of Escalation With Russia Are Still Very Real

Ramzy Mardini

As Western powers continue to provide and approve Ukraine’s use of advanced weaponry against Russia, the veracity of Vladimir Putin’s deterrent threats against such provocations is increasingly called into question.

Throughout the war, each step up the escalation ladder taken by the West—whether supplying Ukraine with fighter jets, long-range missiles, and, most recently, $20 billion in aid funded by seized Russian assets—was preceded by warnings of dire consequences from Moscow. However, no retaliation against the United States or its NATO partners has resulted. Now, this anticlimactic pattern has led many, including President-elect Donald Trump’s designated envoy to Ukraine-Russia, to believe that Putin’s nuclear threats are more bluff than bluster, arguing that the United States should “lean in” to challenge Russia rather than back down. Now, many contend that the unexpected fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria dealt a blow to Russia’s geopolitical standing, fueling more calls to capitalize on Moscow’s weakened position. 

Yet, assuming limited risk or expected advantage in continuing escalation against Russia is dangerously flawed. This hardline approach misreads and oversimplifies the dynamics of escalation and overlooks Russia's increasing conventional military capabilities.

What Happens In The Ocean When Two Cyclones Collide


Tropical cyclones (TCs) not only whip up air masses in the atmosphere, they also churn up water masses in the areas of the ocean that are in their path. When two cyclones collide and merge, these interactions between the ocean and the atmosphere can intensify considerably, as Prof. Dr. Oliver Wurl and Dr Jens Meyerjรผrgens from the University of Oldenburg report in a paper published in the journal Tellus A: Dynamic Meteorology and Oceanography.

The two researchers analysed the encounter between two relatively weak tropical cyclones in the Indian Ocean in 2021, TC Seroja and TC Odette, and found that effects occurred that have otherwise only been observed with much stronger cyclones. Since the frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones is increasing as a result of global warming, this type of convergence – and the resulting extreme interactions between air and sea – could become more frequent in the future, the study concludes.

45 Days In Ukraine, 1,000 Days In War – Essay

Kaspars ฤขฤ“rmanis

The title of this essay would have been a little bit different if I had spent five more days in Odesa as planned. “50 days in Ukraine, 1,005 days in war.” That would be a neat summary of my time in the country, where I visited several cities and experienced everyday life. That’s what this essay is about: personal feelings in a country engulfed in war. However, because of the Russian air attack on Odesa on November 18, I changed my plans. I left Ukraine on November 19 — the 1,000th day since the full-scale war began on February 24, 2022. I left not so much out of fear — I was already used to the sirens warning of air alerts, and I had experienced the attacks of the Iranian Shahed drones. Odesans themselves told me not to stay, and I guess I understand why. They have seen and experienced too much to watch others take unnecessary risks. It’s not about courage anymore; it is about living in permanent stress, where one grows tired of heroism, courage, and killing. Nobody talks about these qualities. There is just a wish to have a normal life.

A Brief Introduction About Myself and Ukraine

This was my sixth and longest visit to Ukraine, and my second during the full-scale war. My story with Ukraine started when I was around 13 years old. I played ice hockey, and my team participated in the Eastern European Hockey League competitions. Latvian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian teams took part in this tournament once a year, and we went to Kyiv. Back in Latvia, people asked me how it was: “Did you like Ukraine?” I answered, “Yes,” and it was an honest answer. Later, as a volunteer in Switzerland, I met other Ukrainians with whom I still have very friendly relationships.

Risks of Military Confrontation in Arctic Increasing, Say U.S. and Russian Officials

John Grady

The Arctic is “where the confrontation of the world’s leading states is unfolding,” the head of the Russian Navy said at a recent forum in St. Petersburg where regional cooperation had traditionally dominated the agenda.

“In addition to political and economic measures to contain Russia in the Arctic, unfriendly states are increasing their military presence in the region,” said Adm. Aleksandr Moiseev, who took command of the Russian Navy in March. He specifically mentioned the United States’ re-establishing the Second Fleet in 2018 and the 2021 creation of NATO’s Joint Force Command in Norfolk.

Moissev said one reason for the rise in tensions has been Moscow’s suspension from the eight-member Arctic Council, following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the placing of economic sanctions on Russian financial institutions, businesses and individuals.

The other seven nations in the forum are NATO members.

He added that updated Arctic strategies, including the United States, “enshrine an anti-Russian focus and also allow for the thesis that the nationalization of the Northern Sea Route by the Russian Federation is inadmissible. Also, unfriendly states are increasing their military presence in the region.”

The implications of emerging changes in land warfare for the focused all-domain defence force

Major General Chris Smith DSC AM CSC

Many elements of 21st-century warfare echo those of the 20th century. The nature of war as a brutal and fundamentally human endeavour has endured despite the introduction of stealth aircraft, precision missiles, drones, satellites and cyber capabilities to contemporary battlefields. Making sense of this context is just one of many challenges confronting the Australian Army and how it best contributes to the joint force.

This report is an analysis of emergent features of contemporary warfare coupled with a range of lessons learned from the history of war relevant to developing solutions for how land forces might contribute to the all-domain ADF. The author’s analysis is proffered in good faith for the sake of further discussion and contest of ideas.

The first section of this report explores the effects of emerging technologies and social circumstances on warfare and how armed forces might adapt. The second section examines the implications of the features of contemporary battlefields for the Army’s role in the focused ADF. The third section explores the implications of the tendency for wars to go on much longer than the belligerents would like. The fourth section explores the often-overlooked role of land forces in deterrence. The fifth and final section makes note of the challenges surrounding the logistics of ADF land warfare in a maritime environment and discusses the relative merits of heavier land forces in the Indo-Pacific.

The AI Export Dilemma: Three Competing Visions for U.S. Strategy

Sam Winter-Levy

Introduction

How widely should the United States share its artificial intelligence (AI) technologies? This question may soon become a defining issue for U.S. foreign policy and economic strategy, yet it has received surprisingly limited public attention. While Washington focuses intensely on constraining AI advances by China, another group of emerging economies—including states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—are increasingly positioning themselves as influential players in the AI landscape. U.S. policymakers are only just beginning to grapple with the opportunities and dilemmas posed by such countries’ AI aspirations.

On the one hand, the growing global appetite for U.S. AI technology—including advanced chips, massive data centers, and frontier models—can be a source of leverage to court so-called swing states and shore up American influence. And U.S. technology companies, facing increasingly steep capital, land, and energy requirements as they scramble to conduct what one analyst has called “the largest infrastructure buildout that humanity has ever seen,” see partnerships with various foreign countries as an answer to many of their prayers. Yet the proliferation of powerful AI systems, even to ostensibly friendly nations, comes with serious risks—including intellectual property theft, misuse by authoritarian regimes, and the siphoning of some of the United States’ most advanced technologies to the Chinese military and other adversaries. Balancing these interests will be a central task for U.S. policymakers for years and probably decades to come.

Israel Loosened Its Rules to Bomb Hamas Fighters, Killing Many More Civilians

Patrick Kingsley, Natan Odenheimer, Bilal Shbair, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay, Sheera Frenkel and Adam Sella

At exactly 1 p.m. on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel’s military leadership issued an order that unleashed one of the most intense bombing campaigns in contemporary warfare.

Effective immediately, the order granted mid-ranking Israeli officers the authority to strike thousands of militants and military sites that had never been a priority in previous wars in Gaza. Officers could now pursue not only the senior Hamas commanders, arms depots and rocket launchers that were the focus of earlier campaigns, but also the lowest-ranking fighters.

In each strike, the order said, officers had the authority to risk killing up to 20 civilians.

The order, which has not previously been reported, had no precedent in Israeli military history. Mid-ranking officers had never been given so much leeway to attack so many targets, many of which had lower military significance, at such a high potential civilian cost.

It meant, for example, that the military could target rank-and-file militants as they were at home surrounded by relatives and neighbors, instead of only when they were alone outside.

Space industrial base racing to meet growing demand for military satellites

Mikayla Easley

Over the next decade, the Defense Department intends to proliferate hundreds of new military satellites on orbit that will provide improved space-based capabilities for warfighters. While the effort has been lauded as an ambitious and innovative plan to revolutionize space acquisition and development for the modern era, it has also exposed critical vulnerabilities in the United States’ ability to manufacture and deliver systems at scale — an issue that both the Pentagon and industrial base are working to learn from moving forward.

“We do not have the industrial capacity built today to get after this,” Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. Michael Guetlein said Dec. 7 during a panel at the Reagan National Defense Forum. “We’re going to have to start getting comfortable with the lack of efficiency in the industrial base to start getting excess capacity so that we have something to go to in times of crisis and conflict.”

Resilience through proliferation

Historically, the Defense Department tended to develop a few very large and exquisite satellites to conduct critical military missions. But with the growing use of space as a warfighting domain by both the United States and its adversaries, the Pentagon is now focusing on different ways to build resilience in its space systems — such as by launching hundreds of smaller, inexpensive satellites for a single constellation.