Indian Strategic Studies: 12/27/24

27 December 2024

Talent and Tech: Fielding and Wielding New Systems Requires the Right People

Jon Reisher

On a cold November morning in the mountains of Utah, “A. C.” produces a surrender appeal in Russian using a standalone artificial intelligence tool kit known as the Ghost Machine. A psychological operations instructor from the PSYWAR School, part of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, in a matter of minutes he builds, translates, and disseminates a notional message directing the opposing force to surrender via a man-portable loudspeaker. The goal is to dislodge the entrenched enemy forces by persuading them to give up, saving both lives and ammunition in a real combat scenario. It is apparent from the lessons of Ukraine that both will be at a premium should the United States find itself in a similar scenario against a peer adversary.

A. C., a combat-tested prior infantryman, is a noncommissioned officer with operational psychological operations experience in the US Southern Command area of responsibility. He is also a full-stack software developer and drone pilot. During the week of operational testing in November, A. C. integrated with like-minded, tech-savvy joint special operations forces at 19th Special Forces Group’s field experimentation training exercise (FETX) at Camp Williams, Utah. A. C. not only used generative AI tools to create and disseminate products but also leveraged his mixture of tactical and technical skills to build sensors, conduct reconnaissance, find downed pilots, and set conditions on a simulated modern battlefield. A. C. is not alone. He is one of many special operations forces at the FETX that represent a growing but underappreciated group of service members that can develop, integrate, and deliver exquisite technical capabilities faster and cheaper than existing Army and DoD systems and processes.

China-India Border Détente: An Uneasy Peace In Asia – Analysis

Girish Linganna

In October 2024, after nearly four years of fraught diplomatic negotiations, India and China reached an agreement to disengage troops from key friction points along the line-of-actual control (LAC). The accord, focussing on the long-disputed areas of Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh, is a rare breakthrough in an otherwise acrimonious relationship. It entails coordinated patrolling and the creation of temporary buffer zones aimed at preventing future clashes. For two nations locked in a cycle of mistrust and competition, the agreement offers a much-needed pause, but it does little to address the root causes of their enduring rivalry.

The LAC, which serves as the de facto boundary between India and China, has been a source of contention since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. This latest détente comes after the most serious military confrontation in decades—the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which left casualties on both sides for the first time in 45 years and fundamentally altered the trajectory of bilateral relations. Despite the recent de-escalation, the structural drivers of conflict remain unresolved, raising doubts about whether this agreement represents a turning point or is merely a lull before the next crisis.

Smuggled Commodities From India and Bangladesh are Lifelines for Myanmar’s Arakan

Rajeev Bhattacharyya

Every afternoon, about two dozen people cutting across communities and genders gather on the banks of the Kaladan River at Paletwa town in Myanmar’s Chin State. They gaze at all the boats coming in from the border with India; most of them sail downstream to different townships in neighboring Rakhine State.

After a while, a bigger boat laden with commodities and covered with a blue tarpaulin sheet docks nearby. Two more boats over-packed with goods arrive in quick succession at the same spot. A crowd of mostly shopkeepers and traders, heavily dependent on the commodities smuggled from Mizoram in India, heads toward the boats and begins to untie the ropes holding down the tarpaulin sheets. The cargo is transferred to some vehicles and motorbikes that have also arrived to transport the items to other destinations near the town.

As at Paletwa in southern Chin State, people in Rakhine State depend on commodities smuggled from neighboring India and Bangladesh as supply routes from mainland Myanmar are blocked. Owing to a lack of motorable roads in Arakan, the region held by the Arakan Army in Rakhine and southern China states, commodities are mostly ferried in boats.

Afghanistan’s Qoshtepa Canal and Water Security in Central Asia

Notwithstanding America’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan following a long, costly, and largely unsuccessful intervention there, the United States continues to have national interests at stake in the country. Those interests require continued attention, argue Center for the National Interest Senior Fellow Andrew Kuchins and his coauthors, and possibly even limited forms of engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban, who rule in Kabul following America’s abandonment of its two-decade effort to remake Afghan politics, economics, and society. Intense geopolitical competition across Central Asia raises the potential costs should the United States wholly turn from Afghanistan and its neighborhood.

In this context, Afghanistan’s massive Qoshtepa Canal project poses both challenges and opportunities.To stimulate agricultural production and economic development in northern Afghanistan—and to leave their literal mark on it, with an irrigation system visible from space—the Taliban authorities are pursuing a decades-dormant dream in excavating the extensive canal network. Yet they are doing so in a manner that might both fuel conflict with states downstream along the strained Amu Darya River and contribute to further environmental degradation across a region already scarred by the Soviet Union’s highly destructive irrigation mega-projects.

THE STATE OF BANGLADESH'S POLITICAL GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIETY

Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile

Fieldwork for the 2024, The State of Bangladesh's Political Governance, Development, and Society: According to its Citizens– was conducted from February 10 to March 6, 2024. More than 6,700 men and women were polled across the country. Following data cleaning, a final sample of 6,510 respondents was achieved. Respondents are 50% male and 50% female, aged 18 years or older. Table 1.1 below shows the distribution of age across various categories.

More than half (64.7%) of respondents were surveyed from rural areas whereas the remaining 35.3% respondents were surveyed from urban areas.

Education levels varied across respondents. Just over a fifth (21.5%) have no formal education, with no significant difference among men and women. The largest proportion (66.7%) have education up to primary level, with a higher proportion of women (46.7%) compared to men (39.5%). The trend is reversed among the 29.0% of respondents with higher secondary school education with a higher proportion of men (32.5%) compared to women (25.5%). Only 5.0% possess a graduate-level and above education.

China’s Next Step in Modernizing the People’s Liberation Army: A New Reserve Service System

Joshua M. Arostegui

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party’s massive active-duty army—the largest in the world—understates the manpower available to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during a future protracted war. Despite the hundreds of thousands of combat troops garrisoned around the country, a prolonged war of attrition will require more than movement of forces from one side of the country to another. The People’s Liberation Army’s reserve force has prepared to supplement troops and units since 1983, but unlike its US and Russian counterparts, China has yet to use its reservists during a time of war.1 Nevertheless, Xi Jinping has emphasized the modernization and restructuring of PLA reserve forces in recent years. Chinese Premier Li Qiang, when announcing the 2024 defense budget, explicitly stated one of the main priorities for the People’s Liberation Army would be expansion of its reserve force.2

How much Chinese cyber sabotage will Trump tolerate?

William A Stoltz and Michael Rogers

US President-elect Donald Trump has named most of the members of his proposed cabinet. However, he’s yet to reveal key appointees to America’s powerful cyber warfare and intelligence institutions.

These include positions like national cyber director, director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and National Security Council cyber lead. These figures will be vital in securing America’s cyber security at a crucial time.

We believe there are three flashpoints that could be particularly troublesome for the incoming administration:

how Trump will balance his economic and security priorities
how his administration can effectively deter Chinese digital disruption
how it will address the suspicions among some MAGA supporters of the powers of the intelligence “deep state.”

Intensifying Chinese cyber espionage

Chinese electronic surveillance and espionage activities against the US have reached an all-time high in terms of level of effort and, most importantly, effectiveness.

Post-Assad Syria: What It Means for China

Scott N. Romaniuk & László Csicsmann

The abrupt ouster of the Assad regime in Syria after five decades of its reign caught governments around the world by surprise. This sudden transition of power and major shift in the geopolitics of the Middle East have implications for many countries. In light of this new normal, we evaluate the implications and potential prospects for Beijing in the political, economic, and security realms.

Türkiye sees the removal of Assad as a chance to normalize relations with Syria through the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group. The fall of Assad signifies the loss of one of Putin’s significant Middle East allies, which reportedly led to the dismantling of some military equipment and the withdrawal of military personnel from Syria. The possibility of a Syrian-style revolution in Tehran and the necessity of Iran’s increased commitment to thwarting outside pressures have become major considerations. Losing Assad might also make it harder for Iran to supply Hezbollah, its proxy group in Lebanon. Similar to Türkiye, the United States (US) and Israel have a unique chance to strengthen their power in the country and the Middle East at the expense of Iranian and Russian sway.

Turkey Replacing Iran As The Dominant Foreign Player In Syria – Analysis

Kian Sharifi

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government at the hands of rebels, including Ankara-backed factions, has effectively made Turkey the dominant foreign actor in Syria at the expense of Iran and its ally Russia.

Turkey and Iran have competed for years for influence in the South Caucasus, and this rivalry appears to have now extended to the Levant.

“The Islamic republic has had significant misgivings about Turkish influence in Syria, be it economic, political, or military, long before the fall of Assad. But with the loss of Iran’s sole state ally in the region, these concerns are set to be magnified exponentially,” said Behnam Taleblu, an Iran analyst at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

Still, experts say Turkey’s rising profile in Syria to the detriment of Iran does not necessarily mean Ankara-Tehran relations will be significantly impacted.

What Is Turkey After?

Since the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran and Russia backed Assad while Turkey supported rebel groups opposed to his rule.

How Iran Lost Syria

Hamidreza Azizi

Thirteen years after the start of the Syrian uprising, the swift and dramatic fall of Bashar al-Assad shattered the perception of a stable, albeit repressive, status quo. For much of the past decade, Assad’s regime, bolstered by unwavering support from Iran and Russia, brutally suppressed dissent. What began as an uprising in 2011 evolved into a devastating civil war that eventually settled into an uneasy stalemate. Despite persistent challenges, Assad’s grip on power appeared secure. Yet his regime collapsed within days of the start of a coordinated rebel offensive.

Turkey and Israel in Syria: Common ground for the best of enemies

Konstantinos Bogdanos

They are supposed to be geopolitical arch-rivals. They are also historical opponents. And especially during the last years they have often engaged in heated diplomatic — or not so diplomatic — exchanges. However, as of late they seem to be collaborating harmoniously in Syria.

Israel and Turkey relations have been on the edge for quite some time. While Tel Aviv is waging war against what it sees as an existential threat in Gaza and Lebanon, Ankara is keen on marketing itself as the champion and protector of Muslims in the Middle East, taking under its wing the Palestinian cause.

Animosity runs deep. Only a month ago, Turkish President Erdogan announced his decision to cut ties with Israel. “We, as the Republic of Turkey and its government, have currently severed all relations with Israel”, he said, as he put forward a trade embargo and a genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

As the Turkish government formally recalled its ambassador to Israel for consultations and Israel evacuated its embassy in Ankara for security reasons, Erdogan vowed to do everything in his power to hold the Israeli Prime Minister accountable for the Gaza “genocide”.

The New 6th-Generation Fighter Summed Up in 4 Words

Caleb Larson

The Future of Aviation?: The Tempest Fighter Project, a sixth-generation aircraft initiative led by the UK with Italy and Japan, is part of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).

-The Tempest aims to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon in the 2030s, featuring cutting-edge stealth, AI, advanced sensors, and next-generation propulsion.

Tempest Fighter: The UK, Italy, and Japan’s Answer to Sixth-Generation Air Combat

The Tempest Fighter Project is a collaborative next-generation fighter project led by the United Kingdom and joined by Italy and Japan to develop an advanced sixth-generation combat aircraft.

Launched as part of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), the project aims to leverage the design and engineering strengths of the three countries involved to build the Tempest.

Once realized, the Tempest is set to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon sometime in the 2030s.

The Tempest is a sixth-generation aircraft that will be stealthy and incorporate artificial intelligence to bring network-centric warfare to the air.

Offensive strategy: The EU’s economic security

Carl Bildt

‘Economic security’ has become a Brussels buzzword in recent years, shaped by a blend of pressure from Washington and Brussels’ own protectionist instincts. In sports, playing defence rarely wins championships. The economic security agenda is defensive; it might slow the decline, but it will not reverse it. What Europe needs is a bold, offensive strategy.

A defensive strategy

From trade defence measures to restrictions and controls, initiatives abound. There is talk of millions, or even billions, being poured into so-called strategic projects in the corridors of the European Union.

Some of these measures are undoubtedly necessary. Yet Europe must tread carefully to avoid a global subsidy race or exacerbate the regulatory burdens that already hinder its competitiveness. In a world where the United States is the innovation superpower and China dominates production, the EU cannot afford to define itself solely as the regulation superpower.

A Pathway to Peace in Ukraine

Samuel Charap

For those seeking to end Russia’s devastating war in Ukraine, the election of Donald Trump presents a crucial opportunity. In direct contrast to U.S. President Joe Biden, whose administration has held to a policy of unwavering support for Ukraine without pushing for a defined endgame to the war, Trump has focused almost exclusively on that endgame. He has long made clear his intention to bring the two sides to the negotiating table soon after he takes office and maybe even before that. Within weeks of his election victory, he named a retired general and former senior official, Keith Kellogg, as special envoy for Russia-Ukraine, underscoring the priority he and his administration will place on winding down the war.

This coming radical shift in the U.S. approach to the war could revive negotiations that have been effectively dormant since April 2022. Back then, in the first weeks of the war, Russia and Ukraine conducted several rounds of talks in person and online aimed at ending the conflict; although a framework for peace called the Istanbul Communiqué was drawn up, an agreement was never finalized. In the run-up to and since Trump’s election, however, there have been signs that both Kyiv and Moscow might be ready to return to the table. This is particularly true of the Ukrainians, who have been losing ground—as well as people and energy generation capacity—for two years and need urgent relief before their manpower situation becomes critical. Russia also faces some challenges: it is taking more ground by the day but at an extremely high price, and the Kremlin wants to lock in those gains without having to incur enormous costs indefinitely.

Farce Then Tragedy: Russian Views Of The West And What They Mean For Ukraine – Analysis

Kadri Liik

The view from the Kremlin

It was about half-way through the press conference when Donald Trump became agitated; cutting off reporters and talking over his co-speaker, Vladimir Putin. “What happened to Hillary Clinton’s emails? 33,000 emails gone, just gone. I think in Russia they wouldn’t be gone so easily.” Even those following the event on Twitter could almost physically sense the horror engulfing the United States officials present. A very public embarrassment was unfolding before their very eyes, and there was nothing they could do to stop it. Fiona Hill, Trump’s Russia adviser at the time, later admitted that she had looked for a fire alarm to pull and considered faking a medical emergency, just to end it.

Karl Marx wrote (citing Hegel) that historical facts and individuals appear “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce”. One wonders, though, whether the opposite could also be true. The Putin-Trump summit in Helsinki in July 2018 sticks in the memory as the farcical apogee of a wobbly relationship: a rollercoaster of expectations and frustrations, ambitions and setbacks, but all in an often ludicrous atmosphere. Indeed, Trump’s erratic personality likely jolted his partners – including Putin – out of their habitual ways. It made them behave more cautiously and refrain from risk-taking.

After primacy: US military options in contemporary East Asia

Melanie W. Sisson and Dan Patt

The United States has an enduring interest in supporting conditions that minimize the likelihood of war in East Asia. Since 1945, this has meant maintaining robust defense alliances that temper intra-regional insecurities and dispatching the U.S. military to underwrite the unimpeded transit of goods and people through the region’s seas and skies.

For decades, the United States achieved these goals by being able “to transport overwhelming air, sea, and land power to far-off places.” The operation of this model of expeditionary power projection in East Asia was enabled, in part, by the United States’ clear military technological advantage over the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This fact allowed the U.S. military wide latitude, as described in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), to “deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted.” It also allowed policymakers to be confident that the U.S. military could be used to address acute conflicts of interest, often without requiring significant trade-offs across cost, risk, reputation, and the ability to maintain operations elsewhere around the world.

The military balance in East Asia no longer clearly favors the United States and is not likely to again. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is becoming an increasingly professionalized and well-equipped force capable of contesting U.S. action across a broad range of military contingencies.

Ukrainian M1 Abrams Commander Talks Tank’s Major Vulnerabilities, Advantages In Combat

Howard Altman

Last week, several Russian first-person view (FPV) drones struck a U.S.-made M1A1 Abrams tank in the Kursk region, but the crew was able to survive. The vehicle’s commander lauded the American armor for saving their lives, but also highlighted some major vulnerabilities it has on today’s drone-drenched battlefield. In particular, he offered important insights on how Ukraine is adapting its M1s to survive — lessons that could prove very valuable for the U.S. Army in future conflicts.

The drone attack was “the first time that the crew survived multiple hits while inside a disabled Abrams,” the tank commander told Rob Lee (@RALee85), a senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Michael Kofman (@KofmanMichael), a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment. “Actually, there were 4-6 direct hits. The crew survived, and even without injuries. God bless America.”

A video of that attack, by an FPV drone with a fiber optic cable, was posted on Russian telegram channels. It showed the Abrams rumbling down a snow-dusted roadway and then cut to it being struck by an FPV drone, which disabled the tank. The video then shows another FPV drone strike on the left side side just below the turret. All the strikes came within about two minutes, the commander, who is with the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade, told Lee and Kofman.

Paper Urges Leaders to Embrace Nontraditional Commands

Army leaders selected for command positions can set themselves up for success both prior to and while commanding, regardless of the type of unit they’re tapped to lead, according to a new paper published by the Association of the U.S. Army.

“All officers have an unspoken level of nervousness and apprehension going into their command positions—and fears and uncertainty are likely heightened when officers are going into nontraditional command roles,” write authors Capts. Andrew Lightsey and Tanner Cook, Col. Xavier Colón and Lt. Col. Chaveso Cook. “There is a lot of written guidance on basic branch and operational commands, but there is not much to be found on ‘alternative’ leadership positions.”

In “The Leadership Route Less Taken: Taking Charge in the Army’s ‘Other’ Commands,” the authors offer advice for commanders as they prepare to take command and during their tenure.

Lightsey is a public affairs officer with the 101st Airborne Division, while Cook commands the Boise Army Recruiting Company. Colón is a division chief on the Joint Staff’s deputy directorate for special operations and counterterrorism, and Cook is a division chief on the Joint Staff’s deputy directorate for global operations.

2024: 10 Events That Changed The World

Tom Nagorski

As we look back at the major national and global security events of 2024, it’s tempting to overuse certain words: stunning; staggering; seismic; paradigm shift. You get the idea. Maybe, in the case of this particular year and our particular focus, those words aren’t really exaggerations. It has been a mind-bending 12 months.

Nowhere has the impact been more profound than in the Middle East, where assumptions have fallen like dominoes, with implications that will last a long time and reach well beyond the region.

So we start there, in this compilation of stories and events that changed the world in 2024. There were many to choose from.

No one saw it coming; the fall of Assad

It was the story that caught the world off guard, the one that even the most prescient forecasters hadn’t seen coming: a lightning-fast rebellion that ended the brutal reign of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

The nature of the revolt was also a surprise. First, there was the speed with which a coalition of rebel groups captured city after city, culminating in a takeover of the capital, Damascus, and Assad’s rushed departure. In 11 days, Syria’s 13-year-long civil war and 53 years of Ba’ath Party and Assad family rule had come to an end.

Is War with Iran Inevitable? The U.S. Military's Re-Engagement in the Middle East

Bilel Kriaa

The Biden administration came to the Oval Office promising to end the United States’ “forever wars” only to find itself entangled in multiple all-out wars in Europe and the Middle East before its term ended. Due to the ‘unconditionality’ of US commitment to Israel, the Biden administration’s foreign policy has not only re-ignited the “forever wars”, but also has blindly pushed Israel to the abyss of its own “forever wars”. (1) Israel is now fully engaged in its invasion of Gaza and on the brink of getting entrapped as well in Lebanon if it does not abide by its ceasefire with Hezbollah and moves forward with an invasion of the country’s south. Both wars have no clear ‘day after’ plans; and the root causes of the conflict with Israel remain unaddressed.

Since the Israeli-Hezbollah ceasefire came into effect on 27 November 2024, it has been repeatedly violated by Israel, resulting in the killing of dozens of persons. (2) The truce agreement is thus on the brink of collapse as Hezbollah has retaliated with assaults from its side. (3) Brokered by the US, the truce calls for Hezbollah to withdraw about 30 kilometres from the Israeli border, north of the Litani River. Meanwhile, the Israeli military has to vacate southern Lebanon in 60 days. The renewed attacks showcase the fragility of the truce and Israel’s growing zeal to expand the war, which may not be in the interests of a second Trump administration that would try to avoid any further entanglement in the region’s conflicts.

Combating Terrorism Center (CTC)CTC Sentinel, December 2024, v. 17, no. 11

Evaluating ‘Transnationalism’ as an Analytical Lens for Understanding REMVE Terrorism

A View from the CT Foxhole: Marshall Miller, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice

Looking West: The Houthis’ Expanding Footprint in the Horn of Africa

Africa Corps: Has Russia Hit a Ceiling in Africa?

Jamestown FoundationChina Brief, December 20, 2024, v. 24, no. 24

Innovation Without Borders: The PRC’s Use of Offshore Bases

Instead of Joint Sword-2024C, PLA Intensifies Winter Naval Training

PLA Steps up Security Cooperation With Russia in 2024

PRC Gray Zone Activities Against Taiwan: Civilian Drone Incursions

State Goals, Private Tools: Digital Sovereignty and Surveillance Along the Belt and Road

Terrorism Monitor, December 11, 2024, v. 22, no. 11

Brief: Wagner Massacre in Mali and

Ukraine’s Kursk Operation Appears to Have Led to PMC’s Partial Withdrawal

Brief: JNIM Attacks in Benin Represented Group’s Growing Operational Strength in Periphery

Countering the High-Denomination Currency Funding Militancy in Pakistan

Jihadist Threats and Propaganda Campaigns Target Indian Elections

Iran’s Red Sea Strategy Amid the RSF–SAF Fratricidal War in Sudan

Congress May Finally Take on AI in 2025. Here’s What to Expect

Andrew R. Chow

AI tools rapidly infiltrated peoples’ lives in 2024, but AI lawmaking in the U.S. moved much more slowly. While dozens of AI-related bills were introduced this Congress—either to fund its research or mitigate its harms—most got stuck in partisan gridlock or buried under other priorities. In California, a bill aiming to hold AI companies liable for harms easily passed the state legislature, but was vetoed by Governor Gavin Newsom.

This inaction has some AI skeptics increasingly worried. “We’re seeing a replication of what we’ve seen in privacy and social media: of not setting up guardrails from the start to protect folks and drive real innovation,” Ben Winters, the director of AI and data privacy at the Consumer Federation of America, tells TIME.

Industry boosters, on the other hand, have successfully persuaded many policymakers that overregulation would harm industry. So instead of trying to pass a comprehensive AI framework, like the E.U. did with its AI Act in 2023, the U.S. may instead find consensus on discrete areas of concern one by one.

The Rise and Fall of Economic Statecraft

Henry Farrell

When Donald Trump returns to the White House in late January, he’ll hold the levers of U.S. economic power. The ubiquity of the dollar as a currency of exchange, coupled with the centrality of U.S. financial institutions and networks, gives Washington an unparalleled ability to make it hard for adversaries to do business. Since 9/11, the United States has wielded financial sanctions at an increasing scale and scope, targeting individuals, governments, and nonstate actors. It has even turned export controls for technologies into a makeshift alternative for sanctions. The future of these tools—some of the most consequential the United States possesses—now resides with a mercurial president.

On the campaign trail, Trump insisted that sanctions were a poor tool compared with tariffs: he vowed to use them “as little as possible” for fear that they would kill the dollar as a world currency—an outcome as bad as losing a war, he claimed. That professed skepticism clashed with his record in office. In his first term, he was happy to slap sanctions on North Korea and deploy them in an effort to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran. Trump’s flip-flopping on sanctions is likely to spark disagreements in his next term. Many of the figures he is bringing into his administration, such as Senator Marco Rubio, the nominee for secretary of state, are proponents of sanctions. They will certainly want to train this major weapon of U.S. economic statecraft on their enemies. Others may be nervous about overusing sanctions, as Steven Mnuchin, the treasury secretary in Trump’s first administration, was. Some may even be actively hostile to the power of the U.S. dollar.

Germany’s AfD is the key to European defense - Opinion

David P. Goldman

My advice to President Trump on how to deal with the mess in Ukraine is simple: you should pull the plug on the Biden Administration’s flailing European peanut gallery. Your friends and allies in Europe want to shoulder the burden of their own defense, but they don’t want to pour money down the drain and risk World War III in Ukraine. Get an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine, a war which no sane European wants to fight, and let the sovereigntist parties of the New Right mop up the globalist Left. They believe in their countries and will fight to protect them, unlike the Brussels liberals cowering behind the skirts of Mother America.

Ending the war won’t happen without an agreement to keep Ukraine neutral and out of NATO. The Deep State will try to convince you that NATO can’t afford to back down on eventual Ukraine membership, and that Russia is bleeding out and ready to fold. But the opposite is true: Europe’s willingness to defend itself depends on a revival of nationalism and the ascent of the sovereigntist parties on the Right. Freeze the fighting and deliver a political victory to European patriots whose watchword is “Make Europe Great Again.”

A recent poll found most Germans probably wouldn’t fight to defend their country, and that two-fifths wouldn’t fight under any circumstances. Most striking is the breakdown by party affiliation. Only 9% of supporters of Germany’s Green Party — the most extreme backer of the Ukraine War — said they would personally take up arms to defend their country, the lowest of any group by party affiliation. Led by the bumbling, malapropism-prone Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, the Greens act like the German branch of the Biden State Department.

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