Indian Strategic Studies: 12/25/24

25 December 2024

India’s Oil Strategy In The Trump Era – Analysis

Amit Bhandari and Aditya Shinde

During his visit to Guyana in South America (20-21 November), Prime Minister Modi signed a number of MOUs, including one for cooperation in the hydrocarbon (petroleum) sector.[1] The agreement included sourcing of crude oil, cooperation in natural gas and development of infrastructure.[2] Guyana has become an important oil producer in the past five years – from its astounding oil discovery in 2015 and first oil production in 2019, Guyana now produces 645,000 barrels/day of oil. A consortium led by U.S. oil major ExxonMobil, which includes China’s state-owned CNOOC, is producing this oil.

To the north, the U.S. seems set to witness a further boost to its oil industry. Incoming President Donald Trump has announced Chris Wright[3], an oil industry executive with extensive experience in shale oil, as his energy secretary. The expectation is that under a Trump administration, there will be fewer curbs on America’s extensive oil industry. The U.S. is already the world’s largest producer of petroleum, well ahead of Saudi Arabia and Russia. Under an industry-friendly Trump administration, described as “drill, baby, drill.,” U.S. oil production is set to rise further.

These production increases will address the growing global demand for oil. OPEC, the group of oil-producing states, projects that the world’s oil demand will increase to 120 million barrels/day by 2050, up from 102 million barrels/day in 2023. India alone is projected to account for an additional 8 million barrels/day, or 45% of this rise.[4] Clearly, the petroleum industry is far from spent, and still has a long way to go and to grow. The recently concluded COP29, whose outcomes have been described as unsatisfactory, also shows that the world is not yet financially or technologically capable of moving away from traditional fuels.

How America Created the Enemy It Feared Most

Azam Ahmed

The Taliban war hero scans the crowd, searching. From the back, he snatches a man with a flop of dusty hair and a face marred by shrapnel.

The man’s head is bowed, and he is missing an arm and an eye. Something has happened to him, something awful.

“This,” the Taliban commander says, shaking the man a bit too hard, “was the last ally of the Americans here.”

In this remote province, the commander carried out one of the deadliest attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan, a pitched battle that sounded an early warning of a conflict terribly off course and altered the history of the war.

Now, years after the Americans abandoned this valley, and Afghanistan altogether, the commander jerks the man from the crowd to explain how the United States lost both.

Clutching the empty arm of his jacket, the commander spins him around like a marionette. The man’s sheared limb and ragged scars tell only half the story: His family was killed next to him, massacred as they fled the Taliban.

Pakistan's missile program is 'emerging threat', top US official says

Jonathan Landay

A senior White House official on Thursday said nuclear-armed Pakistan is developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities that eventually could allow it to strike targets well beyond South Asia, making it an "emerging threat" to the United States.

Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer's surprise revelation underscored how far the once-close ties between Washington and Islamabad have deteriorated since the 2021 U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It also raised questions about whether Pakistan has shifted the objectives of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs long intended to counter those of India, with which it has fought three major wars since 1947.

Speaking to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Finer said Pakistan has pursued "increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems to equipment, that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors."

If those trends continue, Finer said, "Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States."

The number of nuclear-armed states with missiles that can reach the U.S. homeland "is very small and they tend to be adversarial," he continued, naming Russia, North Korea and China.

The Taliban’s Canal

Andrew C. Kuchins, Elvira Aidarkhanova, Najibullah Sadid & Zekria Barakzai

The Qoshtepa Canal, currently under construction in Afghanistan on the Amu Darya River, will dramatically affect the availability of water for irrigation and drinking in one of the world’s most water-scarce regions—Central Asia. In addition to their already existing water challenges, the Amu Darya River basin and Central Asia are experiencing a far more rapid rate of climate change than the global average.

The interim authorities of Afghanistan face major financial, technical, and diplomatic challenges to complete the canal in an efficient, sustainable, and peaceful manner. The region cannot afford for this canal to be as poorly designed and constructed as Soviet canals on the Amu Darya, which, decades after their construction, continue to impinge on regional water security. The Soviet historical legacy also excludes Afghanistan from essential water-sharing agreements.

Six months after regaining control of Afghanistan, in March 2022, the interim authorities of Afghanistan reinitiated the Qoshtepa Canal project on the Amu Darya River, also known as the “Nile of Central Asia.” Initial plans for the canal to be built with Soviet assistance date back to the 1970s. This did not happen. In 2018, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) commissioned a feasibility study for the project, and the Ghani government built the first seven kilometers of the canal before being thrown out of power in August 2021 by the Taliban, a group now referred to in official parlance as the “interim authorities of Afghanistan.”

Can Thailand unite ASEAN to pile pressure on Myanmar?

Tommy Walker

Thailand this week hosted two separate regional meetings in an attempt to tackle the political and security crisis in Myanmar.

The first gathering involved Myanmar's ruling military junta and its neighbors, including China, Bangladesh, Laos and India, while the second included the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

All neighboring countries agreed that direct engagement and dialogue with Myanmar is "critical" and "necessary," Thailand's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nikorndej Balankura said at a press conference in Bangkok.

"They see the value of meeting regularly," Balankura added. "And they share the same understanding, more so than other countries, because they are direct neighbors directly impacted by the situation in Myanmar."

New US Space Force jammers aim to disrupt China’s SATCOM signals

Courtney Albon

The U.S. Space Force is on track to field its first batch of a new ground-based satellite communications jammer in the coming months — designed to disrupt signals from enemy spacecraft.

Space Operations Command just approved the Remote Modular Terminals for initial fielding, a spokesperson told Defense News Wednesday, adding that the jammers will be in the hands of military users imminently.

The Space Force plans to field 11 systems as part of the first release, giving units a chance to use the system before it’s accepted for operations. The program has funding to build around 160, and the service expects to need as many as 200 in the coming years.

The Space Rapid Capabilities Office, a fast-moving acquisition team based at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, is the lead for the RMT program. Space RCO Director Kelly Hammett told reporters last week the small, modular terminals are designed to block adversary communications from satellites that are surveilling U.S. and allies, particularly in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

How Donald Trump Can Undercut China’s AI Strategy

Alexander B. Gray

There is a short window for President Trump and Congress to reassert U.S. competitiveness on artificial intelligence (AI) and undercut China’s strategy before it cements its economic and geopolitical influence for a generation to come. Beijing and Washington are already in an AI race with the highest stakes for our economic and national security. Thankfully, innovation is in America’s strong suit. Open-source AI is how the United States can compete with China in both cost and capability. President Trump and his national security team, led by Rep. Mike Waltz (R-FL) and Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), can embrace the competitive advantages of open innovation so that America will unquestionably win the AI contest with Beijing.

China is on pace to spend more than $1.4 trillion by 2030 in its strategy to become the world leader in AI and other emergent technologies. Additionally, it is releasing AI models that are already competitive with the best American models. In November, the Chinese company Alibaba released its latest AI model, “Qwen,” which beat the best U.S. models in several performance benchmarks. According to CNBC, Alibaba’s models have been downloaded 40 million times since their initial release last year.

Open sourcing is an explicit part of China’s Global AI Governance Initiative. If China is allowed to set global AI standards, the CCP’s long history of censorship will be exported around the world. In one concerning example, Chinese generative AI chatbots censor topics by refusing to respond to questions about Tiananmen Square or falsely claiming that Taiwan is part of China.

Why the Salt Typhoon Hack Is Freaking Everyone Out

Rishi Iyengar

The attack, by a Chinese government-linked hacking group dubbed “Salt Typhoon” by investigators, was first revealed in late September. The hackers infiltrated at least eight major U.S. telecommunication networks, including AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile, targeting the cellphones of several government officials and politicians, including President-elect Donald Trump and Vice President-elect J.D. Vance.

Why a Rapid U.S. Withdrawal From Europe Will Reinforce China

Olivier Schmitt

Those around U.S. President-Elect Donald Trump who advocate for a rapid U.S. drawdown in Europe to better counter China would be wise to heed the law of unintended consequences.

Broadly speaking, the elevator pitch for such a rapid withdrawal goes something like this: The United States’ main threat is China, European countries are wealthy—with a combined GDP five times larger than Russia’s—therefore, Europe can take care of itself. The specifics and the timelines may vary, but overall, the U.S. withdrawal from Europe should be welcomed and will certainly not benefit U.S. adversaries since Europe can and should spend more on its own defense.

But the most fervent proponents of this approach seem to be hyper-compartmentalizing a hyper-interconnected world. In doing so, they run the risk of scoring an own goal: the strengthening of China’s economy.

The rapid withdrawal argument is divorced from empirical reality for a simple reason: It overlooks the European economic base of power that would make such a quick uptick in defense spending possible, especially when coupled with potential Trump trade tariffs.

Why China Isn’t Scared of Trump

Yan Xuetong

For years, Donald Trump has inveighed against China, describing it as the root cause of all manner of ills in the United States. He has lamented Washington’s huge trade deficit with Beijing and blames China for hollowing out the American industrial heartland. He has insisted that the COVID-19 pandemic was China’s fault. More recently, he has pinned the U.S. opioid crisis on Beijing, accusing China of “attacking” the United States with fentanyl. China has appeared in Trump’s rallies and press conferences as a monstrous adversary, a foe whom only Trump can subdue.

What Does Regime Change in Syria Mean for Russian-Turkish Relations? - opinion

Dimitar Bechev

Russia has reportedly asked Turkey for assistance in withdrawing its troops from Syria. Mere weeks ago, such a headline would have been hard to imagine. Yet in the wake of the jaw-dropping collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the report by CNN Türk has a credible ring to it.

Russian troops stationed in various parts of Syria, such as the central desert and the Kurdish-populated northeast, appear to have returned to Russia’s military bases in Latakia province, and according to GUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence, Russia has been airlifting military personnel and equipment back home.

The fate of those bases — Russia’s Khmeimim airfield and naval facility at Tartus — is a matter of speculation. The Russians may well have no choice but to abandon them, unless they are able to secure a deal with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) allowing them to stay on. Russian media have overnight rebranded the Islamist militia that toppled Assad from “terrorists” to “armed Syrian opposition.”

Whatever scenario materializes, one thing is beyond doubt. The power dynamic between Russia and Türkiye has shifted. Now Ankara clearly has the upper hand.

Turkey’s Overreach in Syria: Erdogan Is ‘Playing with Fire’

Sinan Ciddi

In a recent Foreign Policy article, Steven Cook and I highlighted how Turkey may be overplaying its hand in Syria. With events evolving rapidly, it seems that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan now aims to dominate Syria’s political future, sidelining both Moscow and Tehran.

To say Erdogan is “playing with fire” is an understatement. His maneuvers should deeply concern the incoming Trump administration, as Erdogan will likely pitch Turkey as the solution to Syria’s woes. However, allowing Turkey unchecked influence in a post-Assad Syria risks destabilizing the region further.

Turkey’s Backing of HTS

Ankara appears to be grooming Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as Syria’s new political order.

Turkey portrays HTS as capable of establishing a bureaucratic state that brings law and order while serving Syria’s diverse population. This likely explains Turkey’s offer of military assistance to HTS—an alarming gesture from a NATO member.

HTS, however, remains a jihadist organization rooted in Al-Qaeda and ISIS. It celebrated Hamas’ October 7 attacks on Israel, and its leadership still threatens to “conquer Jerusalem.”

Syria’s challenges are even greater than those Libya faced in 2011

Tim Eaton

The rapid and complete capitulation of the Assad regime in Syria shows how quickly fragile political systems can transform.

Syrians have earned the right to celebrate the overthrow of this murderous regime, whose atrocities are still being uncovered. Syria is now in the midst of an uncertain transition, where there are far too many possible outcomes to make predictions with any level of confidence.

Politicians in the region and beyond have expressed their hopes for a new Syria, albeit expressing caution given the complexity of the situation. They have also offered up experiences from other conflict affected states as a cautionary tale.

UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, for instance, told Parliament on 9 December: ‘We do not want Syria to become like Libya… fractured and vulnerable to different terrorist groups’.

Greater challenges

In fact, the scale of the challenge facing Syria is greater than that which confronted Libya in 2011. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown after less than a year of conflict that cost thousands of lives. But on his death, much of the country’s infrastructure remained intact. Libyan rebels had exported oil even before his overthrow.

Türkiye Has a Wish List in Syria. It Should Tread Lightly.

Alper Coşkun

Türkiye is basking in triumph after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime—and trying to cash in on the moment. The head of Turkish intelligence, Ibrahim Kalın, wasted no time in visiting Damascus, where he was accompanied by Abu Mohammed al-Golani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the rebel movement that toppled Assad. This was a trip Türkiye reportedly coordinated with its Western allies and used as an opportunity to convey shared expectations with the new Syrian leadership, representing a semblance of unity in action. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s diplomatic representation in Syria, which had been absent since 2012, quickly resumed its operations—a sign of the fast pace at which the landscape in Damascus is evolving.

With Assad out of the picture, Russian and Iranian influence in decline, and overall dynamics in Syria shifting in its favor, Ankara is upbeat. It sees a historic opportunity to advance its geostrategic interests and gain an advantage over Iran for regional domination, and it is scrambling to position itself for that purpose. Before the latest events, Türkiye’s Syria wish list essentially had three main elements:

Eradicating the cross-border threat posed by the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), comprised mainly of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its affiliates in Syria
Creating the conditions for the return of more than 3 million registered Syrian refugees currently living in Türkiye
Keeping the upper hand in its unspoken but ever-present rivalry with Iran and Russia

Syria is doomed to instability Outside agents will stoke chaos

Rajan Menon

The House of Assad endured for over half a century, but crumbled in 10 days. Ba’athism is dead and Abu Mohammed al-Jolani now finds himself the de facto leader of a government in Damascus, led by his rebel coalition Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). It’s a denouement he may have dreamed of but likely never expected. For now, Jolani can bask in the euphoria and gratitude sweeping his country. But soon, he’ll have to meet Syrians’ pent-up desire for good governance and better lives. In a land as multicultural as Syria, perhaps the most urgent task involves proving his self-proclaimed tolerance. And many Syrians remain cautious, wondering whether his political conversion is little more than a tactical makeover.

In order to convince them, Jolani must create political stability while distancing himself from Assad-era repression. This means ending such practices as casting offenders into dungeons, common under both Bashar al-Assad and his father. It also means the disbanding of Assad’s security services. Nor will Jolani pardon any officials, civilian and military, who have committed egregious human rights violations. Syrians will want to see such offenders brought to justice: especially senior members of the military, the Ba’ath Party, and the mukhabarat (secret police). They will also want the hated shabiha (“ghosts”) to be held accountable. These citizens groups, armed and trained by the Assad regime, have been accused of kidnap, torture and murder on a vast scale. To deliver justice and accountability there must be new legal codes and a new judiciary with people who are both qualified and trusted by the public.

Imagining a US Army Drone Corps

Joshua Suthoff

In February 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces. It is no secret that the Ukrainian military has used drones to great effect. Its units continue to innovate with drone tactics, techniques, and procedures and effects in the air, land, and maritime domains. Both belligerents in the Russia-Ukraine War have pledged to build over a million aerial drones each year to fill the skies. Even with the extremely innovative use of the drones (mine laying, incendiary delivery) already observed in Ukraine, history will show that the most important attribute of drones has been their ability to serve as economy-of-force systems. In a grinding war of attrition, drones have allowed the Ukrainian military to protect its limited combat power and threaten a much larger combat force across multiple domains.

The Unmanned Systems Forces that Zelenskyy announced amount, effectively, to a drone corps. US policymakers have taken note of the effectiveness of drones in the conflict and a drone corps may also be coming to the US Army. A draft 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) from the US Congress directed the Army to establish such a corps as a basic branch. The language did not make the US Senate’s version of the NDAA—however, it is an understatement to say that drones and their effects are here to stay on the battlefield. Drones may not be revolutionary in their impacts, but they are a creditable and enduring enabler—an enabler that continues to threaten the hegemony of traditional branches like artillery and the once dominant mass of infantry and armor. The Army and DoD more broadly are striving to innovate with drones, but standardization, training, and tactics vary. The DoD Replicator program’s primary mission is to increase the available drone inventory, but how effective is a deep magazine of drones without subject matter experts to operate and employ? This trend of drones’ growing impact will likely continue as they are paired with AI and other technologies. But in an imagined near future where the NDAA has passed with the drone corps language intact, what form should such a corps take?

Necropolitics and Counterinsurgency: The Costs of Population Resettlement in Small Wars

Matthew P. Arsenault

In counterinsurgency warfare, isolating insurgents from civilian populations has long been seen as essential. As Brigadier General S.B. Griffith stated, countering guerrilla warfare relies on location, isolation, and eradication (1989). In practice, this often means forcibly relocating civilians away from insurgent support networks, disrupting community life in the name of security (Bender 1972). But a deeper analysis of these strategies reveals a grim dynamic. By forcibly resettling people and controlling their basic necessities like food, water, shelter, and physical security, states impose a form of power that philosopher Achille Mbembe terms necropolitics (2019). This is a kind of rule where the state exerts dominance not only through direct violence but by controlling the conditions of life and death for entire populations.

Necropolitics explains how resettlement strategies often fail by inadvertently dehumanizing those affected. Forced into “protected villages,” communities often found themselves stripped of autonomy, unable to sustain their livelihoods through traditional means such as farming or trade. Instead, they became reliant on the state for basic necessities, including food, water, and security (Jundian 1974; Hoffman et al. 1991). This dependency reinforced the state’s control but simultaneously dehumanized the affected populations, reducing them to subjects of governance rather than active participants in society. For these populations, life becomes a matter of survival, dictated by the whims of the state, with little regard for personal well-being. By examining failed and semi-successful counterinsurgency (COIN) resettlement strategies in places like Rhodesia, Angola, and Vietnam, we can see how necropolitics shapes not only the experience of those displaced but also the effectiveness of COIN strategies themselves.

Sandworm-linked hackers target users of Ukraine’s military app in new spying campaign

Daryna Antoniuk

Ukrainian soldiers have become the target of a new espionage campaign linked to the notorious Russian state-sponsored threat actor Sandworm, according to a recent report.

As part of the operation, the hackers create fraudulent websites that mimic the official page of a Ukrainian military app, Army+, tricking users into downloading an executable file disguised as an app installation package.

Army+ has received significant attention from Ukraine’s government recently. The app, introduced earlier this year, aims to digitize bureaucratic tasks for soldiers, such as submitting reports to commanders.

According to a report from Ukraine’s military computer emergency response team (MIL.CERT-UA), the fake Army+ websites are hosted on a “serverless” platform, Cloudflare Workers, that deploys applications. Hackers often exploit legitimate services to obscure their operations and make fraudulent websites appear more convincing to potential victims.

The executable file delivered through the malicious Army+ app is an installer crafted with NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System), a tool frequently used by developers to create software installation packages.

Bold Global Security Policy for 2025 and Beyond

Americans increasingly have to grapple with the impacts of numerous global risks like nuclear weapons, pandemics, and natural disasters. The threat of nuclear weapons is rising as nuclear weapons states increase their arsenals’ numbers and role in national security, COVID-19 revealed a significant lack of biorisk preparedness by the federal government, and more communities are being devastated by hurricanes, floods, heat waves, and other disasters due to climate change, aging infrastructure, risky developments, and other factors. These challenges must be addressed to ensure human safety and stability.

Recognizing these issues, FAS’ Global Risk portfolio has developed a set of new policy recommendations via actionable memos to help inform and guide Congress and the Executive Branch to enhance disaster and biorisk preparedness, to improve oversight of nuclear weapons-related programs, and to reduce nuclear risk.

Bold Emerging Technologies and Artificial Intelligence Policy for 2025 and Beyond

The United States has long led the way in technological innovation, from the invention of the transistor to the creation of the internet, both of which have fundamentally reshaped the world economy. As President Reagan said, “The best way to predict the future is to create it,” and this holds true today as we stand on the brink of a new technological revolution with artificial intelligence (AI). The global AI market is expected to surpass $1 trillion by 2030, offering immense opportunities in sectors such as healthcare, education, energy, and beyond. In healthcare, AI is already enhancing diagnostics, while in education, it is providing personalized learning that can help bridge achievement gaps. Digital mental health services, powered by AI, are set to expand access to care, offering timely and effective treatment. AI’s potential in energy could lead to breakthroughs in efficiency and cost savings, while its use in government could streamline services, cut waste, and boost taxpayer value. With the right regulations focusing on safety, privacy, and expanding access, the U.S. can not only safeguard its citizens but also strengthen its global leadership in ethical technology development. As competition for AI dominance heats up, this is the moment for America to secure its place at the forefront of the next great wave of innovation.

Is Elon Musk Running the GOP?

Jacob Heilbrunn

Team Trump is scrambling to control the fallout from Elon Musk almost singlehandedly terminating a stopgap spending bill that would have ensured the federal government is funded through March 14. The problem is twofold. One is that the government may soon shutter, leaving House Speaker Mike Johnson with essentially no exit from the debacle. The other is that Musk is starting to eclipse President-elect Donald Trump.

Instead of Trump heading into his second term as Mr. Big, it increasingly looks like Musk is calling the shots. “This bill should not pass,” Musk declared. It didn’t. The result is political mayhem. Sen. Rand Paul is suggesting that Musk should replace Johnson as House speaker. So is Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene.

Writing in Talking Points Memo, Josh Marshall observed, “Musk is erratic, volatile, impulsive, mercurial. He introduces a huge source of unpredictability and chaos into the presidency that for once Trump doesn’t control. See it clearly: Musk did this. Trump thrives on chaos, but his chaos. Not someone else’s chaos.”

Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has essentially been AWOL over the past several weeks. It appears that Musk has cemented the bromance between himself and Trump. He’s everywhere. He goes to the Notre Dame with Trump. He goes to the Army-Navy game with Trump. He goes to dinner with Trump at Mar-a-Lago. The only question is where he does not go.

Will Putin Stop at Ukraine? That’s the Wrong Question

Samuel Charap & Miranda Priebe

In the spring of 2024, Western leaders began issuing dire warnings about the threat posed by Russia to NATO allies.1 During his 2024 State of the Union speech, President Joe Biden addressed the assembled lawmakers: “If anybody in this room thinks Putin will stop at Ukraine, I assure you, he will not.” 2 Biden was far from alone. “It cannot be ruled out that within a three- to five-year period, Russia will test Article 5 and NATO’s solidarity,” said Denmark Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen.3 German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius echoed this assessment: “we have to take into account that Vladimir Putin might even attack a NATO country one day.” While a Russian attack is not likely “for now,” the minister added: “Our experts expect a period of five to eight years in which this could be possible.” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk went one step further, arguing Europe was in a “pre-war era.”

Some might dismiss these statements about the Russia threat as rhetorical flourishes that have scant direct impact on policy. Others may see them as attempts to spur complacent Western political systems—and sluggish Western military industries—into action to counter Russia that have little downside. But the leaders’ assertions reflect four increasingly widespread and influential assumptions in the transatlantic community: first, that Russian reconstitution is proceeding rapidly, giving it the capability to attack NATO in the near future; second, that NATO’s deterrent against a risk-acceptant Russia is inadequate; third, that the organizing principle for the alliance’s military planning and broader strategy should be to counter opportunistic Russian aggression; and finally, that a Russian “win” in Ukraine will embolden the Kremlin and imperil NATO’s security. These assumptions are now motivating proposals to take a hardline approach toward Russia after the Ukraine war ends.

How to Stop a Trade War

Peter E. Harrell

President-elect Donald Trump campaigned on a promise of a trade war more extensive than anything Americans have seen in decades. His proposals include a new 20 percent “universal” tariff on all foreign imports and hiking tariffs on China to 60 percent. In the six weeks since he won a second term, he has used social media to threaten tariffs against Canada, Mexico, the BRICS—a nine-member bloc of countries founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—and other targets.

Yet the ultimate contours of Trump’s trade war remain opaque. In a recent television interview, Trump suggested that he sees tariffs as both a tool to expand manufacturing in the United States and as leverage for negotiations with foreign governments. And as Trump moves to turn his trade instincts into policy, he will hear conflicting advice. Fortune 100 CEOs will urge him to use the threat of tariffs to force foreign governments to give their companies better access to markets abroad. Domestic manufacturers and labor leaders will push Trump to follow through on implementing new tariffs to boost U.S. production. National security types will press Trump to strengthen trade with allies as a counterweight to China. Markets, meanwhile, may drop if Wall Street traders think Trump’s tariffs or other trade policies will drive inflation or hurt corporate profits.

New DOD doctrine officially outlines and defines ‘expeditionary cyberspace operations’

Mark Pomerleau

For the first time, the Department of Defense has begun to recognize and even define cyber operations conducted in physical or tactical spaces in formal doctrine.

A revised version of Joint Publication 3-12 Cyberspace Operations — published in December 2022 and while unclassified, is only available to those with DoD common access cards, according to a Joint Staff spokesperson — officially provides a definition for “expeditionary cyberspace operations,” which are “[c]yberspace operations that require the deployment of cyberspace forces within the physical domains.”

DefenseScoop has seen a copy of the updated publication.

The last version was published in 2018 and was publicly available. The Joint Staff spokesman noted that five years has been the norm for updates.

The definition, recognition and discussion of such operations are indicative of not only the maturity of cyberspace and associated operations, but the need for more tactical capabilities to get at targets that the current cyber force might not be able to access.

U.S. Cyber Command owns the offensive cyber capabilities within DOD, and the services conduct offensive cyber ops through Cybercom and the cyber mission forces that each service provides to the command. Authorities to launch cyber effects have traditionally been held at the highest levels of government. In recent years, those authorities have been streamlined and delegated. However, most cyber operations are still conducted from remote locations by the cyber mission force (CMF) and primarily focused on IP-based networks.

AI goes nuclear

Dawn Stover

When Microsoft bought a 407-acre pumpkin farm in Mount Pleasant, Wisconsin, it wasn’t to grow Halloween jack-o’-lanterns. Microsoft is growing data centers—networked computer servers that store, retrieve, and process information. And those data centers have a growing appetite for electricity.

Microsoft paid a whopping $76 million for the pumpkin farm, which was assessed at a value of about $600,000. The company, which has since bought other nearby properties to expand its footprint to two square miles, says it will spend $3.3 billion to build its 2-million-square-foot Wisconsin data center and equip it with the specialized computer processors used for artificial intelligence (AI).

Microsoft and OpenAI, maker of the ChatGPT bot, have talked about building a linked network of five data centers—the Wisconsin facility plus four others in California, Texas, Virginia, and Brazil. Together they would constitute a massive supercomputer, dubbed Stargate, that could ultimately cost more than $100 billion and require five gigawatts of electricity, or the equivalent of the output of five average-size nuclear power plants.

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