Indian Strategic Studies: 12/22/24

22 December 2024

Disputed Polls and Political Furies: Handling Pakistan’s Deadlock

Introduction

The seeds of Pakistan’s 8 February contested elections and the mass protests they have generated were sown well before election day.1 Pakistan has been beset by political turmoil since Imran Khan, who became prime minister in 2018, was ousted as the country’s premier following a “no trust” vote in parliament in April 2022.2 Though he was unseated through a constitutionally approved procedure, Khan claimed that the U.S. had conspired with Pakistan’s top military leaders and his rivals in the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party to overthrow his government. Fed a steady diet of conspiracy theories, his enraged supporters attacked military properties and installations in several cities following Khan’s arrest on corruption charges on 9 May 2023, including the residence of the army corps commander in Lahore.

Led by Pakistan’s military, the crackdown that followed has resulted in scores of leading figures in Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party quitting the movement or suffering arrest, along with hundreds of supporters, mainly on charges related to the 9 May 2023 unrest. As the country’s principal powerbroker, the military establishment has played a crucial role in tilting the electoral playing field, first in Khan’s favour and lately against him. His victory in the 2018 polls came after then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s relations with military high command soured, leading to his conviction on corruption charges and a ban on standing in those elections.3 Khan’s attempts to influence top military appointments, including that of the incoming army chief, nevertheless placed him at the receiving end of the military’s ire. Sharif, for his part, came home from years in exile in 2023 to lead his party’s election campaign after being exonerated by the courts.

To Counter China, U.S. Must Do More in Myanmar

Steve Ross & Yun Sun

The Problem

As its neighbor to the north, China has always loomed large over Myanmar (also known as Burma). But since a February 2021 coup by the Myanmar military, China has significantly strengthened its position in Myanmar and is now approaching a level of influence unparalleled in the past 15 years. China has strengthened its position by bolstering its support to ethnic armed groups on the China-Myanmar border before balancing such support by recently swinging behind the military government as it seeks to maintain influence over both sets of actors. In so doing, China is fast becoming not only the kingmaker in Myanmar, but the arbiter of checks and balances against the king it anoints.

What has been striking over the past four years is the absence of alternative international leadership on Myanmar. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the people of Myanmar clamored for a strong international response, presence, and approach toward the crisis, particularly from the United States. While the U.S. and others mostly in the West have imposed targeted sanctions and offered strong rhetorical support to the parallel National Unity Government and other pro-democracy forces, much of the international response has been outsourced to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since April 2021, when the bloc agreed to a Five-Point Consensus to address the crisis. ASEAN has achieved little since and no other actor, including the U.S., has demonstrated an inclination to offer practical assistance that could either bolster prospects for the military’s defeat or hasten a political solution.

China is the world’s factory – but less integrated into the global economy than the US and Japan

François Chimits

China is the world’s factory – but less integrated into the global economy than the US and Japan

The new MERICS China Internationalization Index (MCII) shows that China is still significantly less integrated into the global economy than the US and even Japan. Despite two decades of fast increasing economic exchanges with other countries, China's MCII Internationalization score of 0.3 in 2020 was only half the US score of 0.6 and a third lower than Japan's score of 0.4. This seemingly startling difference reflects the fact that China's integration into the global economy has been largely driven by real economic activity – tangible actions such as trade, foreign direct investment, the movement of labor, and the exchange of ideas – and less so by the financial economy and its vast but intangible capital markets and related services.

The MCII shows how much more integrated China's real economy is with the global economy than its financial economy. This discrepancy between China's strength in the "visible" economy and its relative weakness in the "invisible" one suggests why China's integration into the world economy is often a contentious issue.

Perceptions of China's global economic status vary widely, ranging from predictions of eventual dominance to assertions of inevitable decline – both within China and abroad. The unprecedented speed of China's rise from a developing economy to a global powerhouse and the complexity of defining and measuring economic integration only complicate balanced analysis further.

Are AI defense firms about to eat the Pentagon?

PATRICK TUCKER

In an unprecedented wave of collaboration, leading AI firms are teaming up—sometimes with rivals—to serve a Pentagon and Congress determined to put AI to military use. Their growing alignment may herald an era in which software firms seize the influence now held by old-line defense contractors.

“There's an old saying that software eats the world,” Byron Callan, managing director at Capital Alpha Partners, told Investors Business Daily on Wednesday. “It's going to eat the military too."

Over the last week, Palantir, Anduril, Shield AI, OpenAI, Booz Allen, and Oracle announced various partnerships to develop products tailored to defense needs. Meanwhile, the House passed the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act with provisions that push the Defense Department to work more closely with tech firms on AI, and DOD announced yet another office intended to foster AI adoption.

Perhaps the most significant partnership is between Palantir and Anduril, two companies that offer somewhat competing capabilities related to battlefield data integration. Palantir holds the contract for the Maven program, the seminal Defense Department AI effort to derive intelligence from vast amounts of data provided by satellites, drones, and other sensors. Anduril offers a mesh-networking product called Lattice for rapid collection and analysis of battlefield data for drone swarming and other operations.

China’s narrative war with West goes beyond Confucius with focus on other ancient schools

Xinlu Liang

China has set up a research institute on early Chinese philosophies, taking the discourse beyond Confucius in its latest effort to win the narrative war with the West on governance values.

The “Chinese Zhuzi Research Institute”, or “institute of early Chinese philosophies” opened earlier this month at the East China Normal University (ECNU) in Shanghai.

It aims to explore the country’s rich philosophical heritage dating back more than 2,000 years and use that ancient wisdom for contemporary governance in China and beyond, scholars attending the inauguration ceremony last month said.

Analysts see the institute as the latest testament to China’s focus on reclaiming its intellectual heritage for modern governance as it fights a narrative war with the West, albeit with a focus on the less popular schools of thought to encourage a more inclusive dialogue.

Is the U.S. Answer to China’s Belt and Road Working? - Analysis

Lili Pike and Christina Lu

U.S. President Joe Biden combined two of his passions during his much-delayed trip to Africa last week: U.S. foreign policy and trains. At the Lobito port on the Angolan coast, “Amtrak Joe” surveyed new train cars on an 800-mile railway that his administration has touted as its flagship project in Africa and as a symbol of the United States’ new international development model.

“We’re building railroad lines from Angola to the Port of Lobito, in Zambia and the [Democratic Republic of the Congo] DRC, and, ultimately, all the way to the Atlantic—from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean. It’ll be the first trans-continental railroad in Africa and the biggest American rail investment outside of America,” Biden said in a speech during his trip.

How China is adopting battlefield lessons from Ukraine

TYE GRAHAM and PETER W. SINGER

The Ukraine conflict is more than a distant spectacle to China’s People’s Liberation Army; it offers a real-time battlefield laboratory to study for its own strategic needs. From drone swarms to electronic warfare, its lessons are being methodically analyzed and adapted to reshape the PLA’s own approach to conflict—whether in Taiwan, the Himalayas, or beyond.

The Ukraine conflict has underscored the game-changing role of UAVs in modern warfare, particularly for gathering intelligence, precision targeting, and overwhelming enemy defenses. The PLA is responding by seeking to develop and improve various types of drones, including:Cost-effective, expendable drones for saturation attacks.

Drones that can mimic Russian and Ukrainian successes at defeating adversary air defenses through scaled, coordinated assaults, according to a Chinese reporter at the recent Zhuhai Airshow.

First-person-view drones, which have demonstrated tactical advantages in Ukraine, particularly for reconnaissance and close-range strikes. Analysis from PLA National Defense University’s Joint Operations College officers highlights China's push to develop FPVs.

Ultra-low-cost drones. The PLA Air Force recently announced a nationwide competition to design cheap UAVs capable of autonomous navigation, precision targeting, electronic warfare integration, extended-range reconnaissance, swarm coordination, and logistical support.

China’s Foreign Trade Figures Signal Resilience Amid Global Uncertainty – Analysis

Dr. Imran Khalid

China’s foreign trade has always served as a bellwether of its economic resilience and global interconnectedness. As the world’s second-largest economy, the numbers it produces tell a story far richer than mere statistics. In the January-to-November period of 2024, China recorded a 4.9 percent year-on-year increase in its foreign trade, reaching a staggering 39.79 trillion yuan (approximately $5.5 trillion).

For an economy that has weathered numerous global headwinds in recent years – ranging from supply chain disruptions to geopolitical tensions – these figures are not just impressive; they’re a testament to the country’s enduring economic adaptability. Let’s dissect these numbers to uncover what they signify in a broader context. Exports -often seen as the lifeblood of China’s trade – rose 6.7 percent year-on-year to 23.04 trillion yuan. Imports, on the other hand, saw a more modest growth of 2.4 percent, totaling 16.75 trillion yuan. These figures, while seemingly straightforward, reflect the nuanced dynamics of China that has positioned itself as both a manufacturing powerhouse and a voracious consumer of global goods.

Five Ways To Counter China’s Economic Might

Tatsuya Terazawa

The expansion of the Soviet Union posed a geopolitical challenge for more than four decades after the end of the Second World War. The West, led by the United States, won the Cold War through a strategy of containment. The Soviet Union collapsed because its economy could no longer support the burden of the massive arms race.

The geopolitical challenge of our generation is how to deal with the rise of China. While the Soviet Union could boast military might while lamenting its economic weakness, China enjoys both military and economic prowess. The West knows how to address the challenge in military terms. But unfortunately, we have little experience dealing with a potential economic superpower. The following five points are the necessary elements to deal with the rise of China.

1) Playing Offense, Not Just Defense

The typical strategy by the West has been to deny access to technologies. The Biden administration hoped to slow China’s advances by cutting the flow of technology. While this strategy still has relevance in sectors where the West has a clear advantage, unfortunately, these sectors are becoming much smaller as China is advancing in technology. In fact, in a growing number of sectors, China is now ahead of the West.

The Wrong Sort of Power

Lawrence Freedman

There is a clear line from the 1979 Iranian Revolution to the 2024 Syrian Revolution, which leaves open the question of whether there is a potential line to yet another Iranian revolution, this one overthrowing the victors of 45 years ago.

The sudden collapse of the Assad regime is one of those ‘in retrospect it was inevitable but no one saw it coming’ moments. Exactly where it leaves Syria is still unclear, so it is also one of those ‘the future is uncertain, but one thing is for sure, things will never be the same again’ moments.

As Russia and Iran were Bashar al-Assad’s most vital backers, we can be reasonably confident that for now both are the big losers. After a decade of substantial investment in Syria, Russia has nothing to show for it other than Assad himself, now taking up residence in Moscow. It is abandoning its air base in Syria, probably its naval base, and in practice its aspirations to be a major player in Middle Eastern affairs, with only its position in Libya to cling on to.

Iran’s investment goes back even further, and its setback is even greater. This comes at the end of a disastrous year for the defining feature of its foreign policy – its ‘axis of resistance’ drawing on radical Shi’ite groups throughout the region, including in Iraq and Yemen, but with Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Assad in Syria as the key components.

A New Geo-Political Map Is Unfolding: The End Of Syria (And Of ‘Palestine’ For Now) – OpEd

Alastair Crooke

Syria has entered the abyss – the demons of al-Qa’eda, ISIS, and the most intransigent elements of the Muslim Brotherhood are circling the skies. There is chaos, looting, fear, and a terrible passion for revenge scalds the blood. Street executions are rife.

Maybe Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Al-Joulani, (following Turkish instruction), thought to control things. But HTS is an umbrella label like Al-Qa’eda, ISIS and An-Nusra, and its factions have already descended into factional fighting. The Syrian ‘state’ dissolved in the middle of the night; the police and army went home, leaving weapons depots open for the Shebab to loot. The prison doors were flung (or prised) open. Some, no doubt, were political prisoners; but many were not. Some of the most vicious inmates now roam the streets.

The Israelis – within days – totally eviscerated the defence infrastructure of the state in more than 450 air strikes: missile air defences, Syrian air force helicopters and aircraft, the navy and the armouries – all destroyed in the “largest air operation in Israel’s history”.

Hegseth’s Guard Left the Army After the Beating of a Civilian During Training

Dave Philipps and Sharon LaFraniere

When Pete Hegseth visited senators on Capitol Hill this month in an effort to show that he has the qualifications and judgment to lead the Defense Department, he was escorted by a security guard with a dark episode in his past.

The guard, a former Army Special Forces master sergeant named John Jacob Hasenbein, left the military after a 2019 training event in which witnesses said he beat a civilian role player — kicking him, punching him and leaving him hogtied in a pool of his own blood.

Mr. Hegseth’s choice of Mr. Hasenbein as a security escort is the latest instance in which he has stood by soldiers accused of crimes. He has repeatedly criticized military leaders as being too “woke” and waging a “war on warriors.”

In this case, Timothy Parlatore, Mr. Hegseth’s lawyer, said Mr. Hasenbein was the “victim of unjust treatment by a broken military justice system,” and Mr. Hegseth was proud to work with him. He added, “It is stories like his that demonstrate the change needed in the Department of Defense.”

An Israeli Order in the Middle East

Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov

What is happening in the Middle East today is best understood as a struggle over a new regional order. Since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, three competing visions for that order have emerged and then faltered: the Hamas vision, the Hezbollah-Iranian vision, and the American vision. Hamas sought to ignite a multifront war aimed at destroying Israel. Iran, along with its proxy Hezbollah, aimed for a war of attrition that would cause Israel to collapse and push the United States out of the region. The United States, which stood firmly behind Israel, hoped for regional stability built on new political possibilities for the Israelis and the Palestinians, normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and a defense pact between Washington and Riyadh.

None of these visions, however, proved tractable: Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran misjudged the strength of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Israeli society, and the U.S.-Israeli alliance. The United States overestimated its capacity to influence Israel’s approach to the war in Gaza and did not sufficiently contend with the regional threat posed by Iran.

The failure of these three visions creates an opening for a more realistic fourth one: an Israeli vision. Over the past three months, Israel has begun to exert its power to reshape the Middle East. It eliminated Hamas’s military capabilities and—shattering its own long-standing approach to deterrence—decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership and compelled the Lebanon-based group to accept cease-fire terms it had long resisted, leaving Hamas isolated and Iran without its most capable proxy. Israel has also carried out sophisticated strikes inside Iran. The opportunistic toppling of the Assad regime in Syria at the hands of rebel forces can be understood, in part, as an attempt to take advantage of Israel’s undermining of Iranian regional power. As a result, Iran has lost the land corridor stretching from its borders to Israel’s, a corridor that Iran had devoted significant resources to establishing over the past four decades.

INSA Releases Presidential Transition Memo

The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) today released its Presidential Transition Memo: Building a Secure Tomorrow, offering actionable recommendations for the incoming Administration to address within its first 100 days to strengthen the Intelligence Community (IC).

Developed with input from INSA’s policy councils, thought leaders, and subject matter experts, the memo outlines practical steps to improve workforce readiness in AI and cybersecurity, streamline security processes, and enhance collaboration between government, industry, and academia. By focusing on achievable improvements, the recommendations aim to position the IC for greater efficiency, innovation, and agility in meeting national security challenges.

“These recommendations provide a clear, actionable framework to help the Administration deliver immediate impact while supporting long-term success for the IC,” said Suzanne Wilson Heckenberg, President of INSA.

INSA, a nonpartisan nonprofit dedicated to advancing public-private-academic collaboration to address national security priorities, stands ready to work with the Administration in building a resilient, efficient, and future-ready intelligence and national security workforce.

Mind the Gap: U.S. Preferences and Israel’s War Conduct

Jeremy Pressman

Introduction

The Biden administration has firmly stood by Israel’s side for the past year. U.S. military and diplomatic support has been crucial to Israel’s conduct in its war in Gaza and will shape the legacy of this latest iteration of Israel-Palestine conflict.1

These U.S. decisions, which are completely divorced from the official U.S. policy of supporting a two-state solution, have meant aiding an expansionist Israeli state as it seeks to impose its exclusionary territorial vision on the Palestinian people. These decisions have also left an administration with a foreign policy record in the Middle East that has been heavily reliant on military means and stands in stark contrast to its initial desire to reduce the U.S. military presence in the region.

U.S.-manufactured weapons, whose export to Israel’s armed forces has been approved and often funded by the U.S. government, have been key to mass Israeli killing and societal destruction in Gaza. Israel’s military has killed at least 42,000 Palestinians in Gaza, with over 95,000 wounded, and some estimates are much higher.2The Israeli military has hit every hospital in Gaza and destroyed apartment buildings, cultural institutions, mosques and churches, roads, schools, universities, and water and sewage facilities. It has killed unprecedented numbers of journalists and humanitarian workers.3

Michael Hochberg and Marcus Gomez, AI is for Allies, No. 608

Dr. Michael Hochberg & Marcus Gomez

The U.S. Department of Commerce recently sought to enhance export controls on artificial intelligence (AI) hardware and added several People’s Republic of China companies to the entity list.[1] This is a step in the right direction, aimed at containing China’s ability to weaponize AI. But it’s not enough.

Progress in AI models is moving at an astounding pace: The most advanced models are now producing glimmers of what may be considered strategic action and self-protection.[2] These models are like nuclear weapons were in the 1950s—a technology that will revolutionize warfighting in ways that we cannot yet anticipate. But unlike nuclear technology, which spread slowly, AI is being rapidly and widely weaponized, with attendant dramatic changes in warfare.

What is to be done? The liberal-democratic West (including Japan, Korea and Taiwan) have an effective monopoly on the best AI hardware, especially for training giant models. The West should now cut off China, Russia, Iran and North Korea’s (i.e., the CRINKs) access to this hardware, and cripple their capabilities for building their own competing hardware based on Western semiconductor technology. The next wave of AI improvement is going to be revolutionary, and there’s no reason to enable our enemies to benefit.

Journal of Policy & Strategy, 2024, v. 4, no. 4

The Need for Our National Security Professionals to Refocus

Protecting and Advancing U.S. National Interests in Outer Space

Post-Truth and National Security: Background and Options for a New Administration

Russia’s Second Front: The Balkans

The Impact Of Russia Sanctions On Central Asia – Analysis

Maximilian Hess

Since Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine and invited the largest international sanctions regime against Russia since the Second World War, Central Asia and the Caucasus have been forced into an uncomfortable position at the front of the accompanying economic war.

The region finds itself in a position that its constituent states did not choose, and its countries have engaged in complex and differentiated balancing strategies. Notably, not one has brought the sanctions into its legislation and regulation, though most have quietly pushed for compliance to avoid the significant risks that come with falling afoul of those issued by the West and the United States in particular. The sanctions have undeniably had some costs for the region—particularly for businesses deeply integrated into Russia, or whose leadership is. However, forcing the Kremlin into an economically defensive position has also inadvertently opened up new opportunities for the region, some of which offer potential long-term benefits while others carry significant risks.

Ballistic-missile Proliferation and the Rise of Middle Eastern Space Programmes

John B. Sheldon

The proliferation of ballistic missiles is now a global phenomenon, as is the dissemination of space and satellite technologies. The Middle East is no exception to these trends. Several regional actors, including non-state actors, have acquired ballistic-missile capabilities, which offer unique military advantages and are increasingly seen as complimentary to traditional missile forces. In parallel, over the past two decades, regional states have ramped up their space ambitions, including the development of space-launch vehicles (SLVs) and establishment of regional space ports. This IISS research paper focuses on the nexus of ballistic-missile proliferation and the spread of space technologies in the Middle East, its implications for further proliferation and regional security and stability, and the utility of diplomatic tools and measures for countering Middle Eastern ballistic-missile proliferation and achieving space security.

With a couple of exceptions, modern SLV development has now largely decoupled from ballistic-missile programmes as the space industry has become more commercialised and the two types of systems have grown increasingly technologically divergent. But other dual-use space technologies, most notably satellite systems, are increasingly being adopted by regional states to enhance their military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. This shift could fuel the national pursuit of counter-space capabilities, of which the potential for conversion of ballistic missiles into direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapons is of particular concern for regional security and stability.

Science giveth and science taketh away

Razib Khan

Not even two full centuries have passed since Charles Darwin reluctantly lobbed his meticulously built grenade into Victorian society, averring in On the Origin of the Species, that “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down. But I can find no such case.” In the intervening 166 years, not only has natural science gone from the almost exclusive pursuit of leisured English gentlemen like Darwin, to a complex, industrialized global knowledge production system churning out reams of data and theory by the minute, its millions of subsequent practitioners still have yet to “find such [a] case.” Darwin’s first-draft theories have proven almost miraculously robust and been profitably extended to illuminate both our deep past and our present.

Darwin’s insights marked a great leap forward for scientific theory. And the suite of fertile fields they spawned have continued to chart periodic great leaps forward ever since, including a truly miraculous one still unfolding today. Consider this discontinuity, though. Darwin could sit alone in his Down House study, mulling over the fruits of his copious correspondence with a small coterie of other curious minds, and indeed perhaps he alone was poised to not just posit evolution by means of natural selection (as Alfred Russell Wallace had done independently, spurring Darwin to set aside his book project and rush a paper out first to avoid being scooped) but to advocate for the nascent theory in volume after volume, beginning with the Origin of the Species. Today, truly no mind, however singular, works so independently.

ASSESSING POTENTIAL FUTURE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RISKS, BENEFITS AND POLICY IMPERATIVES

Identifying desirable AI futures

Governments should consider the medium- and long-term implications of AI

The medium to long-term implications of rapidly advancing AI systems remain largely unknown and fiercely debated. Experts raise a range of potential future risks from AI, some of which are already becoming visible. At the same time, experts and others expect AI to deliver significant or even revolutionary benefits. Future-focused activities can help better understand AI’s possible longer-term impacts and begin shaping them in the present to seize AI’s benefits while managing its risks.

To this end, the OECD Expert Group on AI Futures (“Expert Group”) is a multi-disciplinary group of 70 leading AI experts that helps address future AI challenges and opportunities by providing insights into the possible AI trajectories and impacts and by equipping governments with the knowledge and tools necessary to develop forward-looking AI policies. Policy actions today can help achieve desirable future scenarios The Expert Group, through a survey, discussions, and scenario exploration exercises, presented its views on the characteristics of desirable AI futures in society and governance (see methodology in Annex A). These desirable futures embody the realisation of potential future AI benefits and the mitigation of key future risks. Positive futures will not occur automatically; they demand concrete action by policymakers, companies, and other AI actors.

Jared M. McKinney, Coming Full Circle on Semiconductor Deterrence, No. 607

Dr. Jared M. McKinney

In November of 2021, as the world faced semiconductor shortages due to fragile supply chains and just-in-time business practices, a colleague and I proposed an idea intended to reduce the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait: Taiwan should threaten to self-destruct its prized semiconductor machinery in response to a People’s Republic of China (PRC) invasion.[1]

The idea, as originally conceived, was inspired by two sources.

The first source was the longstanding idea of a “Silicon Shield in Taiwan,” which suggested that semiconductors were to Taiwan what oil was to Kuwait: something so important the United States would intervene to see the resource protected.[2] However, by 2021 it was not just the United States that was dependent on Taiwan’s chips, but China too. The problem had become one of interdependence, with Taiwan as the critical node.

The second source was a Chinese novel series, the Three-Body Problem, which introduced the idea of “dark forest” deterrence.[3] The dark forest described a structural condition of hostility among civilizations across the universe. Could understanding this “cosmic sociology” allow Earth to deter an invasion? This was to be done by threatening to reveal the location—to the universe—of both Earth and the Trisolaran home world, which would result in the destruction of both. The trick was: could such a threat be credibly made?

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The new struggle for space

Aaron Bateman

Hundreds of miles above the earth, thousands of satellites are enabling the battle for Ukraine. Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites provide the connectivity to Ukraine’s armed forces that is vital for targeted drone strikes against Russian units. Meanwhile, commercial imaging satellites deliver crucial battlefield intelligence to Ukrainian soldiers. It is therefore unsurprising that the conflict in Ukraine has been dubbed the first commercial space war. Defence analysts frequently point to the Gulf War (1990-91) as the first space war due to the integration of satellites into the US-led coalition’s combat operations. However, neither of these claims about the role of satellites in conflict is wholly accurate. American forces first used satellites during the Vietnam War and commercial communications satellites played an important role during the First Gulf War. These historical nuances aside, satellites, particularly commercial ones, have become woven into the fabric of modern warfare, intensifying military competition in space.

The very idea of space conflict conjures up images of space battleships that could be taken from the pages of a Jules Verne novel. The US military’s newest service, the Space Force, has already been incorporated into kitschy popular culture representations of space conflict. But space systems constitute a multi-billion-dollar information infrastructure for the United States to project power across the globe. Russia and China have also heavily invested in weapons designed to degrade and destroy the satellites that are so crucial for the US way of warfare.

Government-Owned Broadband Networks Are Not Competing on a Level Playing Field

Ellis Scherer

Introduction

Local government officials are often taken in by the allure of government-owned broadband networks (GONs) when told by activists or consultants that they are superior to relying on private providers. While a GON could be the least bad option if no private providers are willing to invest, build, and operate, GONs are typically a suboptimal choice.

Comparisons between GONs and private Internet service providers (ISPs) are often asymmetric—overlooking favoritism toward GONs and hostility to private deployment. From a policy perspective, such a skewed comparison is unhelpful in finding the best way to connect consumers and efficiently use national resources. Instead, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) under President-elect Trump should push policymakers to conduct an unbiased evaluation of the relative merits of both options. It is faulty reasoning to leap from the importance of broadband or animosity toward private ISPs to an assumption that a local government could do a better job for consumers. As much as local officials might like a car factory, they don’t get into that business because they know they have neither the competence nor the scale to do it efficiently. The same is usually true with broadband.

The Role of Non-State Actors as Proxies in Irregular Warfare and Malign State Influence

Sam Mullins

Introduction

During the last decade or so, a growing international consensus has emerged that the boundaries between peace and war are becoming ever more blurred. States increasingly seek to compete with, coerce, and influence one another in ways that are widely perceived to be hostile, yet intentionally remain below the threshold of conventional war.[i] Although in some respects, this is nothing new—examples of everything from economic coercion to “fake news” can be found throughout history—such tactics have expanded and proliferated in the post-Cold War era as a result of increased globalization and advances in technology, along with the rising costs of war.[ii]

Authoritarian, revisionist states like Russia and China, which have spearheaded the rise in so-called “gray-zone warfare,” have also been driven by their fear of U.S. conventional military superiority. Moscow and Beijing have further demonstrated a growing sense of paranoia surrounding “color revolutions” in the former Soviet Union, and the “Arab Spring” uprisings against corrupt governments in the Middle East and North Africa. Over time, Russian and Chinese leaders came to view these events, not as legitimate manifestations of popular discontent, but as Western-orchestrated plots that amounted to a new way of warfare aimed at undermining and ultimately overthrowing autocratic regimes.[iii] As a result, they have invested heavily in such tactics as disinformation, subversive economics, political interference, and use of proxies.

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