21 December 2024

'We thought it was a ball' - the bombs killing and maiming Indian children

Soutik Biswas, Nupur Sonar & Tanushree Pandey

Over the last three decades, at least 565 children in the Indian state of West Bengal have been injured or killed by home-made bombs, a BBC Eye investigation has found.

So what are these deadly devices and how are they linked to political violence in West Bengal? And why are so many Bengali children paying the price?

On a bright summer morning in May 1996, six boys from a slum in Kolkata, the capital of India's West Bengal state, stepped out to play cricket in a narrow alley.

Their shantytown, nestled in the middle-class neighbourhood of Jodhpur Park, thrummed with life. It was a holiday - voting day in a general election.

Nine-year-old Puchu Sardar, one of the boys, grabbed a cricket bat and quietly slipped past his sleeping father. Soon, the cracking noise of bat meeting ball echoed through the alley.

A ball batted out of the boundaries of their makeshift pitch sent the boys searching for it in a small garden nearby. There, in a black plastic bag, they found six round objects.

They looked like cricket balls someone had left behind, and the boys returned to the game with their spoils.

Generative AI and its Influence on India's 2024 Elections

D Dhanuraj, Sreelakshmi Harilal and Nissy Solomon

Introduction

Elections are important for a thriving democracy. A robust democracy is underpinned by trustworthy and trusted election processes in a rule-based order and the active participation of voters in a free and fair manner. In recent years, however, the impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning on modern society has also produced spillover effects in the conduct of elections. With 2024 being the “super election year” worldwide, experts are concerned about the potential impact of AI on democratic institutions and processes (UNDP, 2024).

Indian political parties have never shied away from experimenting with novel technologies in their election campaigning strategies. For instance, in 2014, Prime Minister Modi appeared in several of the party’s political rallies via a 3-D hologram version of himself. Similarly, during the DelhiAssembly elections in 2020, an AI-generated lip-syncing video of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) politician was generated by a political consultant in two regional languages, appealing to different sections of voters.


The Case for an IndoMed Quad: India, Italy, UAE, and US Cooperation

Emanuele Rossi

Since the eruption of violence in Gaza following Hamas’s October 7 attack, the geopolitical significance of the “Indo-Mediterranean”—a term gaining currency in Italian strategic circles—has come into sharp focus. Amid regional instability and security threats, the evolving relationships between the United States, the United Arab Emirates, India, and Italy suggest the formation of a new cooperative alliance: an “IndoMed Quad.” This integrated cooperation could address the region’s security and developmental challenges, offering a pragmatic solution to stabilize one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors.

Strengthening Bilateral Ties as the Foundation of the IndoMed Quad

Bilateral relations among the prospective IndoMed Quad members have strengthened considerably in recent years, providing a solid foundation for this new strategic alliance. The US-UAE relationship has deepened, with the United Arab Emirates now designated a “major defense partner.” This partnership encompasses joint security initiatives similar to those within the original Quad (United States, India, Japan, and Australia), reflecting Washington’s broader latticework approach to regional security alliances.

The United Arab Emirates and India have also bolstered their defense cooperation, holding joint military exercises and enhancing maritime security in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The IndoMed Quad would be a natural extension of this cooperation, building on existing frameworks like the Twelfth Joint Defense Cooperation Committee and India’s active engagement in the US-India Critical and Emerging Technology initiative.

Taliban’s Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani killed: Why it matters

Ruchi Kumar

The Taliban’s minister of refugees, Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani, was killed along with four others in a suicide attack in Kabul on Wednesday.

The deceased minister was a senior leader within the Haqqani Network, the Taliban’s closest ally which has jointly controlled power in Afghanistan since 2021.

Haqqani’s killing was claimed by the ISIL (ISIS)-affiliate in the Khorasan Province, ISKP, and marks the most significant assassination of a leader in Afghanistan’s Taliban-led administration since the ouster of the United States-backed government of former President Ashraf Ghani three years ago, say analysts.

The bombing, they say, has raised questions about internal tensions within the Taliban and its allies, the influence of the ISKP in the country and security in Afghanistan more broadly.

Drones, Desperation, and Displacement: Rohingya Flee Violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State

Shafiur Rahman

As the violent clashes between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military intensify, thousands of Rohingya and other ethnic minorities are fleeing their homes in Rakhine State, seeking refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. The border area has become a critical zone, with approximately 4,000 to 5,000 Rohingya, Chakma, and Barua people stranded in various villages around the Zero Point and Tombru areas. Many risk perilous journeys at night, aided by brokers, to cross into Bangladesh, only to face the threat of being apprehended and pushed back by the Border Guard Bangladesh.

Amid this humanitarian crisis, the personal accounts of two Rohingya women – Humaira and Salma Bibi – illuminate the profound struggles faced by those escaping the turmoil.

Humaira’s Journey: A Tale of Loss and Survival

In March, during the holy month of Ramadan, “We were told to leave our village by Mogh Baghi [Arakan Army], as they planned to engage in fighting with the Myanmar military,” recalls Humaira, a Rohingya woman. She once lived peacefully in the village of Hadir Bill. The warning marked the beginning of a relentless flight from danger for her and her family.

Their first refuge was Nol Boinna, where they stayed for “10 to 15 days.” However, fear of escalating violence forced them to move again to Maungni Fara. “We had to move once more to Hari Fara when weapons and bombs started landing on Maungni Fara,” Humaira explains. Each village they sought shelter in became another battleground, leaving them with no choice but to keep moving.

Strengthening Resilience in Taiwan

Daniel Byman, Seth G. Jones, and Jude Blanchette

There is a lack of U.S. and international attention to systematically assessing Taiwan’s resilience and developing a comprehensive assistance plan to improve it. Taiwan’s geopolitical, technological, and economic importance in the Indo-Pacific region has made it a focal point of U.S. strategic interests, especially in countering Chinese influence and aggression. Taiwan has taken important steps to strengthen resilience over the last several years. However, the threat it faces is significant, and it falls short in many important dimensions of resilience. The question of the readiness and resolve of Taiwan’s civilian population to resist in the event of foreign aggression also remains concerning.

To help improve resilience in Taiwan, this report contains specific recommendations in such areas as (1) raising threat awareness among the people of Taiwan through a more systematic strategic communications plan; (2) improving ties to the private sector, including companies involved in critical infrastructure; (3) bolstering Taiwan’s energy infrastructure, especially in such areas as the power grid; and (4) increasing strategic reserves and redundancy of food and energy. These and other steps would not only help strengthen Taiwan’s will and ability to resist external pressure, influence, and potential invasion but also bolster deterrence by raising the costs and risks for an aggressor, reducing the overall risk of conflict.

Laser Focus: Countering China’s LiDAR Threat to U.S. Critical Infrastructure and Military Systems

Craig Singleton & RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

Introduction

“Only by mastering crucial core technologies within our own hands,” said Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, “can we [China] truly seize the initiative in competition and development, and fundamentally safeguard our national economic security, national security, and security in other domains.”1 Xi’s declaration underscores his desire to transform China into a science and technology great power, which, he argues, hinges on tightening “international production chains’ dependence on China.”2 LiDAR, a remote sensing technology with both military and civilian applications, stands at the center of Beijing’s bid for technological superiority.

Xi’s technological vision is not just an ambition — it is already materializing. Today, Chinese companies are rapidly consolidating control over the global LiDAR market, with PRC-origin sensors now widely deployed across civilian and military networks worldwide, including in the United States. These sensors often serve as essential nodes within interconnected public safety, transportation, and utility systems, which is a clear benefit to the United States. However, Chinese LiDAR’s system-wide integration also leaves its users vulnerable to espionage and sabotage, potentially enabling Beijing to access sensitive U.S. data or disrupt critical operations.


China’s Economy Has Not Peaked

NANCY QIAN

What happens to the world economy and global geopolitics in 2025 will depend significantly on China, the world’s largest exporter and second-largest consumer market. But prevailing assessments of China’s economic health are deeply flawed.

The headlines in 2024 have been mixed. China’s GDP is growing, though the precise rate is always a matter of debate. Youth unemployment, which shocked policymakers when it reached a peak of 21.3% in June 2023, has declined to 17.6%. And the property-market crisis finally seems to be moderating, with transactions increasing following the government’s bold intervention to support the sector, which, directly and indirectly, accounts for one-third of the Chinese economy.

And yet, the dynamism that characterized China’s economy over the last three decades seems to be missing. Consumption growth is slow, as apprehensive Chinese households maintain high savings rates. Likewise, foreign investors’ confidence is at an “all-time low.” As prices drop, fears of a deflationary spiral are growing, recalling the prolonged stagnation that gripped Japan beginning in the 1990s. Against this backdrop, some now argue that China’s economy has already peaked.

Taking Stock of the Islamic State

Kim Cragin

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has reopened the debate on the U.S. military presence in Syria and the wider Middle East. The United States has three primary interests in Syria: averting adversaries’ potential possession of chemical weapon stockpiles, preventing an Islamic State resurgence in the region and accompanying external operations against the West, and limiting regional instability more generally. But the Islamic State’s resurgence has already begun to some extent. Islamic State fighters killed 139 people during an attack on a concert hall in Moscow, Russia, in March 2024. An Islamic State plot shut down Taylor Swift’s concert in Austria in August 2024. Then, in October, the FBI arrested an Afghan man and juvenile for planning an Election Day attack in Oklahoma City. The latter two attacks were halted due to intelligence and law enforcement investigations, but they feel a little too close for comfort.

Some critics have argued that this resurgence is the result of a reduced U.S. military presence in Syria and Iraq, and its withdrawal from Afghanistan. They believe that U.S. intelligence cannot provide sufficient indicators and warnings from a distance. Others argue that even if U.S. intelligence is up to the task, the current approach of periodic air strikes or raids conducted from “over the horizon” will not work. These critics draw on prior studies of decapitation operations and observe that they rarely have long-term effects. I have expressed my own doubts, arguing that over-the-horizon strikes might be too risky for senior decision-makers because they make it difficult to achieve the necessary pace of operations.

The Fall of Bashar al-Assad May Not Be Good News for the Taliban

Weiss Mehrabi

The fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad marks a turning point not only for Syria but also for Islamist movements worldwide. For the Taliban, this moment is bittersweet. While the collapse of a rival regime offers a symbolic victory, the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) poses a direct ideological and strategic challenge. HTS’s promises of inclusivity, tolerance of minorities, and democratic reform highlight the Taliban’s regressive policies and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Syrian rebels’ victory could inspire opposition movements within Afghanistan and embolden moderate Taliban officials to push back against their leader’s hardline rule.

The surprising advances of opposition forces in the Syrian civil war and the subsequent collapse of the Assad regime have sent shockwaves across the globe. The Arab world has watched Syrian developments with mixed emotions – hope for change but also concerns over instability. The Taliban, however, greeted the event with overt enthusiasm.

Several Taliban-affiliated social media accounts celebrated the recent successes of the rebels in Syria. On December 8, the Taliban extended congratulations to the HTS-led forces, the rebel groups that toppled the Assad government, expressing hope that the power transition in Syria would lead to the establishment of a government aligned with “the aspirations of the people and Islamic values.” In Kabul and other Afghan provinces, the Taliban marked the victory with celebrations, distributing sweets and rallies.

Erdogan Gets His ‘Leader of the Muslim World’ Moment

Steven A. Cook and Sinan Ciddi

Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has come full circle and then some on Syria. At the dawn of the Erdogan era, Turkey’s then-prime minister was Bashar al Assad’s patron—once even proposing that the Erdogan and Assad families vacation together. The two leaders fell out after Assad turned his military against the uprising that began in 2011, resulting in millions of refugees streaming into Turkey.

Erdogan could never convince President Barack Obama to invade Syria and overthrow the regime, so he kept his options open, putting together a rebel force dubbed the Syrian National Army (SNA) and tacitly supporting the jihadists that became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The SNA was primarily a tool Turkey used to fight Syrian Kurds who wanted to set up a state on Turkey’s doorstep. HTS was useful against the Russians and the regime, but Russian arms confined them to the Idlib province.


The politicians lying about Syria History is being rewritten

Tom McTague

Old grievances in Western politics have been reopened by the sudden fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. And they are as dispiriting in their dishonesty as they are myopic in their self-interest. On the one hand, we have the unrepentant interventionists convinced that the tyrant’s fall would have happened years earlier were it not for Ed Miliband’s recklessness in 2013, when he blocked British airstrikes. On the other, we have the unrepentant anti-interventionists, led by Miliband himself, who say the real criminals are those who recklessly pursued the Iraq war a decade earlier. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, it's a pity that both sides can't lose this tedious and tendentious war of history that reveals far more about the failures of our political class than either side appears to understand.


Turkey’s Syria Conundrum

Robert Ellis

Once upon a time, Turkey’s then-prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, hosted Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, for a family holiday in Turkey and planned a Middle East Union together with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. But the Arab Spring changed all of that. Assad ruled with a savagery that surpassed that of his father, Hafez, until his downfall at the hands of an opposition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) last weekend.

Later, Assad became “the murderer al-Assad,” and now President Erdogan declared he would soon pray in the Ummayad mosque in Damascus. This, however, has taken longer than he expected. To replace Assad’s Alawite-led regime and substitute it with Sunni rule, Erdogan has employed both subterfuge and an alliance with a motley band of jihadis.

In a gaffe at Harvard University in 2014, then-Vice President Joe Biden, in a Q&A, stated that America’s allies in the region, Turkey, the Saudis, and the Emirates, were the largest problem in Syria.

“They were so determined to take down Assad, and essentially have a proxy Sunni-Shia war, what did they do? They poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad—except that the people who were being supplied, were al-Nusra and al-Qaeda, and the extremist elements of jihadis who were coming from other parts of the world.”

Plan for the End Now…. So, It Is Not a Surprise

Fred Wegner

All wars end, that is what they do. The Korean War might be an exception to this rule. As a result, the Korean War might provide a good example for Ukraine’s situation and how to conclude its war with Russia. That being said, unless Ukraine and its Western supporters want to fight to the last Ukrainian soldier, it is time for the Ukrainians, and their supporters, to prepare the way for a successful transition to a long-term peace. Planning for the eventual end to hostilities now is better than muddling through to an uncertain outcome later down the road.

Make no mistake, this war is a war between Russia and the West. In this use, the West refers to NATO and the European Union (EU). Ukraine is the serving as the West’s proxy force against Russia, conducting nearly all the combat operations against Russia’s military forces, and carrying the brunt of the costs for the destruction, chaos, and societal upheaval within Ukraine.

For these reasons the West should lean hard on both sides to sit down and negotiate the end of the conflict. Because of its leading position in providing funding and material support to Ukraine, the US should maintain a central position in these negotiations. This does not mean, however, that the US should be front and center, and lead the face-to-face negotiations needed to end the conflict.

Kirillov killed outside apartment as 'war comes to Moscow'

Jenna Moon

Early this morning, an explosion in a Moscow neighbourhood killed Russian Lt Gen Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Ilya Polikarpov. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) say it was behind the blast.

Here's a recap:
  • Kirillov headed Russia's Radiological, Biological, Chemical Defence Forces (NBC). Just yesterday, Ukraine charged Kirillov in absentia for war crimes - it says he oversaw the use of chemical weapons against Ukrainian soldiers
  • The bomb was detonated remotely, according to Russian state media, and contained anywhere from 300g to 1kg of explosives
  • The bomb was seemingly planted on a scooter outside the building and went off when Kirillov and his aide left this morning
  • Kirillov was known for outlandish claims and had long suggested Ukraine was developing a "dirty" nuclear bomb. He was described by the UK as "a significant mouthpiece for Russian disinformation"
  • Ukraine has been stepping up its assassinations, our defence correspondent Jonathan Beale writes. The SBU is believed to be behind the deaths of two other Russian officials in recent weeks
  • And - from the scene - our Russia editor Steve Rosenberg says the explosion brings the Ukraine war home for people in the capital

What we know about mysterious drones over New Jersey and other states

Bernd Debusmann Jr

Mystery continues to swirl after nearly a month of drone sightings over New Jersey and other US states, alarming some residents.

US authorities have been unable to provide definitive answers, saying only that the objects are not believed to pose a danger to the public or national security.

On Sunday, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas confirmed the sightings included drones, as well as manned aircraft commonly mistaken for drones.

He added that he knows of "no foreign involvement" to do with the unmanned aerial vehicles.

Some lawmakers have criticised the government's handling of the drone reports and the lack of public information.

The drone sightings have prompted a wide-range of baseless conspiracy theories, including that they are searching for nuclear weapons, radioactive "dirty bombs" or are form part of an impending invasion by aliens.

EU issues first-ever sanctions over ‘Russian hybrid threats’

Alexander Martin

The European Council announced on Monday it was sanctioning 16 individuals and three entities “responsible for Russia’s destabilising actions abroad.”

It is the first time the bloc’s political executive is issuing sanctions under powers established in October. When the powers were agreed, Brussels said they were a response to the Kremlin’s “intensifying campaign of hybrid activities” targeting member states and partners.

The sanctions aim to impact a wide range of actors, from those involved in GRU Unit 29155 — a Russian military intelligence unit that has been accused of cyberattacks and assassinations — through to other intelligence agency staff and private individuals involved in spreading Russian propaganda both in Europe and Africa.

Among the individuals being sanctioned for propaganda are Sofia Zakharova and Nikolai Tupikin, both of whom have been linked to the Doppelgรคnger influence campaign by a U.S. Department of Justice affidavit.

The sanctions also target several people involved in “a Russian intelligence operation against the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in which highly classified information was passed to the FSB,” including Vladimir Sergiyenko, an aide to a far-right German politician.

Top Russian general killed in bomb blast in Moscow

Max Seddon and Christopher Miller

A top Russian general accused of using chemical weapons in the invasion of Ukraine has died after a bomb went off at the entrance to his home in Moscow early on Tuesday, investigators said, killing him and his assistant. 

Russia’s Investigative Committee, a major crimes unit, said Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, the head of the military’s nuclear, chemical and biological defence forces, had died in an explosion caused by a bomb placed on a scooter. 

Kirillov is the most prominent military officer to be assassinated since Russia began its full-scale of invasion of Ukraine in 2022. 

Ukraine’s SBU security service had a day earlier put out a “notice of suspicion” — essentially a warrant — for Kirillov over alleged “war crimes committed” against Kyiv’s forces. 

A Ukrainian intelligence official with direct knowledge of the attack told the Financial Times that the SBU was behind the killing. 

“Kirillov was a war criminal and a completely legitimate target, as he gave orders to use banned chemical weapons against the Ukrainian military,” the official said. “Such an inglorious end awaits all who kill Ukrainians. Retribution for war crimes is inevitable.”

Does it Matter if You Call it a Wargame? Actually, yes.

Phillip Pournelle

Much of what the Department of Defense calls wargaming is not actually wargaming and this abuse of nomenclature has real consequences. Wargame-like activities, if conducted properly, are necessary and valuable, but the Department needs to do a better job of differentiating between true wargames, and wargame-like activities. Understanding the types and styles of wargames and wargame-like activities, when which is appropriate, what they look like, and what they can do for you is critical. Without a proper understanding of what a wargame is, and what it is not, the Department of Defense risks wasting money, time, and talent. It has become is all too common that a group of people together having an unstructured conversation is referred to as a “wargame,” and then the sponsor claims to be better prepared for having done it. Such claims are tautological, self-serving, and do not advance organizational learning.

Over the years, the analytic and wargaming community has developed a set of tools with known standards and expectations. Leadership in the Department of Defense should familiarize themselves with them because government sponsors control the larger analytic ecosystem. Better informed customers and sponsors will be able to responsibly choose designers and events appropriate to their purpose and thus generate good strategies.

AI Is for Allies

Michael Hochberg & Marcus Gomez

The U.S. Department of Commerce recently sought to enhance export controls on artificial intelligence (AI) hardware and added several People’s Republic of China companies to the entity list.[1] This is a step in the right direction, aimed at containing China’s ability to weaponize AI. But it’s not enough.

Progress in AI models is moving at an astounding pace: The most advanced models are now producing glimmers of what may be considered strategic action and self-protection.[2] These models are like nuclear weapons were in the 1950s—a technology that will revolutionize warfighting in ways that we cannot yet anticipate. But unlike nuclear technology, which spread slowly, AI is being rapidly and widely weaponized, with attendant dramatic changes in warfare.

What is to be done? The liberal-democratic West (including Japan, Korea and Taiwan) have an effective monopoly on the best AI hardware, especially for training giant models. The West should now cut off China, Russia, Iran and North Korea’s (i.e., the CRINKs) access to this hardware, and cripple their capabilities for building their own competing hardware based on Western semiconductor technology. The next wave of AI improvement is going to be revolutionary, and there’s no reason to enable our enemies to benefit.

Turkey’s Evolving Geopolitical Strategy in the Black Sea

Antonia Colibasanu

Introduction

Several major developments are now affecting the Eurasian security paradigm. First, Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine defied the 1990s consensus that fighting in Europe had ended and peace was the new normal. On the contrary, war has returned to the continent. Second, there are obvious signs from across the Atlantic that the American commitment to European security cannot be taken for granted, particularly given that other global concerns may put Washington’s energy and resource bandwidth to the test. This comes at a time when tensions in the Middle East are rising, with a new regional war changing power dynamics in the area.

The cumulative effect of these issues has renewed debate about strengthening the European military pillar of transatlantic security and the NATO alliance so that it can stand firmer beside the United States, which, together with Canada, constitutes the North American pillar. Turkey, as a NATO ally and a formal EU candidate (although a distant one) with interests in the continent’s security architecture, is critical to this argument. Turkey plays a critical role in the geopolitics of the Black Sea area, connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Ankara has increased its geographical, economic, and military influence in the Black Sea, particularly in light of the continuing war in Ukraine and the intensifying conflict in the Middle East. These crises, which are unfolding on Turkey’s northern and southern flanks, present Turkey as a major connector between volatile regions. As the two conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are increasingly interconnected, Turkey’s strategic ambitions to become a regional force are dependent on its ability to handle these the challenges at its borders while maintaining its core stable.

The Price of Russian Victory

Elaine McCusker

Many Americans are concerned about the cost of aid to Ukraine. It took the U.S. Congress seven months to approve the last funding measure to provide aid. A November Pew poll indicates that most Americans support helping Ukraine, yet roughly a quarter believe that Washington has been providing too much assistance. Elected officials, including the Vice President-elect JD Vance, continue making misleading comments about being “half a trillion dollars in the hole for the Ukraine conflict.” The billionaire Elon Musk, who is helping the incoming Trump administration sort out plans to cut federal spending, posted on social media last February that it was “insane” for the United States to continue its investment in Ukraine.

Such worries are understandable. The United States is faced with numerous challenges. Illegal immigration, financing the national debt, competition with China, war in the Middle East, and a generally unpredictable global security environment all compete for attention and resources. It is not surprising that it is difficult for Washington to sort out its priorities.

But Americans worried only about the cost of helping Ukraine are thinking about the issue in the wrong way. They should be worried about the cost of not helping Ukraine. Right now, by providing aid to Kyiv, the United States is preventing Russia from directly menacing eastern and central Europe, which would doubtless consume even more U.S. resources. Washington may, in fact, be deterring a direct war between NATO and Moscow, one in which U.S. forces would have to fight.

What’s At Stake in Ukraine: European Security in a Broader Context

Stephen Blank

Introduction

Crisis denotes both challenge and opportunity. The war in Ukraine is no exception. Moreover, both the crisis and the opportunity are clear. Russia continues to demand the de facto, if not de jure, destruction of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The opportunity now standing before Washington and Europe is the chance to defeat Russia and thereby affect the greatest strategic transformation in a generation. As of September 2024, the United States therefore stands at a decisive, strategic inflection point triggered by Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk Oblast, and concurrently, strong demands upon the West for both more and continuing support and the right to use Western weapons against deeper Russian targets persevere.

These events represent an inflection point despite mounting efforts by third parties—India and China—and misguided Western actors to arrange a negotiation process for the following reasons.
  1. Russia shows no signs of negotiating, especially with Ukrainian troops on its territory, even though it demands recognition of its conquests as constituting part of Russia.[1]
  2. Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that if the West allows its weapons to be used, as Ukraine has requested, this will mean that NATO is at war with Russia which will then draw the appropriate consequences.[2] This obviously is another threat of escalation, potentially to the nuclear level.

Counter-Drone Tech Struggles to Keep Up with Evolving Threat

Laura Heckmann

During the last year, the Navy alone has spent more than $1 billion shooting down missiles and uncrewed aerial systems in the Red Sea — an expense made unsustainable by the sheer proliferation of relatively inexpensive drones in battle zones.

The Defense Department is scrambling for affordable and adaptable counter-drone options, and it’s going to require something that’s rare to come by — agreement on how best to tackle a technology that is constantly evolving.

“We’re very interested in counter-UAS because the next war will be robotic,” retired Army Lt. Col. Matthew Dooley and defense strategic initiatives lead at Forterra said during a recent panel at the National Defense Industrial Association’s Future Force Capabilities Conference and Exhibition.

“And [it] may not look exactly like what you see in Ukraine or Israel, but it may be something very analogous to that, and it will fight combined arms,” he said.

As a result, solutions to counter drones will likely be a combination of legacy systems, new capabilities and a “shift in doctrine, organization, tactics — how we teach other leaders,” Dooley said. “So, the conversation about UAS and counter-UAS is very powerful.”

Army’s next-gen command and control program will be a ‘clean slate’

Mark Pomerleau

The Army’s effort to overhaul how it conducts command and control will begin with a completely clean slate, according to officials.

The service is currently undergoing parallel tracks to improve how forces perform command and control on the battlefield in the future. The first, named C2 Fix, is aimed at bolstering soldiers’ so-called “fight tonight” ability. That effort is expected to serve as a bridge to a longer-term solution, dubbed Next Gen C2.

Next Gen C2 is the Army’s top priority, from the chief of staff to the commander of Futures Command. As the service transitions from over 20 years of operations against technologically inferior enemies to large-scale combat operations across vast distances against sophisticated adversatives, the current systems and architectures for command and control are not suitable for success, top officials contend.

Next Gen C2 “is intended to be a different approach — and a different approach in order to ensure that the Army is able to take advantage of data centricity Army-wide to transform to take advantage of that, so that our commanders can make more decisions and they can make them faster and they can make them better than the adversary,” Joe Welch, deputy to the commander of Futures Command, said at the Army’s Technical Exchange Meeting in Savannah last week. “The design principle of NGC2 from the beginning was clean sheet, unconstrained.”