Indian Strategic Studies: 12/20/24

20 December 2024

Why India’s Semiconductor Future Needs Empowerment, Not Red Tape

Shree Kumar| & Pranay Kotasthane

‘Make in India’ was launched with much fanfare a decade ago, with the mission of making India a global hub for manufacturing, design, and innovation. However, over the years, the mission has floundered, thanks to many hit-wicket policies such as the recently withdrawn Chip Import Monitoring System (CHIMS).

To understand CHIMS, picture a census and import control rolled into one regulation. Launched in October 2021, it mandated prior registration of most integrated circuits (chips) through an Import Management System portal, adding another complicated regulatory layer to the existing Importer-Exporter Code (IEC) registration. Applying for approval entailed submitting extensive information, including technical documentation of the chips to be imported. The customs would clear the consignments only upon receiving this chip license.

For reasons that may never be known, CHIMS imposed an additional burden and cost to the routine business of importing chips, affecting the entire electronic design services ecosystem. In the early phase of its rollout, the scheme caused inconvenience and delays among large importers. For small and medium enterprises, startups and the general chip design industry, CHIMS was an unwelcome overhead, increasing the already high costs of doing business in India. The hardest hit, however, were innovators: CHIMS pretty much smothered their initiatives by making the import of chips in small quantities harder and far more unpredictable. While innovators in the US and Europe could buy components directly from China (despite an ongoing trade war), Indian innovators couldn’t.

IS-KHORASAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

SUBRAMANYAM SRIDHARAN

Introduction

It is now established that the attack on the Crocus City Hall concert venue in Moscow Oblast on March 22, 2024 that killed 143 and injured over 80, was by the Khorasan branch of the IS (invariably denoted as IS-K or Islamic State Khorasan Province, ISKP), a part of the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, also known as ISIL - Islamic State of Iraq and Levant -, or Dawalah Islamiyah or Da’esh), though the Russian President Putin tried desperately to implicate Ukraine in the affair initially. It is speculated that IS-K attacked a faraway Moscow, distant from its usual zone of operation, in order to demonstrate its growing reach.

The UN Secretary-General’s 18th biannual strategic-level report on the threat posed by the ISIS, authored by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UN Security Council, released on February 15 2024 stated that while ISIS-Sahel (Sahel is the region in North Africa just below the Sahara) posed the greatest threat, the IS-K remains the most serious terrorist threat in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, retaining the ability to recruit and conduct attacks. The UNSC’s 2023 Report had already identified India as a country vulnerable to IS-K. According to the UN report cited above, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has not taken any effort to curtail the IS-K and on the other hand, its release of several prisoners has already swelled the number of IS-K terrorists from 2,200 to 4,000. This, in spite of the fact that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been at loggerheads with the ISIS ever since the latter’s formation. The two also fear that the other can wipe one out. The emir of IS-K is an Afghan Tajik, Sanaullah Ghafari

Strengthening the IndiaAI mission

Bharath Reddy & Rijesh Panicker

As details about the budget allocation for the IndiaAI mission emerge, this is an opportune moment to reassess its objectives for fostering India’s AI ecosystem and to evaluate how the government can achieve these goals. The authors argue that the government should promote open-source initiatives, adopt funding mechanisms that enable the market to evaluate value creation and innovation, and fund research to understand AI risks in an Indian context.

A recent response to a question in the Lok Sabha outlined the allocation of the budgeted Rs 10,372 crore across the seven pillars of the IndiaAI mission. A signicant share, around 44%, is directed toward building domestic computing capacity. An innovation centre and startup nancing each account for 19% of the budget, while the remainder is distributed among future skilling, an application development initiative, a datasets platform, and a safe and trusted AI initiative.

Investments in computing infrastructure are among the most signicant expenses in AI development. For instance, Meta reported spending $8.5 billion in the second quarter of this year alone on AI-related computing infrastructure. In comparison, the IndiaAI’s planned investment over a ve-year period are modest. Big tech rms are estimated to have spent $189 billion globally in 2024 and are projected to spend an additional $500 billion over the next three years on capital expenditure. Given this scale, the IndiaAI mission must carefully consider where and why it allocates funds for computing and AI research.

China’s Slowdown Has Changed the Trade War

Daniel H. Rosen, Reva Goujon, and Logan Wright

The China that President-elect Donald Trump will face in 2025 is fundamentally different than the one he encountered when his first administration began in 2017, or even the one with which he negotiated a trade deal near the end of his term. Now, for the first time in more than four decades, China’s share of the world economy is shrinking—it peaked at just above 18 percent of global GDP in 2021 and stands at around 16 percent today.

China’s growth has slowed significantly since the property sector collapsed in 2021 and COVID-related restrictions impeded all types of economic activity in 2022. Domestic demand and household consumption made only a limited rebound after those restrictions were lifted at the end of 2022. Official Chinese GDP growth rates showed just a minor blip, but rising trade imbalances and falling domestic prices tell a grimmer story. China remains an investment-led economy: it is the world’s largest source of investment (around 28 percent) and gross manufacturing output (35 percent), but it represents only around 12 percent of global consumption. China’s domestic economy cannot generate nearly enough demand to absorb everything China produces. To create growth, therefore, Beijing has come to rely even more on exports of excess industrial output that cannot be absorbed in the domestic market. But China can only make further relative gains if other countries reduce their manufacturing investment or if Beijing expands its share of global exports.

China’s Different Approach to Space Situational Awareness

Kristin Burke

Introduction This report attempts to answer two questions. First, what do Chinese authors writing in Chinese and English reveal about domestic satellites supporting space situational awareness (SSA).i Second, given the available open-source information, in what ways does China’s approach to conducting space-based SSA differ from that of the United States.

This report identified at least ten spacecraft Chinese researchers have used for spacebased SSA. Another eight inferred satellites are included based on Chinese discussion of their orbits or sensors. Among the known SSA satellites are two which are developed, owned, and operated by Chinese mixed-ownership enterprises.ii In the sections that follow, the reader can find all the satellites in Table 2, and descriptions in aggregate and in detail. This review covered previously or currently on-orbit satellites, not plans for future systems.

This report finds three significant differences between China’s and the U.S.’s approach to space-based SSA. China has a different approach to space-based SSA architectures, different priorities for their placement in orbit, and a different rationale for enabling autonomous decisionmaking on satellites equipped with SSA sensors.

The primary factor driving these three differences is China’s lack of consistent access to a worldwide network of radars and telescopes, a problem that the U.S. has not had to face. China has mitigated the impact of this constraint by prioritizing SSA satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) that operate autonomously and watch LEO, over SSA satellites dedicated to geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Given China’s setup, it appears China needs space-based SSA, in pa

The Invisible Frontline: The Nature of China’s Unrestricted Warfare and Why the US Needs a Strategic Wake-Up Call

Dallas Tueller

Introduction

Imagine you’re playing a game of chess with the assumption that the rules are traditional. Your opponent, however, gets to change the rules at any time, distract you with clever misdirection, and manipulate the audience’s perception of the match. This game is no longer equal; one player has a major advantage. This is the essence of China’s approach to warfare in its Unrestricted Warfare (UW) strategy. Rather than relying solely on traditional military strength and playing by the “rules,” China employs the full spectrum of national power, including cyberattacks, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and spies, to achieve strategic goals. The United States (US) is scouring the rule book for effective responses but is coming up short. These tactics fall outside the typical rules of warfare and are increasingly relevant in today’s interconnected world, effectively creating a new normal. With a traditional mindset on warfare, the US needs to adapt to these changes to keep up with integral changes to the character of war and effectively protect itself from external influence. China’s use of UW is having profound repercussions on core US infrastructure. These effects occur without recognition and proper urgency, putting US national security and hegemony at risk. It’s critical that senior-level policymakers and strategists adequately recognize the impact of China’s UW on the US. This article provides evidence of UW’s occurrence within vital US systems and details possible solutions to mitigate its effects. The primary aim is to increase awareness of China’s ongoing action against the US to stimulate strategic discussion within higher levels of the government.

The Price of American Retreat

Mitch McConnell

When he begins his second term as president, Donald Trump will inherit a world far more hostile to U.S. interests than the one he left behind four years ago. China has intensified its efforts to expand its military, political, and economic influence worldwide. Russia is fighting a brutal and unjustified war in Ukraine. Iran remains undeterred in its campaign to destroy Israel, dominate the Middle East, and develop a nuclear weapons capability. And these three U.S. adversaries, along with North Korea, are now working together more closely than ever to undermine the U.S.-led order that has underpinned Western peace and prosperity for nearly a century.

The Biden administration sought to manage these threats through engagement and accommodation. But today’s revanchist powers do not seek deeper integration with the existing international order; they reject its very basis. They draw strength from American weakness, and their appetite for hegemony has only grown with the eating.

Many in Washington acknowledge the threat but use it to justify existing domestic policy priorities that have little to do with the systemic competition underway. They pay lip service to the reality of great-power competition but shirk from investing in the hard power on which such competition is actually based. The costs of these mistaken assumptions have become evident. But the response to four years of weakness must not be four years of isolation.

Persuasive technologies in China: implications for the future of national security

Daria Impiombato , Dr Nathan Attrill , Albert Zhang , Fergus Ryan & Bethany Allen

Introduction

Persuasive technologies—or technologies with persuasive characteristics—are tools and systems designed to shape users’ decision-making, attitudes or behaviours by exploiting people’s physiological and cognitive reactions or vulnerabilities.1 Compared to technologies we presently use, persuasive technologies collect more data, analyse more deeply and generate more insights that are more intimately tailored to us as individuals.

With current consumer technologies, influence is achieved through content recommendations that reflect algorithms learning from the choices we consciously make (at least initially). At a certain point, a person’s capacity to choose then becomes constrained because of a restricted information environment that reflects and reinforces their opinions—the so-called echo-chamber effect. With persuasive technologies, influence is achieved through a more direct connection with intimate physiological and emotional reactions. That risks removing human choice from the process entirely and steering choices without an individual’s full awareness. Such technologies won’t just shape what we do: they have the potential to influence who we are.

Will Syria’s New HTS Government Be a Protector or Persecutor of Minorities?

Joseph S. Laughon

The Syrian civil war has shifted into a new phase, one that was unthinkable just a few short days ago. The rebels, largely led by the former al-Qaeda affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and their leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, have conducted a lightning offensive through major cities, eventually taking the capital of Damascus on December 8th. The Assad regime, which had ruled Syria for over 53 years, suddenly collapsed as Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow.

Suddenly, HTS have gone from ruling a besieged enclave to the kingmakers of a new Syria. Al-Jolani insists that his organization has changed, promising to protect human rights and minority communities. American policymakers should not be credulous. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s record, the consistent trend of deception in jihadism and western naïveté demands extreme suspicion until proven otherwise.

Humiliated Abroad, Iran Is Also Enfeebled at Home

Kay Armin Serjoie

Every dramatic development in the Middle East this year has left Iran weaker. In 2024, the Islamic Republic lost in Gaza, in Lebanon, and, most spectacularly, in the Syrian Arab Republic, the linchpin of the “Shiite Crescent” collapsing so quickly this month that Tehran had to scramble to evacuate its officers of the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force. In a stroke, the demise of the Assad regime halved the number of states that Iran counts as an ally, leaving only Venezuela, a nation emptying itself of its people. The Axis of Resistance is down to rump militias in Iraq and the Houthi tribe of Yemen, the poorest country in the Middle East.

Inside Iran, though, things may be even worse. The economy is at its lowest point since the 1979 Revolution that brought the theocracy to power. The ministry of social welfare last year announced that 57 percent of Iranians are experiencing some level of malnourishment. Thirty percent live below the poverty line. The Iranian rial has fallen 46 percent in the past year, and is officially the world’s least valuable currency, worth less than the Sierra Leonean Leone or the Laotian Kip. As ordinary Iranians watch their savings vaporize on the pages of bank statements, a deeply unsettled regime has decided this is a good time to threaten them.

How to Hold Syria Together

Sam Heller

Until Bashar al-Assad fled Syria, on December 8, few countries actually wanted the Syrian dictator’s government to fall. This was not because foreign governments liked Assad or approved of the brutal way in which he reigned over Syria. Rather, they were afraid of what might replace him: rule by extremist militants, sectarian bloodletting, and chaos that could engulf not just Syria but much of the Middle East.

That fearful vision was also the Assad government’s argument for itself, that its continued survival kept anarchy and carnage at bay—and many people, including foreign policymakers, were convinced of it. In 2015, when opposition militants came close to toppling Assad, U.S. officials regarded the possibility of outright rebel victory and regime collapse as tantamount to “catastrophic success.”

Now Assad is gone. Syrians are celebrating in the streets of Damascus, opposition groups are attempting to organize a political transition, and the world is about to find out what comes after the fall. Assad remained ruthless and cruel to the end, even as he presided over an increasingly impoverished and dysfunctional state. He leaves a shattered country in his wake, and any new government—never mind a coalition of fractious armed opposition groups—would struggle in these circumstances. But the poor record of Syrian rebel groups when they have ruled significant stretches of territory also makes it difficult to be optimistic.

Russia in the Middle East and North Africa—Disrupting Washington’s Influence and Redefining Moscow’s Global Role

Amr Hamzawy

Introduction

Faced with various threats and conflicts ranging from the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the danger of a wider regional war to the rise of nonstate actors that systematically use violence in internal and external conflicts, today’s Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries are drawing in China and Russia to compete with the United States over military presence, arms sales, energy and trade ties, and security roles. At the same time, most European Union (EU) member states have come to define their roles as allies of the United States and to focus their policies on trade and immigration questions. The resulting regional environment is characterized by greater agency for MENA states and nonstate actors.

On the one hand, the geostrategic and energy significance of the MENA region, the risks the region poses to global security, its economic opportunities, and young populations have drawn all great powers to its shores in search of political influence and trade and investment opportunities, as well as to protect security interests. Outcomes have varied across the Middle East and North Africa, creating a complex influence map that does not lend itself to sweeping generalizations. On the other hand, the agency of MENA states and nonstate actors and their multilayered interactions with the United States, China, Russia, and the EU have helped shape the complex outcomes of the great power competition. Analyzing the minutiae of those multilayered interactions and examining the nature and impact of regional agency are the core tasks of this research project.

Trump’s Worldview Isn’t as Unpredictable as You Think

Hal Brands

What will the world, and America’s place in it, look like after another four years of President Donald Trump? Since Election Day, I’ve been asked that question by foreign diplomats, US officials, corporate executives and seemingly everyone else. The range of outcomes is enormous, because a volatile US president is about to collide with a volatile globe.

Trump’s volatility is real, even if his “unpredictability” is overstated. He racked up head-snapping policy reversals in his first term, while threatening to tear up treaties that had been cornerstones of US policy for decades. What’s different, this time, is that Trump is inheriting a plethora of hot wars, cold wars and potential wars. He can reasonably claim to be entering an uglier, more dangerous landscape than any president in decades.

At this point, Trump himself probably doesn’t know exactly how he’ll handle this upheaval. But there are five key scenarios worth considering: rejuvenation, rejection, defection, recalibration and confusion.

Cyber Europe 2024 - After Action Report

Introduction

Cyber Europe is a series of European Union-level cyber incident and crisis management exercises organised by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)2 , intended for both the public and private sector across the European Union and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Member States. These exercises simulate the escalation of large-scale cybersecurity incidents into cybersecurity crises. They provide opportunities to analyse sophisticated technical cybersecurity incidents and assess participants' ability to manage complex scenarios.

Cyber Europe 2024, which focused on the energy sector, took place from 19 to 20 June in a hybrid format; it was coordinated from the Exercise Control Centre in Athens, Greece, where the organising team and most national Planners were based. (Local) Planners were involved with preparing, designing, and organising their teams' participation, determining objectives, scenarios, and logistics. During the cybersecurity exercise, they were responsible for coordinating participant involvement, ensuring the exercise runs smoothly, and monitoring the progress of the exercise at the organisational level. They assisted the Players with any questions they had about the scenario.

The local Planners, along with the Players, participated online. Players were the individuals or entities actively involved in exercise. They contributed to Cyber Europe 2024 by executing assigned tasks, making decisions, and responding to simulated events or incidents. Recognising the energy sector's critical importance to the EU’s economic growth and development, and its status as a prime target for cyberattacks, this year's exercise scenario was carefully designed to help stakeholders - including companies and industry leaders - prepare for, and proactively address, evolving cybersecurity threats

Decoding ChatGPT’s Success: Policy Brief Takeaways for Europe’s AI Future

Alexandre Ferreira Gomes & Maaike Okano-Heijmans

Introduction

The release of ChatGPT 3.5 in November 2022 is among the most important milestones in the development of artificial intelligence (AI). Launched by OpenAI, which is based in San Francisco, ChatGPT was the first widely accessible General-Purpose AI chatbot (see Box 1). It was the outcome of seven years of development since OpenAI’s establishment in December 2015. ChatGPT brought GPAI to the general public and transformed the perception of technology experts and users alike about its potential, akin to how the advent of the internet revolutionised communications in the late 1990s.

The new chatbot attracted over one million users within five days of its launch.3 Users quickly tested the tool, thereby showcasing its diverse capabilities, from essay writing, travel planning and code generation, to step-by-step guides on how to create a business. Shortfalls were also quickly identified, including false academic sources or book names, incorrect answers to simple mathematics problems, or how its safety protocols could initially be bypassed relatively easily through clever prompting.

ChatGPT is the final product of a complex GPAI supply chain that involves all layers of the so-called technology stack, from hard infrastructure (including chips and data centres) to the application layer (software and applications). This GPAI supply chain serves not only large language model (LLM) applications such as ChatGPT, but also image generators like DALL-E, and video generators like Synthesia, which have been launched in parallel as groundbreaking products in the broader GPAI revolution.

Jamestown FoundationChina Brief, December 6, 2024, v. 24, no. 23

Winter is Coming: Beijing Tightens Public Security

Xi Jinping Challenged Following Spate of Violent Attacks

The Shapeshifting Evolution of Chinese Technology Acquisition

Generally Unacceptable Accounting Principles: Lessons From PwC and AstraZeneca’s Contrasting Fates

From Ambition to Anxiety: The Unraveling of Xi Jinping’s Vocational Education Policy

Murder, mayhem, and minerals: The price of the renewable energy revolution

Jessica McKenzie

It’s not as if the human and environmental toll of mining is a particularly well-kept secret. But the full extent of the damage from mining for the rare earth elements and other metals that go into electronic devices, electric vehicles, solar panels, and countless additional components of modern life can be hard to wrap one’s mind around—unless the mountain of evidence is laid out end-to-end, as in Vince Beiser’s new book Power Metal: The Race for the Resources That Will Shape the Future. The book begins with an overview of what Beiser calls “critical metals,” where they come from, and the history of their discovery and extraction, before moving on to the current state of mining and processing critical metals today.

Demand for these substances has soared in the Information Age and is projected to keep climbing. (One factoid that stood out: “Just one Tesla Model S can contain as much lithium as ten thousand mobile phones.”) The environmental damage caused by the production of critical metals is continuing to mount—and could grow in unexpected ways if, for example, companies begin mining the sea floor.

Still, humans need these substances, especially for the renewable energy technologies needed to stem climate change. There is no Cinderella-shoe solution. There are always trade-offs. As Beiser writes, “When it comes to mining, the choice is never between bad and good but only bad and less bad.”

MILSATCOM for the most critical no-fail missions

Satellite communication is so reliable and commonplace it’s easy for everyday users to take it for granted, whether watching live sports or checking email mid-flight.

Since the 1980s, militaries have also migrated to space-based communications systems. Ensuring the U.S. military and its allies have continuous communication capability, however, is more complicated than providing cable television and internet service to consumers. Military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) systems need to fight through adversary jamming, operate despite ground station disruptions, withstand challenging environmental conditions, and mitigate an ever-growing set of attack approaches.

In short, protected MILSATCOM systems need to be no-fail — and no company has more experience in delivering on these stringent requirements than Northrop Grumman, said David Doami, senior director of MILSATCOM and Sustainment at Northrop Grumman.

“MILSATCOM systems are used to communicate the highest priority messages that we have in our country including the president, as commander in chief, commanding the combatant commanders and our strategic forces,” said Doami, pointing to Northrop Grumman’s decades of designing and delivering strategic SATCOM for the U.S. military. “During the Cold War, we had a single nuclear threat, and space supported the air, ground and sea domains. Today, we have multiple nuclear-capable threats and space itself is a contested domain. In this environment, survivable and assured MILSATCOM are more critical than ever before as a vital communications link for the warfighter.”

US Opinion Leaders Deeply Divided on Israel-Gaza WarNovember 25, 2024

Lama El Baz, Craig Kafura, Dina Smeltz, Jordan Tama, and Joshua Busby

US President-elect Donald Trump is set to inherit an unprecedented and intractable conflict in the Middle East, one that has slowly drawn Israel, the United States’ closest regional ally, into a broader confrontation with Iran. As he prepares to take office for the second time, the world eagerly waits to see how he intends to resolve this conflict and establish a lasting peace in the Middle East.

A 2024 Chicago Council-University of Texas survey, conducted August 7–October 3 among 471 foreign policy opinion leaders, finds stark partisan divisions in views of US policy on the Israel-Gaza war. Mirroring the partisan divisions found in the 2024 Chicago Council Survey of the American public, Republican elites favor a more militarized and heavy-handed approach than Democratic and Independent opinion leaders, who favor more diplomatic and restrained policies toward the conflict between Israel and Hamas.

Cyberlaw: an area of law for all of us

John Bandler

Cyberlaw is everywhere so no lawyer can ignore it or pretend it doesn't apply to them. Let's embrace it and analyze how law intersects with technology.

Cyberlaw is a term that means different things to different people, let's first break it down into its components.

Cyberlaw = cyber + law

This helps a little, now let's examine each word.

Law

Law is our system of rules for how to conduct ourselves: what to do and not, plus rules for how to resolve a dispute — when one party claims another did not conduct themselves properly. Law also includes rules for our system of government and democracy, since we are a nation of laws.

Law has a long tradition and continuing evolution, and the cyber age is a relatively recent development.

Impact of AI on the Use of Space-Based Assets in Future Wars

Artificial Intelligence (AI) will have a significant impact on the use of space-based assets in future wars, transforming how these assets are deployed, managed, and defended. It is worthwhile speculating on some key areas where AI will have major impacts on space warfare and the use of space-based systems may more effectively be employed. Let's start with the enhancement of satellite operations and autonomy. AI will lead to improved efficiency and autonomous operations of satellites. Functions such as satellite navigation, fault detection, and correction will lead to reduced need for human intervention. AI-driven systems will autonomously adjust satellite orbits, manage power consumption, and optimize payload operations, thus, increasing overall resilience and mission success during conflicts.

Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) functions will be enhanced by automating data processing and analysis. AI driven systems can sift through large volumes of satellite imagery, signals, and other data to identify threats, track enemy movements, and detect anomalies in real time. This increased processing speed and accuracy can give military forces a significant advantage in terms of situational awareness and decision-making during battle operations.

The threat of AI-driven cyber warfare is real and it can disrupt the world- Opinion

Ersin Cahmutoglu

In the summer of 2017, the world witnessed what was later ascertained as the worst cyberattack ever in history, which crippled private companies and public institutions and caused a staggering financial loss of up to $10-$19 billion globally.

The NotPetya ransomware, as it was later named, was partly an AI-supported cyber operation because a bot network reportedly using AI technology was built to exploit security vulnerabilities in systems.

If such an attack were to happen today, when AI technology is more advanced and effective, it will likely cause much greater financial losses and even disrupt global trade.

No wonder, governments worldwide are taking note of the potential threat AI poses, especially in the hands of hackers and similar unethical groups.

Countries are also strengthening their military and security-oriented activities to protect them against such attacks.

Developments in AI have advanced even further, especially in the last few years. As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes widespread and systems such as large language models (LLM) are used in different domains, states have had to keep up with the fast-evolving sector.

2024 Report on the State of the Cybersecurity in the Union

LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT

Recent EU policy developments like the NIS2 Directive, the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), the Cyber Solidarity Act (CSOA) and the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), have strengthened the EU’s cybersecurity framework, setting up structures and processes for advancing EU’s cybersecurity posture. At the same time, sectors-specific policies address unique challenges in various critical sectors of our economy and society

UNION LEVEL RISK ASSESSMENT

The cybersecurity threat level in the EU during the reporting period was assessed as substantial. Entities are likely being directly targeted by threat actors or exposed to breaches through recently discovered vulnerabilities, making serious disruptions of essential and important entities or EUIBAs a realistic possibility

Staying Current with Emerging Technology Trends: Using Big Data to Inform Planning

Emelia Probasco and Christian Schoeber

Introduction

Decision-makers today are pressed to stay ahead of the tsunami of new science and technology research. Many hope that big data and artificial intelligence (AI) will help identify research evolutions and revolutions in real time, or even before they happen. As we will discuss below, data alone cannot predict scientific revolutions. Examining data to stay current with, or slightly ahead of, new technologies, however, is still valuable.

This paper proposes a human-machine teaming approach to systematically identify research developments for an organization. First, our approach starts by identifying papers that the organization has authored. Second, we use those papers to find research clusters in the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Map of Science, which displays global academic literature clustered according to citation patterns. Third, we select a subset of clusters based on metadata that we believe indicates important research activity. Fourth, we share the selected clusters with subject matter experts (SMEs) and facilitate a discussion about the research and its potential impact for the organization.

Sealift: Commercial shipping’s potential in military logistics By Charlotte Kleberg

Charlotte Kleberg

A mid diversifying security threats in a contested maritime environment, the United Kingdom (UK) faces critical vulnerabilities in its logistical supply chains and sealift capacity. Sealift can enable the deployment and sustained presence of a substantial force in an overseas theatre. 1 While Britain faces growing threats from aggressors within its own waters – such as hostile underwater activity – the nuclear deterrent allied to the country’s maritime geography means expeditionary operations are still likely. This makes sustainment and rapid resupply during extended operations a pressing concern. Recent events, including the contestation and denial of trade routes as seen in attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, underscore the need for resilient supply chains to ensure national security.

The UK’s ability to maintain a global presence and respond at the ‘speed of relevance’ in distant and increasingly contested environments depends on a sucient strategic lift and logistical support capacity. 2 Because military equipment, personnel, and supplies are primarily transported by sea, the ongoing Strategic Defence Review should make logistics, sealift, and sustainment of forces, one of its key issues. A robust logistical support capacity, swift transport of troops and equipment, and timely reinforcements are essential for conducting a wide range of operations both within Europe and beyond. The worsening security environment, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, underscores the growing requirement for sealift capabilities to reinforce operations at short notice

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