Indian Strategic Studies: 12/15/24

15 December 2024

Negotiating the India-China Standoff: 2020–2024

Saheb Singh Chadha

Introduction

In April 2020, a standoff commenced between India and China when the latter diverted its troops from an exercise in Tibet to near the border with India.5 These troops then proceeded to move toward the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh and also “sought to change the status quo” in several locations.6 The Indian side maintained that these actions by China were “in complete disregard of all mutually agreed norms,” and reciprocated with the induction of forces to the border in eastern Ladakh.7 The crisis reached a tipping point when troops clashed in the Galwan Valley on the night of June 15, leading to the first fatalities on the India-China border since 1975. India’s EAM, S. Jaishankar, stated at the time that the “unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship.”8

The past four years have been characterized by tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors and the substantial augmentation of troops and equipment on their shared border. The period has also seen clashes that carry the risk of escalation, such as in Galwan in June 2020 and Yangtse in December 2022.9 This paper argues that it is possible to divide the past four years of the standoff into three phases based on the negotiating positions of both sides. Between April and September 2020, both sides sought to manage the crisis, reduce tensions, and avoid a clash akin to the Galwan incident. Between September 2020 and September 2022, both sides negotiated disengagement in four friction points in eastern Ladakh. These were Patrol Point (PP)-15, PP-17, and PP-17A in the Gogra-Hot Springs area, and the northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso.10 After September 2022, the gaps in the two sides’ positions widened. China signaled unwillingness to disengage in the two remaining friction points—Depsang and Demchok. It wanted both sides to move past the border standoff and for the broader bilateral relationship to continue unencumbered. India doubled down on its demand for complete disengagement and de-escalation of troops before broader bilateral exchanges could deepen. In October 2024, both sides came to an agreement on patrolling in Depsang and Demchok.11 In December 2024, it was announced that disengagement had been “achieved in full,” and broader bilateral exchanges were being discussed.12

Fears loom over India's 'Hong Kong' project on a remote island

Janhavee Moole

“The forest is our supermarket,” says Anstice Justin. “We get almost everything from the forests on these islands. It is what we survive on.”

Mr Justin, an anthropologist, has grown up in the Andaman and Nicobar islands straddling India’s east coast. A federally-administered territory, the ecologically-fragile region consists of 836 islands, of which only 38 are inhabited. The Nicobar Islands are a distinct group of islands in the southern part of the territory, located some 150 km (93 miles) south of the Andaman Islands.

Now Mr Justin watches with trepidation as India plans a multi-billion ‘Hong Kong-like’ development project on the Great Nicobar Island, one of the largest and most secluded parts of the Nicobar archipelago.

Built on a budget of 720bn rupees ($9bn or £6bn) and spread over 166 sq km, the project includes a transshipment harbour, a power plant, an airport and a new township, all designed to link the area to crucial global trade routes along the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal.

Positioned near the Strait of Malacca, one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, the project promises to boost international trade and tourism - the government reckons that some 650,000 people will be living on the island by the time the project is completed in 30 years.

China edges closer to intervention in Myanma

Euan Graham

Military intervention by China in Myanmar’s civil war is more likely than generally thought. While attention is fixed on Beijing’s expansionist activities in the South China Sea and aggressive intentions towards Taiwan, China’s more immediately consequential move in Southeast Asia could come via an overland vector.

Speculation that China may step up its involvement in Myanmar’s civil war has been brewing for some time. However, discussion has been mostly limited to Myanmar watchers, receiving little mainstream attention in comparison with Beijing’s well-publicised behaviour in the South China Sea.

According to media reporting, China recently proposed establishing a ‘joint security company’ with Myanmar. While there is no agreement on what this will consist of and how it will be established, the presence of armed Chinese personnel operating within Myanmar’s territory would shorten the odds on Beijing’s direct intervention in the civil war, with a high risk of mission creep.

China Is Watching the Political Disarray in Nations Along the First Island Chain

Hung Tran

The first island chain broadly refers to the chain of islands encompassing Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia – allies or friends of the United States. Conceptually these islands and nations form the first line of defense against China in the U.S. strategic posture in Asia-Pacific – in which South Korea, though not an island country, also plays an important role. From China’s perspective, the first island chain is a line of strategic containment near to its shore. China must break out of this island chain so that its blue water navy can have unfettered access to the Pacific and beyond.

In that context, China is keenly interested in the strength of those governments and the popular support of their China policies – especially when such policies are against Beijing’s interests.

As a consequence, China has reasons to view recent political disarray in those countries as being to its advantage, especially if domestic turmoil limits the ability of these U.S. allies to bolster their defense postures.

South Korea

South Korea is the most obvious example of political chaos. President Yoon Suk-yeol announced martial law in the evening of December 3, then lifted it six hours later after a National Assembly vote. Yoon apologized to the public and survived the first attempt at impeachment in the National Assembly, but even his allies’ defense against impeachment hinges on the claim that Yoon no longer exercises any presidential authority. Meanwhile, he faces investigations for insurrection and treason as a second impeachment vote looms.

The Era of Supply Chain Spy Wars Is Here

Calder Walton

The sabotage earlier this year of Hezbollah’s communications devices, apparently by Israel, was undoubtedly spectacular, but, as a matter of espionage, it was anything but new. Intelligence agencies have long targeted and exploited supply chains both for intelligence and sabotage purposes. From the 20th century Cold War to today’s geopolitical clash with Russia and China, infiltrating supply chains has always offered the opportunity to acquire valuable information about an adversary, or to disrupt critical sectors of its economy.

Western officials are now busily assessing their own strategic and tactical supply chain vulnerabilities. Hardly a D.C. conference goes by without mention of the CHIPS Act and semiconductor supply chains. The United States is funneling billions of dollars towards the development of ecosystems for high tech manufacturing and critical materials processing to support microelectronics both domestically (e.g., Intel in Arizona) and in partner countries (Mexico, the Philippines, and others).

‘No winners’: China’s Xi warns US against a trade war

Juliana Liu

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has warned the United States against restarting a trade war, saying there would be “no winners” even as he vowed to defend the country’s economic interests.

Xi made the remarks on Tuesday during a meeting with the heads of several global financial institutions, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, a day after Chinese regulators announced an antitrust investigation into American chip maker Nvidia.

The probe is widely seen as a major escalation in a growing battle for AI dominance, which both Washington and Beijing believe is crucial to safeguarding national security, even before Donald Trump returns to the White House.

“Tariff wars, trade wars, and technology wars go against the historical trend and economic laws, and there will be no winners,” Xi said according to state broadcaster CCTV.

“Building ‘small courtyards with high walls’ and ‘decoupling and breaking chains’ will hurt others and not benefit oneself. China has always believed that only when China is good can the world be good. Only when the world is good can China be better,” he added.

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has used the “small yard and high fence” phrase to describe a strategy of allowing most trade with China to progress normally while placing restrictions on some goods, particularly high-tech products like semiconductors, deemed to have military applications.

What is high bandwidth memory and why is the US trying to block China’s access to it?

Wayne Chang and Rosa de Acosta

The US government has imposed fresh export controls on the sale of high tech memory chips used in artificial intelligence (AI) applications to China.

The rules apply to US-made high bandwidth memory (HBM) technology as well as foreign-produced ones.

Here’s everything you need to know about these cutting-edge semiconductors, which have seen demand soar along with the global frenzy for AI.

What is high bandwidth memory?

High bandwidth memory (HBM) are basically a stack of memory chips, small components that store data. They can store more information and transmit data more quickly than the older technology, called DRAM (dynamic random access memory).

HBM chips are commonly used in graphic cards, high-performance computing systems, data centers and autonomous vehicles.

Most importantly, they are indispensable to running increasingly popular AI applications, including generative AI, which are powered by AI processors, such as the graphic processing units (GPU) produced by Nvidia (NVDA) and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD).

Syria After Assad: What to Know About HTS, Hezbollah, and Iran

Bruce Hoffman

Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Sunni Islamist group. How should the U.S. and its regional allies view its ascendancy in Syria?

With grave alarm. The U.S. State Department has long offered a $10 million reward for the capture of HTS founder and leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani. He fought under the notorious al-Qaeda in Iraq leader, Abu Musab Zarqawi, and subsequently spent five years in an Iraqi prison for his terrorist activities. In 2011, he returned to Syria and founded Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda franchise in that country. As its commander, he was responsible for detention and torture of American journalist Theo Padnos (née Theo Peter Curtis) between 2012 and 2014, among other crimes. Al-Jawlani claims that HTS broke with al-Qaeda in 2016 and no longer adheres to its Salafi-jihadi ideology—a claim doubted by knowledgeable observers.

What are the dynamics between HTS and the Islamic State remnants in central Syria?

As noted above, HTS emerged from the older Jabhat al-Nusra founded by al-Jawlani. Al-Jawlani had resented the attempts of the self-declared Islamic State, known as ISIS, to dominate Jabhat al-Nusra, and this resulted in a permanent breakdown in relations when al-Jawlani refused to bend to ISIS founder and leader Abu Bakr al-Baghadai’s will. But that was a decade when ISIS was in its ascendance and could afford to ignore the upstart Jabhat al-Nusra. Today, the situation is the reverse, and with ISIS profoundly weakened, the prospect of reconciliation and even amalgamation or alliance cannot be completely dismissed.

Cybersecurity: Doomed To Fail?

David Charney

The most recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference was better than ever, providing a unique opportunity to get a full sense of what’s truly “top of mind” for intelligence community thought leaders. Every speaker’s central concern was cybersecurity, threats posed by our most dangerous antagonists, mainly China, and the three other usual suspects, Russia, North Korea and Iran. For example, for his “top of mind,” to quote General Michael Hayden, former Director of both the NSA and the CIA: “It’s China, China, China.”

I was especially alarmed hearing about stealthy intrusions into our public utilities, such as our water supplies. Our most basic survival systems could easily be shut down, leaving us unable to conduct our daily lives, much less survive a war. Government agencies as well as private sector companies make enormous efforts to build protective defenses against these multiplying hacks and intrusions. It’s become a vast game of Whack-A-Mole with threat actors inserting their malicious code everywhere they please and we can barely keep up.

By the end of the second day of the conference, I became bothered by something more—and it finally came to me. Close to the entirety of our efforts to counter cyberattacks are devoted exclusively to defensive measures, with almost no discussion of offensive measures.

US sanctions Chinese firm over potentially deadly ransomware attack

Raphael Satter

The United States sanctioned a Chinese cybersecurity company over an ambitious cyberattack that U.S. Treasury officials say could have killed people.

The Treasury said in a statement, opens new tab on Tuesday that the Chengdu-based Sichuan Silence Information Technology Company and one of its employees, Guan Tianfeng, deployed malicious software to more than 80,000 firewalls run by thousands of companies worldwide in April 2020.

The malicious software not only stole data, but it was used to deploy ransomware, which paralyzes corporate networks by encrypting data. The statement said three dozen firewalls were protecting the systems of critical infrastructure companies and that, had the hacking not been thwarted or mitigated, the potential impact "could have resulted in serious injury or loss of human life."

In particular, the statement said that an energy company targeted in Sichuan Silence's hacking campaign was "actively involved in drilling" during the attack. Had the hacking not been thwarted, the statement said, "it could have caused oil rigs to malfunction."

Guan was separately charged with conspiracy to commit computer and wire fraud, according to a Department of Justice indictment made public on Tuesday, opens new tab. The FBI is offering $10 million for

China and North Korea Throw U.S. War Plans Out the Window - Analysis

Raphael S. Cohen

In November, two watershed moments changed the global geopolitical landscape. For the first time, North Korean troops showed up on the battlefield in the Russia-Ukraine war. Shortly afterward, the Danish military detained a Chinese-flagged bulk carrier, the Yi Peng 3, on the suspicion that it had deliberately cut two data cables on the floor of the Baltic Sea.

Both incidents mark a fundamental shift in the strategic environment. For the first time, the United States’ adversaries are willing to come to the direct military aid of one another, even on the other side of the globe.

Syria has exposed Russia’s frailty Putin's multipolar world is a sha

Ian Garner

Five months ago, Vladimir Putin declared that the so-called “multipolar world” had become a reality. He surely imagined this meant Russia would be one of only a handful of powerful nations able to dominate 21st-century global politics. But if the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria is anything to go by, then the multipolar reality is for Russia one of chaos and enfeeblement.

For a quarter of a century, Putin has dreamed of ending the era of American hegemony that followed the Cold War. Just 11 days after his shock appointment as acting president in 1999, Putin signed a National Security Policy declaring that "Russia will facilitate the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world". In theory, the "multipolar world" describes the end of american unipolarity. In reality, it is a synonym for the return of Russia's international standing.

The U.S. Should Prepare For More Syria-Like Tumult

Lawrence J. Haas

The stunning events in Syria, where one of history’s most brutal strongmen has just been forced to flee, remind us that even longstanding dictatorships can be hollow shells, with little to keep them intact when opposition mounts from within.

Thus, U.S. policymakers should prepare now for the real possibility that, across the Middle East and elsewhere, the angry populations of other authoritarian nations could find inspiration from the toppling of Bashar al-Assad and mount new challenges to the brutal regimes that terrorize them.

Otherwise, Washington could find itself in the same place it has been all too often in the past—ill-positioned to capitalize on the opportunities that such stirrings around the world offer U.S. interests.

“Prediction is very difficult,” Niels Bohr, the Nobel laureate in physics, once said, “especially if it’s about the future!” Nowhere is such a note of caution more appropriate than in the effort to foresee global change. What will prompt a popular uprising (or, as in Syria, enable a rebel force to free a suffering people)? Nobody knows.

Fate Of Russia’s Prized Syria Bases: What We Know

Joseph Trevithick

What will happen to highly strategic Russian air and naval bases in Syria is now very much an open question following the downfall of long-time strongman Bashar Al Assad. Though Russia has pulled back forces, it is unclear whether there are plans to abandon the crucial facilities for good. There are now signs that the Kremlin could be looking to cut a deal with the same rebels it has spent the better part of the last decade fighting.

The current situation in Syria is extremely fluid following the final and total collapse this weekend of the brutal decades-old Assad regime. It took the Command of Military Operations rebel coalition, with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) at its helm, some two weeks to steamroll its way from areas under its control in the northwest to the capital Damascus. Other rebel factors, including U.S.-backed predominantly Kurdish forces in the east, had subsequently launched their own offensives.

Rebel forces are now in at least de facto control of Syria’s Latakia and Tartus regions, which are home to Russia’s Khmeimim Air Base and Tartus naval base, respectively.

“Yesterday, the opposition took full control of the Latakia province, including the cities of Tartus and Jableh [near Khmeimim],” Russian state media outlet TASS reported earlier today citing an unnamed “local” source. “The opposition’s armed forces did not and have no plans to penetrate the Russian military bases, which continue to operate normally.”

Don’t Rush Syrian Refugees’ Return

Will Todman

Just one day after Bashar al-Assad’s ouster, Austria announced plans to deport Syrians back to Syria. A dozen European countries also announced that they had stopped processing Syrians’ asylum claims. This is a huge mistake.

Many European states have wanted to send Syrians back to their home country for a long time. Before Assad’s fall, several states had hardened their stance on refugee returns, pushing for Syrians to return even without political reforms. The collapse of the regime has given them the opportunity to pursue these aims openly. Even more Syrian refugees are in the Middle East, and their hosts are hoping for their rapid return after 13 years of war.

However, refugee return to Syria will be fraught with challenges. Rushing the return of millions of Syrians would put even more pressure on Syria at an extremely fragile moment and would undermine the prospect of a successful transition. It could backfire in ways that destabilize the wider Levant, frustrating host communities’ expectations, exacerbating social tensions, and leading to renewed flows of displacement. To avoid a broader crisis, donor governments should temper expectations of rapid returns, formulate a comprehensive strategy for safe refugee return, and provide sufficient funding to facilitate an orderly process. It requires time, not rapid-fire edicts.

Saudi Arabia Will Eventually Have To Increase Oil Production

Greg Priddy

OPEC+ decided on December 5 to kick the can down the road yet again, postponing the timeframe for putting additional barrels back into the market until April 2025 and slowing the pace of the notional tapering so that the cuts will not unwind until the end of 2026. This avoids immediate financial pain for producers but does not offer a way out of the dilemma of producing well below capacity while the competing supply continues to grow. In fact, it is becoming increasingly clear that Saudi Arabia will eventually have to retake market share despite lower prices, and it might have reasons to do so more abruptly than the OPEC+ plan suggests.

Producing at around 9 million barrels per day (bpd) with nearly 3 million bpd of spare capacity is clearly not the long-term revenue maximizing path for Riyadh if competing production is just going to continue to take away market share, even though it is probably in the short-term. That is true even when one looks at it in terms of the net present value of the future stream of revenue, discounting the long-term future accordingly. However, this would be a major climbdown for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Shifting the kingdom toward a more “price hawkish” policy is one of his signature initiatives. Hence, the repeated delays from OPEC+, in which it wields disproportionate influence, in moving to retake market share.

Is Jolani Any Better Than Assad? - Analysis

Anchal Vohra

Hani Alagbar was beaming with joy and packing his bags on Sunday morning soon after Bashar al-Assad’s government was toppled by former al Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). He moved to Lebanon in 2012 at the height of the Syrian uprising and hasn’t been home since, not even to attend his father’s funeral. All these years he has worried he might be randomly arrested by the regime.

Algabar, like Syrians elsewhere, celebrated Assad’s unexpected but much awaited ouster. But he wasn’t yet sure what to make of the extremist rebels who will now call the shots. “It’s too early to say how they will operate,” said Algabar.

A new PM and warnings from Israel - what happened today in Syria?

Adam Durbin and Johanna Chisholm, with Barbara Plett Usher, Yogita Limaye and Alice Cuddy

We're going to be pausing our live coverage for the day, but before we do so, here's a recap of the third day since the end of Bashar al-Assad's rule in Syria.

Mohammed al-Bashir, who previously governed a small pocket of rebel-held territory during Assad's rule, was named as Syria's new interim prime minister
The Israeli military acknowledged its troops are operating in Syrian territory, beyond the demilitarised buffer zone between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned Syrian rebel forces not to allow Iran to "re-establish" itself in the country
Meanwhile, Turkey has joined some Middle Eastern nations - including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Egypt - in accusing Israel of "exploiting" the downfall of AssadThe Israeli military says it carried out 480 air strikes in Syria over the past 48 hours, destroying "most of Syria's strategic weapon stockpiles"
It has also confirmed it carried out attacks on Syria's naval fleet, as part of its efforts to neutralise military assets in the country

To go deeper on this topic, you can also continue reading about the latest developments in Syria with these stories:

The BBC’s James Landale joins the latest Newscast episode to discuss what a new government in Syria means for the Middle EastSyrian families' describe to the BBC the 'unbearable' wait to know the fate of their detained relatives
The BBC's Lucy Williamson met with a mother whose son's death inflamed the 2011 Syrian revolution
And our explainer breaks down which countries have played a role in Syria - and could continue to do so in the future

After the Fall of Assad, the Middle East Braces for Unrest

Hilal Khashan

Jubilant crowds in some of Syria’s biggest and most politically significant cities toppled statues of former President Hafez Assad over the past week, in a scene reminiscent of the toppling of statues of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in 2003. They were celebrating the sudden and stunning ouster of Assad’s son, Bashar Assad, after 24 years in power. But the fall of Bashar Assad will not bring peace and stability to Syria in the foreseeable future. The militant group that led the rebellion, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and its controversial leader, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, will struggle to convince Syrians, let alone the outside world, that they have abandoned their jihadist past. Though most Syrians are dedicated Muslims, they have little interest in religious dogma. There is little common ground among Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious groups, which will prevent agreement on the fundamentals of a future political system and national identity. Complicating the situation further, the country’s neighbors have set their sights on Syrian territory amid the growing uncertainty there.

Syria Is Again a Victim of Its Geography

Arash Reisinezhad

Now that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has emerged as the victors of the Syrian civil war, it’s tempting to imagine the country restored to some semblance of stability. In truth, there is no stability to restore. As much as the civil war was a sectarian and ideological conflict, it was also always a war created and fueled by the country’s fundamental geography. The end of this chapter of war likely means the beginning of the next chapter of conflict.

Geography has always punished Syria. The country lacks significant natural barriers, both within its territory and along its borders. To the west lies the Mediterranean, a route for trade—and thus for military invasions. To the east lies the Euphrates River Valley. The south is bordered by desert and the north by the plains at the southern foothills of the Taurus Mountains. In essence, Syria’s geography offers neither external defenses to deter invasions nor internal strongholds as a last line of defense. Most of modern Syria’s borders are artificial rather than natural. The southern border is a straight line, and the eastern border is similarly arbitrary. This has resulted in fragile boundaries, contributing to Syria’s historical lack of independence and a weak national identity.

In Post-Assad Middle East, Iran’s Loss Is Turkey’s Gain - Analysis

Vali Nasr

The cataclysmic events of the last few weeks in Lebanon and Syria—from Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah to the fall of the Assad regime—have opened a new chapter for the Middle East. The hope may be that the collapse of Iran’s so-called axis of resistance in the Levant augurs a period of peace and stability in the region. The more likely outcome, however, is an intensification of regional competition to fill the vacuum left by the diminishment of Iran and its allies. The collapse of Hezbollah changed the balance of power between Iran and Israel, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad has further weakened Iran. But the broader consequence is a change in the balance of power between Turkey and everyone else.

The quick end of the Assad regime is a watershed moment for Syria. It marks the liberation of a long-suffering country from 54 years of family rule marked by depravity and brutality, never more cruelly than over the past 14 years of near-constant war. It is also a humiliating defeat for Iran and Russia, which propped up Assad; Russia may lose the military bases it has used as a springboard to Africa, while Iran loses Syria as its land bridge to Lebanon.

The Weakness of Israel’s Approach to War

George Friedman

The Middle East has broken down into a state of extreme combat. The collapse of the system of governance throughout the region has opened up new fronts of warfare. Historically, such situations there were handled by the Israeli military. That basic reality – that Israel is the dominant military force in the region – remains. But there is a new dimension to the conflict. We have to consider whether the Israeli military strategy can be a definitive one – that is, whether Israel has the ability to continue to impose its will on its enemies over greater territories. In a sense, the Israelis have some options, none of which are necessarily appealing.

The problem starts with Hamas. After the Oct. 7 attack, Israel faced a dilemma: It believed it needed to destroy Hamas in an overwhelming way. The Israeli strategy, then, was to impose a system on Hamas designed to destroy its capabilities. In theory, this seemed reasonable. In practice, it was difficult to execute. It resulted in massive attacks all over Gaza. Had Israel been more restrained, the strategy might have worked. Instead, it attacked its enemies in increasingly intensive battles that never overwhelmed Hamas and thus enabled it to survive.

Good luck reforming the Department of Defense

Harlan Ullman

No matter who President Donald Trump’s secretary of Defense ends up being, that person will be charged with disrupting the Pentagon to reform it and annihilating any vestiges of diversity equity and inclusion and wokeness.

But reforming and transforming the Department of Defense are aspirations, not actions.

When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, the main threat to the U.S. and its allies vaporized. Yet, the U.S. made relatively modest reductions to its forces, cutting back by about 25 percent.

We have a few instructive examples of attempted reform. When Robert McNamara was President John Kennedy’s choice for secretary in 1961, he brought to the Pentagon, the “Whiz Kids.” In addition to relative youth and huge brainpower, this team believed that systems analysis, through intellect and rigor, could solve any problem and turn the management of defense into a more precise business. McNamara had served in World War II in the analytical branch of the Army Air Corps and later went on to be the first non-Ford to become president of that company.

Rebottled Jew-Hate: The Boycott of Jewish Genius

Nils A. Haug

Somewhat covertly, in November 2024, Ayelet Shaked, a former Israeli Minister of Justice, was shockingly denied permission to enter Australia for the purpose of participating in a conference discussing current Middle East events. The conference was hosted by the Australia Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), and intended to be a Jewish community event.

Colin Rubenstein, executive director of AIJAC, denounced the visa denial, made without a reason being disclosed at the time, by Australian Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke. In Rubenstein's view, "The decision to refuse a visa to... Shaked on the grounds that she would vilify Australians and incite discord among the community is a disgraceful act of hostility towards a democratic ally."

Refusing entry to a Western country of a former Israeli cabinet minister is simply a further incident in a global de-platforming movement against Jewish-Israeli personalities. In January 2022, some 20 cultural acts withdrew in protest against sponsorship by Israel's embassy in Australia of a performance by the Sydney Dance Company, scheduled to be presented at Sydney's cultural festival. The act was based on a work by Tel Aviv's Batsheva Dance Company, and Israeli choreographer Ohad Naharin, but was vilified due to its Israel-Jewish connection.

Rethinking The Quantum Chip

Researchers at the UChicago Pritzker School of Molecular Engineering (UChicago PME) have realized a new design for a superconducting quantum processor, aiming at a potential architecture for the large-scale, durable devices the quantum revolution demands.

Unlike the typical quantum chip design that lays the information-processing qubits onto a 2-D grid, the team from the Cleland Lab has designed a modular quantum processor comprising a reconfigurable router as a central hub. This enables any two qubits to connect and entangle, where in the older system, qubits can only talk to the qubits physically nearest to them.

“A quantum computer won’t necessarily compete with a classical computer in things like memory size or CPU size,” said UChicago PME Prof. Andrew Cleland. “Instead, they take advantage of a fundamentally different scaling: Doubling a classical computer’s computational power requires twice as big a CPU, or twice the clock speed. Doubling a quantum computer only requires one additional qubit.”

Taking inspiration from classical computers, the design clusters qubits around a central router, similar to how PCs talk to each other through a central network hub. Quantum “switches” can connect and disconnect any qubit within a few nanoseconds, enabling high-fidelity quantum gates and the generation of quantum entanglement, a fundamental resource for quantum computing and communication.

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