10 December 2024

How the Taliban’s Rule Is Fueling the Movement to End Gender Apartheid

Clara Fong and Noël James

The Taliban’s outright denial of women’s rights in Afghanistan has spurred a global push to combat gender-based oppression.

What conditions do Afghan women face under Taliban rule?

The Taliban’s 2021 return to power brought a slew of new constraints on women and girls that the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan Richard Bennett calls an “unprecedented deterioration of women’s rights.”

Since then, the Taliban have issued more than eighty edicts targeting the twenty million women and girls who make up just short of 50 percent of Afghanistan’s population. Women and girls face draconian restrictions in public life, namely, on education, employment, access to the justice system, and activities and travel outside the home. These include prohibitions on education beyond sixth grade, veiling and dress codes enforceable by the morality police, and bans on leaving the house without a mahram, a male relative chaperone. According to news reports, repressions are only deepening, and the Taliban have resumed the practice of corporal punishment, including stoning, flogging, and execution.

The Taliban justify these policies as adherence to a strict interpretation of Islamic law. They claim that removing women from public space and society demonstrates the “purity” of the regime under sharia, says Zahra Nader, an Afghan-Canadian journalist who leads the women-led, investigative newsroom Zan Times. “[Taliban leaders] feel if they give a little bit of rights to women, they might be rejected from the broader Taliban movement, which is fundamentalist,” she says.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, an intergovernmental organization comprising mostly Muslim-majority countries, and other experts highlight how such restrictions are not explicitly dictated in the Quran; they argue that the Taliban has instituted a regime of gender apartheid that reflects conservative cultural biases justified by an extremist interpretation of Islamic law.

Revisiting ‘Forces Goal 2030’: Bangladesh’s Military Modernization Plan Under the New Government

Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan

The toppling of Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in a popular mass uprising has changed the strategic, political, and social dynamics of South Asia’s second-largest economy. Given the country’s pacifist foreign policy motto, it often gets overlooked that Bangladesh has the third most powerful armed forces in the region, only behind nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Thus, Bangladesh is militarily the most powerful non-nuclear weapons state in South Asia.

Given its policy of non-alignment and strategic balancing with international and regional powers, a military with professional manpower and modern equipment has always been a crucial ambition for enhancing Bangladesh’s deterrence. However, the emphasis given to economic development – and the resulting lack of funds in the defense budget – meant that military ambition never materialized.

This changed in 2009, when, under Hasina’s direction, Dhaka initiated its first formalized military modernization plan, Forces Goal 2030. This plan – revised in 2017 – created a historic groundwork to meet the Bangladesh Armed Forces’ demand to transform into a sophisticated 21st century military. After more than 15 years of this initiative, the Armed Forces of Bangladesh (AFB) have been substantially upgraded.

With Hasina’s 15-year reign now over, the new interim government of Muhammad Yunus has initiated plans to reform key sectors and institutions of the country, including the police, judiciary, and constitution. Every major step taken during the previous administration is now subject to change. Therefore, it is not beyond question that the successes and limitations of Forces Goal 2030 may also undergo a reassessment by the current government.

Bangladesh’s shuffled geopolitical landscape and shifting security priorities in the post-Hasina period may require revisiting the current military modernization plan. This will also require securing deeper strategic ties with Dhaka’s primary arms sellers, such as China and Turkiye.

Aid Under Fire: Humanitarian Crisis In Post-Coup Myanmar – Analysis

Naw Seng

The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup highlights the devastating intersection of political conflict, environmental vulnerability, and systemic governance failures.
Key Takeaways:Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis stems from the combined impacts of conflict-driven displacement, climate change, and political instability, leaving millions without shelter, food, or healthcare.

Military restrictions on NGOs and civil society obstruct humanitarian efforts, while bureaucratic barriers and security risks worsen access issues. Strong collaboration with local networks is essential to ensure aid delivery to vulnerable populations.

Economic collapse and rising food prices have caused severe food insecurity, leaving millions without adequate nutrition. Addressing this crisis demands integrated food security programs, agricultural rehabilitation, and governance reforms to address its root causes.

This analysis examines the multifaceted challenges that have exacerbated the crisis, focusing on displacement, climate change, restricted access to aid, and food insecurity, providing insight into the complex dynamics at play.
Conflict and Displacement

The political turmoil following the 2021 military coup caused massive internal displacement. Due to political unrest, humanitarian crises, and environmental degradation, an estimated 18.6 million people in Myanmar—primarily women and girls—need immediate assistance. Combined with climate change-related disasters, millions were left without shelter, food, or medical services, making Myanmar one of the most challenging places for humanitarian access.

In addition to the 2.6 million people displaced by the ongoing conflict, the poverty line has doubled since 2021. Only 45% of Myanmar’s 2023 humanitarian response plan has been funded, leaving nearly 2 million without essential assistance. Armed conflicts between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and different ethnic groups caused further displacement, triggered by the coup’s violent suppression of protests.

US Officials Recommend Encryption Apps Amid Chinese Telecom Hacking

Andy Greenberg & Lily Hay Newman

A consortium of global law enforcement agencies led by Britain’s National Crime Agency announced a takedown operation this week against two major Russian money-laundering networks that process billions of dollars each year in more than 30 locations around the world. WIRED had exclusive access to the investigation, which uncovered new and troubling laundering techniques, particularly schemes to directly change cryptocurrency for cash. As the United States government scrambles to address China’s “Salt Typhoon” digital espionage campaign into US telecoms, two senators demanded this week that the Department of Defense investigate its failure to secure its own communications and address known vulnerabilities in US telecom infrastructure. Meanwhile, Signal Foundation president Meredith Whittaker spoke at WIRED’s The Big Interview event in San Francisco this week about Signal’s enduring commitment to bring private, end-to-end encrypted communication services to people all over the world regardless of geopolitical climate.

A new smartphone scanner from the mobile device security firm iVerify can quickly and easily detect spyware and has already flagged seven devices infected with the invasive Pegasus surveillance tool. Programmer Micah Lee built a tool to help you save and delete your X posts after he offended Elon Musk and was banned from the platform. And privacy advocate Nighat Dad is fighting to protect women from digital harassment in Pakistan after escaping from an abusive marriage.


China’s Mineral Export Ban Strikes at the US Defense Industrial Base

Gregory Wischer, Morgan Bazilian, and Jahara “Franky” Matisek

On December 3, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that “the export of dual-use items such as gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials to the United States will not be permitted.” This announcement likely means that over 20 mineral items – encompassing both metals and chemicals – are banned from being exported from China to the United States.

Many of these items are important to U.S. national security. For example, antimony is found in bullets and artillery rounds; gallium is used in integrated circuits for advanced radar systems; and germanium is needed for night-vision and thermal-sensing systems. Without adequate supplies of these elements, the defense industrial base could be delayed in manufacturing the downstream munitions and weapons systems, undermining the warfighting capabilities of the U.S. military.

Critically, China – the United States’ “most consequential strategic competitor” according to the 2022 National Defense Strategy – is the largest source of U.S. imports for antimony metal and oxide, as well as germanium metal. China is also the second largest source of U.S. imports for gallium. Since China’s export ban takes immediate effect, the U.S. defense industrial base could experience short-term mineral shortages and higher prices. This should not be taken lightly: mineral shortages can impede defense manufacturing and undermine the strength of the military, just as the United States experienced during World War II.

The resulting supply disruptions from China’s new export ban could also have a multi-billion-dollar impact on the U.S. economy. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey recently calculated that if China blocked all exports of gallium alone, U.S. gross domestic product could decline by up to $8.2 billion.

Importantly, firms in third-party countries that import antimony, gallium, and germanium from China and then export them to the United States would violate China’s export ban and “will be held accountable according to [the] law.” While firms in other countries do themselves produce these minerals, these firms may not have enough production and uncontracted capacity to fully replace U.S. imports from China. For instance, China has a near monopoly on gallium production, producing about 98 percent of the world’s gallium annually.

Four Big Flaws In Trump’s Threat To China Over The Dollar – OpEd

Dean Baker

Last week Donald Trump made a bizarre threat on his Truth Social site that he would impose 100 percent taxes on the imports (tariffs) from any country that doesn’t take a pledge to not move away from the dollar as its reserve currency.
Donald Trump’s Big Fear Exists Only in His Imagination

The threat was bizarre for several reasons. First, he seemed to imagine that the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and their allies are in the process of setting up an alternative currency to the dollar.

This would be very hard to imagine since this group of countries has little in common other than feeling marginalized by the United States, West Europe, and the international institutions they have established. Agreeing on rules for a common currency involves considerable haggling and is difficult even among countries that are similar in their economies, history, and culture. Ask the countries in the euro zone. Bringing this group together in a common currency seems a long shot even one or two decades out.

So, Trump was making some grand threat against a development that will almost certainly not happen. Oh well, always good to be cautious.
Who Cares If They Establish Their Own Currency?

Trump’s ignorance of trade and finance issues really shines through on this one. Paul Krugman has been working hard trying to educate the public on the meaning of a reserve currency.

First of all, there is not a single reserve currency. There is no law that requires all international payments be made in dollars, and many in fact are not. If businesses find it more convenient to sell in euros or yen, there is nothing that prevents them from doing so. It’s not clear if Donald Trump is unaware of this fact or thinks that he somehow will police all the transactions in the world and require them to be done in dollars.

Emerging Anti-US Axis Worrisome But ‘Not Acting As A Bloc’ – Analysis

Jeff Seldin

Washington’s most dangerous adversaries may be working together more closely than ever before, but U.S. intelligence analysts think that for now, they are falling short of forming a tight-knit alliance that could more effectively counter the United States.

Concerns among the United States and its allies about growing cooperation among Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have been increasing steadily since Moscow launched its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine — sustained by intelligence showing Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang providing Russia with technology, missiles, drones and even troops for the war effort.

The former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific earlier this year went as far as to describe the growing ties between the four U.S. adversaries as a nascent “axis of evil.”

Yet U.S. intelligence officials believe the axis, in some ways, has been bogged down by its own shortcomings.

“They’re not acting as a bloc,” said Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, speaking Thursday in Washington at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“We don’t see them as a sort of four-part alliance or something along those lines,” she said. “We don’t see them likely as becoming allies in the same way that we are allies with our NATO partners, for example — that kind of level of interoperability and military collaboration.”

U.S. intelligence analysts, however, still see the axis as a concern on several fronts.

Haines said the increased cooperation among Russia, China, Iran and North Korea has contributed to a further erosion of international norms around weapons of mass destruction.

Where Russia and China were once more willing to cooperate with the United States and the West on nuclear counterproliferation, Moscow and Beijing now seem more inclined to give Iran and North Korea additional leeway.

Trump is planning to rip the guts out of the US armed forces

David Axe

In a bloody bid to consolidate his power and eliminate anyone he considered insufficiently loyal to himself, Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union for 29 brutal years starting in 1923, led what is now known as the Great Purge. Between 1936 and 1938, Stalin’s goons killed a million people. Some got show trials. Many didn’t.

The victims included tens of thousands of military officers. And in that sense, the entire Soviet Union fell victim to the Great Purge.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the German army faced a gutted Red Army – one that couldn’t think and wouldn’t fight, and very nearly lost the whole country to the Nazis before emergency reforms began to undo the Purge. Without bringing any justice to its victims, of course.

This is why US President-elect Donald Trump is so dangerous. In vowing to lead his own purge, Trump threatens to do to the US military what Stalin did to the Soviet military. Trump doesn’t plan to kill American military officers, but he may sack them in considerable numbers. (That said, Trump did post on social media that General Mark Milley, at the time head of the US armed forces, had committed a “treasonous act” that was “so egregious that, in times gone by, the punishment would have been DEATH!” Milley’s supposed crime was speaking to a Chinese general on a phone call.)


The Battle for Ukraine Is a War of Demography

Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes

We live in a strange time marked by widespread and ongoing depopulation. The entire world is grappling with a crisis of childlessness. By 2015, the global fertility rate had dropped to half of what it was in 1965, and most people now lives in societies with fertility rates below replacement levels. Populations are shrinking across rich and poor nations, secular and religious societies, democracies and autocracies alike.

As the eminent American demographer Nicholas Eberstadt recently observed in Foreign Affairs, “Human beings have no collective memory of depopulation.” The last major episode of large-scale depopulation resulted from the bubonic plague that devastated Eurasia 700 years ago. But what history clearly shows is that depopulation always has political effects. These include a potential increase in warfare—fighting motivated by the desire to compensate, directly or indirectly, for population loss.


Fact-Checkers Cannot Save Us

Eliot Higgins

Turning Point: The United States launched a broad effort, including sanctions and indictments, to fight Russian influence and disinformation campaigns related to the 2024 election.

Since the election of Donald Trump in 2016, policymakers, think tanks, the media and intergovernmental organizations have responded to a surge in disinformation around the world.

Disinformation is often seen as a symptom of foreign interference; states or state-sponsored actors trying to influence the tides of geopolitics. Russia, for example, was blamed during the 2017 French presidential election for attempting to undermine Emmanuel Macron’s campaign, and it seems likely that Russian-linked accounts spread disinformation to sway public opinion in favor of leaving the European Union before the 2016 Brexit referendum.

But I have found that while disinformation is a common tool for countries like Russia and China, the growth in its power stems from a fundamental cultural and social shift — one that’s changed our relationship with information and the truth.

The Big Five - 7 December edition

Mick Ryan

As 2024 draws to a close, the number of events in national security and geopolitics seem to be acclerating. This week, I will be covering a broad range of conflicts, starting with Ukraine, then the Middle East and finally across the world to the Pacific Theatre. And, as always, I will finish with my five recommended reads on war and national security issues from the past week.

Ukraine

The British Ministry of Defence this week released new figures on Russian casualties in Ukraine since Feburary 2022. The daily average casualty rate for the Russians has now exceeded 1500 in November, and for the first time in the war (on 28 November) over 2000 casualties were reported on a single day. The British report also concludes that November 2024 was the deadliest month for Russia since its large-scale invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022, with a total of 45,860 casualties. Putin is sprinting to the inauguration of Donald Trump, hoping to capture as much of Ukraine as he can, and more importantly, solidify in the minds of Trump and his advisors the idea that Russian victory is inevitable.

Operations in Kursk continue with the Ukrainians holding on to their defensive positions and the Russo-Korean offensive seeking to dislodge the Ukrainians. As the two maps below show (one from two weeks ago and one from this week) there has been very little terrain that has changed hands in that time. Of note, Putin sacked the regional governor this week. What took him so long?

Why NATO’s reaction force needs to be rapid to be relevant

Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Introduction

For years, NATO has fielded a NATO Response Force (NRF), spearheaded of late by a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, or VJTF. The NRF rotates among nations, but regardless of which one holds the reins, it has never been felt to be up to the task of rapid deployment and employment in times of crisis.1 The current crisis in Ukraine, following Russia’s aggression in Georgia, the Donbas, and Crimea, underscores the importance of a credible NATO combat force that can move quickly to reassure allies and deter short-notice Russian offensive actions on NATO territory.2

By definition, this force must be air transportable, able to arrive and commence operations within ten days, and thus not an armored or mechanized force arriving overland by rail and road. For decades, NATO fielded this capability in the form of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, or AMF. Deactivated a generation ago, the AMF featured many capabilities that are in high demand today. As the Russian Federation threatens to upset the balance of power in the European security space, the time is right to revive the AMF in a new form: the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, or NRRF.

As the Russian Federation threatens to upset the balance of power in the European security space, the time is right to revive the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force in a new form: the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, or NRRF.


The Meaning and Significance of North Korean Troops’ Deployment to Russia

Dr Choi Yonghwan

The details of North Korea’s troop deployments to Russia will likely become clearer over time. However, the repercussions are clear: the North Korean army’s participation in the war will dramatically increase Russia–North Korea cooperation.

But why did North Korea suddenly take this step? There have been several occasions during the Ukraine war when Russia has been on the defensive. However, the recent situation does not seem particularly difficult for Russia. The true answer is to be found in North Korea’s own strategic objectives: Pyongyang appears to want to reshape the geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula.

Since the Eighth Communist Party Congress in 2021, North Korea’s foreign strategy can be described as a ‘New Cold War Structure Utilisation Strategy’, which consists of an effort to refashion the geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula. The beginning of this was the improvement of Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing by taking advantage of the rising tensions between the US and China. North Korea also strengthened its relationship with Moscow after Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To all intents and purposes, Pyongyang viewed the rising US–China strategic competition and the Russo-Ukrainian war as a strategic opportunity.

Central Asia Is Partnering With The World On Its Own Terms – Analysis

Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

In 2024, Central Asia emerged as a key player on the global stage. Central Asia has become a battleground for intensifying competition, particularly between Russia and China. As 2025 approaches, the Central Asian republics are increasingly focusing on economic diversification, sustainable partnerships and policies that uphold national autonomy while benefiting from foreign investment and cooperation.

Central Asia has evolved from being a mere arena for the power plays of other nations to a region that asserts its autonomy. As the region emerges as a middle power, Central Asian republics have made substantial contributions to global affairs, particularly in the realms of energy, transportation and conflict mediation. The region has established robust partnerships, gaining influence in the critical minerals sector. The developments of 2024 will continue with increasing intensity and shape bilateral and multilateral relations in 2025.

This year witnessed Russia and China intensify their engagement towards Central Asia. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 2024. As expected, these high-level meetings emphasised the importance of maintaining strong ties and seeking solutions to international sanctions on Russia. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visits to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan signalled that China’s influence in the region remains robust. Xi Jinping called on Shanghai Cooperation Organisation member states to protect the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ against all threats.

During the year, numerous countries sought to strengthen their ties with the Central Asian republics, particularly in the areas of critical minerals and the Middle Corridor. The European Union is seeking to prevent Central Asia from falling under China’s financial influence. In addition to the EU Global Gateway project, periodic meetings are being held to establish an integrated connectivity system linking Central Asia to the West. The United States is also intensively focusing on Central Asia’s critical minerals to reduce the region’s dependence on China.

The United Kingdom and Germany have developed a new Central Asia policy, particularly in light of the Russia–Ukraine war and growing concerns about China’s influence in the region. Then UK foreign secretary David Cameron’s extensive April 2024 visit heralded the start of a ‘new era’. During his visit, agreements were made to enhance cooperation in energy, economy and education, alongside plans for a ‘5+1 platform’.

Ukraine Military Situation: Russian Military Continues To Press On Multiple Fronts – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

1. The United States Will Equip Ukraine with Antipersonnel Land Mines

The Biden administration has decided to send a $725 million military assistance package to Ukraine. This presidential drawdown authority package will include anti-drone systems, 105mm- and 155mm-class artillery rounds, anti-tank systems, interceptors for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), rockets for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), nonpersistent antipersonnel land mines, and other assets to help Ukraine sustain the fight.

The land mine package will likely include 155mm area denial artillery munitions (ADAMs), Modular Pack Mine Systems (MOPMS), and M136 Volcano vehicle-launched scatterable mine systems. These weapons will allow Ukrainian combat formations to rapidly deploy land mines across sizable contested areas. This will significantly enhance their defensive capabilities and deter Russian offensives.

Open-source intelligence suggests that mines have played a significant role in helping the Ukrainian military fend off Russian assaults. Given the infantry-centric character of the war and the favorable force-on-force and force-to-terrain ratios that Russia enjoys, antipersonnel mines could give Kyiv an additional lethal capability. The possibility that North Korea could combat deploy additional troops to Russia, discussed during Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov’s recent visit to Pyongyang, renders Ukraine’s need for antipersonnel mines even more urgent.

2. The Ukrainian Drone Program Sets Ambitious Goals for 2025

Ukraine’s progress in robotic systems continues to provide hope for Kyiv and lessons in emerging and disruptive technologies for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In an interview with Reuters, Ukraine’s minister of digital transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, indicated that Ukraine plans to boost its production of unmanned ground vehicles in 2025 to augment its land warfare capabilities. This year Ukrainian defense companies have produced around 1.3 million drones, mainly of the first-person-view (FPV) variety. Fedorov indicated to Reuters that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has set a production goal of 30,000 strategic deep-strike drones to hit targets deep inside Russia. Fedorov also stated that the Ukrainian military will start to field autonomous drones with high-end artificial intelligence features next year.

Why Ukrainian – Israeli Defense Cooperation Is in the U.S. National Security Interest

Benjamin Bardos

Cooperation between Israel and Ukraine and the wartime experiences of both sides can live up to their unrealized potential amongst one another, as well as endowing the United States with valuable lessons on how warfare has evolved, which can be a formidable deterrent against China.

The wars in both regions have been viewed as two entirely separate conflicts with no outstanding connections between them beyond the obvious, being that the United States plays a pivotal role in both. However, the reality could not be further from this, as the adversaries on the opposing sides of the collective Western partners have increasingly coalesced to form a front around a few geopolitical objectives, namely, the blatant standoff against the United States and its allies.

First and foremost, as said by Lt. Col. Sobolevskyi on a panel at the Warsaw Institute, it is the harsh reality that this impromptu axis of Russia, China, D.P.R.K., Iran, and their proxies are “performing well” especially if “you estimate their abilities to help each other, you will see”. This can be acutely observed in Russia’s war effort, where its ‘allies’ have provided immense support, ranging from an economic lifeline provided by China to Iranian drone technology and production and all the way up to D.P.R.K. troops and ammunition.

This clearly demonstrates that the war is no longer solely Putin’s or even just Russia’s war effort. Instead, it has evolved into a unifying force, bringing together countries that have now become allies through shared circumstances. While their shared common interests are limited if not even conflicting at times, regardless, the implications of such cooperation speak volumes to the effectiveness and impactfulness of such a multi-nationally interwoven support network.

Trump Team Should Focus on Molding a New Generation of ‘Warrior Admirals’

Steven Wills

Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro announced on Oct. 31 the formation of a new maritime Strategic Studies Group (SSG) modeled on the 1980’s Chief of Naval Operations group. Its mission is to “train future flag officers in strategic thinking and to conduct research on some of the Department of the Navy’s most vexing strategic challenges.”

The election of former President Donald J. Trump to a second term would likely obviate this effort, as John Phelan, Trump’s incoming Navy secretary, would have his own ideas and potential organizational changes for the naval services.

But the next Navy secretary should keep the core of Del Toro’s idea and create a group of upwardly mobile Navy, Coast Guard and Merchant Marine captains and Marine Corps colonels to examine, assess, create and experiment with new concepts of Naval strategy and operations. The increasing tensions with China demand it.

A Navy secretariat-led SSG could also forge the connections with political leaders needed by the Navy to revive the interest and expertise of civilian government leaders in maritime strategy and policy. Finally, exposing flag-eligible Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Merchant Marine officers to senior policy makers and their challenges supports the development of wartime leaders that better understand and work with the nation’s civilian leadership.

The original Strategic Studies Group (SSG)was created in 1981 by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Thomas Hayward. It was designed to take advantage of the facilities and instructors of the Naval War College and support a group of upwardly mobile Navy captains and Marine Corps colonels as they sought to implement the Navy’s new maritime strategy concept and to connect these solutions to Navy programming efforts for future systems.

Sharon, Netanyahu, and the Lebanon Deal

Elliott Abrams

The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2006 offers some useful lessons for Israelis, and for the United States, as a ceasefire in Lebanon begins.

As a reminder, Ariel Sharon’s government proceeded in 2004 and 2005 with his plans to remove all settlements and military installations from Gaza. As implementation got closer, Benjamin Netanyahu resigned from the cabinet on August 7, 2005. The evacuation of settlers was completed on August 22, and of the IDF by September 12.

During the withdrawal, on August 25, Hamas fired two Kassam rockets into Israel. On September 24, five Israelis were injured when thirty rockets struck from Gaza. The invasion of Israel and the capture of Gilad Shalit on June 25, 2006 led to Operation Summer Rains, starting on June 28. By then, according to the IDF, 757 rockets of various kinds had been fired by Hamas and Islamic Jihad since Israel’s departure from Gaza the previous year.

Pressure Points

Abrams gives his take on U.S. foreign policy, with special focus on the Middle East and democracy and human rights issues.

Prime Minister Sharon had warned against rockets being fired during the withdrawal or after. He told the visiting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July, 2005 that “our reaction (to attacks) will be of a different kind, with the addition of very harsh means, both if it takes place during the evacuation, or after we evacuate the Gaza Strip.” In a public speech in August, while the withdrawal was underway, he said “"The world is waiting for the Palestinian response -- a hand stretched out to peace or the fire of terror. To an outstretched hand we shall respond with an olive branch, but we shall fight fire with the harshest fire ever.”

But Sharon did not do it. He had a minor stroke on December 18, 2005 and a massive one on January 4, 2006, that put him into a vegetative state for the rest of his life. Still, he did not respond either to the August 25 attack or the much larger September 24 attack with the kind of force he had threatened. By the following Spring, an emboldened Hamas (and Islamic Jihad) were firing dozen of rockets every month, and finally invaded via tunnels Israel in June.

What Syria’s Revived Civil War Means for the Region

Steven A. Cook

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.
How did opposition fighters gain control of Syria’s second-largest city eight years after they were routed? How significant is this?

During the height of the conflict in Syria nearly a decade ago, Aleppo was divided between government-controlled and rebel areas, but with the help of Russian airpower and the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad was able to regain control over the entire city by the end of 2016. Since about that time, conflict in Syria was static with the rebels largely confined to the Idlib governate, which is adjacent to the Aleppo governate.

Clearly, the armed opposition to Assad has taken advantage of the fact that Israel has done significant damage to Iran’s so-called axis of resistance, especially Hezbollah. A greatly weakened Hezbollah and a Russia distracted by its fight in Ukraine make it harder to defend the Assad regime. That does not mean that Hezbollah or the Russians will not help. Both are deeply invested in Syria, but they do not have the forces they had in 2015 and 2016 that were used to crush the insurgency.

After Aleppo’s fall, Assad’s grip on power seems tenuous. A major question is what is happening in Damascus. There were unconfirmed reports not long after Aleppo fell that Assad and his family were in Moscow, that there were scuffles on the streets of the capital, that different units of the Syrian army were in conflict, and most dramatically, that the presidential palace was overrun. Most of these reports are likely the result of disinformation, but what is happening within the councils of power in Damascus will be critical for how this new phase of the Syrian conflict unfolds.

Ukraine’s cyber defenders turn years of conflict into useful lessons for all

David Hollingworth

TRYZUB is a new training platform based on real-world, frontline cyberwarfare experiences – here’s how it works, and why it could matter for Australia.

As the saying goes, “When life gives you lemons, make lemonade.” In this instance, however, it’s more a case of “when life gives you harsh lessons in cyberwarfare, you should turn them into real-world training exercises”.

That’s pretty much the backstory of a new training service recently announced by cyber security firm Cyber Ranges, which is based on the lived experience of Ukraine’s Computer Emergency Response Team, CERT-UA.

Russia’s build-up and execution of its so-called Special Military Operation – largely ‘special’ these days for being the most costly and destructive conflict on European soil since the Second World War – saw a wave of cyber-attacks unleashed across NATO countries and allies, but no nation has borne the brunt of those attacks like Ukraine has.

Just months after the Russian invasion, Ukraine was already facing unprecedented malicious cyber activity both in terms of its scope and sophistication, and it had already been engaged in defensive cyber operations since as early as 2013. This ongoing activity has the goal of degrading and disrupting both domestic and military targets, while also discrediting the Ukrainian government.

Even as early as June 2022, there were at least eight families of malware being used against Ukrainian networks, deployed via a range of methods, and often conducted in tandem with traditional military operations.

As well as state-backed actors, often with close links to Russia’s Federal Security Service and other agencies, it’s also been the target of various pro-Russian hacktivist groups with varying degrees of sophistication in their operations.

Basically, long story short, Ukraine’s network defenders are probably some of the most experienced cyber security specialists on the planet right now, particularly when it comes to cyber warfare at scale.

Musk could become political puppet master, says Clegg

Jennifer McKiernan

Billionaire and X owner Elon Musk could become a "political puppet master" in the US, former deputy prime minister Nick Clegg has said.

Clegg, who is now Mark Zuckerberg's second-in-command at Meta, where he is the president for global affairs, made the comments to Nick Robinson's Political Thinking podcast.

When asked whether Musk was a threat to democracy, Clegg said the entrepreneur had been "playing an outsized role" in the US election and in the formation of the new Trump administration.

He also stood by comments labelling Meta's social media rival, X, a "one-man, hyper-partisan, ideological hobbyhorse".

The former Liberal Democrat leader, who served as deputy PM to David Cameron in 2010's coalition government, swapped Westminster for Silicon Valley after losing his Sheffield Hallam seat to Labour in the 2017 general election.

In 2022, he was promoted to a senior role by Zuckerberg, with responsibility for policy as well as communication and a reported bonus of £10m on top of his £2.7m annual salary.

He has been the voice of Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, on a range of highly controversial issues since then.

In his interview with Nick Robinson, he spoke about how his role was making judgements about how to balance freedom of expression with protecting audiences from harmful content on Meta.

In contrast, Musk has spoken of his mission to "remove all the censorship" from X, with Clegg saying "you can't move [on X]... for want of tripping over stuff from the person who now privately owns it".

When asked if Musk was "a threat to democracy", Clegg said: "I think Elon Musk is obviously now playing an outsized role in both the election and now the formation of the new US administration.

South Korean leader’s rash move spells upheaval at home and risk abroad

Euan Graham

President Yoon Suk Yeol’s decision to rescind his declaration of martial law, in the face of embattled opposition from South Korea’s parliament, has at least spared the country a disastrous return to military rule. Yoon’s ignominious move is likely to seal his political fate, but also underlines the fragility of democracy in South Korea and will leave behind a disruptive political legacy.

Within the space of a few dramatic and chaotic hours last night, Yoon declared martial law in South Korea, citing anti-state and pro-North Korean forces, and ordered the military to take over the National Assembly, South Korea’s parliament.

The most encouraging aspect from this bizarre episode was the National Assembly’s unanimous 190-0 vote to strike down martial law, with 18 members from Yoon’s ruling party joining the opposition.

If South Korea has been spared the nightmare and embarrassment of a reversion to military rule, this owes much to the bravery of its elected representatives, who were under physical threat. Images of parliamentary staff barricading themselves inside and resisting armed soldiers with fire extinguishers poignantly captured the moment that South Korea’s democracy was literally under siege, at gunpoint. It is extremely fortunate that no loss of life occurred, though this is unlikely to spare the shame of the military personnel who took part in the assault on the National Assembly.

While few could have predicted Yoon’s impetuous move, in South Korea or outside, his anti-democratic methods have been on display for some time, resorting to legal pressure tactics against his political opponents and their family members. The President’s prosecutorial background has manifested in a tendency to rule by law. This has largely gone unnoticed internationally, because Yoon’s major foreign policy initiatives—revitalising the alliance with the United States and pursuing rapprochement with Japan—were widely and rightly welcomed by Washington and its allies.

Erdoğan’s risky play in Syria

Jamie Dettmer

Jamie Dettmer is opinion editor at POLITICO Europe. He covered Syria’s civil war from 2013 to 2016 for Voice of America and the Daily Beast.

As Syrian dictator Bashar Assad’s forces turned tail and fled Aleppo in the face of a long-planned and stunning offensive by an alliance of Islamist militias in the country’s northwest, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was left fulminating, casting around for an explanation.

The fall of Syria’s second-largest city to the alliance led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — an al Qaeda breakaway — isn’t just a humiliation for Assad. It’s also a humiliation of his allies Iran and, to some extent, Russia.


In 2016, Iran-commanded Shiite militias — aided by a scorched-earth bombing campaign from Russia — had helped the Syrian autocrat grab Aleppo back from insurgents who had controlled around half the city for four years. After that, it was meant to be safe in Assad’s hands. But last week, it took all of 72 hours to overrun Aleppo, reigniting the long-running Syrian civil war initially sparked by Assad’s brutal repression of pro-democracy protests.

Why?

Upon his arrival in Damascus for urgent talks, Araghchi offered the most damning explanation he could think of — it was all a “plot by the Israeli regime to destabilize the region.” But while it’s convenient for Tehran to blame the Zionists — Israeli missiles and airstrikes may have marginally helped the insurgents — Aleppo’s fall has little to do with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s aspirations to reshape the Middle East and much more to do with the state of Assad’s armed forces.

IT’S EASY TO GET LOST: THE TEMPTATION OF OVERRELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY

Carlos Peña 

In adopting technology, we need a balanced approach in training that enhances both technological proficiency and fundamental skills.

Consider the challenges in conducting anti-drug operations in Mexico. Officers often operate in rugged terrain, tasked with locating and destroying drug plantations before safely returning to their base. Moreover, they need to maintain unit cohesion to fend off potential attacks by criminals. Essential to their mission is the skill of land navigation. Therefore, officers have increasingly turned to Global Positioning System (GPS) technology. However, reliance on such devices presents risks. Should officers lose their GPS device, damage it, or deplete its battery, they might find it difficult to navigate back through challenging terrain because they are less skilled and experienced using only traditional methods like maps and compasses.

This simple example is illustrative of a broader problem, a dependency on technology that leads to the loss of basic skills which can lead to disaster when technology fails. In adopting technology, we need a balanced approach in training that enhances both technological proficiency and fundamental skills. A strong warfighting culture ensures that soldiers possess the skills and knowledge necessary to perform tasks manually should technology fail. However, commanders often face time constraints that prevent them from incorporating this type of training into their plans. This leads to a potential overreliance on technology, creating a significant vulnerability for any army.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and robotics into modern warfare is a topic that both fascinates and concerns many. These technologies are reshaping the very fabric of military strategy and operations, potentially redefining what it means to engage in war—a contest traditionally viewed as a test of human will and endurance.

As we delve into the dual role of AI in warfare, it’s essential to consider its impact. AI not only assists in making quicker, more informed decisions but also coordinates hybrid teams, integrating drones and robots with human warfighters to execute complex missions. This synergy mirrors the historical evolution of warfare, from the adaptation to gunpowder to the strategic deployment of nuclear weapons, where each technological leap has offered a new combat advantage.

Wars drove global arms sales to $632bn in 2023: SIPRI


Wars, ongoing conflicts and rising tensions have driven sales of arms and military services by the world’s 100 largest companies to $632bn in 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report.

This represents a 4.2% real-terms increase compared to 2022. Arms revenues rose across all regions, with significant growth observed among companies in Russia and the Middle East. Smaller producers were notably quicker to meet the increased demand driven by the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, escalating tensions in East Asia, and rearmament efforts in various regions.

SIPRI military expenditure and arms production programme researcher Lorenzo Scarazzato said: “There was a marked rise in arms revenues in 2023, and this is likely to continue in 2024. The arms revenues of the Top 100 arms producers still did not fully reflect the scale of demand, and many companies have launched recruitment drives, suggesting they are optimistic about future sales.”

In the US, 41 companies recorded arms revenues of $317bn, accounting for half of the total arms revenues. Although arms revenues for US companies have increased, they continue to face production challenges.

This was a 2.5% increase from 2022, despite companies such as Lockheed Martin and RTX experiencing a decline.

SIPRI military expenditure and arms production programme director Dr Nan Tian said: “Larger companies like Lockheed Martin and RTX manufacturing a wide range of arms products often depend on complex, multi-tiered supply chains, which made them vulnerable to lingering supply chain challenges in 2023. This was particularly the case in the aeronautics and missile sectors.”