Indian Strategic Studies: 12/06/24

6 December 2024

India-China: Tactical détente, strategic differences

Shibani Mehta & Saheb Singh Chadha

A new phase of high-level India-China dialogue has been unlocked following the October 21, 2024, agreement on border patrolling. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping, along with both nations’ foreign and defence ministers, have held meetings since then, with the ministers’ talks concluding just last week. The two sides have also agreed to resume dialogue at the Special Representatives and foreign secretary-vice minister levels. These developments signal long-awaited progress in a prolonged border standoff, breaking the diplomatic ice that had frozen ties between Asia’s largest neighbours since the summer of 2020. Behind these positive steps lies a carefully orchestrated diplomatic manoeuvre, revealing much about the evolving dynamics of one of Asia’s most complex bilateral relationships.

Breaking the Ice

The path to this moment began seven months earlier, in April 2024, when both nations began taking careful steps toward finding common ground. Prime Minister Modi’s characterisation of the relationship with China as “important and significant” served as a clear diplomatic signal from the very top level of Indian decision-making. While maintaining India’s firm stance on the border standoff, these words offered an olive branch to Beijing. China’s response came in May with the appointment of an ambassador to India after an 18-month vacancy, reopening a crucial channel of communication.

The real momentum, however, built after India’s June elections with an intensive period of diplomatic engagement. The Foreign ministers met twice in July. The Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs (WMCC) held two meetings barely a month apart between July and August. The national security advisors met on the sidelines of a BRICS gathering in September. Most significantly, corps commanders from both sides engaged in discussions spanning ten days in October to hammer out the details of the agreement.

What Does India’s Hypersonic Missile Test Mean?

Diya Ashtakala

On November 16, India announced the successful test launch of its first long-range hypersonic missile. The missile, developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), was intended to carry “various payloads for ranges greater than 1,500 kms for the Armed Forces.” The test makes it one of the few nuclear-armed countries to develop these missiles, including the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh on X (formerly Twitter) termed it a “historic moment” for India, putting in a “group of select nations having capabilities of such critical and advanced military technologies.” The missile test occurred only days after China showcased a new hypersonic glide vehicle, the GDF-600, at its flagship Zhuhai air show.

India’s test highlights the intensifying global race for hypersonic, including India’s growing maturity in developing hypersonic systems, which it has invested in since the 2000s. It warrants further analysis of what this means for regional stability, particularly India’s precarious relationships with China and Pakistan. Recent developments also indicate bilateral and regional approaches for the next U.S. administration to consider in an intensifying global race for hypersonic weapons.

Q1: Why is India testing its hypersonic missile now?

A1: The recent test represents a public culmination of India’s multi-decade research into hypersonic systems. India’s hypersonic ambitions began far before 2007 when it first took delivery of its BrahMos missile, a joint venture with Russia. In 2004, India first publicized its indigenous development of the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle, demonstrating its scramjet engine in a 2020 flight test.

The timing of India’s test comes alongside rapid developments in the global hypersonic arsenals. The test occurred days after China showcased the GDF-600. India finds itself in a global environment marked by rapid developments in the hypersonic space. Most recently, the United States tested its hypersonic missile in the Pacific as part of its Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program. Over the past year, Russia loaded its Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with nuclear-capable Avangard HGV and was alleged to have used its Zicron hypersonic missile in its ongoing war in Ukraine. North Korean state media reported a test of the Hwasong 16B hypersonic missile, described by President Kim Jong Un as a “key piece of the nuclear deterrent.”

The United States and the Democracy Question in South Asia

S. D. Muni

The police assemble during anti-quota protests in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on July 19, 2024.Credit: ID 337716121 © Mamunur Rashid | Dreamstime.com

Ideologically, the United States is a self-proclaimed promoter and protector of democracy in the world. Its democracy policy has evolved over the past century. The U.S. fought World War II, in part, to defend democracy against fascism and waged a three-decade-long struggle during the Cold War against communism.

Soon after the Cold War, U.S. President George H. W. Bush proposed a “New World Order” based on “freedom, peace and democracy.” His successor, President Bill Clinton, said at the United Nations on September 27, 1993, that the “overriding purpose” of U.S. foreign policy was to “expand and strengthen the world’s community of market based democracies.”

In order to advance this purpose, Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright took the initiative of establishing a Community of Democracies (CoD). At the first meeting of the CoD in Warsaw in 2000, 106 countries promised to advance democratic norms and institutions. The United Nations endorsed this intergovernmental organization and later raised a “U.N. Fund for Democracy,” with contributions from members.

In more recent years, President Joe Biden convened the “Summit for Democracy.” The first such summit was convened in a virtual form on December 9-10, 2021. Its objectives were “defending against authoritarianism, addressing and fighting corruption, and advancing respect for human rights.” The second summit was hosted by the United States in collaboration with Costa Rica, Zambia, the Netherlands, and South Korea in March 2023, and the third summit was hosted by South Korea in March 2024, in a hybrid format.

Biden promised at the second Summit for Democracy that he would work with the U.S. Congress to “commit $9.5 billion across all our efforts to advance democracy around the world.”

How to Beat China in the Quest for AI Dominance

Jack Burnham

In August 2023, the Biden administration restricted investments in countries of concern and cracked down on illegal trade to stop U.S. emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) from bleeding at the hands of foreign adversaries. However, an attempted hack of OpenAI by the Chinese-based hacker group SweetSpecter last month indicates that the incoming Trump administration will need to reinforce and expand efforts to ensure the United States wins the AI race.

AI will be “a crucial component of economic and military power in the near future,” Stanford University’s AI research center succinctly stated in its 2023 AI index report. AI tops both the White House’s list and the Defense Department’s list of critical and emerging technologies necessary for U.S. national security. China, likewise, recognizes AI as one of the “future industries” that will power its economy.

Today, China exports AI technology to nearly twice as many countries as the United States, focusing on autocracies and weak democracies. In doing so, China will spread its ideology and facilitate the adoption of techno-authoritarian practices, enabling state control over its population and undermining democracy around the world. Likewise, China has begun exporting facial-recognition AI—technology it uses to support its own surveillance state. Beijing’s authoritarian-minded partners also want to use that technology to control their populations in the face of historic unrest and low economic performance.

While most assessments place the United States ahead in the AI race due to its superior workforce and data processing infrastructure, China could quickly close the gap through well-manufactured, well-executed, and state-sponsored intellectual property theft. Indeed, SweetSpecter’s attempted hack of OpenAI is no surprise, given China’s long history of cyber-enabled economic warfare to steal strategically valuable commercial technology.

Cyber theft allows China to leapfrog U.S. innovation and circumvent market competition despite its own deficient research and development capabilities. In a dramatic case uncovered two years ago, Chinese state-backed hackers stole up to trillions of dollars worth of intellectual property on pharmaceuticals, solar panels, advanced manufacturing, and cutting-edge technologies in a years-long campaign. In the case of AI, successful cyber-enabled economic warfare will propel China forward to dominate this emerging technology.

‘Great Game On’

John West

Over the past decade, a major power shift has been taking place as China has advanced in displacing Russia as the dominant power in Central Asia, according to Geoff Raby in his new book, Great Game On: The contest for Central Asia and Global Supremacy. And this power shift has only accelerated since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as Russia has been depleted militarily and lost prestige and influence.

Raby is a well-known former Australian ambassador to China. His previous book, China’s Grand Strategy and Australia’s Future in the New Global Order, focused on another power shift, involving China’s rise, the emergence of a multipolar world order and the passing of America’s post-Cold War ‘unipolar moment’.

According to Raby, it used to be said that China and Russia had a division of labour among the five stans of Central Asia, namely Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Russia provided military assistance and security, while China’s role was economic. But the rise in China’s power has brought it much closer to these countries.

It is significant that China’s Belt and Road Initiative was launched in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2013. The initiative has played an important role in elevating China’s power and influence in Central Asia. China has become the region’s biggest source of infrastructure construction and is the biggest creditor of the region. In 2023 Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted the inaugural China-Central Asia Summit in Xi’an, a historic Chinese city. The heads of state of the five stans attended, but Russia was not invited.

Raby sees in China’s emergence as the preeminent power in Central Asia an uncanny historical analogy with the US. By the end of the 19th century, the US had consolidated its territory and secured its borders, and by the early years of the 20th century had established hegemony over the Western hemisphere. It was then free to project power globally, which it did. China’s historic security concern has been its western, inland frontiers. By becoming the dominant power in Central Asia, it is similarly freer to project power globally.

Germany’s China Challenge: Security Versus Business as Usual

Antonia Hmaidi

It looked like a turning point.

In August, the German Foreign Office summoned the Chinese ambassador to Germany, accusing Beijing of conducting a cyberattack against the state cartography agency. It was the first time that Germany had summoned China’s ambassador since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.

Germany has woken up to the China challenge. The current government demonstrates a new understanding and willingness to act against Chinese threats. And yet, many decisions continue to reflect a business as usual – and business first – approach. New elections planned for February are unlikely to lead to a significant course correction, even if Donald Trump will be impatient with Berlin’s meandering.

German intelligence agencies have broken with their insular and reticent tradition and are now confronting China. At a 2022 parliament hearing, German spy chiefs warned that while everyone is paying attention to Russia’s disinformation, hacking and espionage, the much greater long-term challenge comes from China. Russia represented “the storm,” they said. China is “climate change.”

Leaked data from a Chinese cyber-attack contractor confirmed this year for the first time that Chinese government contracts sustain a dangerous hacking-for-hire industry. The Chinese government collects weaknesses in code and funnels them to hackers. Before publishing the data,the domestic Verfassungsschutz intelligence agency shared the story in German media.

Iran targeted senior Israeli figures with over 200 cyberattacks

Emanuel Fabian

The Shin Bet security service said on Monday that it had identified more than 200 Iranian phishing attempts against senior Israeli officials in a bid to secure their personal details.

Among those targeted were senior security officials, political figures, academics, media personnel, journalists, and others, the Shin Bet said.

The hackers approached Israelis via WhatsApp, Telegram and email, and tried to get them to download an app that would grant access to their devices and share their personal details such as home addresses and frequent locations.

The agency said that the information would then be used by Iran to carry out attacks against individuals in Israel, “through Israeli cells they have recruited within the country.”

The Shin Bet said the targets were approached with an “individually tailored cover story for each victim according to their area of work, so the approach doesn’t seem suspicious.”

In one example shown by the Shin Bet, the hacker posed as Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs and told the target he was trying to coordinate a meeting with him and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Syria’s Assad and Iran Face Tough Choices as Rebels Advance Story

Sam Dagher

(Bloomberg) -- Syria-based rebel forces are seeking to build on recent gains and capture more territory controlled by the government, raising the question of whether President Bashar Al-Assad can hold onto power.

There are a lot of unknowns in how the latest twist in Syria’s 15-year conflict will play out, and much depends on the agendas of powerful external actors as much as the internal enmities that have influenced events. For Assad, 59, that means Iran, which considers Syria part of its so-called axis of resistance against Israel and the West and has for years provided the bulk of ground forces, and Russia, an old Cold War-era ally that stepped in to save him in 2015.

A major game changer would be if Russia, which has an airbase in the country, commences a sweeping aerial bombardment against the rebels like it did nine years ago. The difference this time is that Russia is occupied with its war in Ukraine.

Syrian Rebels Take Over Aleppo, Control Airport | Rebel forces — Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a breakaway faction of al-Qaeda — push toward Hama after taking Aleppo© Bloomberg News

Assad has ground Syria down with its population struggling with poverty, shortages and power outages. The conflict so far has left between 300,000 to 500,000 dead, more than 7 million internally displaced, at least 6.4 million refugees and caused almost half a trillion dollars of damage, according to United Nations agencies and Syrian NGOs.

Here are some of the key questions:

Tough Diplomacy, Not Invasion, Is the Way Forward With Iran

Mike Fredenburg

Back in September, Israel successfully destroyed a bunker buried 60 feet underground, killing virtually all of Hezbollah’s senior leadership. Executing the operation involved about a dozen F-15s, each carrying six 2000-pound GBU-31v(3) joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) bunker-buster bombs. First the residential high rises over the underground bunker were systematically destroyed. Then a brilliantly planned operation was executed, involving dropping dozens of bunker-busters in a precisely timed pattern that eventually blasted through 20 yards of soil and rock to destroy the bunker. Only a few militaries in the world could have executed such an intricate and complex operation.

The point of the above description is not to praise Israeli military competence, but to show just how hard it is to destroy a bunker. This sheds concerning light on analysis by the Institute for Science and International Security that finds that two of Iran’s most important nuclear weapons facilities buried under at least 80 to 145 meters of rock (262 to 475 feet), with further protection from reinforced concrete that is very resistant to penetration and the ground shockwave produced by a bunker buster’s explosives. This makes taking them out problematic; the world’s most powerful conventional bunker buster, the United States’ 30,000-pound GBU-57 bunker buster can penetrate only about 40 meters of moderately hard rock.

Still, multiple precision strikes by massive ordnance penetrators delivered by our B-2 stealth bombers could almost certainly severely damage or destroy Iran’s less deeply buried facilities. Even the more deeply buried facilities could be crippled by collapsing their main entrances, although such facilities almost certainly have backup entrances that would allow them to continue with some level of function.

But even if our B-2s can evade Iran’s Russia-supplied anti-stealth radars and deliver enough GBU-57s to damage or destroy all the known facilities involved with nuclear weapons production and delivery, we still don’t really, truly know how much weapons-grade enriched uranium or plutonium—which can be quickly made into implosion-type fission bombs—the Islamic Republic has been able to acquire and hide away in secret locations.

The South Korean president's martial law gamble backfired: What was he thinking?

Laura Bicker

One of the biggest questions on people's minds in Seoul on Wednesday is: what was the president thinking?

In a late-night address that threw South Korea’s parliament into chaos and tested the country’s commitment to democracy, President Yoon Suk Yeol declared that he was imposing martial law.

Less than 24 hours later, his political future is on the brink, with protests on the streets and impeachment proceedings against him under way.

So, what happened?

What is martial law and why was it declared?
Woman who grabbed South Korean soldier's gun speaks to BBC
How two hours of martial law chaos unfolded

Martial law was last introduced in South Korea in 1979, sparked by the assassination of the then-military ruler in a coup. Today's South Korea, however, is a far cry from that, and the repressive years that followed.

It is a stable, prosperous democracy - yet Yoon claimed he was introducing military rule to save the country from dark forces. He called the opposition-controlled National Assembly a “den of criminals” that was “attempting to paralyse” the government.

Hours later, he was forced to back down as furious protesters and lawmakers gathered outside the National Assembly - the MPs made it inside and voted down the order.

‘Russia can turn the lights off’: how the UK is preparing for cyberwar

Dan Milmo

The Swedish government checklist for surviving a war would not have looked out of place decades ago: bottled water; sleeping bags; extra batteries; enough cash for a week; and non-perishable food such as rice and cereal.

Without being mentioned in name, Russia once more lurks in the background as it did during the cold war. But the nature of the threat it poses in the pamphlet, called “In case of crisis or war”, has changed.

Alongside raising the possibility of “an armed attack against Sweden”, the guide also mentions “cyber-attacks” and “disinformation campaigns”.

As well as coping with the threat of nuclear conflict or an armed border incursion, Europe must now contend with a very 21st-century foe: cyberwarfare.

Richard Horne, the head of the National Cyber Security Centre, will say on Tuesday that “the severity of the risk facing the UK” from countries like Russia and China “is being widely underestimated”.

Horne will make the warning as the NCSC reveals a significant increase in serious cyber-incidents over the past 12 months.

What the Fall of Aleppo Means for Russia

Hamidreza Azizi and Nicole Grajewski

Last week, Syrian rebels led by the Sunni Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise offensive, capturing significant parts of Aleppo, one of Syria’s largest cities, and advancing south into Hama province. This offensive—the most substantial territorial gain by rebel forces in nearly a decade—struck at the heart of what Russia once considered its defining achievement in Syria: the 2016 recapture of Aleppo.

In December 2016, Russian airpower, in coordination with Iranian-backed forces and the Syrian army, retook the city in an operation that demonstrated Moscow’s military effectiveness and cemented its role as the decisive external actor in Syria, overshadowing other actors such as the United States, which focused narrowly on countering the Islamic State, and Turkey, which was preoccupied with containing Kurdish forces near its border with Syria. The loss of Aleppo thus represents not just a military setback but a symbolic challenge to Russia’s claim of being able to decisively shape Syria’s future.

The Return of Syria’s Rebels: Neither Unexpected Nor Final

Arman Mahmoudian

The sudden territorial gains of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in northern Syria, including Aleppo—Syria’s second-largest city—have reawakened the nation’s dormant civil war. Although these developments may catch some off guard, they are neither unexpected nor unprecedented. In fact, they have been a long time coming; the regime of Bashar al-Assad has been vulnerable to such upheaval for years.

First, for over a decade, the Syrian army had struggled to obtain the upper hand in a brutal civil war, resulting in a decline in its military capabilities and morale. While the situation had notably stabilized in favor of Assad’s regime since 2018, the Syrian army never received a chance to recover. Once considered a proud military force, the Syrian Arab Army has, in recent years, devolved into a fragmented patchwork of factions and militias heavily influenced by foreign powers, including Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.

The presence and activity of external forces, establishing bases and asserting control across the country, have likely impacted troop morale. Many have begun to question the extent to which they are truly fighting for their country’s sovereignty. Additionally, the Syrian army’s infrastructure, command centers, and bases have been relentlessly targeted by Israeli airstrikes over the past decade. Hundreds of these strikes have critically weakened its operational capacity. These external pressures, alongside the army’s decline and frustration, dealt a serious blow to the overall effectiveness of the Syrian army.

The second factor behind the current developments in Syria is Russia’s so-called “Ukrainian fatigue,” or more precisely, the strain caused by its protracted war in Ukraine. Back in 2015, when Russia declared its support for Assad, it played a pivotal role in restoring the regime’s health. Massive Russian airstrikes were critical in shifting the balance of the civil war, allowing the Syrian regime, supported by Iranian forces and allied Shia militias, to gain the upper hand.

Online Information Sellers Threaten Servicemembers, Veterans

Naveed Shah and Emily Peterson-Cassin

Francis Walter, a veteran from Virginia, blamed data brokers when the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Social Security Administration could not verify his identity. Dale Craft, an Army servicemember from Ohio, suspects data brokers are the reason more spam calls, spam emails and junk mail are targeting him.

Both are among the millions of military servicemembers and veterans who could be targeted, not just by scammers but also foreign governments, unless the government does everything possible to crack down on unaccountable data brokers who collect and sell extremely detailed personal information on all Americans.

Both Walter and Craft wrote complaints to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as part of public comment for a proposed rule that would require these largely unregulated data brokers to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Under the new rule, they would finally be forced to handle personal information responsibly.

With data breaches constantly in the headlines and a persistent stream of identity theft warnings in our inboxes, it can be tempting to tune out privacy issues these days. But it cannot be stressed enough how much information data brokers collect and how alarmingly specific that information can be.

Data brokers routinely collect and sell not only our names, addresses and Social Security numbers but also information on our income, our religion, what apps we’ve signed up for, what websites we visit, our body mass index, our prescriptions and medical conditions, who our spouses and children are and even what pets we have.

The Ugly Truth about the Permanent War Economy

Julia Gledhill

Despite ever growing Pentagon budgets, the national security establishment has expressed concerns about insufficient spending to deter or win a great power conflict. But war is not inevitable, and the consequences of a military buildup are grave. Decisionmakers must consider the strategic and fiscal challenges that will face their successors in thirty years – not the interests of corporations and their spokespeople, today.

National security spending has grown nearly 50% since 2000, and the Pentagon budget alone will soon reach the trillion-dollar threshold.1 Still, lawmakers, Pentagon officials, and defense industry spokespeople alike routinely sound the alarm about what they perceive as insufficient national security spending.2 They argue the budget isn’t large enough to maintain deterrence and that Pentagon processes are too slow and rigid for the United States to respond to emerging threats, or if necessary, to prevail in a potential great power conflict.

Proponents of these arguments justify a military buildup by inflating the Pentagon’s ability to address foreign threats to national security. The Pentagon’s core issue, however, is a lack of clear or realistic strategic guidance. No amount of money will resolve issues that are ultimately matters of strategic overreach. Policymakers must scrutinize higher spending proposals and consider their long-term economic impacts. A military build-up would further entrench generations of Americans in the permanent war economy, which already does little to safeguard their security, much less their collective prosperity.

All bow before the almighty US dollar

Urban C. Lehner

The dollar is strong and likely to get stronger. Image: DTN files

Back in 1971, the world was suffering from a vast overabundance of dollars. American foreign investment and foreign aid coupled with inflationary US government policies had flooded the world with greenbacks.

At the same time, the world – especially the United States – had too little gold. That was a problem because, unlike today, exchange rates didn’t float freely on markets. The United States was committed to redeeming dollars for gold at $35 an ounce. (Other nations’ currencies were pegged to the dollar at fixed rates.)

Foreigners were desperately trying to redeem dollars for gold or convert them to other currencies. With the US increasingly unable to meet its commitment, speculators anticipated devaluation.

In August of that year, President Richard Nixon addressed the dollar crisis by suspending the dollar’s convertibility into gold.

Despite a subsequent negotiated devaluation, speculators continued to attack the dollar. By 1973, the gold standard and fixed exchange rates were history.

It was during the 1971 devaluation negotiations that Nixon’s Treasury Secretary John Connally made a deliciously cynical comment that is oft-quoted even today. Connally told foreign counterparts that the dollar is “our currency but it’s your problem.”

Israel’s Victory in Lebanon

Brian Carter

Israeli operations in Lebanon have defeated Hezbollah and compelled the group to end its involvement in the October 7 War. On November 26, Israel and Hezbollah reached a ceasefire deal that ended Hezbollah attacks into Israel and required the group to disarm in southern Lebanon.[i] These conditions achieve the stated Israeli war aim of safely returning displaced citizens to their homes in northern Israel. The ceasefire ensures the Israeli right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose as well.[ii] Hezbollah, on the other hand, is severely degraded and has failed to achieve its stated war aim of compelling Israel to accept a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[iii] Israel’s victory and Hezbollah’s defeat have drastically changed the security landscape in the Middle East by limiting Hezbollah’s ability to deter Israel. Though Israel has won this round of conflict in Lebanon, Hezbollah will almost certainly begin reconstituting its forces and likely try re-entrenching itself in southern Lebanon at some point. The United States and Israel must ensure that Hezbollah adheres to the ceasefire. If Hezbollah violates the ceasefire, the United States must permit Israel to use force to disrupt Hezbollah efforts to rebuild its forces and the threat that it poses to Israel.

In a ruined Hezbollah stronghold, supporters question the costs of war

Abbie Cheeseman, Suzan Haidamous

TYRE, Lebanon — The bodies were laid out in long rows, hundreds of them, mostly fighters but civilians too, in plywood boxes poking out from heaps of earth.

“It’s our culture to view this as a victory,” said Mahmoud, a police officer, standing by the grave of a relative and tracing the outline of the coffins with his finger. “But anyone who tells you that we won militarily … something has gone wrong in their head.” Like others in this story, Mahmoud spoke on the condition that he be identified by his first name, fearing retribution from Hezbollah.

The ceasefire in Lebanon that came into force last week was spun by the Iranian-backed militant group as a triumph over Israel, but among its supporters — now getting a first glimpse of their devastated villages — the sense of loss is overwhelming. After more than a year of cross-border fire between the Israeli military and Hezbollah, which began its attacks on Oct. 8, 2023, in solidarity with Hamas, Israel ramped up its aerial campaign in late September and sent ground troops across the border soon after, laying waste to much of southern Lebanon.

The first stop for many returning families was to makeshift graveyards like this one in Tyre, where women wailed over their loved ones as they ran their hands through the dirt. With the Israeli military still holding its positions inside Lebanon, and civilians warned to stay away from communities close to the border, many of the dead are still in temporary resting places, awaiting final burial.

The Syrian tragedy continues

Tim Black

The terrible 13-years-long conflict in Syria has been mainly framed as a civil war between the government of Bashar al-Assad and domestic opponents. The sight of jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capturing villages and towns in north-west Syria, before advancing on and taking the city of Aleppo on Friday, has largely been interpreted through this civil-war lens – as the reignition of a conflict between ‘rebel’ groups and ‘regime’ or ‘government’ forces.

This, though, is to tell only part of the story. Not just of the latest direct challenge to Assad’s hollow rule, but also of Syria’s long-standing descent into violent instability. (For one thing, ‘rebels’ seems like an oddly anodyne way to describe the vicious Islamists of HTS.)

Throughout this long conflict, there have certainly been domestic factors involved, chief among which is the illegitimacy and chronic lack of authority of Assad’s de facto, tin-pot dictatorship. This weakness gave rise to the initial popular uprisings against him in 2011. But since that initial eruption of anti-Assad protest during the Arab Spring, this has ceased to be a conflict determined by social, political forces internal to Syria itself.

EU’s ‘Europe First’ strategy is a paper tiger

Thomas Fazi

In recent years, Western governments have increasingly engaged in self-conscious industrial policies to address a variety of problems — the green transition, resilience of supply chains and, perhaps most importantly, geopolitical competition with China. Initiatives such as the Biden administration’s CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in the US are symbolic of this new wave of industrial policy.

In response to the IRA — which many European officials have worried could harm EU manufacturing — several officials and leaders have advocated for a robust European industrial policy featuring reciprocal subsidies and support mechanisms. They are emphasising the need for a “Made in Europe” strategy to counterbalance the potential economic impacts of the “America First” policies embedded in the IRA. Calls for a more unified European industrial response have naturally grown in tandem with President-elect Donald Trump’s threats of more aggressive American protectionism.

Hence why this week, Stéphane Séjourné, the EU’s new industry chief, called for a “Europe first” strategy for key business sectors. “It’s not at all about protectionism because Europe really has no interest in a global trade war,” he said. “We have a strategic and technological interest to develop our own industries, to create employment and to create growth”.

This may sound promising, but the reality is that the EU’s institutional framework makes it seriously unfit, both economically and politically, for confronting the new 21st-century geopolitical landscape. Economically, the single currency and the EU’s restrictive fiscal rules, combined with the lack of a true common fiscal capacity, represent a serious barrier to investment — at both the national and European level. This issue is further compounded by the EU’s structural and ideological bias against state intervention in the economy. This is exemplified by the EU’s stringent rules regarding state aid, which seriously inhibits industrial policy.

Europe Quietly Prepares for World War III

Ellie Cook

With warnings swirling over a possible war with Russia in a matter of years, NATO's European members have already started laying the groundwork for defenses, should Russian troops set foot on alliance soil.

"Russia is preparing for a war with the West," Bruno Kahl, the head of Germany's foreign intelligence service, said in late November.

But it's not likely to be a large-scale attack into NATO territory, the intelligence chief warned. Moscow could opt for a limited incursion or upping its hybrid warfare tactics to probe the alliance's conviction, Kahl said.

NATO is trying to prepare for both scenarios: an all-out war, and less obvious techniques designed to undermine stability in the alliance's member countries.

"There are multiple options for Russia to test the cohesion of the alliance," including limited land grabs, the former head of NATO's Multinational Corps Northeast based in northwest Poland, Lieutenant General Jürgen-Joachim von Sandrart, told Newsweek just before leaving his post in November.

The urgency is now obvious from senior military and political officials. Andrius Kubilius, the European Union's commissioner for defense, said in September that defense ministers and NATO commanders "agree that [Russian President] Vladimir Putin could be ready for confrontation with NATO and the EU in six to eight years."

Estonia's foreign intelligence service warned in February NATO "could face a Soviet-style mass army in the next decade" if Russia successfully reforms its military. The army would be "technologically inferior" to NATO forces in areas other than electronic warfare and long-range strikes, the service said, but its "military potential would be significant."

"If we take these assessments seriously, then that is the time for us to properly prepare, and it is a short one," Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, told the Reuters news agency. "This means we have to take quick decisions, and ambitious decisions."

Russia’s long war with the maritime powers

Andrew Lambert

The ongoing conflict in the Ukraine is only the latest flashpoint in a long-running economic, ideological and cultural contest between the very different world views of Russia and a progressive ‘West’. The Russian regime is defending an autocratic repressive system against western encroachment. Critically, this conflict is asymmetric, the latest iteration of a long struggle between freewheeling maritime economies, shaped by progressive-inclusive politics, capitalism and connectivity – and militarised autocratic regimes that use external threats to reinforce domestic control. These contests tend to be won by progressive coalitions exploiting the asymmetric leverage and financial power that flow from maritime/legal/economic approaches to conflict resolution. Russia has been defeated in many such conflicts.

In geographical terms, Russia’s access to the world ocean has always been compromised by maritime chokepoints (and polar ice), which leave the great bulk of its export economy, bulky products relying on shipping, or pipelines exposed to maritime interdiction, economic blockades based on international law, delivered by superior naval forces. Alfred Thayer Mahan explored this strategy through the British experience between 1660 and 1815, and it was adopted as the League of Nations’ preferred instrument to coerce aggressors in 1919. The inability of the League to execute it should not obscure the inherent power of the method.

While the strategic history of Russian empires across the last 1,000 years has focussed on the generation of military power and the acquisition of territory, the Russian economy, the basis of state power, has always depended on the revenues generated by bulk exports, forest products, timber, tar and pelts, along with agricultural surpluses of grain, hemp and flax, basic iron production and more recently hydrocarbons and military hardware. These bulky, low-value exports relied on maritime communications, ports and ships; the latter usually controlled by foreign powers.

Human and development costs of the Middle East’s protracted conflict

The Israel–Hamas war, now in its thirteenth month, has caused unprecedented levels of physical destruction and economic collapse in Gaza and southern Lebanon. In the second quarter of 2024, the economies of Gaza and the West Bank contracted by 86% and 23% respectively, while 90% of pre-war jobs in Gaza had been lost. The scale of civilian casualties and the humanitarian emergency, with Palestinians suffering from widespread shortages of food, fuel and medical equipment, have raised doubts about Israel’s war aims and conduct.

Conflict trends and driversWhile remarkable, the current escalation of war in the Middle East is part of a broader upward trend of political violence and conflict in the region, which increased in intensity after the Arab uprisings in 2011. Starting with Iraq in 2003, then Libya, Syria and Yemen after the Arab Spring, and now Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories, conflicts in these countries have caused massive destruction, displacement and loss of life, which are coupled with development setbacks in the form of foregone income, capital flight, reduced trade and human-capital losses. According to the World Bank, the Middle East and North Africa’s (MENA) average number of conflict episodes per year more than doubled between the 1990s and 2010, while its share of global conflict-related fatalities increased sixfold between the 1990s and 2022.

Since 2000, conflicts in the MENA region have been driven by a mix of factors, including historical identity-based divisions, domestic authoritarianism and geopolitical turmoil. In 2011, the chronic failure of governments to address social and economic grievances led to domestic uprisings in Libya, Syria and Yemen that soon turned into politically intractable armed conflicts that drew in external powers. But even before then, the rise of transnational non-state armed groups like al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State (ISIS) were followed by botched foreign military interventions that led to confrontations between proxy forces and international and regional powers. Geopolitical and regional-security imperatives trumped international diplomatic efforts to facilitate conflict resolution.

Navigating Troubled Waters: The Houthis’ Campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden

Prior to the Hamas-led 7 October 2023 attacks against Israel, Ansarullah (‘Partisans of God’, known best as the Houthis), a predominantly Zaydi Shia armed group with roots in northern Yemen, had been viewed by most international observers as primarily a local threat, despite belonging to Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’. This changed in October 2023, when the Houthis launched a first wave of missiles and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) against targets in Israel, ostensibly in solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza. Seeing that most of the attacks failed to cause significant damage, the Houthis in November 2023 moved to attack merchant ships affiliated with Israel and its Western allies in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, delivering a propaganda victory for the group and sending shock waves through the shipping industry. Subsequent attacks have targeted more than 300 ships, using a wide range of weapons systems. Though most attacks missed or did little damage, the Houthis have sunk two ships and four sailors have lost their lives.

This report analyses the evolution of Houthi strategy at sea over the twelve months since the start of the campaign, particularly with regard to targeting criteria, geographic scope and weapons systems used. It also considers the international military response, which includes several multinational naval missions, as well as the actions by Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States against ground targets in Yemen. It demonstrates that these strikes, while temporarily degrading the capabilities of the Houthis, have not succeeded in significantly reducing the overall number of attacks on ships. Meanwhile, the Houthi arsenal continues to develop and expand. Consisting primarily of Iranian-designed ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as UAVs and uninhabited surface vessels, the group continues to improve the range of its weapons systems and the accuracy of its targeting. Analysing how the Houthis, who have been subject to a United Nations Security Council arms embargo since 2015, manage to smuggle weapons and their components to Yemen, the report illustrates the crucial role played by maritime smuggling using traditional dhows, and in particular the importance of the Red Sea ports of Hudaydah and Salif, which have remained under the control of the Houthis. It also discusses gaps in the enforcement of the sanctions regime and the important role of Yemen’s neighbours in this regard.

Winning the AI race with research talent

Anirudh Suri

The recent visits of Nvidia’s Jensen Huang and Meta’s Yann LeCun didn’t just highlight the importance of the Indian market to artificial intelligence (AI) majors. It made clear that India needs top-tier AI research talent — and not just AI infrastructure — if it wants to become an AI power and make its National AI Mission a success.

Yann LeCun, Chief AI Scientist at Meta, spoke at various educational institutions including IIT Delhi and IIT Chennai, among others. LeCun, winner of the Turing Prize in 2018, urged India to enhance its participation in the global AI research community, and not focus only on AI product development. A dearth of cutting-edge research opportunities in AI, and brain drain (of some of India’s best AI research talent), he pointed out, are among the primary challenges for India to build its own AI expertise.

In contrast, when they shared the stage at the Nvidia AI Summit last month, Nvidia’s Jensen Huang and Reliance’s Mukesh Ambani emphasised building affordable AI infrastructure for India. But surprisingly, Jensen made almost no mention of the criticality of top-tier research talent for India. Their emphasis on AI infrastructure is in line with the weight India has placed on compute infrastructure in its National AI Mission (NAIM), with half of the Mission’s funds allocated towards it.