Indian Strategic Studies: 12/02/24

2 December 2024

Competing for the Global South

As the world transitions into a multipolar era, an increasing number of nations are challenging Western dominance and reshaping the global order. Central to this shift is the rise of the Global South, led by Asia’s powerhouses - India and China. These two nations, each offering distinct governance, development, and security models, are in a growing competition for influence. Countries across the Global South are advocating for a more equitable international system, demanding debt restructuring, climate action, and solutions to emerging security challenges. What strategies will India and China propose to address these demands? And how will their rivalry shape the future of the Global South as a unified force on the world stage?

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The BRICS Summit, De-Dollarization, and the Global Realignment

Axel de Vernou Farrell Gregory

Last month’s BRICS summit saw representatives from thirty-six countries discuss the formation of a new world order without dollar dominance—and, by extension, one in which America and its allies no longer play a preeminent role. As BRICS member states alleviate bilateral tensions and Global South countries turn away from American aid, Washington urgently needs to adjust to today’s shifting geopolitical landscape.

The summit’s theme was unlocking the potential of countries that felt spurned by the West in the post-Cold War era. “We are not building up a bloc that will be targeted against somebody’s interests,” Putin said. He envisions BRICS as a safe haven for countries wronged by Washington’s punitive use of the dollar. However, Russia alone cannot create an alternative financial ecosystem. This is why outreach to the Global South is indispensable to its strategy.

In September, during the Russian Energy Week International Forum, Putin emphasized that BRICS countries will lead the world’s future economic growth and that Moscow will support their industries by exporting fuel and energy products. A few days before the summit, Putin noted that BRICS, thanks to its new members, has surpassed the G7’s contribution to global GDP. Xi Jinping closed the event by repeating that the rise of the Global South heralds a “great transformation across the world.”

If these countries, as Putin contends, are seeking refuge from a U.S.-led financial system, what is the best way to attract them into an alternative geopolitical sphere? Russia and China see the solution in cross-border payment systems that rely on local currencies. The BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (BCBPI) will act as the vehicle that establishes these channels so that member countries can conduct exchanges while circumventing any American involvement.

Economic decision-making in China

Over the last two months China has announced a flurry of economic policies that have both excited and disappointed financial markets. This period has illustrated three significant lessons about how economic policies are made during President Xi Jinping’s third term. Firstly, it has demonstrated the continuation of top-down decision-making guided by a strategic objective. Secondly – and importantly – this does not stop the Party-State from exercising some policy flexibility when economic circumstances necessitate it. Finally, it has also potentially signalled that policymakers recognise the need for an adjusted style of economic decision-making as China becomes increasingly reliant on its domestic capital market to achieve its strategic objectives.

Policies drive market instability China’s economy is showing several signs of weakening and is projected to grow by less than the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) target of 5% in 2024. Property investment fell by 10.2% and foreign direct investment (FDI) by 28.2% compared to the same period in 2023, and over the past three years US$6 trillion has been lost from the value of the Chinese and Hong Kong stock exchanges. In response, on 24 September China’s central bank unveiled its biggest stimulus package since the coronavirus pandemic, and an unprecedented Politburo meeting signalled the leadership’s recognition that more economic support was needed. The markets reacted positively, making their largest gains since 2008, but this response was then halted by the National Development and Reform Commission’s (NDRC) announcement at a press conference on 8 October that, contrary to expectations, there would be no further stimulus measures.

The Ministry of Finance stabilised the markets four days later by suggesting that additional measures would be announced at a meeting of China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) held on 4–8 November. To the markets’ dismay, rather than announcing a sizeable stimulus package, the NPCSC unveiled a debt-swap programme that aimed to relieve local governments’ immediate debt-repayment pressures, causing the Hang Seng Index to fall, erasing all gains from the previous two months.

Did China just blink in the South China Sea?

Yucong Wang, Clive Schofield and Warwick Gullett

Earlier this month, China declared new “baselines” around Scarborough Shoal, a large coral atoll topped by a handful of rocks barely above sea level in the South China Sea. By doing so, China reaffirmed its sovereignty claim over what has become a global flashpoint in the disputed waters.

This was a pre-calculated response to the Philippines’ enactment of new maritime laws two days earlier that aimed to safeguard its own claims over the reef and other contested parts of the sea.

This legal tit-for-tat is a continuation of the ongoing sovereignty and maritime dispute between China and the Philippines (and others) in a vital ocean area through which one-third of global trade travels.

The Philippines rejected China’s declaration as a violation of its “long-established sovereignty over the shoal.” Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said:

What we see is an increasing demand by Beijing for us to concede our sovereign rights in the area.

As the tensions continue to worsen over these claims, there is an ever-increasing risk of an at-sea conflict between the two countries.

What is the Scarborough Reef?

Scarborough Shoal is called Huangyan Dao in Chinese and Bajo de Masinloc by the Philippines. It is located in the northeast of the South China Sea, about 116 nautical miles (215 kilometers) west of the Philippine island of Luzon and 448 nautical miles (830 kilometers) south of the Chinese mainland.Disputed claims in the South China Sea. Author provided

The Gulf Cooperation Council states’ uninhabited and autonomous capabilities

The Arab Gulf states are increasingly investing in acquiring and developing uninhabited and autonomous capabilities – such as uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and uninhabited ground vehicles (UGVs) – to offset manpower constraints, minimise risks to personnel on the battlefield and address logistical challenges such as extended time spent at sea. These technologies promise to overcome training hurdles, as it is generally easier, cheaper and faster to train a UAV pilot than a traditional aircraft pilot. Autonomy will also allow operators to control greater numbers of assets than is currently possible. But with AI for military applications still in its infancy in most Arab Gulf states due to the large financial, human and computational input required, these countries may remain dependent on partners to develop the technology for the foreseeable future.

Time to go shopping In recent years, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has placed orders for around 500 UAVs, supplementing its existing fleet of Chinese UAVs. In the land domain, the UAE ordered 20 tracked robotic combat vehicles and 40 THeMIS uninhabited ground vehicles from EDGE subsidiary Milrem Robotics in 2024. Its coast guard already operates uninhabited surface vehicles (USVs), and the UAE Navy in November 2024 selected French company Exail to supply an uninhabited mine-countermeasures system.

Saudi Arabia, which has been operating Chinese UAVs for a decade, signed a USD3 billon deal in 2023 for an undisclosed number of Turkish Bayraktar Akinci UAVs. Neighbouring Qatar’s armed forces acquired smaller Bayraktar TB2 UAVs in 2018, and its Ministry of Interior recently purchased a Turkish USV for the coastguard. Meanwhile, in 2023 Kuwait bought an undisclosed number of TB2s for USD367 million and a semi-autonomous mine-countermeasures system from Saab. Finally, Oman procured a small number of CH-4 UAVs from China sometime after 2020.

Local development efforts These recent acquisitions have been complemented by several domestic development programmes.

Bridging, not hedging: Arab Gulf States’ ambitions in a polarised world

Hasan Alhasan

Great-power competition creates opportunities for agile actors to position themselves as key connectors in an increasingly fragmented global system. Often thought of as hedging against US decline or abandonment by drawing closer to China or Russia, the Arab Gulf states are better understood as embracing a new bridging role by inserting themselves as conduits between global and regional rivals. In an era of weaponised interdependence, these states are leveraging their multi-aligned relations to act as political and economic power brokers irrespective of geopolitical rivalries.

Reliable partners Nowhere is this activity clearer than in the energy domain. Arab Gulf states have seized on the global energy crisis that followed the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine to reinforce this message. Arab Gulf oil producers have defended their neutrality with regard to the war in Ukraine – a stance they view as a prerequisite for working with Russia to ensure oil market stability via OPEC+. Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent the United Arab Emirates have also upheld their swing-producer status, ramping up oil production in July 2022 to cushion rising prices while bearing the brunt of cuts in production quotas later in the year due to uncertainty over future demand.

The Arab Gulf states have also deepened their energy relations with both China and the US. Saudi Arabia has doubled down on the Chinese market by investing with Sinopec in a US$10 billion refining complex in Fujian province. Meanwhile, the UAE’s ADNOC made its first significant US investment in May 2024 by securing an equity position and offtake agreement in the Rio Grande liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, with Saudi Aramco mulling similar deals in US–LNG projects.

Beyond oil and gas, the Arab Gulf states’ sprawling investments in renewable energy, spanning countries in Asia, Africa and Europe, indicate a clear desire to sidestep geopolitical boundaries.

Russia’s Redlines

James W. Carden

Last week’s decision by Russian president Vladimir Putin to launch an intermediate-range ballistic missile against a military complex located in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro (population 937,000) was a response to a prior Ukrainian attack on Russian territory that made use of American-made ATACM and British-made Storm Shadow ballistic missiles. This is but the latest in a series of alarming escalatory moves from both sides of the conflict. Worryingly, the same people who assured us Russia would acquiesce to NATO’s enlargement to its borders are now assuring us that Putin’s repeated threats to resort to nuclear weapons are nothing to worry about.

In a televised speech on November 21, Putin warned that, “We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against military facilities of those countries that allow their weapons to be used against our facilities.”

Dr. Stephen Starr, who served as the Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri points out,

The U.S. ATACM and UK Storm Shadow missile attacks directed and conducted against Russian territory, have had no prospect of changing the outcome of the Ukraine War. Russia has already won. The U.S., NATO, and their proxy Ukraine have been decisively defeated on the battlefield by a Russian military armed with a host of weapons far superior to anything possessed by the West—all at the terrible expense of the people of Ukraine, who have lost well over a million killed and wounded, with their nation utterly destroyed.

All this comes fast on the heels of Russia’s announcement, also made last week, that Russia has amended its nuclear doctrine by lowering its threshold for a nuclear strike. Going forward, Moscow will consider an attack by a non-nuclear country that is supported by nuclear-armed powers as a joint attack.

Will the Ukraine War end in 2025?

Patrick Drennan

Russian President Vladimir Putin has doubled down on his decision to continue the war in Ukraine, threatening to use nuclear weapons if he cannot get the solution he seeks in negotiations with incoming American President Donald Trump. He wants to keep existing boundaries based on the battlefield front lines, including annexed Ukrainian oblasts, and disarm Ukraine and deny them membership of NATO.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected this proposal outright, but also said “Ukraine deserves to make next year a year of peace".

Neither side can fight on for another 12 months without causing considerable carnage and economic calamity to their respective countries.

The recent actions of both leaders seem to recognize this reality. Notwithstanding Putin’s aggressive nuclear threats after Ukraine’s use of powerful long-distant NATO weapons on Russian territory, where they struck North Korean troops and wounded a high-ranking general, Russia responded with a ballistic missile attack on a minor (undefended) Ukrainian town. Notably, Russia warned the USA before firing, so as not to risk a nuclear response.

Nevertheless, Putin still assumes that Russia’s war machine, with support from its allies in Iran, China, and North Korea, can outlast Ukraine and NATO. However, the Institute for the Study of War disputes this - “Russian forces lost roughly 80,000 troops during September and October 2024, but likely only recruited an estimated 60-70,000 into military service - indicating that the Russian military’s recruitment rates have begun to fall behind Russia’s previous one-to-one loss replacement rate.”

Also, Russia's DIB, the country's defense production system, is unlikely to match the production rate necessary to replace Russian weapons losses under current monetary policies. Foreign Policy, citing OSINT analysts, report that Russia has been losing around 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels per month but can only produce 20 per month. They declare that Russia will likely run out of cannon barrels in 2025 due to battlefield losses, dwindling Soviet stocks, and sanctions impacts.

Putin says Russia could hit 'decision-making centres' in Kyiv with new missile

Mark Trevelyan

"Of course, we will respond to the ongoing strikes on Russian territory with long-range Western-made missiles, as has already been said, including by possibly continuing to test the Oreshnik in combat conditions, as was done on November 21," Putin told leaders of a security alliance of ex-Soviet countries at a summit in Kazakhstan.

"At present, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff are selecting targets to hit on Ukrainian territory. These could be military facilities, defence and industrial enterprises, or decision-making centres in Kyiv," he said.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy denounced Putin's "promotion" of the Oreshnik as a tactic to disrupt attempts to end the war, particularly by U.S. President-elect Donald Trump.

"He doesn't seek an end to this war. Moreover, Putin wants to prevent others from ending the war," Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address.

"He can go on wielding his Oreshnik only to thwart the efforts of President Trump which are sure to follow his inauguration. Putin wants to escalate the situation to such an extent so that President Trump's attempts will fail. So that he cannot end the war."

Putin said a massive Russian overnight attack on Ukraine was also a response to Kyiv's use of U.S. ATACMS ballistic missiles.

Zelenskiy said Russia used cruise missiles with cluster munitions in the attack, which cut power to more than 1 million people, something he called a "despicable escalation".

Zelenskiy also said he was speaking to Western leaders, including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, to devise a response to "Russia's attempt to make the situation more unbearable and drag out the war".

Washington Careens Toward the Abyss of World War

Doug Bandow

What could possibly go wrong? The president, now perhaps in name only, reportedly decided to loose American munitions on Russia, a step avoided even during the Cold War. Moscow’s response was to use a nuclear-capable hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile against Ukraine. The American people, more focused on the coming Thanksgiving holiday than the latest eruption in Europe’s deadly proxy war, yawned. Ukraine and its European acolytes, however, held emergency talks and demanded action, meaning a U.S. response.

Never has it been so dangerous to be a great power, for both the dominant great power and the wannabe imperial power. The United States began its history by emphasizing its distance from Europe. The Monroe Doctrine, claiming the Western Hemisphere as America’s own, was arrogant presumption when first issued in 1823. Within a few decades, however, no foreign power could seriously challenge the U.S. in its neighborhood. In reality, America was already one of the most secure nations ever established, in practice vulnerable only to internal conflict.

When World War II ended, the Old World had wrecked itself twice in little more than a generation. America enjoyed global preeminence, which turned into primacy after the demise of the Soviet Union and its satellite system. Then came George H.W. Bush’s infamous “what we say goes,” when the Monroe Doctrine was inverted to mean that Washington expected no challenge when it intervened up to every other nation’s border, and sometimes within those nations as well. U.S. policymakers seemed to believe that America was the eternal unipower.

Yet President George W. Bush and his more arrogant than merry band crashed the glorious bandwagon just a few years later. Manipulated into war on a lie, Uncle Sam destabilized the Mideast, wrecked multiple nations, left hundreds of thousands of civilians dead, and loosed deadly new geopolitical viruses upon the world. It was “a heckuva’ job!” by the younger Bush and his successors. We continue to pay the price today.

Donald Trump and Elon Musk Could Radically Reshape NASA. Here's How

Martha McHardy

From America's 250th birthday to the the 2026 World Cup, President-elect Donald Trump will enjoy the global spotlight during a number of major events in two years' time. But one will likely be sweeter for him than all others: he is poised to become only the second president in history to place a phone call to the moon.

In September 2026, NASA's Artemis program is due to return humans to the moon for the first time since 1972. If successful, it will be the culmination of years of scientific endeavor, commitment and ingenuity—all qualities for which NASA is famed around the world.

By then, however, NASA's role may have been transformed, experts have told Newsweek. The extraordinary comeback of Trump heralds the possibility of big changes to the 66-year-old agency, including much deeper partnership with the private sector, a push toward Mars exploration, and a renewed focus on competing with America's key rival on Earth and in space: China.

By Trump's side is Elon Musk, the billionaire entrepreneur who is the face of modern space exploration with his rocket company SpaceX. Musk, who is set to lead the newly created Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), gave Trump a demonstration of his remarkable achievements when the president-elect joined him to watch a launch of SpaceX's Starship Rocket in Texas.

Musk's leadership at SpaceX has reshaped the space industry, demonstrating that private companies can deliver innovative, cost-effective solutions faster than government programs. However, his potential involvement in shaping space federal policy raises not only potential conflicts of interest, but also questions about priorities, funding, and his influence on NASA—an agency beset by ageing infrastructure and budget challenges.

Avoiding the next front: Iraq’s fight to stay out of the Israel-Iran conflict

Hamzeh Hadad

The cycle of escalation between Israel and Iran seems to have entered a cooling period as the two sides assess how US president-elect Donald Trump will approach the Middle East when he takes office in January. But neither this pause nor the uneasy ceasefire in Lebanon will soothe nerves in Baghdad that Iraq could find itself drawn into the widening war in the region.

Before the US election, Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran’s possible next attack on Israel could be launched by Iraqi Shia armed factions allied with Iran – an outcome that would invite retaliatory strikes on Iraq. Baghdad has dismissed these claims, but drone attacks from Iraq have targeted Israel in recent weeks. Rising US-Iranian tensions could see these Iranian-allied paramilitary groups launch a violent campaign against Israel – a close US ally.

With the failure to secure a ceasefire in Gaza, Europeans need to remain focused on preventing the conflict from spreading further. Iraq’s government and Shia religious leaders have been fundamental in preventing Iraqi Shia armed groups from launching attacks against US and Israeli interests over the past year. Given the considerable resources European governments have spent stabilising Iraq after waves of violence over the past two decades, they now need to support Iraq’s leadership and religious figures as they safeguard the country from renewed conflict.

Trump can deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan — if he has the will

Joseph Bosco

Last week, the Brookings Institution held a security conference with Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command — the U.S. military arm charged with confronting the hostile rise of the People’s Republic of China.

Here he addressed the growing danger of conflict with China, warning, “Over the summer I saw the [largest] rehearsal and the most joint exercises from the People’s Republic of China that I had ever seen … over an entire career of being an observer.”

Paparo recounted that 2027 is now the date by which Xi Jinping has said the People’s Liberation Army must be ready to seize Taiwan, eight years earlier than China’s original target date of 2035. He said Beijing has made it “a war of necessity” rather than a “war of choice” because of the working of China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which declared that if Taiwan took too long to accept “peaceful” unification, China would be entitled to unify it by “non-peaceful means.” That enactment was China’s answer to America’s Taiwan Relations Act, which made Taiwan’s democratic security an official interest of the United States.

The U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity on whether it would defend Taiwan must finally be replaced by strategic clarity — that an attack on any U.S. asset or ally, even if less than “massive,” will be treated as the act of war it is and will bring down the full non-nuclear force of the U.S. military on China. There can be no question of incremental, tit-for-tat, “non-escalatory” targeting that would drain U.S. resources and will (and allow Beijing to re-arm and re-group). China must be made to understand the self-destructive stupidity and futility of starting a war with the United States.

It will soon fall on President-elect Trump to send that message to Beijing, and far more effectively than President Biden has. On four different occasions, he told journalists that the U.S. would use military force to defend Taiwan, only to have White House and State Department officials walk back the remarks. Presumably, Marco Rubio as secretary of State and Mike Waltz as national security adviser will ensure that a strong Trump message of resolve will be reinforced, not undermined, by the foreign policy establishment within the federal government, aided and abetted by business leaders more committed to corporate profits than America’s national security.

Trump’s Ukraine envoy has a plan to end the war that Putin may revel in

Nick Paton Walsh

In a single post, the president-elect told the world what the end of the Ukraine war might look like. And it is going to be a big diplomatic ask, to say the least.

“I am very pleased to nominate General Keith Kellogg to serve as Assistant to the President and Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social channel. “Together, we will secure PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH, and Make America, and the World, SAFE AGAIN!”

By appointing Keith Kellogg as his special envoy to Ukraine, Donald Trump has also chosen a very specific, pre-announced plan for the thorniest foreign policy issue on his plate.

Kellogg, Trump’s 80-year-old former national security advisor, has laid out his peace plan in some detail, writing for the America First policy institute in April.

It begins calling the war “an avoidable crisis that, due to the Biden Administration’s incompetent policies… has entangled America in an endless war.”

In short, a ceasefire will freeze the frontlines and both sides will be forced to the negotiating table. But it is in the longer details where it all gets complex.

Changing the US’ involvement

Kellogg spends most time berating Biden’s actions - saying that his administration gave too little lethal aid too late. He says Trump’s decision to give the first lethal aid to Ukraine in 2018 conveyed the strength needed to confront Putin, and that Trump’s soft approach to the Kremlin head - not demonizing him like Biden has - will enable him to strike a deal.

Kellogg says more weapons should have been given before the Russian invasion, and immediately afterwards, to enable Ukraine to win.

The Myth of Peace: Imperialism and Control of Occupied Lands from Ukraine to Gaza

Siamak Naficy

Warfare is often viewed through a Eurocentric lens, framing conflicts as binary events—war or peace—that oversimplify global realities. Rooted in European concepts (e.g., Westphalian sovereignty, nation-states, formal declarations of war), this view assumes war is a temporary rupture in an otherwise peaceful status quo, followed by negotiations and treaties. However, conflicts from Ukraine to Gaza demonstrate that traditional notions of war fail to capture the continuous, structural violence experienced in regions where force is a routine tool of dominance.

The annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and Israel’s internationally recognized illegal occupation of Palestinian territories challenge traditional notions of war. These regions remain in perpetual insecurity, blurring the lines between war and peace. By studying such “irregular wars” on the global periphery, we can move beyond this binary framework and see war as a permanent condition, tied to imperial legacies.

Imperialism shapes not only borders and governments but also leaves behind structures of exploitation and inequality that fuel ongoing violence. Rethinking conflict this way allows for more meaningful peacebuilding, addressing the root causes of violence in both historical and modern contexts.

Consider, for instance, Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Many Western analyses viewed this as the start of a new phase of conflict, marking a deviation from the prior “peace” in the region. However, this perspective overlooks the long-standing historical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, which have roots in imperial control, cultural suppression, and Soviet-era policies that destabilized Ukrainian sovereignty. The annexation itself was presented by Russia as a “reunification” rather than an act of war, reflecting a different understanding of conflict that sees war and peace as more fluid concepts. This continuous assertion of Russian dominance over Ukraine, not just through overt military aggression but through economic coercion, political subversion, and disinformation campaigns, blurs the traditional boundaries between war and peace.

Israel building new military dividing line across Gaza, satellite images suggest

Benedict Garman, Nick Eardley & Matt Murphy

Israel is creating a new military dividing line in Gaza, separating off the far north of the strip, satellite images studied by BBC Verify appear to show.

Troops are in control of, and are clearing, an area across the width of north Gaza. Satellite images and videos show that hundreds of buildings have been demolished between the Mediterranean Sea and the Israel border, mostly through controlled explosions.

Images also show Israeli troops and vehicles have been stationed across the new divide. Analysts said the images suggest Gaza is being split into zones to make it easier to control.

An IDF spokesperson told the BBC it was "targeting terrorist operatives and infrastructure" in north Gaza.

Dr H A Hellyer, a Middle East security expert from the Rusi think tank, said the satellite images suggested Israel was preparing to block Palestinian civilians from returning to the north Gaza governorate. More than 100,000 people have already been displaced from the far north of Gaza, according to the UN.

Images appear to show two long sections of road on either end of the strip being connected by cleared land through an urban area. Buildings are being demolished between the two sections of road, with a clear pattern visible since early October.

This partition stretches about 5.6 miles (9km) across Gaza, from east to west, dividing Gaza City and the towns of Jabalia, Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia in north Gaza.

The BBC has been told that there is a tactical route between Jabalia and Gaza City, which is part of operational activities targeting Hamas in Jabalia.

Israel’s Trump Delusion

Shalom Lipner

Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election could not have come at a better time for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. More than 13 months since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attack, Israel finds itself on a roll. Since the beginning of the year, Israel has assassinated much of the senior leadership of both Hamas and Hezbollah, decimated their ranks, and conducted precision strikes in Iran. At home, after seeing his approval rating hit rock bottom following October 7, Netanyahu has watched his popularity start to rebound.

Now Netanyahu and his government see a rare opportunity for a comprehensive realignment of the Middle East. Resisting calls for a truce, Netanyahu—with potent stimulus from his extreme right flank—is pledging to double down on his pursuit of “total victory,” however long that might take. In addition to continuing the Gaza war and laying the groundwork for a protracted Israeli security presence in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, this narrative involves imposing a new order on Lebanon; neutralizing Iran’s proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; and ultimately, eliminating the Islamic Republic’s nuclear threat. Some members of Netanyahu’s governing coalition also aspire to bury the prospects of a two-state solution forever. At the same time, Netanyahu thinks that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries will eventually agree to normalization with Israel. And with Trump returning to the White House, the prime minister is confident that the United States will support him.

This scheme is seductive and even carries a certain logic: after all, Trump is viewed in Jerusalem as a staunch patron of Israel who is far less concerned about international norms and institutions—and the need for restraint—than his Democratic predecessor. Moreover, the president-elect has already telegraphed plans to resume his “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran and prioritize the expansion of the Abraham Accords.

Shaking Off the Shackles of Sovereign Debt

Martín Abregú, Crystal Simeoni, and Ndongo Samba Sylla

Four out of ten people in the world live in a country that spends more money servicing the interest on its sovereign debts than it does on education or health care. Such figures may feel abstract to creditors, which are primarily wealthy countries, multilateral banks, and large bondholders, but they could not be more consequential to debt-burdened countries. Every dollar spent repaying sovereign debt is a dollar that could have been spent on public services—building roads, fixing schools, climate-proofing infrastructure, paying doctors and civil servants. It’s in this way that repayment schemes, many of them predatory, help keep

A New Arms Race In Europe: Euromissiles 2.0 – Analysis

Aaron Stein

(FPRI) — Last week, Russia simulated a nuclear strike in Europe with a purpose-built missile designed to carry multiple nuclear or conventional warheads. The missile, which Russia has dubbed ‘Oreshnik’, is the latest Russian missile designed to strike targets in Europe. The missile is a purported variant of the RS-26, which was built using the first stage booster from the RS-24, a road-mobile missile designed to strike targets in the United States.

The RS-26 was never deployed when first tested in 2011. However, the missile’s use in combat is clearly now intended to signal to Europe that Russia has a credible delivery system for intermediate-range nuclear strikes. This is part of an effort to make Russia’s nuclear threats more credible and forebodes continued tensions in Europe. The backdrop to these developments is the collapse of Russo-Western relations. This downturn stems from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has destabilized Europe and forced European countries to prepare once again for the prospect of regional conflict.

These tensions have had a clear impact on missile proliferation in the region. The roots of missile proliferation date back to the turn of the 21st century, the gradual demise of the arms control agreements, and the upending of European security following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The use of the Oreshnik/RS-26 is, I believe, intended to influence decision-making in European capitals about the future of European-Russian relations. This is a classic Russian strategy and broadly reminiscent of Moscow’s thinking about the deployment and development of the SS-20 missile. I believe that this approach to intra-European relations will fail and, along with the United States, Europe is destined for the vast expansion of conventionally armed, medium-range missiles, designed to strike with extreme accuracy.

This development forebodes continued instability in Europe, a future where arms control will be far more difficult than ever before to use to lessen tensions and suggests that the arms build-up that is now taking place will continue well into the future.

A SS-20 Clone: Renewed Capabilities and Faulty Assumptions

The Slow Demise of the British Military Has Begun

Stavros Atlamazoglou

The United Kingdom, the closest ally of the United States, is slashing its defense force with major cuts.

Last week, the British Ministry of Defense announced major cuts to its defense force. The cuts include dozens of helicopters and four major surface warships.

The cuts raise concerns about the capabilities of the British armed forces and their ability to assume a leading role in the defense of Europe in the event of a conflict with Russia.

Major Cuts Across the Pond

Although some of the defense cuts make sense in the sense of modernizing the force, the slashing of the Royal Navy’s two amphibious landing ships is concerning and will likely have a substantial effect on the British military’s amphibious warfare capabilities.

“So today, with full backing from our Service Chiefs, I can confirm that six outdated military capabilities will be taken out of service,” British Defence Secretary John Healey said in a statement. 

According to the estimates of the U.K. Ministry of Defense, the cuts will save as much as $190 million over the next two years and $630 million over five years. The plan is to keep the money within the budget and reallocate the funds to other purposes.

“In this Statement, I have laid a WMS to outline the details of my decommissioning decisions. These include HMS Northumberland, a frigate with structural damage that makes her simply uneconomical to repair. 46 Watchkeeper Mk1s, a fourteen-year-old Army drone that technology has overtaken. HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, landing ships both effectively retired by previous Ministers but superficially kept on the books for nine million pounds a year,” the British Minister of Defense said in a statement.

What Does the G20 Do?

Anshu Siripurapu, Noah Berman, and James McBride

The G20, formed in 1999, is a group of twenty of the world’s largest economies that meets regularly to coordinate global policy on trade, health, climate, and other issues.

Previous summits have addressed the COVID-19 pandemic, 2008 financial crisis, the Iranian nuclear program, and the Syrian civil war.

With the African Union joining as the newest member, the 2024 summit faces continued divisions over the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Introduction

The Group of Twenty (G20), originally a collection of twenty of the world’s largest economies, was conceived as a bloc that would bring together the most important industrialized and developing economies to discuss international economic and financial stability. Its annual summit, a gathering of G20 leaders that debuted in 2008, has evolved into a major forum for discussing economics as well as other pressing global issues. Bilateral meetings on the summit’s sidelines have occasionally led to major international agreements. And while one of the group’s most impressive achievements was its robust response to the 2008 financial crisis, its cohesion has since frayed, and analysts have criticized its lackluster response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Tensions within the group have continued to grow as high- and low-income countries have increasingly diverged on major issues such as climate change, economic development, and the ongoing fallout from the war in Ukraine. The 2023 summit saw the entrance of the African Union (AU) as the group’s newest member, and at the 2024 summit in Rio de Janeiro, host Brazil is seeking to further strengthen the influence of the Global South in world affairs.

How Biden Can Salvage Middle East Peace—and His Legacy

Jonah Blank

When U.S. President Joe Biden leaves office in January, the already faint prospect of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may follow him out the door. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejects the very concept. Biden’s successor, President-elect Donald Trump, spent his first term actively promoting Netanyahu’s most expansionist dreams. Biden has so far failed to achieve his highest goals for the Middle East—but in his final days he can single-handedly reset the Israeli-Palestinian equation, preserve the potential for a two-state solution, and rescue much of his tarnished legacy. His status as a lame duck paradoxically gives him the power to do things possible only for a leader whose next step is retirement.

Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the only moments when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seemed potentially solvable have been times when the United States has taken charge. And domestic politics have always limited the amount of pressure any American president can apply. Biden now has an opportunity that none of his predecessors had: he has been relieved of all domestic political constraints at a moment when U.S. pressure is clearly needed. Each of his predecessors has had a lame duck period, but none have coincided with such a decisive moment in the conflict.

The status quo suits nobody. Palestinians are the most obvious victims. In the past year, Israeli forces have killed over 40,000 people in Gaza, as well as around 700 in the West Bank (where Hamas is not in control). Israel is ensnared in a trap of its own making: it cannot retain its identity as both a democracy and a constitutionally Jewish state while maintaining an occupation through which it rules over five million Palestinians who are not citizens of Israel. The United States, by providing diplomatic cover for an occupation that most of the world considers illegal—and by providing the weaponry on which this occupation relies—has torpedoed its credibility, limiting its ability to champion international law and criticize bad actors such as China, Iran, and Russia. Something must give.

Space Force looks to bulk up against anti-satellite weapons

Brad Dress

The 5-year-old U.S. Space Force is moving quickly to confront what is becoming its priority challenge: the threat of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) from foreign adversaries, including Russia and China.

The Space Force is building up its space defense architecture to help modernize the Space Surveillance Network (SSN), which monitors objects and potential threats in space. It comes as the military branch has struggled to close gaps in space domain awareness.

Officials are also exploring a myriad of other ways to improve detection and defenses, including launching hundreds of military satellites into low-Earth orbit, all part of an effort to get the Space Force ready by 2026 for a more contested environment above Earth. The U.S. has warned that Moscow is even developing a nuclear ASAT.

Charles Galbreath, a senior resident fellow for space studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said the American public should “understand what’s at stake if we go to conflict and an adversary starts attacking our space capabilities.”

“It’s not just going to be impacting the lives of our military members. It’s going to be impacting the lives of all of our citizens and people around the world,” he said. “There’s so much riding on protecting those space capabilities and the way of life that they enable.”

Lt. Gen. Philip Garrant, commander of Space Systems Command, which is focused on acquiring new weapons systems at the Space Force, said earlier this year the efforts across the military branch are a “call to action.”

“The idea is a big sense of urgency. The adversary isn’t stopping,” he said at a May event. “We need to be prepared and we need to make sure the [defense systems] we have we can use.”

Building America’s AI Arsenal

Ben Van Roo

Building America’s AI Arsenal: The Case for a National Computing Reserve

A Category 5 hurricane barrels toward the Gulf Coast. Unlike Helene and Milton, this time AI leads our response.

Within hours, it precisely predicts the storm's path, identifies vulnerable areas, and optimizes evacuation routes. Emergency responders are deployed with unprecedented efficiency. Lives are saved. Damage is minimized. This isn't just better disaster management—it's a revolution in saving lives.

On today's battlefield, commanders need AI-powered tools to process vast amounts of data and make split-second decisions. From processing sensor data to coordinating multi-domain operations, military leaders require unprecedented computing power at the tactical edge.

But to make this vision a reality, we need to act now. Three years ago, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy proposed a National Strategic Computing Reserve—a coalition ready to contribute massive computational power in times of national need. It was a good idea then. Today, it's an urgent necessity.

Why? Because in those three years, our need for compute power—the raw processing capability that drives our digital world—has exploded. AI has evolved at a blistering pace, turning once-futuristic capabilities like real-time language translation and complex strategic decision-making into everyday realities.

The numbers are staggering. Since 2018, the computational requirements for training large language models have doubled every six months. By 2023, the largest AI training runs were using over a million times more compute than a decade ago. And that's just for training. Running these models across countless real-time applications pushes demand even higher, straining our computational infrastructure to its limits.

Makers of Modern Strategy with Hal Brands

Hal Brands | Jordan Schneider | Lily Ottinger

Few books have influenced me as much as the Makers of Modern Strategy series. The three volumes (published in 1942, 1986, and 2023) are indispensable to understanding statecraft, leadership, and the evolution of warfare across millennia.

The New Makers of Modern Strategy (2023) is a thousand pages long and analyzes strategy from ancient Greece to the Congo.

The man behind this behemoth collection is Hal Brands, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a returning ChinaTalk guest.

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