1 December 2024

India-Kazakhstan Cooperation in Critical Minerals Signals a Shifting Regional Approach

Araudra Singh

The critical minerals sector has attracted significant global attention, including from New Delhi and Astana. On November 4, India and Kazakhstan partnered to produce titanium slag, a critical mineral. Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) and Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium and Magnesium Plant (UKTMP) have signed an agreement to establish an Indo-Kazakh joint venture company (JVC), IREUK Titanium Limited, which is set to process low-grade Ilmenite reserves in Odisha into high-grade titanium feedstock. UKTMP, besides providing the technology and capital investment, would also offtake agreed quantities of titanium.

This initiative aims to develop the titanium value chain within India. According to the official press release, the arrangement “shall be instrumental in bringing valuable forex for [India] and aid UKTMP JSC in raw material security.” Synergizing the strengths of both sides, the joint venture is expected to enhance the brand equity of both companies while serving as a hub for India and Kazakhstan in the titanium value chain, aligning with the broader strategic objectives of both sides in securing critical mineral supply chains.

The new India-Kazakhstan titanium deal reflects three important aspects. First, the agreement represents a positive yet incremental development in India’s long-term goal of developing a critical minerals supply chain and a way to compensate for previous lapses. India’s attempts to auction off mining rights for critical minerals have received lackluster responses in the past. Given the costly extraction process, Indian investors have been reluctant to invest due to the outdated official resource classification rules, which lack the necessary information on the economic viability of mining a block. The Ministry of Mines (MOM), having failed to receive a minimum of three required domestic bidders on multiple occasions, has had to scrap the auctioned mineral blocks. In the third tranche of auctions, for example, MOM annulled three out of the total seven auctioned blocks – including the one containing titanium.

Trump’s Return Is an Opportunity for India

ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN

NEW DELHI – It might be tempting to assume that Donald Trump’s return to the White House augurs stability in US-India relations. After all, there is strong bipartisan support in Washington for deeper ties, particularly as a counterbalance to China’s growing economic and geopolitical influence.

To be sure, the strategic partnership between the United States and India offers several mutual benefits. Unlike other partners, India is not seeking US financial or military aid. And beyond their personal rapport, there is also a clear ideological alignment between Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) agenda and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalism.

Despite this, Trump’s second term could pose significant risks to the bilateral relationship, owing to two Indian vulnerabilities. First, although Trump’s transactional approach to politics makes him unpredictable, his support for using tariffs to reduce America’s trade deficit has been steadfast. His recent pledge to impose a 25% tariff on all products coming into the US from Canada and Mexico, as well as an additional 10% tariff on all Chinese imports, is a prime example.

This spells trouble for India, which maintains some of the world’s highest tariffs and has a growing trade surplus with the US (nearly $46 billion in 2022). Trump’s trade czar, Robert Lighthizer, has already labeled India the world’s “most protectionist” country, suggesting that heightened trade tensions are all but inevitable.

Yunus’ remarks on Hindu attacks 'undermine' the crisis: Bangladesh ex-foreign minister

TOI World Desk

Former Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Hasan Mahmud criticized Muhammad Yunus, the country's chief advisor, for his remark that the issue of attack on Hindu minority community in Bangladesh is "overhyped". Mahmud said that Yunus' claims is downplaying the gravity of the situation and ignoring the increasing violence against Hindus.

In an interview with PTI in September, Muhammad Yunus claimed that the issue of attacks on Hindu minorities in Bangladesh is "overhyped," stating that these attacks are more political than communal, arising from the perception that most Hindus supported the now-deposed Awami League regime.

Mahmud strongly refuted Muhammad Yunus' claim, saying:"The issue is not a matter of political perception, but a real and growing threat to the safety and security of religious minorities," adding that such comments downplay the gravity of the situation and ignore the increasing violence against Hindus.

Mahmud added that Bangladesh is in “total anarchy” due to the interim government’s policies. He accused the government, led by Yunus, of allowing “mobocracy” to replace democracy and fueling anti-India sentiment, emboldening fundamentalists and terrorist groups. Mahmud fled Bangladesh after recent student protests. He gave a phone interview to PTI from an undisclosed location.

Myanmar: Wa Rebels Reject Thai Demand To Withdraw From Bases Along Shared Border


Ethnic rebels in eastern Myanmar’s Shan state on Tuesday dismissed calls by the Royal Thai Army to withdraw from nine military camps along a disputed portion of the border with Thailand, suggesting Bangkok take the issue up with the ruling junta.

The United Wa State Army, which controls an autonomous region of Shan state, has designated the townships of Tachileik, Mongsat, Mongton, Hway Aw and Pong Par Kyin — near Thailand’s Mae Hong Son province — as part of its “171 Military Region.”

Leaders of the Wa army, or UWSA, met with officers from the Thai Royal Army in Chiang Mai, Thailand from Nov. 18-19 to discuss tensions along the border, after which Thai authorities demanded that the rebels withdraw from the nine military outposts by Dec. 19, according to Thai media reports.

On Tuesday, the UWSA responded to the demand, saying troops withdrawals must be decided as part of official bilateral talks.

“This is a matter of negotiation for the two governments,” said UWSA liaison officer Nyi Rang, referring the issue to Myanmar’s ruling junta, which seized power in a February 2021 military coup d’etat.

UWSA officials said tensions between its forces and the Thai military are highest along the border with Shan’s Mongton and Mong Hsat townships.

Beginning Monday, the Royal Thai Army has been reinforcing its troops in the area, further stoking the border spat, a resident named Aung Kyaw told RFA Burmese.

“At present, no clashes have occurred, but troops on both sides remain in a standoff,” he said. “It is hoped that conflict can be avoided to prevent any loss of life or property. The situation should be resolved peacefully.”

Aung Kyaw said that residents of the area are concerned by military preparations on both sides of the border.

China’s aircraft carriers begin to spread their wings


China has achieved milestones recently in developing aircraft-carrier operations and has been parading some notable capabilities. However, what they represent and exactly what the trajectory of China’s carrier force will be remains uncertain.

In October 2024, China brought together at sea for the first time its two operational aircraft carriers, the Liaoning (Type 001) and Shandong (Type 002), for ‘dual-carrier’ manoeuvres with their accompanying escort groups. Their embarked air groups also reflected a growing capability. Beijing’s latest and potentially most-capable carrier, the Fujian (Type 003), has also undertaken successive sea trials, the first of which began on 1 May 2024. Yet, notwithstanding the choreography of recent developments, questions remain over the future trajectory and operational effectiveness of China’s carrier force.

All at seaThe People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) bringing together its first two operational carriers at sea, accompanied by escorts such as three Type-055 cruisers, a number of Type-052D destroyers and the two Type-901 large auxiliaries, marked a moment of at least symbolic significance. The imagery of the gathering alone sent a message about Beijing’s regional power-projection ambition. Whether by coincidence or not, this is often how the United States Navy parades its ability to bring multiple carriers together, including, on occasion, with allies and partners.

What is unclear is the extent to which, beyond a photo opportunity, this represents an actual capacity to conduct complex multi-carrier operations. The US Navy has far greater experience honed over decades, at a higher level of capability centred on a large force of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, now being joined by the new-design Gerald R. Ford-class of vessels. Nevertheless, the PLAN’s incremental development of its carrier operations for now more than a decade shows China’s clear intent to evolve such a capability.

The air groups on board the carriers also appeared to include the new catapult-capable Shenyang J-15T combat aircraft and the J-15D electronic-warfare variant. The J-15T and the J-15D were on display also at the recent Zhuhai Airshow, along with China’s second low-observable combat-aircraft design, the Shenyang J-35, which appears destined for both the navy and the air force.

When Maritime and Continental Powers Collide: A Historical Framework for US Asymmetric Competition with China

Matthew Sansone

Alternate visions grappling for supremacy over the structures and norms of global politics and power is at the very center of strategic competition. In this struggle, comprehensive national power across all dimensions of diplomacy, information, military, and economic might, often below the threshold of armed conflict, are means to the broader end of national prestige and supremacy on the world stage. From Athens and Sparta to the United States and the Soviet Union, history is replete with competitions over the balance of power and the assertion of the dominant state’s values, norms, and power.

History may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes, and modern competition has similar rhythmic tones to the past. Competition has historically played out most dramatically between maritime and continental powers, each party wielding strengths and mitigating vulnerabilities as it seeks to impose an international order that serves its interests. The dynamic interplay of maritime and continental powers occurs because of a fundamental difference in national statecraft and prioritization.

Continental powers emphasize territorial control, overland trade routes, and maintaining security through land-based military capabilities. They prefer to focus on immediate border threats and influencing the affairs of neighboring states to maintain border or territorial security. Continental powers traditionally utilize territorial conquest or overland trade to address national resource constraints. Historical continental powers include states such as Sparta, Rome, dynastic China, the Mongol Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg monarchy, Napoleonic France, and Imperial Russia and Germany. Although these states would acquire and often utilize naval forces, their primary imperative was territorial expansion for state security, creating a centralized economy, and a unified national culture. These priorities would often lead continental powers to govern through centralized governance to maintain territorial security and political rule.

Defeating Hezbollah Inside Lebanon Is Only Half the Battle

Michael Rubin

Israel continues to battle Hezbollah, with diplomatic efforts for a ceasefire scuttled by the travel freeze that International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim Khan imposed on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

While the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) tries to uproot Hezbollah infrastructure and eradicate missiles acquired or tunnels dug under the watchful eyes of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), it has made significant progress. With the deaths of much of Hezbollah’s leadership, many in spectacular ways, the group’s bluster is gone or empty.

Certainly, Israeli leaders can celebrate Hezbollah’s demise in Lebanon and the United States, France, and United Nations can seek to negotiate Hezbollah’s disarmament inside Lebanon to put Lebanon into compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, but that alone addresses only half the Hezbollah problem.

Lebanon’s greatest export has always been its people. Historically, the country’s Shi’ite community was largely feudal. Shi’ites were subsistence farmers with little hope for political power or advancement. In The Innocents Abroad, American writer Mark Twain described his 1867 travels through Lebanon to Palestine; the Shi’ites whom he surely saw did not merit his inclusion. With little prospect for upward mobility, many Shi’ites emigrated to engage in business and trade, especially elsewhere in the Middle East, Africa, and South America. Today, the Lebanese diaspora population just in Brazil and Argentina is equal to Lebanon’s population. Not all Lebanese emigrants were Shi’ite, of course, but they were disproportionately so.

Into the mid-twentieth century, the lack of domestic prospects led Shi’ites who remained in Lebanon to embrace either Marxism or Arab nationalism. As the late historian Fouad Ajami explained in The Vanished Imam, Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935-2010) sought to channel Shi’ite identity and discord into Shi’ism. He became the spiritual leader of Hezbollah. His influence extended past Lebanon, however, to the Shi’ite communities abroad. As the Washington Institute’s Michael Eisenstadt and Kendall Bianchi showed, family permeates Hezbollah inside Lebanon. The same dynamics affect with the Lebanese community abroad. Many have close ties to those who remained inside Lebanon. As Hezbollah’s tentacles grew through the 1980s and 1990s, the Lebanese diaspora became an important component of Hezbollah’s broader network.

Soft Power and the US Nuclear Umbrella

Daniel O'Connor 

As China increases its nuclear capacity and Russia continues to maintain ambiguity in relation to the possible employment of their nuclear arsenal, it becomes difficult to view nuclear weapons as tools of diplomacy rather than those of war. Nuclear weapons can rightly be viewed as the hardest element of hard power for any nation, but holding this view to the exclusion of all others is shortsighted. For sure, nuclear threats can hold populations, infrastructure, and even entire governments at risk – a fact long recognized by nuclear theorists. Those same nuclear theorists, from Brodie to Kahn, have tended to think in primarily realist terms. This view is not necessarily false, but it is incomplete. The world today is intertwined by worldwide information and economic networks. This makes nuclear weapons far from simply a bilateral issue. They are rather a complex network of relationships, competing goals, and sought outcomes.

But while the preceding makes a strong case for the superiority of hard power, this view completely ignores the important role of soft power and the various benefits it bestows on a nation seeking to convince others to emulate their example. This article seeks to make the argument that while nuclear weapons are a frightening specter and certainly an instrument of hard power, the way they are used by the United States currently forms the foundation of a strong source of soft power that works in concert with other American soft power sources. This soft power is a powerful tool that aids in the attainment of US strategic goals; most notably, deterring adversaries from aggression. This article further takes aim at the current theoretical paradigm for deterrence and culminates by proposing a more complete method for considering deterrence.


Trump’s Trade Wars Are Already Starting

Keith Johnson

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has already waded into his future trade wars before taking office. His proposal of a steep import tax on all products from the country’s top trade partners gives a preview of exactly how his zero-sum approach to economics could quickly become zero-benefit for businesses and consumers.

Trump, who vowed during his campaign to slap tariffs on everything that moved, said on Nov. 25 that he would, on his first day in office, put a 25 percent duty on all imports from Canada and Mexico—the United States’ two biggest trade partners, all bound together by a trilateral, tariff-free trade deal that Trump himself wrote. For good measure, Trump also threatened a 10 percent tax on all imports from China. His demand was for those countries to take immediate steps to curtail U.S.-bound deliveries of drugs and migrants.

The Pitfalls for Europe of a Trump-Putin Deal on Ukraine

Fredrik Wesslau

The real risk is not the prospect of a Trump-Putin deal struck above the heads of Ukrainians and Europeans. It is, rather, that Putin will use Trump’s desire for a deal to extract concessions from the United States, split the West, and undermine Western support for Ukraine. This would make it easier for Russia to subjugate and take political control of Ukraine; rearm and recover with the strength of the Ukrainian economy and population; and prepare for the next attack on a European country. What’s left of Western alliances and the European security order would be permanently destroyed.

New US Drones Tested on Ukraine Frontline Hailed as 'Game Changer'

Billal Rahman

New advanced U.S. drone systems have been hailed as "game changers" after being successfully tested on the front lines of the war in Ukraine.

Developed by two leading American tech companies, the revolutionary counter-drone technology has shown impressive potential to take down drone threats in real-life combat situations and boost battlefield intelligence.

Russia and Ukraine have both relied on drones to track enemy movements, guide weapons, and execute strikes since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022.

Ukrainian servicemen of the 22nd Brigade launch a Leleka reconnaissance UAV drone near Chasiv Yar, Donetsk region, on April 27, 2024, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. New advanced U.S. drone systems have been hailed... More Photo by Genya Savilov/AFP via Getty Images

IronNet, the AI-based collective defense cybersecurity company, and Asterion Systems, a leader in counter-unmanned air system (UAS) technology, have collaborated to create a defense system capable of protecting entire countries.

The defensive network is formed by combining IronNet's Iron Dome cybersecurity system, which provides real-time detection of cyber threats, with Asterion's Hitchhiker counter-drone technology. The system is designed to neutralize hostile drones."

Mystery drones fly over US Air Force bases

Will Musk’s ‘Algorithm’ reduce military inefficiency—or increase risk?

TODD HARRISON

Following through on a campaign promise, president-elect Donald Trump recently appointed Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy to co-lead an effort they are calling the Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE. While it is not actually a government department, the entity is likely to prove influential within the Trump administration and the Republican-led Congress—at least initially. Its mandate is to cut federal spending, and Musk and Ramaswamy have made clear that the Pentagon is in their sights. “The Pentagon recently failed its seventh consecutive audit,” the co-leaders wrote in a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed, “suggesting that the agency’s leadership has little idea how its annual budget of more than $800 billion is spent.”

Previous DoD efficiency initiatives have tried, and largely failed, to trim spending. This time will be different, one could argue, because Elon Musk is involved. He has done things in industry, such as revolutionizing space launch and electric vehicles, that many thought were impossible. To achieve these unlikely feats, Musk developed a ruthless approach that he calls “The Algorithm.” As recounted in Walter Isaacson’s biography, the Algorithm consists of five sequential steps: 1) question every requirement; 2) delete any part or process you can; 3) simplify and optimize; 4) accelerate cycle time; 5) automate. As Musk tries his hand at public policy, can this approach work?

Musk’s Algorithm has largely, and perhaps exclusively, been applied to high-technology and manufacturing-intensive sectors of industry. While the arm of DOD that develops and procures weapons fits this mold, acquisition consumes only about one-third of the defense budget in any given year. The other two-thirds of the budget go toward labor (military and civilian employees) and operations (training, military exercises, routine peacetime operations, housing, and military construction).

Assessing Hezbollah’s Intelligence Failure

Nadav Pollak

It started with the famous “pagers attack” on Sept. 17, which injured thousands of Hezbollah fighters. Then came the walkie-talkie attack on Sept. 18, which also inflicted significant damage. Two days later, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) took out Ibrahim Aqil, the head of Hezbollah’s operations unit, along with the entire command of the Radwan unit, which was planning to conduct another Oct. 7-like attack against Israel. A few days later, on Sept. 23, Israel bombed more than a thousand military targets belonging to Hezbollah. Later that week, the IDF took out the commander of Hezbollah’s strategic missile units, Ibrahim Muhammad Qubaisi, and the head of Hezbollah’s drone unit, Muhammad Hussein Srur—both top-level commanders in Hezbollah’s ranks.

Then, on Sept. 27, came the attack that shocked the region: The Israeli air force bombed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s bunker, killing him and other senior Hezbollah and Iranian commanders.

For many longtime Hezbollah researchers and analysts, the speed and destruction of these strikes was a remarkable surprise. For years, Hezbollah has had a reputation for both its immense power relative to other terrorist groups—primarily through its large arsenal of rockets and missiles and tens of thousands of trained fighters—and its tight operational security standards, which made it difficult for Israel to target these strengths.

Hezbollah has experienced something very similar to what Israel experienced on Oct. 7—a devastating intelligence failure. Hezbollah, which for years thought it understood Israeli officials’ decision-making and operational conduct, not only missed key signals that indicated Israel had changed profoundly after the Oct. 7 attack but also failed to see that Israel’s leadership was willing to take risks it was not willing to take in the past. Israel’s adversaries would do well to update their assessment of Israeli strategy and its new tolerance for escalation. Hezbollah paid a high cost for not understanding that Israel was no longer deterred by its arsenal; Iran could make the same mistake.

The Democrats’ Only Option

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ

Although a variety of factors seem to have contributed to Donald Trump’s victory in this year’s US presidential election, the message for the defeated Democrats is clear. The party must abandon neoliberalism and return to its progressive roots in the presidencies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson.

NEW YORK – As the shock of Donald Trump’s victory sinks in, pundits and politicians are mulling what it means for the future of the United States and global politics. Understanding why such a divisive, unqualified figure won again is crucial for the Democrats. Did they go too far left and lose the moderate Americans who make up a majority? Or did centrist neoliberalism – pursued by Democratic presidents since Bill Clinton – fail to deliver, thus creating a demand for change?

The New Futurism: What A Meloni-Musk Alliance Could Mean For Europe – OpEd

Arturo Varvelli

Last week, Elon Musk got a slap on the wrist from Italian president Sergio Mattarella, after he backed Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni’s policy of detaining foreign migrants in Albania. Musk had said certain Italian judges “need[ed] to go” because they questioned the legality of the detainment policy. The US-based entrepreneur’s support for Meloni has been growing since he attended her annual party in Rome last year. In September, Musk awarded Meloni with the Atlantic Council’s Global Citizen award in New York, reaffirming their mutual esteem.

In turn, Musk has become a cultural reference point for the Italian right, particularly under Meloni’s leadership. For years, Italian conservatives have struggled to find intellectual and cultural touchstones to match the influence of left-wing thinkers and movements. Musk provides them with a figure who embodies a new kind of “cultural futurism”. His embrace of technology, space exploration, and unfettered free speech offers the Italian right an intellectual sheen they have long sought.
An icon for the Italian right

In some ways, Musk echoes Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, the early 20th-century Italian poet and founder of the Futurist social movement. Both figures managed to capture the imagination of their respective eras with bold visions of technological progress and societal disruption. Marinetti’s Futurism was a rallying cry for speed, innovation, and a break with the past – ideals that aligned closely with the early Fascist movement’s desire for radical transformation. Similarly, Musk’s ventures in electric cars, space exploration, and social media have positioned him as the new standard-bearer of technological progress, appealing to those who see the future as a realm of limitless potential. Just as Marinetti’s Futurism provided the early Fascists with a cultural framework for their revolutionary zeal, Musk’s hyper-technological vision offers Meloni and her allies a blueprint for their own aspirations.

Musk could be both a liability and an asset for the Italian far-right. On the one hand, his focus on innovation could help drive European technological sovereignty. His electric car company, Tesla, is in talks with Rome about substantial investments in Italy, particularly in energy and automotive technology, which align with Meloni’s focus on boosting the country’s industrial base. On the other hand, his unpredictable nature could introduce instability, especially since his views diverge from mainstream European policies.

It’s Time For The US To Bid Farewell To NATO – OpEd

Alexander Coward

In April 1949, as Cold War tensions between the United States and Soviet Union intensified, 12 nations came together to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, giving birth to NATO. The alliance was formed with a clear purpose: to provide collective defense against the looming threat of Soviet expansion. At that time, Europe was still reeling from the devastation of World War II, its economies in shambles and its militaries depleted. The US, triumphant in victory and solidifying its position as a global superpower, took on the mantle of protector, extending its military might across the Atlantic and halfway across Europe.

Fast forward 75 years. The world has changed dramatically, yet NATO persists as a relic of a bygone era. The Soviet Union is no more, replaced by a Russia with a GDP smaller than Italy’s. The European Union, along with the United Kingdom, boasts a combined economy nearly ten times the size of Russia’s. France and the UK possess their own nuclear deterrents. Yet, inexplicably, US taxpayers continue to foot the bill for Europe’s defense.
With Russia weakened, Europe is getting a free ride

Some argue that Russia’s actions in recent years, particularly its invasion of Ukraine, justify the US’s continued NATO membership. They paint a picture of a resurgent Russian threat, echoing the Cold War narratives of the past. But this comparison falls flat when we examine the facts.

During the Cold War, the US faced off against an empire of comparable might. The Soviet Union’s military and economic power posed a genuine threat to both Western Europe and US interests. Today’s Russia, however, is a shadow of its former self. With a GDP of about $2 trillion, it pales in comparison to the combined economic might of the EU and the UK, which totals more than $22 trillion.


Moreover, the population demographics tell a similar story. Russia’s population is less than 150 million, dwarfed by that of the EU and UK totaling more than 500 million. The combined military spending of the EU and UK stands at $370 billion, far outstripping Russia’s total defense budget of $130 billion. Yet, despite these advantages, Europe continues to rely on the United States for its security.

Europe’s missile renaissance


Russia’s use of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles against Ukraine has prompted a renaissance among some European countries to reacquire analogous capabilities. But political, technical and budgetary challenges need to be overcome for this aspiration to be viable.

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated European NATO members’ interest in modernising and strengthening their armed forces after nearly three decades of underinvestment. Among the many capabilities being sought, some countries have stated their interest in acquiring long-range, ground-launched conventional missiles through a joint effort known as the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA). This marks the renaissance of a capability that has mostly been absent from the arsenals of European countries since the 1990s. While ELSA has the potential to provide deterrence benefits for European states and improve NATO’s defence and deterrence posture, there are, however, several political, technical and budgetary challenges associated with a co-development that will need to be addressed if the project is to bear fruit.

Europe re-evaluates ground-launched missilesRussia’s large-scale use of ballistic and cruise missiles in its war against Ukraine has led some European countries to re-evaluate the benefits of possessing conventional long-range strike capabilities. One option is to buy from outside of the region, but another is to either manufacture indigenously or in partnership. The latter approach informs the ELSA project. France, Germany, Italy and Poland launched ELSA in July 2024 with the intention to develop a sovereign capability to improve ‘the defence of Europe and to strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base’ and to contribute to ‘strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, for better sharing of the burden between Allies’.

Russia’s hybrid war in Europe enters a dangerous new phase


Russia is intensifying its hybrid war in Europe, mounting more frequent operations with a constantly shifting front line. But despite Western governments’ increasingly vocal concerns over Russian activity, they have limited coordinated means to defend against it.

The damage to two undersea cables in the Baltic Sea on 17–18 November is the latest instance of suspected sabotage. The Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3, allegedly with a Russian captain at the helm, passed the two cables at approximately the same time as each cable was cut. Danish authorities detained the ship but have yet to attribute the action to Moscow or Beijing. Concerns over the activity of the Yi Peng 3 in the Baltic Sea are well founded. Earlier this year, the deputy head of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command said that Russia and other malicious actors were targeting the extensive vulnerabilities of underwater cables and pipes that connect Europe’s energy and communications networks.
Hybrid war spreads across EuropeUndersea cables are not the only critical national infrastructure (CNI) to be targeted. Earlier in 2024, concerns about the proximity of a recently consecrated Russian Orthodox church built in Vรคsterรฅs, central Sweden, close to an airport and other critical national infrastructure led the Swedish Security Service to find that it was linked to Russian intelligence operations, concluding that the Kremlin uses the Russian Orthodox Church in Sweden as a platform for such activities. The airport is used for Swedish military exercises and is located near an electric power and district heating provider and a number of energy companies, including Westinghouse Electric Company, which provides nuclear fuel for Energoatom, a Ukrainian state enterprise that operates all four nuclear-power plants in the country.

The role of the Russian Orthodox Church in covert operational activity is one strand of the Kremlin’s growing hybrid war against European states that support Ukraine. In late October, Polish prosecutors announced the arrest of four individuals following an investigation into a fire caused by an exploding parcel at a courier firm near Warsaw. The fire is one of three similar incidents that took place in July and are under investigation by security and intelligence agencies in Poland, the United Kingdom and Germany. A second package caused a fire at a DHL warehouse in a suburb of Birmingham, while the third set fire to a container at the DHL hub in Leipzig, the world’s largest hub for air freight. The parcels, all sent from Lithuania, contained electric massage machines with a highly flammable magnesium-based substance inside and, according to Polish authorities, resembled a dress rehearsal for further operational activity.

Putin Isn't Bluffing: Intermediate-Range Hypersonic Missile 'Warning'

Anna Matveeva

Throwing caution aside, President Biden decided to use the transition period to raise the war stakes in Ukraine. He sanctioned the U.S. military contractors to deploy inside the country, authorized the U.S.-made ATACMS missiles to strike deep into Russia, and transferred anti-personnel mines to Ukraine. The last act is not illegal since the United States never signed the Ottawa Convention, although it is still morally dubious. Altogether, the desire to maximize the U.S. support to its ally is clear so that Ukraine can hold on beyond Biden’s time in the White House. More aid is expected.

Militarily, ATACMS and UK-produced Storm Shadows are unlikely to be game-changers for Ukraine. The Russian military is familiar with them from the battle they fought and likely has moved their valuable assets out of the range of fire. Ukraine does not have large missile stocks, and its priority lies in defending its territory rather than keeping a foothold in Russia’s Kursk indefinitely.

Moreover, if a navigation error makes a Western missile land on a Russian kindergarten, it will add to international reputation damage for the West.

What appears obvious is that Joe Biden is determined to leave as complicated a foreign policy legacy to his successor as possible and disrupt Donald Trump’s ambitions to bring peace between Russia and Ukraine. The impression is that Russia is being provoked into a reckless response, making peace negotiations with Putin far too difficult—even for Trump. The upcoming president’s approach to the conflict is not based on Russia’s defeat, but it may be unable to withstand serious escalation. This is what Trump reportedly warned Putin against doing.

‘Record’ Drone Barrage Pummels Ukraine as Missile Tensions Seethe


Russia launched a record 188 drones at Ukraine overnight, Kyiv said Tuesday, amid growing international tensions after Russia fired a nuclear-capable missile that could reach European cities.

The Kremlin declined on Tuesday to confirm that Ukrainian forces had again launched US-provided long-range ATACMS at Russia this week but blamed Washington for escalating the conflict nonetheless.

Moscow and Kyiv have been ratcheting up their drone and missile broadsides, with Ukraine recently firing US long-range missiles at Russia and the Kremlin retaliating with an experimental hypersonic missile.

The barrage came as ambassadors from Ukraine and NATO’s 32 members were due to meet in Brussels over Russia’s firing last week of the intermediate-range missile on the city of Dnipro.

“During the night attack, the enemy launched a record number of Shahed strike unmanned aerial vehicles and unidentified drones,” the air force said Tuesday, referring to Iranian-designed drones and putting the overall number fired at 188.

The air force said it had shot down 76 Russian drones in 17 regions, while another 95 were either lost from their radars or downed by electronic jamming defensive systems. It did not specify what happened to the remainder.

Moscow also fired four Iskander-M ballistic missiles, the air force said.

“Unfortunately, critical infrastructure facilities were hit, private and apartment buildings were damaged in several regions,” a statement said.

How Trump Can Win in Ukraine

Stephen Blank

Mario Cuomo famously observed that you campaign in poetry but govern in prose. There is no reason to suppose the incoming Trump Administration will be different in this respect. Events, personalities, and facts, as much, if not more than, rhetoric, will likely drive its policies. This observation pertains as much to Ukraine policy as to all other policy domains. So, despite his campaign rhetoric President Trump can succeed on Ukraine not by giving Russia a victory camouflaged by negotiations but rather by using American power to force Russia to negotiate with Ukraine or even to obtain a victory for Kyiv. Indeed, despite much commentary that Ukraine cannot win, in fact Russia’s domestic situation is considerably worse than is reported and Russian media reveals a deep and arguably growing elite discontent. Although Trump has said he could make peace between Russia and Ukraine in 24 hours; this is clearly an exaggeration. And while incoming Vice-President Vance stated that he does not care about Ukraine; an objective look at the facts, including those pertaining to Russian domestic factors, should convince him and President Trump to realize that they have it within their power to achieve a victory for the United States and thus themselves that increases their support by supporting Ukraine.

To do so they need to look at the current facts of the case not campaign rhetoric. Due to the insertion of north Korean troops and Russia’s dependence on North Korean artillery, Iranian drones and missiles, and Chinese exports of dual-use technology this war has assumed global reverberations. Therefore, whatever Washington does will have serious, even critical, ramifications for its Asian policies -- the likely priority of a Trump Administration – and Middle Eastern policies. For these reasons, Trump’s policy moves will go beyond affecting Ukrainian and European security. Indeed, this much is obvious. More importantly, the second consequence of Russia’s dependence on foreign governments is that it confers upon the United States an enormous opportunity to deploy, with its allies, its superior economic and military capability either to bring Russia to the table or more preferably, help Ukraine achieve victory. Victory for Ukraine entails restoration of its territorial integrity, and guarantees of its full sovereignty, including the right to join NATO and the EU, and, if possible, the institution of reparations and war crimes trials.

Why cyber doomsday warnings do more harm than good

Joyce Hakmeh

At the weekend, several UK media outlets reported that cabinet minister, Pat McFadden, would warn at a NATO cyber defence conference in London that ‘Putin is ready to cripple Britain with cyberattacks’. This sparked widespread reactions about the use of such cyber doom rhetoric, with many arguing that it does more harm than good, as such language can heighten fear unnecessarily and overshadow more tangible and current risks.

In his speech, McFadden did indeed highlight the real and significant risks posed by cyberattacks, noting that Russia could potentially ‘turn off the lights for millions’ by targeting critical infrastructure. However, his remarks were framed in the context of Ukraine’s ongoing struggle against Russian aggression – not an isolated warning about the UK. He referenced Russia’s cyberattacks on Ukraine’s electricity grid, airports, and other critical national infrastructure, discussing the broader cyber warfare being waged against Ukraine, including cyber espionage.

This rhetoric plays into the hands of adversaries like Russia, whose information operations seek to destabilize Western nations by projecting vulnerability and eroding trust in national infrastructure.

It is unclear whether McFadden changed his remarks in response to the criticism, or whether the media failed to capture his words accurately. But this confusion highlights an essential point: the need for precision in public discourse when discussing cyber threats. The way we frame and define these issues profoundly influences how we understand and respond to them. Our perceptions of threats, cyber or otherwise, shape the strategies and resources allocated to combat them.

Tackling Data Brokerage Threats to American National Security

Justin Sherman

They tracked phones traveling from U.S. military barracks in Germany to work buildings, Italian restaurants, grocery stores, and bars. They tracked 189 devices inside a high-security German military installation, as people walked around—and watched as four mobile devices from Ramstein Air Base, a U.S. Air Force installation in Germany, traveled to brothels off-base, including a place called SexWorld.

This specific story isn’t an operation by China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) or Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU)—it’s a joint effort by Wired, Bayerischer Rundfunk, and Netzpolitik.org showing just some of what can be done with more than 3 billion phone location pings gathered (and sold) by a U.S. data broker. But it just as easily could have been conducted by a foreign actor, especially one with deep pockets, years of experience in deception, and a persistent dedication to gathering data on U.S. persons and targeting the U.S. government.

Far from an isolated incident, this latest, troubling story speaks to an urgent problem for the incoming presidential administration and Congress: how to keep building out data security protections for all Americans, including military service members and intelligence community personnel, in light of ever-expanding for-profit data collection and a raft of growing data threats from—among others—the Chinese government. It is far too easy for foreign actors to obtain highly sensitive data, including geolocation data on people serving in the military and intelligence community, via data brokers and other commercial firms and use it to harm those people and the country. As the next administration identifies its top policy priorities in what it describes as strategic competition with China—and as the United States faces highly persistent adversaries determined to collect and exploit Americans’ and U.S. companies’ data, including to run intelligence operations and build artificial intelligence (AI) models—it should integrate this problem into its approach to China, cybersecurity, and strategic questions around data.

Army building a new expeditionary cyber battalion

Mark Pomerleau

The Army is adding more expeditionary cyber teams and creating a new battalion focused on cyber — a validation that the concept has proven its worth.

In late February, the Army Force Structure Transformation (ARSTRUC) plan directed the activation of two more so-called expeditionary cyber and electromagnetic activities teams (ECTs) in the 11th Cyber Battalion — a total of 90 authorizations — rounding out that battalion and an additional 390 authorizations for ECTs to begin building the 12th Cyber Battalion, Lt. Gen. Maria Barrett, commander of Army Cyber Command, said in an interview with DefenseScoop.

“We’re doubling down on what the expeditionary [Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Activities] teams have been doing to date. I think that is a good sign,” Barrett said.

The battalion provides tactical, on-the-ground cyber operations (mostly through radio-frequency effects), electronic warfare and information operations. The unit consists of four companies with over 300 personnel total and five ECTs — scalable formations designed to augment units upon request.

They’re expected to maneuver with units, plan tactical operations for commanders and conduct operations on the ground.

The decision to expand the teams — and the overall concept — comes after what initially began as a pilot effort over six years ago to test how the Army could integrate tactical cyber and electronic warfare effects for brigades on the ground without having to rely upon the remote, strategic resources of U.S. Cyber Command, which are not only in high demand but, at the time of the pilot, limited in authorities to conduct operations.

Continuous Transformation Institutional Transformation in Contact

Lt. Gen. Milford H. Beagle Jr., U.S. Army, Lt. Col. Tyler J. Rund, PMP, U.S. Army

Lt. Gen. Milford Beagle Jr., commanding general of the U.S. Combined Arms Center, delivers a presentation on transforming in contact, deliberate transformation, and concept-driven development 10 September 2024 during the first day of the annual Maneuver Warfighter Conference at Fort Moore, Georgia. The annual conference gathers U.S. Army senior leaders and subject-matter experts from across the globe to discuss the way forward for maneuver forces. (Photo by Patrick A. Albright, U.S. Army)

The Army operates in an environment that is more complex, dynamic, and unpredictable than ever before. The rapid pace of technological advancement, coupled with the evolving capabilities of near-peer adversaries, has created a battlefield that demands adaptability and constant innovation. To succeed in this environment, the Army must not only be ready to fight today’s battles but also be prepared to win tomorrow’s wars. This is where transformation in contact (TiC) becomes essential. TiC is not just about modernization—it’s about enabling the Army to adapt in real time, evolving in sync with the demands of the operational environment while maintaining strategic overmatch.

The chief of staff of the Army’s vision for TiC is rooted in the belief that the Army must remain responsive, capable, and lethal across all domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyber. However, this transformation is not just about the operational forces on the front lines. It extends deeply into the institutional Army, the engine that drives the training, sustaining, and equipping of soldiers and leaders for the fight and ensures its Army civilian professionals remain a vital part of the enterprise. The institutional Army must undergo its own transformation to ensure it can continuously adapt and support the operational force, providing it with the necessary tools, skills, and leadership to succeed.