Indian Strategic Studies: 11/28/24

28 November 2024

The Next Dalai Lama: Preparing for Reincarnation and Why It Matters to India

Vijay Gokhale

His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama is eighty-nine years of age. He has been living in exile since 1959. He assures his followers that he will live for several more years, possibly until he is 113.1 Since the early 1980s, there have been attempts by the Dalai Lama to reconcile with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Thus far, these efforts have not borne fruit. Although a reconciliation in the future that might permit him to return to Tibet cannot be ruled out, the likelihood of this happening appears to be remote. He could likely pass away in exile. In 2022, he said that he would prefer to die in a free and democratic country like India rather than be surrounded by Chinese officials at the time of his death.2

As a Living Buddha, he is expected to reincarnate, but the question of his succession remains shrouded in uncertainty since the current Dalai Lama has forewarned of the possibility that the line might end with him. He has also indicated at various times that he might reincarnate outside Tibet. The PRC, which has ruled Tibet since 1950, says there will be a successor to the 14th Dalai Lama and that the next incarnation will be born inside China and approved by the Chinese government.

The question of who selects the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama is debatable. Tibetans reject the idea that China has the authority to exercise legal jurisdiction over the process of selecting the Dalai Lama (and other Living Buddhas of Tibet). The PRC claims that the imperial ordinance of 1793 (known as the Imperially Approved Ordinance for Better Governance of Tibet or the 29-article Ordinance) stipulates the procedure for the reincarnation of the Living Buddhas (including the Dalai Lama) and subjects the selected candidate to approval by Beijing.3 However, it is a fact that the Golden Urn method of selecting the Dalai Lamas, stipulated by the 1793 imperial ordinance, was only selectively applied in the cases of the 11th and 12th Dalai Lamas but was dispensed with for the 9th, 13th, and 14th Dalai Lamas.4

India’s Caste Census Will Act As A hindrance To National Unity And Growth – OpEd

K.S. Venkatachalam

The caste system, deeply rooted in India’s socio-cultural fabric, has historically influenced various aspects of life, including social status, economic opportunities, and access to resources. The idea of conducting a caste census in India has sparked considerable debate, especially regarding its impact on meritocracy and its potential as a tool for equitable development.

Even after 75 years of independence, India continues to wrestle with the complexities of the caste system, a challenge further compounded by vote-bank politics. The debate over conducting a caste census has intensified, raising significant concerns about its potential impact on meritocracy and the country’s socio-economic development. Although, the intention behind the census is to address historical inequities, such measures risk exacerbating societal divisions.

Recently, several states have conducted caste-based censuses to create a development model that addresses economic disparities and provides equal opportunities for marginalised communities. The goal is to identify these groups and direct resources toward their upliftment. While such initiatives seek to rectify social inequality and the unequal distribution of resources in India, they also present certain challenges. A caste census would generate detailed data on the socio-economic conditions of various caste groups, which could inform targeted policies to reduce disparities.

Mapping South Asia’s digital landscape

Mark Linscott and Gopal Nadadur

Data protection regulations in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are of immense importance to the three countries and to the world. In addition to their geopolitical importance, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are home to large and young populations, with digital economies that are either fast-growing or have the potential to be. Close to 2 billion people in total reside in the three countries, with more than 60 percent of this population younger than 35 years old. All three countries boast high cellular connectivity: there are around 200 million mobile phone subscribers each in Bangladesh and Pakistan and over 1.2 billion in India. This connectivity is driving rapid growth in new, data-reliant industries such as e-commerce.

Recognizing this rapid progress as well as the tremendous potential, policymakers in the three countries are rightly betting on the promise of their technology sectors to play key roles in economic growth, job creation, and overall social good. As policymakers are aware, developing vibrant and innovative technology sectors is even more urgent given the ongoing transition worldwide from labor-intensive economies to more knowledge-intensive ones. This trend is accelerating because of recent technological breakthroughs, including in automation and robotics, big data, and generative artificial intelligence (AI).

Policymakers are also rightly prioritizing greater data regulation, for reasons that range from combating misinformation to safeguarding national security and sovereignty. These priorities—including economic, social, and security—involve complex trade-offs.

To be sure, none of these trade-offs and complexities are unique to these three South Asian countries. Governments across the world are navigating similar issues, made even more challenging by the rapid pace of technological progress.

Recognizing the importance and complexity of this topic, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center embarked in 2023 on a study of the state of data protection regulations in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. The project resulted in three issue briefs—one each for the three countries—that were published from March through May 2023 and provided an overview of the regulatory landscape, the underlying politics, and watchpoints. This paper represents the capstone of the project.

What happens when China puts boots on the ground in Myanmar?

David Hutt

It now appears to be a question of “when, not if” Chinese security personnel will arrive in Myanmar, with Beijing looking to secure its strategic interests in the war-torn country and those of its ally, the military junta that has lost large chunks of the country since the 2021 coup.

The Irrawaddy online news outlet reported that the junta formed a 13-member working committee on October 22 to prepare the groundwork to establish a “joint security company” with China.

According to the report, the committee, chaired by Major-General Toe Yi, the junta’s deputy home affairs minister, is currently tasked with “scrutinizing the importing and regulating of weapons and special equipment” until Beijing signs a drafted MOU on forming a “security company.”

After that, according to the narrative from Beijing and Naypyidaw, Chinese personnel would join a “company” — more like a militia — alongside junta troops, which would be tasked with defending Chinese strategic and economic interests in the country.

I’m told that China will send troops from the military and police in a “private” capacity, giving the fiction of detachment.

Yet this would not be a joint venture in anything but name.

Managing U.S.-China Tensions over the Global Economic Order

Scott Kennedy

The U.S.-China Global Economic Order (GEO) Dialogue, now in its ninth year, focuses on strengthening dialogue and fostering cooperation around the three pillars of the Bretton Woods system: international trade, finance, and development. The purpose of the dialogue is to provide a platform for in-depth discussions among a small number of subject-matter experts. Through repeated exchanges and consultations with policymakers, the dialogue provides an opportunity to raise sensitive topics, test assumptions, analyze challenging problems, and explore potential solutions. Although the discussions are the main “deliverable” of the GEO Dialogue, the project has previously published reports in 2017, 2019, and 2021. The primary value of these reports were their collective call to adopt imaginative policies to resolve difficult problems. The current volume adopts the same posture but with one difference. Whereas the dialogue sessions were the foundation for previous volumes, with a portion of the participants picking up the pen to write wholly formed commentaries, this volume comprises brief notes drafted in advance of the session, held in May 2024 in Washington, D.C., and then lightly revised afterward. Participants offer tentative yet provocative solutions to the policy community in four topical groups: economic competition, economic security, finance, and decarbonization and development.

Russia and China in Central Asia Cooperate, Compete, or De-conflict?

Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Kate Johnston and Nathaniel Schochet

Despite the many proclamations that Russian and Chinese interests would collide in Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing continue to work together in service of their shared objectives. These include, most importantly, keeping the United States and the West—and democracy—out of the region, maintaining stability, and pursuing economic benefits.

Fissures between Moscow and Beijing exist, especially in the economic sphere, where China has become the more dominant power, and over the potential development of the Middle Corridor trade route, which could significantly disadvantage Russia. However, Russia and China are managing these divergences, and the overarching imperative to weaken the United States provides a powerful motive for reducing or preventing any friction from derailing their broader partnership.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the Central Asian states’ apprehensions about Russia, including about its capacity to uphold its security role in the region. However, the Kremlin remains committed to maintaining its influence in the region, and the war in Ukraine is restructuring economic dynamics in ways that will enable the Kremlin to limit the extent of its declining economic influence.

Looking forward, the most significant change in Russia-China relations in Central Asia is likely to occur in the security sphere, where China is likely to take on a greater role, especially as Russia’s military and security services are preoccupied in Ukraine and with the domestic challenges the war creates. Any rise in instability in the region—which could result from an uptick in terrorist threats in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or from the region’s brittle autocracies—could propel China to step into a sphere where Russia has historically played the primary role but that the Kremlin will struggle to fulfill while the war in Ukraine continues.

Trump Trade War Took China by Surprise, But Xi Is Ready This Time

Hal Brands

The US is in the midst of its presidential transition, but the world isn’t waiting patiently for Jan. 20 to arrive. Russia’s Vladimir Putin is pressing his advantage in Ukraine. Israel is devastating Hezbollah and Hamas. The Houthis of Yemen are intensifying their Red Sea attacks. And even as Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with President Joe Biden one final time last weekend, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima, China is bracing for trouble with President-elect Donald Trump.

For Biden, the valedictory meeting was a chance to show off his administration’s record of competing with China on the one hand, while trying to stabilize the relationship on the other. Washington and Beijing announced an agreement not to give artificial intelligence control over the use of nuclear weapons (not that either side was planning to do so, anyway), even as the Biden team keeps tightening the technological and financial controls it has placed on China.

For Xi, however, the meeting served a different purpose. Yes, the Chinese leader touted his and Biden’s “joint stewardship” and voiced the usual platitudes about the virtues of cooperation and the dangers of rivalry. But Xi, like every other leader on the planet, is already looking past Biden, to Trump.

Some Chinese analysts see opportunity in Trump’s presidency, given his propensity to alienate US allies and the likelihood that he will sow conflict and division within America itself. Others may hope that Elon Musk, the Trump whisperer with massive business interests in China, will assure Beijing a sympathetic ear.

A Chinese View of Marine Corps Force Design

Gary Anderson

Having played the Chinese side in a number of war games and studied their strategic approach in projects for DoD’s Office of Net Assessment, I have a reasonable feel for how Beijing views the Marine Corps Force Design doctrine. Below is my take on their assessment of Force Design.

Situation

As we prepare to bring the rogue province of Taiwan back into the bosom of the Motherland, we have assessed the situation of American strategy to influence any attempt on our part to bring Taiwan under our control by force. Essentially, U.S. strategic posture in the region has been relatively static for several decades with one exception. The Marine Corps’ shift in 2020 from a global force in readiness to a narrow Sino Island chain focus. This concept called Force Design (FD) envisions placing small units called "stand in Forces" (SIF) on the islets and shoals in the South China Sea illegally claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Armed with short range anti-ship missiles, these small units would seek to deny us sea control in the disputed regions in the First Island Chain. Overall, this operational concept is called Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO). The SIF are designed to shoot and move supported by a new class of amphibious ships called Landing Ship Medium (LSM), with no armored protection, these ships are designed to protect themselves by blending in with normal merchant traffic.

The Double-Edged Sword of Semiconductor Export Controls: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment

William Alan Reinsch, Jack Whitney, and Matthew Schleich

Export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) represent a key focus of ongoing U.S. government efforts to “choke off” China’s access to leading-edge semiconductors. The United States, along with allies such as the Netherlands and Japan, is a global leader in production and R&D for chipmaking tools. By imposing uniquely broad and unilateral controls on U.S. toolmakers’ access to the Chinese market, however, the U.S. government has turbocharged Chinese efforts to wean off all U.S. SME due to growing concerns about the reliability and trustworthiness of U.S. companies. In this way, expanding U.S. trade restrictions are facilitating the “design-out” of U.S. toolmakers in Chinese semiconductor supply chains in favor of domestic and third-country (i.e., non-U.S. and non-Chinese) companies. This growing trend in China’s market, the world’s largest for semiconductor manufacturing, threatens the long-term leadership of the United States in SME by diverting revenue (and R&D investment) away from U.S. industry. As a result, current U.S. export controls risk jeopardizing the economic and national security of the United States by hindering U.S. companies’ market share and accelerating China’s relative technological gains. This report, the second in a series on U.S. semiconductor export controls, outlines the importance of SME to chip markets, key types of tools being designed-out, and the rapid growth of Chinese toolmakers. It also evaluates how toolmakers based in third countries have leveraged U.S. unilateral controls to win new business with Chinese customers. The report argues that the United States should limit further unilateral controls on SME sales and consider new incentives for allies to create multilateral export regimes, which could mitigate some of the negative impacts of current controls on U.S. companies.

A Ukrainian nuclear program: Could it be done?

Mariana Lastovyria

For a brief period just over thirty years ago, Ukraine possessed the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

Its missiles could reach targets more than 10,000 kilometers away in just 25 minutes.

But in 1994, after the breakup of the USSR, the newly independent country gave up all of its nuclear weapons. In return, it signed the Budapest memorandum alongside the United States, Britain and Russia, which obligated them to provide security in return.

But all illusions were shattered when a country that was one of the guarantors waged war against Ukraine, first in 2014, and then in a full-scale invasion in 2022.

The nuclear threat in Ukraine has been rising. On November 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin lowered the country's legal threshold for a nuclear strike, so it could consider a nuclear strike in response to a conventional attack. Putin made the change after President Biden allowed Ukraine to use American-made missiles to strike inside Russia.

The fundamental issue when it comes to a hypothetical Ukrainian nuclear program is that the instinct behind it is driven by betrayal. Betrayal by Russia, for invading; betrayal from the West for not living up to its security assurances.

The Old World Is Not Coming Back

Bari Weiss

When did you know?

Looking back, now that we are on the far side, I wonder: When did you realize that things had changed?

When did you know that the things we had taken for granted were suddenly out of our reach? That the norms that felt as certain as gravity had disappeared? That the institutions that had launched our grandparents had turned hostile to our children?

When did you notice that what had once been steady was now shaky ground? Did you look down to see if your own knees were trembling?

When did you realize that we were not immune from history, but living inside of it?

When did you see that our world was actually the world of yesterday—and a new one, one with far fewer certainties, one where everything seems up for grabs, was coming into being?

Threat of global war ‘serious and real,’ Poland’s Tusk warn

Csongor Körömi

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned Friday that there is a "serious and real" threat of global war after this week's major escalation in the conflict in Ukraine.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine “is entering a decisive phase," Tusk said in a speech to the Polish Teachers' Union. "We all know it, we feel that the unknown is approaching. None of us knows the end of this conflict, but we know that it is taking on very dramatic dimensions at the moment,” he added.

“The events of the last few dozen hours show that this threat is really serious and real in terms of a global conflict,” Tusk said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed early Friday that Moscow fired a new intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile into Ukraine on Thursday in response to Kyiv's use of advanced weapons provided by the United States and the United Kingdom earlier this week.

Responding to Putin's announcement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia's decision was a sign of "how scared" the Kremlin is of Kyiv.

How Best to Rule The World? Regime Type & Great Power Competition

Monte Erfourth

Introduction

The world's political landscape is marked by diverse forms of governance, each with unique features and consequences for society. Democracy, autocracy, oligarchy, and totalitarianism represent distinct models, each defining how power is distributed and how citizens are engaged in the political process. At the core of these regimes lies a spectrum of approaches to authority and individual rights. These regime types influence international relations. Each form of governance heavily influences how the regime decides to leverage power and influence others to advance and protect its interests geopolitically.

Since WWII ended, the U.S. democratic approach to international relations—founded on the rule of law, respect for human rights, and promotion of a rules-based order—has long been considered a more sustainable and morally grounded way of engaging with the world. During the Cold War, this approach starkly contrasted the closed, repressive regimes of the communist Eastern Bloc, garnering support from countries seeking a path to stability, security, and prosperity under a liberal world order. This model promotes transparency and accountability, allowing for checks on power and fostering alliances based on mutual respect and shared values. It helped shape international institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank, which have played crucial roles in fostering cooperation and reducing global conflict.

Russia will not intimidate us with cyberthreats, UK minister tells NATO

Elizabeth Piper

Britain and its allies will not be intimidated by Russian cyberthreats into stopping supporting Ukraine, British cabinet office minister Pat McFadden said on Monday, urging NATO to work closer together to stay ahead in "the new AI arms race".

In the latest Western warning about Moscow stepping up cyber attacks on nations backing Ukraine, McFadden said the U.S.-led military alliance, businesses and institutions must do "everything they can to lock their own digital doors" to protect themselves from what he called an increasingly aggressive Russia.

Addressing a NATO Cyber Defence Conference in London, McFadden called for allies to double down on their support for Kyiv against Russian President Vladimir Putin, who he said was trying "to deter our support for Ukraine with his threats".

"We will not join those voices of weakness who want to give Putin a veto over our help for Ukraine," McFadden said without offering details.

"While no one should underestimate the Russian aggressive and reckless cyber threat to NATO, we will not be intimidated by it and we will never allow it to dictate our decisions or policies. And we will do everything we can to defend our countries against it."

After 1,000 days of war, what is next for Ukraine?

Ben Coxon

19th November will mark 1,000 days since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This grim milestone comes at a time of increasing uncertainty for Kyiv, particularly following the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House. However, the outcome of the war is far from decided, as Ukraine remains steadfast in its fight against Moscow, holding onto territory in Russia’s Kursk Oblast and inflicting heavy casualties on the invading forces. So, in this week’s Big Ask, we asked ten experts: After 1,000 days of war, what is next for Ukraine?

Sir Michael Fallon

Secretary of State for Defence (2014-2017)

Wars end. Long or short, they come to an end eventually. But it’s hard to see this one ending easily or suddenly. First, the end should be sustainable. Ukraine has been invaded twice in the last ten years, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Ukraine’s other allies failing to deter Russia each time. Any settlement should be enforceable, and should prevent Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, from restarting his war in three, five or ten years’ time. That might mean deploying NATO troops on the ground to secure the ceasefire, as in Kosovo, and then providing Ukraine with a permanent air defence shield against future missile attack.

Second, it is not for London, Paris or Washington to rule on territory. Only Ukraine can decide if it’s prepared to cede any land at all, in return for future allied protection. Any change to current borders should also consider Ukraine’s neighbours and the future security of the Black Sea region.

Europe is under attack from Russia. Why isn’t it fighting back?

LAURA KAYALI, DIRK BANSE, WOLFGANG BÜSCHER, ULRICH KRAETZER, UWE MÜLLER & CHRISTIAN SCHWEPPE

If not for a delay in a connecting flight, the incendiary bomb would likely have burst into flames in the belly of a plane flying high above the European Union.

Instead, it ignited on the ground in Germany’s Leipzig airport, setting fire to a DHL air freight container.

Western intelligence officials believe the attack, which took place in July, was a trial run by Russian agents who planned to place similar bombs on flights to the United States.

“We have been observing aggressive actions by the Russian intelligence services for some time now,” said Thomas Haldenwang, who recently stepped down as president of Germany’s federal domestic intelligence agency.

“Russia is using the entire toolbox, from influencing political discussions to cyber attacks on critical infrastructure to sabotage on a significant scale,” he said.

The Kremlin has long carried out so-called hybrid warfare against European countries, including disinformation campaigns, hacking, cyberattacks and election interference to destabilize European societies and, in the past few years, push them to decrease military support for Ukraine.

Ukraine Should Have Heeded Milley’s Warning

Sumantra Maitra

The day the first U.S. ATACMs from Ukraine landed in Russia, making it the first time in the postwar era a U.S.-guided and U.S.-target-coordinated weapons system landed anywhere within Russian landmass, another bomb dropped without much fanfare but far more significance. Gallup released a poll showing that, for the first time since the conflict began, a majority of Ukrainians want to negotiate with Russia and end the conflict.

Within that group, a large portion wants to cede territory to Russia. “A fair share of Ukrainians who favor negotiating a quick end to the war believe Ukraine should be open to ceding some territory in exchange for peace. More than half of this group (52 percent) agrees that Ukraine should be open to making some territorial concessions as part of a peace deal to end the war, while 38 percent disagree and another 10 percent don’t know,” Gallup reported. To contrast, in 2022, 73 percent of Ukrainians preferred fighting until victory, without, of course, defining what victory is. That has obviously changed.

The New Secretary of Defense: The Task at Hand

Donald McGregor

Historically, Washington, D.C., has favored insider candidates for high-level positions, typically promoting individuals from within the Washington establishment. However, President-elect Trump's approach marks a departure from this tradition. One of his key campaign promises was to "drain the swamp" of entrenched insiders and return the government to the people. In line with this promise, he has quickly chosen non-traditional appointees who may have less experience but demonstrate capability, loyalty, and a commitment to his vision. One notable selection is Pete Hegseth, a Washington outsider and unconventional candidate for Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

However, the new Secretary will have to navigate the largest agency in the federal government with the second-largest federal budget. He will inherit responsibility for over three million personnel and an astounding $3.8 trillion in assets—not counting the immense responsibility of defending the nation. Yet, the most significant challenge may lie within the Pentagon and the Washington establishment. A complex network of processes, procedures, personalities, and agendas can generate more turmoil than any battlefield. The “task at hand” is immense, and navigating this environment will be difficult and time-consuming.

After spending several years at the Pentagon advising a Joint Chiefs of Staff member and working on various defense issues and congressional legislation, I have observed agenda-driven deals, decisions, and the challenges of defending our nation. I want to share a few observations and suggestions for the new secretary to help navigate this complex landscape.

‘Plug and play’: Army’s Project Linchpin prepares to unveil open-source architecture for AI

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

The Army’s artificial intelligence accelerator, Project Linchpin, is working with open source software firm Red Hat to unveil an initial version of its AI development architecture as early as next week, product lead Bharat Patel said.

The architecture, in essence, is a set of common technical standards — Application Programming Interfaces (API), data labeling protocols, and so on — to ensure that AIs built for the Army by different vendors are all compatible.

“We are defining some of these APIs and some of these architectures with Red Hat now, [with] an open source project being dropped end of November,” Patel told the Red Hat Government Symposium here on Tuesday. “This is going to be one of our first attempts at a public-private partnership.”

By creating a level playing field for competition among innovative companies of different sizes, this “open architecture” should allow the Army to use whichever algorithms it likes best into its suite of AI software, fully confident the different products will work together, Patel and other officials explained in public comments and interviews with Breaking Defense.

Ukraine Lost Nearly Half The Territory It Captured In Russia: Report

Howard Altman

Faced with waves of counterattacks from nearly 60,000 Russian troops, Ukraine has lost more than 40% of the territory it once controlled in its August invasion of Kursk, Reuters reported, citing a member of the Ukrainian General Staff.

“At most, we controlled about 1,376 square kilometers (531 square miles), now of course this territory is smaller. The enemy is increasing its counterattacks,” the source told Reuters.

“Now we control approximately 800 square kilometers (309 square miles). We will hold this territory for as long as is militarily appropriate.”

Adding to Ukraine’s problems in Kursk is the presence of some 12,000 North Korean troops, Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate, told us. In exchange for its support, North Korea is reportedly getting air defense systems and other military equipment from Russia, according to South Korea’s National Security Adviser Shin Wonsik. Energy shipments are also occurring. You can read more about that here.

Still, Ukraine continues to do what it can to hold Russian forces at bay. The following video shows another strike on a pontoon bridge Russians used to cross the Seym River. It was reportedly attacked with U.S.-donated GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB).

The EU Code of Practice for General-Purpose AI: Key Takeaways from the First Draft

Laura Caroli

What Is the Code of Practice?

On November 14, 2024, the first draft of the European Union’s General-Purpose AI Code of Practice, established by the EU AI Act, was published by the EU AI Office. According to Article 56 of the AI Act, the code will outline the rules operationalizing the requirements the Regulation sets out for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models (Article 53) and GPAI models with systemic risk (Article 55). The AI Act is a product safety type of legislation and heavily relies on harmonized standards to support compliance with the requirements. Harmonized standards are sets of operational rules established by European standardization bodies, namely the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, where industry experts as well as, in smaller proportion, civil society and trade unions translate requirements set out by EU sectoral legislation upon a specific mandate by the European Commission.

The commission assesses the proposed standards, and if they respond to the mandate, they will be adopted, becoming so-called harmonized standards. Harmonized standards provide a presumption of conformity to any company using them to comply with the respective legislation. In the field of high-risk AI systems, which constitute the bulk of requirements set out by the AI Act, such standards do not yet exist. CEN and CENELEC are currently working to have them ready by April 2025, in time for the requirements for high-risk AI systems to apply in two years.

Six Ways To Strengthen The Acceptance Of Wind Power

The European Commission is working to speed up the permitting process for renewable energy projects. However, the rapid deployment of wind power can raise concerns and opposition within local communities.

An international working group led by the Natural Resources Institute of Finland (Luke) and representing seven countries has come up with six recommendations to help improve the acceptance of wind power.

Different countries are at different stages of wind energy development and implementation. Developed through international cooperation, the policy brief provides an opportunity to share knowledge and experience on best practices in wind energy that contribute to a sustainable and socially acceptable transition to clean energy.

1. Consider welfare impacts

The concerns of local communities should be considered and addressed in an open and transparent way, using scientific knowledge. Although research shows no evidence of direct effects of wind power on human health, low-frequency noise and flickering lights can cause irritation and stress and reduce quality of life. It is important to prevent and minimise these.

‘Double Standards’ As Israel Not Treated Like Russia

Ben Deighton

Double standards in the way the international science community deals with Israel compared to Russia is leading to a mistrust in the global science system by Arab researchers, according to the head of Lebanon’s main science policy body.

While Russian scientists have been barred from international science collaborations as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, the same thing has not happened to Israeli scientists despite the country’s ongoing offensive against neighbouring Lebanon and Gaza.

“As scientists, not only citizens, when we see that you have these double standards when dealing with Russians and not with Israelis, for us … it is a problem of mistrust in this international system, and mistrust in the international scientific system,” said Tamara Elzein, secretary general of the National Council for Scientific Research of Lebanon.“What this system is advocating, like freedom [for] researchers, freedom of speech, human rights, we think now these are empty slogans.”

Tamara Elzein, secretary general, National Council for Scientific Research of Lebanon

A Defining Moment In The Ukraine War – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

The Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a statement on Thursday regarding the two attacks by Western long-range weapons on Russian territory on November 19 and 21 and Moscow’s reactive strike on a facility within Ukraine’s defence industrial complex in the city of Dnepropetrovsk with a hitherto unknown non-nuclear hypersonic ballistic missile named Oreshnik.

On Friday, at a meeting in the Kremlin with the military top brass, Putin revisited the topic where he clarified that Oreshnik not really at an “experimental” stage, as Pentagon had determined, but its serial production has actually commenced.

And he added, “Given the particular strength of this weapon, its power, it will be put into service with the Strategic Missile Forces.” He then went on to reveal, “It is also important that along with the Oreshnik system, several similar systems are currently being tested in Russia. Based on the test results, these weapons will also go into production. In other words, we have a whole line of medium- and shorter-range systems.”

Putin reflected on the geopolitical backdrop: “The current military and political situation in the world is largely determined by the results of competition in the creation of new technologies, new weapons systems and economic development.”

Portable drone jammer uses a Raspberry Pi tactical Software Defined Radio

Ash Hill

What makes a Raspberry Pi project tactical? Maker and developer Media-Grizzly has their own ideas with this cool, portable Pi-powered software-defined radio (SDR) system they built from scratch dubbed the D.E.S.E.R.T Pi-Powered Tactical System. Not only does it work as a handy SDR on the go, it doubles as a drone jammer that can disable nearby drones with the flip of a switch. It's got a handful of features with plenty of room for modification in the future.

Media-Grizzly's D.E.S.E.R.T Pi-Powered Tactical System is housed in a portable case with a decent selection of hardware to play around with. We don't have a full build list yet but we can see a nice, laser-engraved faceplate encompassing a keyboard, power LED, USB port, and an LCD display in the middle. However, the most tempting input of all is the big red switch in the corner labeled "DE-AUTH".

According to Media-Grizzly's, this DE-AUTH switch is programmed to interact specifically with drone signals. It's important to note that the legality of such interference can vary greatly depending on where you live and Media-Grizzly assures this is a theoretical use case. That said, the drone jammer would work by connecting an antenna and arming the switch. Any drone within range of the antenna will lose its signal while activated.

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