Indian Strategic Studies: 11/27/24

27 November 2024

Cornering Modi

Bharat Karnad

It is said of highly professional intelligence agencies that what they consistently do well is focus on the leaders of countries their government deals with, to try and find some weakness, some sore spot, a well hidden secret in the present or from the past, perhaps, marital discord, or sexual peccadilloes, or evidence of sexual deviance, of a lover squirrelled away in some safe house somewhere, or a woman scorned who can be turned to provide the dirty on the leader, something, anything, that the leader would rather keep away from the public eye, and to use this or that piece of information to get that leader of that government of that country to do as he is told, to take this decision, make that policy, announce such and such friendly step, or sign a specific deal. Information is a foreign state’s leverage and it is the stuff of external intelligence gathering.

The biggest intelligence coup of recent years is Putin’s KGB — the Russian Federal Security Service reportedly videographing, among other things, Trump during one of his business tours, pre-presidency, to Russia enjoying the company of blondes and a “golden shower”. Do you wonder why, where Moscow is concerned, Trump is a mewing pussycat?

Indian leaders have always had their weaknesses. There were obvious giveaways. Nehru had this thing for Edwina Mountbatten, and Whitehall used it without compunction to scuplt many of India’s policies during the Interim government when Lord Mountbatten was Viceroy and, a short time later, as the first Governor General of free India got Nehru to do many things London asked for. It is as if nothing had changed.

How Taiwan’s Authoritarian Past Shapes Its Security Politics Today

Friso Stevens

On February 28, 1947, the Kuomintang (KMT) government led by Chiang Kai-shek launched a harsh crackdown in Taiwan by indiscriminately gunning down protesters. On that fateful day, protesters had gathered to denounce two years of chaos and corruption under the KMT after the Allies had handed Taiwan back to China. The violent crackdown, known as the 228 Massacre, cost thousands of lives and ushered in a period known as the White Terror.

The legacy of Chiang’s dictatorship continues to shape the island’s polarized society and security policies today.

At the most recent annual memorial of the 228 Massacre in Memorial Park, the guest of honor was Chiang Wan-an, the young KMT mayor of Taipei and the alleged (illegitimate) great-grandson of Chiang Kai-shek. Ma Ying-jeou, 70, the KMT president from 2008 to 2016, led the procession hand in hand with a survivor of the killings, and laid a wreath both at the start and end of the ceremony.

Chiang Wan-an, 45, apologized to the family members of the victims who sat before him for his speech, framing those massacred as “our elders” who needed to be remembered, instead of reflecting on his family’s and party’s role as perpetrators.

Beijing Grows Anxious Over Internationalization Of Cross-Strait Relations – Analysis

Yi-Chuan Chiu

Four days after Taiwan’s National Day on 10 October 2024, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched another large-scale military exercise around Taiwan, dubbed ‘Joint Sword-2024B’. While Taiwanese and US officials condemned these drills as ‘military provocations’, China’s justification included a phrase key to understanding Beijing’s anxiety about recent tensions in the Taiwan Strait— ‘the internationalisation of the Taiwan issue’. The term reflects Beijing and Taipei’s different views of the status quo and how this complicates cross-strait dynamics.

‘Internationalisation’ refers to framing China–Taiwan relations as a state-to-state relationship and an international dispute open to third-party intervention. Though the term originated in the 1950s, it resurfaced in Chinese official discourse when Beijing resisted comparisons between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan. Such rejections reflect Beijing’s long-standing assertion that Taiwan belongs to China, is an unresolved issue of the Chinese Civil War and that solving the issue in any way is a domestic Chinese matter.

Beijing’s disdain for internationalisation has been repeatedly quoted in its justification for launching PLA exercises protesting Taiwanese President Lai Ching-Te’s inauguration speech in May 2024 and National Day address in October.

China's Massive Espionage Machine: Can the U.S. Effectively Fight Back?

Monte Erfourth

Introduction

In response to China's growing espionage activities, the United States has crafted a robust counterintelligence strategy to mitigate the theft of critical information and intellectual property. The "National Counterintelligence Strategy of 2024" outlines key measures to outmaneuver and constrain foreign intelligence entities, particularly China, which the U.S. sees as one of its most significant espionage threats. Chinese intelligence operations target everything from advanced technologies to sensitive government data, infiltrating not only federal systems but also private industries, research institutions, and academic settings. Recent high-profile incidents, such as the dismantling of Flax Typhoon and other botnets, have heightened awareness across sectors and driven immediate enhancements in countermeasures, reinforcing the need for coordinated responses.

The U.S. strategy to combat this threat is multi-pronged, focusing on defensive and offensive measures. It emphasizes the need to "Detect, Understand, & Anticipate Foreign Intelligence Threats" by expanding innovative intelligence collection methods, integrating these capabilities across federal, state, and local levels, and enhancing information sharing among intelligence agencies, local governments, and international allies. Offensively, the strategy aims to "Counter, Degrade, & Deter Foreign Intelligence Activities & Capabilities" through advanced tools like artificial intelligence and cyber operations. Protecting America's technological edge, combating cyber intrusions, and addressing influence operations are critical pillars of this approach. The National Counterintelligence Strategy aims to provide a comprehensive framework to outpace adversaries by developing an integrated, proactive, and resilient posture, ensuring the U.S. retains its strategic advantages in an era of persistent threats.

Suspected sabotage by a Chinese vessel in the Baltic Sea speaks to a wider threat

Elisabeth Braw

Officially the Yi Peng 3 is just a bulk carrier, one of countless such ships carrying everything from grain to coal, aluminum, and fertilizer. But as she left Russia’s Baltic port of Ust-Luga last week, the Chinese-flagged ship may have had a rather different mission. Authorities and the open-source intelligence (OSINT) community have zeroed in on the Yi Peng 3 as potentially responsible for cutting two undersea cables on her journey through the Baltic Sea, and Germany’s defense minister has already called this a hybrid attack. More such incidents should be expected.

On November 17, an undersea cable connecting Sweden and Lithuania was cut, and less than twenty-four hours later, the only communications cable connecting Finland with Germany was also severed. As OSINT investigators quickly gathered, the Yi Peng 3 was at the scene both times. Swedish, Lithuanian, Finnish, and German authorities have not yet publicly blamed the bulk carrier, but as she sailed from the Baltic Sea toward Denmark’s Great Belt and from there toward the Atlantic Ocean, her actions have drawn scrutiny. By the time the bulk carrier reached the Great Belt, on November 19, she was being followed by Danish Navy vessels.

On November 19, Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, expressed what most observers had also concluded. One had to assume, he said, that the incidents were hybrid aggression, and he described them as “sabotage.” Indeed, given that cables and pipelines are painstakingly detailed on navigational charts, it’s nearly impossible for a ship to sever not just one but two cables by accident.

Chinese hackers preparing for conflict, US cyber official say

Chinese hackers are positioning themselves in U.S. critical infrastructure IT networks for a potential clash with the United States, a top American cybersecurity official said on Friday.

Morgan Adamski, executive director of U.S. Cyber Command, said Chinese-linked cyber operations are aimed at gaining an advantage in case of a major conflict with the U.S.

Officials have warned that China-linked hackers have compromised IT networks and taken steps to carrying out disruptive attacks in the event of a conflict. Their activities include gaining access to key networks to enable potential disruptions such as manipulating heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems in server rooms, or disrupting critical energy and water controls, U.S. officials said earlier this year.

Adamski was speaking to researchers at the Cyberwarcon security conference in Arlington, Virginia. On Thursday, U.S. Senator Mark Warner told the Washington Post a suspected China-linked hack on U.S. telecommunications firms was the worst telecom hack in U.S. history.

That cyber espionage operation, dubbed “Salt Typhoon,” has included stolen call records data, compromised communications of top officials of both major U.S. presidential campaigns before the Nov. 5 election, and telecommunications information related to U.S. law-enforcement requests, the FBI said recently.

Emerging Details of Chinese Hack Leave U.S. Officials Increasingly Concerned

David E. Sanger, Julian E. Barnes, Devlin Barrett and Adam Goldman

Leaders of the top telecommunications companies were summoned to the White House on Friday to discuss a security problem that has been roiling the government: how to expel Chinese hackers from the deepest corners of the nation’s communications networks.

The meeting in the Situation Room came after weeks in which officials grew increasingly alarmed by what they had uncovered about the hack.

They now believe the hackers from a group called “Salt Typhoon,” closely linked to China’s Ministry of State Security, were lurking undetected inside the networks of the biggest American telecommunications firms for more than a year.

They have learned that the Chinese hackers got a nearly complete list of phone numbers the Justice Department monitors in its “lawful intercept” system, which places wiretaps on people suspected of committing crimes or spying, usually after a warrant is issued.

While officials do not believe the Chinese listened to those calls, the hackers were likely able to combine the phone numbers with geolocation data to create a detailed intelligence picture of who was being surveilled.

China's Cyber Offensives Built in Lockstep With Private Firms, Academia

Jai Vijayan

Hundreds of private cybersecurity firms, technology services providers, and universities are helping China's state apparatus develop offensive cyber capabilities to support the country's strategic military, economic, and geopolitical goals, according to research released this week.

"The existence of state-sponsored threat groups operating under the Chinese state's direction has long been well documented," researchers at France's Orange Cyberdefense wrote in their report, based on eight months of analysis of China's cyber-offense capabilities. But any notions that these entities are strictly in government hands, especially given the authoritarian nature of China's government, are off base, the authors warned. "China's offensive cyber capabilities are, in fact, supported by a complex and multilayered ecosystem involving a broad array of state and non-state actors," they wrote.

Their findings provide deeper context on the troubling success that Chinese cyber actors have had infiltrating US critical infrastructure, breaching government, military, and business networks, not to mention theft of defense data, trade secrets, and intellectual property from American entities and others around the world.

Reinhold Niebuhr and the Future of US Support for Ukraine - Opinion

Craig R. Myers

This past June, a young Ukrainian pastor lamented to me how a Republican presidential victory would end US military aid to his embattled nation. Examining this led me back to Reinhold Niebuhr, a Reformed Protestant minister from Missouri. Applying Niebuhr to current events is tricky. He sought American victory in World War II and the Cold War, but opposed US involvement in Vietnam. Yet, based on Niebuhr’s significant contribution to International Relations scholarship, I believe he would support arming Ukraine. Niebuhr argued that turning the other cheek is a Christian response to personal mistreatment, but turning a blind eye when an innocent nation is brutalized is not. Salvation would come from outside history, he wrote, but until then there is no law over nations, only between them.

An aggressive state can only be stopped by other nations, Niebuhr argued in the 1932 book that largely introduced his IR philosophy – Moral Man and Immoral Society:

The selfishness of human communities must be regarded as an inevitability. Where it is inordinate it can be checked only by competing assertions of interest; and these can be effective only if coercive methods are added to moral and rational persuasion.

Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria was the catalyst for Niebuhr’s worldview. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was similarly preemptive and brutal. Japan’s pretense was protecting Japanese in Manchuria and guarding against Western cultural and geopolitical encroachment. Putin has offered similar justifications for his invasion. The League of Nations and Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war could not stop the Japanese. Likewise, neither the United Nations nor the 1994 Budapest Memorandum – in which Russia committed to respect Ukraine’s territory if it gave up nuclear weapons – could dissuade Putin.

Heartland vs. Sea Power: Why the Rimland Will Shape the Future of World Order

Anu Anwar

For centuries, the contest for global dominance has been inextricably linked to geography and the civilizations that have thrived within it. From the Heartland to the seas, geopolitical competition has revolved around the control of critical spaces and the strategic advantages they confer. Theories of geopolitics provide frameworks for understanding these dynamics. Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory posited that control over Eurasian interior—the ‘pivot area’— was the key fulcrum to global dominance (Mackinder 1904). Later, Alfred Thayer Mahan, in contrast, shifted the paradigm to the oceans, arguing that naval supremacy was the foundation of global influence (Mahan 1890). This principle remains relevant in many ways, as the United States continues to rely on sea power for its power projection aiming at global dominance. These theories shaped centuries of strategic thinking, guiding the policies of empires and superpowers alike. Mackinder’s ideas underpinned Cold War containment policies, while Mahan’s principles informed British and American naval dominance.

In the 21st century, neither the Heartland nor the seas alone can explain the complexities of current global competition as the world transitions into an era of intensified great power competition and multipolarity. Instead, Nicholas Spykman’s Rimland Theory—which highlights the coastal periphery encircling Eurasia—is the dominant framework for understanding modern geopolitics (Spykman 1944). The Rimland is where land power meets the sea power. It acts as the bridge between land and sea, housing critical natural resources, rapidly growing economies, and a significant portion of the world’s population. The region also hosts vital sea lanes and chokepoints, such as the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, and the Bab-el-Mandeb, essential for global trade and energy flows. As the U.S.-led Western sea power confronts the land power coalition of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, the Rimland is increasingly becoming the ultimate battleground where the future of the world order will be determined. In the 21st century, the Rimland is not just a geographic space but the geopolitical fulcrum that will shape the balance of power for decades to come.

Seeing Through the Fog of Justice in Israel and Palestine

Mark Kersten

As is often said, the first casualty in war is the truth. Misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda are commonplace in the context of armed conflicts, as warring sides and their allies attempt to secure narratives conducive to their wartime aims. No contemporary conflict has been as rife with untruths as the conflict in the Middle East, a reality that extends to ongoing efforts to address the mass atrocities committed in Israel and Palestine. In what follows, I dispel some popular but false claims about the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its investigation into the situation in Palestine.

Firstly, there is the issue of jurisdiction. Israel, the United States, and a few other states have cast doubt on whether the ICC has jurisdiction over Israeli officials. According to them, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over citizens of Israel because Israel has never joined the ICC. Others, like former Canadian Justice Minister Irwin Cotler, a staunch defender of Israel and opponent of accountability for atrocities committed against Palestinians, has attempted to argue that the ICC has jurisdiction over Palestinian citizens, but not Israeli ones. These claims are false.

The ICC has jurisdiction over both Israeli officials and Palestinian leaders. In 2015, Palestine became a member-state of the ICC. That same year, the Court opened a preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine. In 2021, judges determined that the ICC Prosecutor therefore has jurisdiction over Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and an official investigation into the situation in Palestine ensued.

UK warns of ‘hidden cyber war’ as Putin hails ‘unstoppable’ hypersonic missiles

Alexander Butler & Vishwam Sankaran

A UK cabinet minister has warned of a hidden cyber war being waged by Russia as Vladimir Putin ramped up his threats to the West, hailing Moscow’s “unstoppable” hypersonic missiles.

Liz Kendall warned that Russia would do everything within its power to destabilise Ukraine as well as Nato allies.

“There is not only open military war with Russia as the aggressor, but there is also a hidden cyber war,” she told Sky News.

“Russia will do everything in its power to destabilise not only within Ukraine but amongst the Nato allies There is a threat from Russia, this hidden warfare, as well as the open military aggression.”

Meanwhile, Putin claimed there was no way of stopping the intermediate-range “Oreshnik” ballistic missile used to strike Ukraine on Thursday.

“There is no countermeasure to such a missile, no means of intercepting it, in the world today. And I will emphasise once again that we will continue testing this newest system,” Mr Putin warned.

As government warns of cyber war with Russia, what are cyber attacks?

Ellen Manning

Nato countries including the UK are involved in a “hidden cyber war” with Russia, the government has warned, ahead of a speech set to warn that Vladimir Putin is prepared to launch a series of cyber attacks as it seeks to weaken support for Ukraine.

Work and pensions secretary Liz Kendall called for vigilance amid the threat of cyber war with Russia, saying: "We have to be absolutely vigilant in that as a government, but also in businesses and wider society to protect against those cyber hacktivists."

Her comments on Sky News’ Sunday Morning with Trevor Phillips programme come ahead of a major speech by chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Pat McFadden this week, in which he is set to say Moscow will “not think twice” about exploiting defence gaps to target UK businesses.

In a speech to the Nato cyber defence conference at Lancaster House, McFadden is expected to warn that cyber interference enables Russia to “turn the lights off for millions of people” and represents the “hidden war” it is waging against Ukraine.

He will say: "Given the scale of that hostility, my message to members today is clear: no-one should underestimate the Russian cyber threat to Nato. The threat is real. Russia is exceptionally aggressive and reckless in the cyber realm.”

Russia ready to wage cyber war on UK, minister to say

Adam Durbin

Russia is ready to carry out cyber attacks on the United Kingdom and other allies in a bid to weaken support for Ukraine, a senior minister will warn later.

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Pat McFadden, whose role includes responsibility for national security, is set to tell a Nato meeting that the Kremlin could target British businesses and leave millions without power.

It is the latest in a series of warnings about the cyber-warfare capabilities of Russia, which McFadden is to call a "hidden war" being waged against Ukraine.

He is also expected to single-out Russia's Unit 29155, which the government says has carried out a number of attacks in the UK and Europe.

In a speech to the Nato Cyber Defence Conference at Lancaster House in London, the cabinet minister will warn "cyber war can be destabilising and debilitating" and describe the Kremlin as "exceptionally aggressive and reckless" in this area.

McFadden will focus on the threat of Russia's capacity to shut down power grids and "turn the lights off for millions of people", as well as its willingness to target British businesses "in pursuit of its malign goals".

UK warning: Russia’s ‘aggressive’ cyber warfare is threat to NATO

Victor Jack

Moscow is prepared to launch a wave of cyberattacks against NATO allies that could leave millions without power, according to a senior United Kingdom minister.

Russia is “exceptionally aggressive and reckless in the cyber realm,” Cabinet Office Minister Pat McFadden, whose portfolio includes national security, is expected to tell participants at a NATO cybersecurity conference in London on Monday.

“Given the scale of that hostility, my message to members today is clear: No one should underestimate the Russian cyber-threat to NATO,” he will say, according to prepared remarks shared in advance by his ministry.

The comments come as tensions between NATO and Russia reach a new high. Russian President Vladimir Putin last week warned that the war in Ukraine had taken on “a global character” after the U.K., the United States and France authorized Ukraine to use long-range missiles to strike targets deep inside Russia.

That means Moscow is now ready to cause “unprovoked attacks against our critical national infrastructure,” McFadden will warn, including power grids, which “can turn the lights off for millions of people.”

Key Takeaways from Russia's Oreshnik Medium/Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile — Part 1

Fabian Hoffmann

On the night of November 20–21, Russia launched a missile strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, reportedly featuring a new medium- to intermediate-range ballistic missile called “Oreshnik.”

What we know

At this point, a lot of what can be reasonably known about the missile and the attack is likely understood. The Oreshnik is very likely derived from the Russian RS-26 Rubezh (NATO designation: SS-X-31), which itself traces its origins to the Soviet-designed and built RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20 Saber).

Development of the RS-26 began in 2008 but was mothballed in 2018 before the missile achieved full operational capability. Like the RS-26, the Oreshnik features a MIRVed payload, meaning it can deliver several independently targetable warheads.

The missile likely shares a similar range with the RS-26. Although Putin described it as a “medium-range ballistic missile,” it is plausible that the Oreshnik falls into the intermediate-range category, with a range exceeding 3,000 kilometers.

Russia’s Ballistic Missile Attack on Ukraine Is an Alarming First

Stephen Clark

Two days ago, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced a change in the country's policy for employing nuclear weapons in conflict. Then, on Thursday, Russia attacked the Ukrainian city of Dnipro with a new type of ballistic missile capable of one day delivering multiple nuclear warheads to distant targets with little warning.

Putin says his ballistic missile attack on Ukraine is a warning to the West.

These events are just part of what has been a week of escalation in the war between Russia and Ukraine. In recent days, Ukraine fired US-made ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles and UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles at targets in Russian territory for the first time. This followed approval by President Joe Biden for Ukraine to use US-provided longer-range missiles against Russian targets. Previously, Ukraine was only permitted to use them on its own territory.

In a rare televised statement Thursday, Putin said he ordered Russia's military to strike Dnipro, home to Soviet-era rocket factories, using a ballistic missile named Oreshnik. This means “hazelnut tree” in Russian. The attack was the first use of the Oreshnik missile “under combat conditions,” Putin said.

The rise of hybrid warfare, where states attempt 'winning without fighting'

Emil Chan

Ukraine on Wednesday (Nov 20) said Russia was trying to sow panic and apply "psychological pressure" by circulating fake messages about looming attacks, amid a war between the two countries that has now passed 1,000 days.

The day before, two undersea cables cut in the Baltic Sea in 48 hours led to European and American officials labelling the incident as an example of “hybrid warfare" by malicious actors”, similarly linked to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

What is hybrid warfare?

While conventional warfare is generally understood as direct military action, there is no perfect nor fully agreed upon definition of hybrid warfare, which also goes by names such as non-linear warfare or indirect strategy.

The NATO military alliance defines it as a combination of “military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces”.

These may also include industrial espionage, the use of proxies or insurgencies, diplomatic pressure or even military action that is below the threshold of an armed conflict.

The US Is Calling Out Foreign Influence Campaigns Faster Than Ever

Lily Hay Newman

Ahead of the the 2024 US elections, the US intelligence community and law enforcement were on high alert and ready to share information—both among agencies and publicly—as foreign malign influence operations emerged. Tech giants like Microsoft similarly sprang into action, collaborating with government partners and publishing their own information about election-related disinformation campaigns. The speed and certainty with which authorities were able to pin these efforts on threat actors in Russia, China, and Iran was unprecedented. But researchers also caution that not all attributions are created equal.

At the Cyberwarcon security conference in Arlington, Virginia, today, researchers from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab are presenting initial findings on the role of attribution in the 2024 US elections. Their research compares the impact of quickly naming and shaming foreign influence actors to other recent US elections in which government attribution was far less common.

“We’re building on a project that we did back in 2020 where there was a lot more context of concern that the Trump administration was not being forthcoming about foreign attacks,” says Emerson Brooking, director of strategy and resident senior fellow for DFRLab. “In contrast to 2020, now there was an abundance of claims by the US government of influence operations being conducted by different adversaries. So in thinking through the policy of attribution, we wanted to look at the question of overcorrection.”

Can Trump tame the Pacific Dragon?

John Schindler

There is no more pressing national security matter for President-elect Donald Trump than that of how to deal with China.

The China problem our 47th president is inheriting from the Biden administration is grave. Like the two terms of former President Barack Obama’s White House before him, President Joe Biden’s China policy has telegraphed diffidence and weakness against a backdrop of American military decline. Two years into his presidency, Biden blurted out that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, ending decades of “strategic ambiguity” with Washington’s posture vis-à-vis Taipei and Beijing. Biden then repeated this statement at least three other times, with the White House rowing back his rhetoric on each occasion.

Yet Biden never followed up his policy change with action. As a result, Beijing never took our outgoing president particularly seriously. During the embarrassing early 2023 China spy balloon incident, the Defense Department’s efforts to talk with Chinese counterparts to defuse the crisis fell apart because the Chinese military wasn’t taking our hotline calls. In his final meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Saturday, an elderly Biden was unable to project strength, while this week, an effort by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to meet with his Chinese counterpart at a security conference in Laos was rudely rebuffed. The Chinese Communists no longer hide their contempt for Team Biden.

World War III has officially begun, Ukraine’s ex-top general says

Ketrin Jochecová

Ukraine's former military Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny said that the direct involvement of Russia's autocratic allies in its war on Ukraine means that World War III has started.

"I believe that in 2024 we can absolutely believe that the Third World War has begun," said Zaluzhny, who is now Ukraine's envoy to the United Kingdom, during a speech at Ukrainska Pravda's UP100 award ceremony.

"Because in 2024, Ukraine is no longer facing Russia. Soldiers from North Korea are standing in front of Ukraine. Let's be honest. Already in Ukraine, the Iranian 'Shahedis' are killing civilians absolutely openly, without any shame," said Zaluzhny, adding that North Korean and Chinese weapons are flying into Ukraine.

Zaluzhny urged Ukraine's allies to draw the right conclusions.

"It is still possible to stop it here, on the territory of Ukraine. But for some reason our partners do not want to understand this. It is obvious that Ukraine already has too many enemies. Ukraine will survive with technology, but it is not clear whether it can win this battle alone," he said.

Ukraine Military Situation: Russian Forces Unleash Massive Barrage Of Missiles And Drones – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

1. Biden Administration Eases Restrictions on Use of US-Provided Weapons

In a major development, the Biden administration gave Ukraine permissionto use American long-range weaponry, particularly the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), to strike military targets inside Russia. Subsequently, the French newspaper Le Figaro reported that France and the United Kingdom had followed suit by allowing Ukraine to use SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow missiles for the same purpose, though the publication revised that reportshortly after its release to indicate that London and Paris were only engaging in “debates” on the question.

Press sources report that Washington may still be limiting Kyiv’s use of American munitions to targets relevant to Ukraine’s Kursk incursion. Regardless, the Biden administration’s decision to remove the restraints came not a moment too soon. The Ukrainian Armed Forces need to target Russia’s strategic depth, particularly critical military basing structures and force groupings in assembly areas. Depending on its warhead configuration and variant, the ATACMS is well-suited for this role.

2. North Korean Heavy Artillery Spotted in Russia

Geolocated open-source imagery identified North Korean M1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled howitzers on Russian railways near Krasnoyarsk last week, indicating that Pyongyang has stepped up its tactical support for the Kremlin.

The Operational And Strategic Genius Of The Kursk Offensive – Analysis

Dan Cox

Current analysis of the recent offensive conducted by Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region of Russia is incomplete at best and misguided at worst. Most of the pundits are focused on speculating whether the recent offensive will anger American politicians, lead to an eventual victory, or halt the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Dealing with the anger of American politicians first, it is unlikely that Ukraine conducted this counteroffensive in a vacuum. American politicians were likely aware of the operation. Dealing with the next question, speculating on whether one operation will “tip the scales” fits into the American culture of viewing events, wars, and almost everything as a black-and-white or win-lose dichotomy. Finally, the attack on Russia was not intended to halt the main Russian offensive in Pokrovsk. At most, this attack was aimed at drawing troops from the Russian attack on Kharkiv, which, being one of the largest population centers in Ukraine, would represent a major loss for Ukraine, should it fall into Russian hands.

Instead of entering this American cultural quagmire, this essay examines the situation by looking at the Kursk campaign holistically and through the intersection of military operations and strategy. This intersection is often referred to as the area where operational art occurs. By examining the Kursk offensive holistically, this approach does not fall into the rut of determining winners and losers. Instead, myriad potential opportunities and pitfalls can be examined simultaneously. The evidence shows a great deal of cleverness and foresight in developing the Kursk battle plan. The West should support this new propensity in the system as it puts Vladimir Putin and his military planning staff on the horns of multiple dilemmas.

The Counter-Insurgency Is ‘On’ – Against Trump’s ‘Storm’ – OpEd

Alastair Crooke

The Deep State whispered to Trump: ‘You cannot withstand the storm’. Trump whispered back: “I am the storm”. The war is on. The Deep State has launched a war of disruption to disable Trump’s ‘storm’. This week’s ATACM strike was but one part to an inter-agency counter-insurgency – a political strike directed at Trump; so too are all the inter-agency false narratives attributed to the Trump camp; and so too, the escalating provocations directed at Iran.

Be assured the Five Eyes are full participants in the counter-insurgency. Macron and Starmer openly conspired together in Paris ahead of the U.S. announcement to promote the ATACMS strike. The inter-agency grandees clearly are very fearful. They must worry that Trump may expose the ‘Russia Hoax’ (that Trump in 2016 was a Russian ‘asset’) and put them in jeopardy.

Whilst the long-range ATACM launch on ‘deep Russian pre-2014 territory’ is no game-changer – it will not change the course of the war (ATACMS regularly are – at 90% – downed by Russian Air Defences); the salience of this act however, is not strategic; rather, it lies with the crossing into the realm of direct NATO attacks on Russia.

Surviving The New Trump Era – OpEd

John Feffer

Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election was surprising in a number of ways. He won every swing state as well as the popular vote, which a Republican candidate hadn’t done in two decades. He led his party to a congressional sweep, with the Republicans maintaining control of the House of Representatives and seizing a majority in the Senate. And he benefited from an unexpectedly large shift in votes among Latino and African-American men.

In 2016, when Hilary Clinton won the popular vote by a significant margin but lost the Electoral College, anti-Trump forces could plausibly argue that most of the country opposed the new president. This time around, a very slim plurality of voters had no problem putting back into the White House a convicted felon who supported efforts to overthrow the results of the 2020 election.

In 2016, Trump himself was surprised by his own victory, and his team was ill-prepared to take power. In 2024, the Trump team is ready to hit the ground running on day one. It has already made some of the most extreme choices in U.S. history for the top positions in U.S. government: serial rule-breaker Matt Gaetz for attorney general, conspiracy theorist Tulsi Gabbard for director of national intelligence, right-wing TV host Pete Hegseth to head up the Pentagon, and extremist Stephen Miller to oversee immigration.