Managing the Canada-India Diplomatic Conflict

Andrew Latham

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The ongoing diplomatic dispute between Canada and India has escalated into a serious national security concern for both nations. What began as a political row, sparked by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s allegations of Indian involvement in the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, has evolved into a wider conflict that threatens to disrupt security dynamics in both countries. With accusations ranging from interference in domestic affairs to targeted political actions, both Canada and India find themselves in a standoff with far-reaching security implications. This piece argues that while a full resolution may be elusive, both nations must take immediate steps to manage the conflict to prevent further harm to their national security interests.

The Diplomatic Fallout: More Than Just Political Posturing

The Canada-India diplomatic rift gained significant momentum after Trudeau publicly accused India of being involved in the murder of Nijjar, a Canadian citizen and Sikh separatist leader, on Canadian soil. This serious allegation, which India categorically denies, has led to reciprocal expulsions of diplomats and a freezing of relations. But this incident is not just a political spat—it is a matter of national security for both countries, highlighting vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hostile actors if not managed carefully.

Sri Lanka’s Efforts from the Viewpoint of New Approach for Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Yoshimasa Adachi

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Introduction

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined by comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency while addressing its root causes. During the Fourth Eelam War (July 2006 – May 2009) under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s administration (November 19, 2005 – January 9, 2015), the Sri Lankan government achieved a decisive military victory over the LTTE, quelling the rebellion. The Rajapaksa administration’s efforts to eliminate the LTTE drew attention as a successful example of crushing a rebel force through decisive military action in counterinsurgency (COIN). Because the LTTE was ultimately crushed with many civilian casualties, the thorough use of force tends to be emphasized. However, this view does not capture the full picture of the Rajapaksa administration’s COIN.

Traditionally, COIN strategies are categorized into two primary approaches: the population-centric approach and the enemy-centric approach. These approaches have influenced COIN in various countries, yet both come with inherent challenges. The population-centric approach emphasizes focusing COIN efforts on the civilian population rather than the insurgents. By safeguarding the population, providing essential services, and securing their support, this approach aims to isolate the insurgents from the populace, ultimately leading to the suppression of the rebellion. However, this approach is often based on idealistic theories and untested assumptions, making it difficult to apply effectively in real-world conflict scenarios. Conversely, the enemy-centric approach prioritizes targeting insurgents directly, often employing fear and coercive force to suppress rebellions, including exerting pressure on the population. This method tends to overlook the protection of civilians, which can fuel further rebellion and lacks a nuanced political perspective.

The Promise of Trump’s Realist China Grand Strategy

Dr. Ionut Popescu

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President-elect Donald Trump’s decisive election victory gives him a once-in-a-generation mandate to finally implement an America First grand strategy and thus replace the outdated globalist post-World War II framework. Trump’s vision is a hard-nosed realist strategy very well suited to the current era of intense strategic competition and geopolitical peril. The new grand strategy includes securing the border and economic nationalism, core elements of Trump’s agenda, but its most important component is prioritizing the containment of China as the driving principle of U.S. foreign policy in the new Cold War against the Chinese Communist Party.

After three decades of being the only unquestioned regional hegemon and global superpower, and hence benefiting from the geopolitical and financial advantages conferred by this privileged status, a peer rival is now on the horizon. And while conflicts in the Middle East or Russia’s war in Ukraine dominate the daily headlines, there should be no higher priority for America’s grand strategy in coming years other than containing China’s quest for regional hegemony and global superpower status.

Taking Xi at His Word: War in 2027

Harrison Schramm

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Leaders of both China and the United States[i] have opined about the possibility of a Cross (Taiwan) Strait invasion in early 2027. While there are historical examples of countries having deadlines internally (famously, Hitler’s four year plan for Germany[ii]), having both sides of a potential conflict agree – at least in rhetoric – when the war should start is novel.

In this piece, we explore what happens when we take both President Xi and his prospective opponents at their word; that a cross-straits invasion of Taiwan will begin approximately 750 days from press time; Friday, 1 January 2027. Specifically, we would like to explore two issues:

1. If we really believe this war is upon us on this timescale, what should we do, and what are the risks of being wrong?
2. If China really believes that, what would they do that we could observe to know they are serious? What would be the risks to believing them?

But first, a short primer in:

How militaries spend money

Note: If you are a longtime “Pentagon Warrior” you might feel this section is a review; you should read it anyway. Defense budgets are both huge and notoriously opaque. Perhaps surprisingly and counter to popular sentiment, it is straightforward to understand how the United States spends its’ defense budget. You can get an exhaustive briefing here[iii]; and the items not covered in the budget are notable by their rarity. Conversely, it is nigh on impossible to figure out how China spends their defense budget (we’ve tried)[iv]. 

China military now a ‘significant threat’ capable of winning in a conflict with U.S., says repor

Bill Gertz

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China’s military power poses an acute threat to the United States and Beijing’s forces could now potentially defeat the U.S. military in a future regional conflict, according to a congressional commission report made public Tuesday.

The report, based on both classified and unclassified information and hearings, also warned that Beijing is escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific region against Japan, in addition to continued military pressure targeting Taiwan and the Philippines further south.

Two decades of large-scale military expansion by China focused on building large numbers of missiles, ships, aircraft and other systems for a future Indo-Pacific conflict, said the 793-page report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

“As a result, U.S. forces and bases in the region would face a significant threat from the [People’s Liberation Army] in any regional contingency involving treaty allies and/or security partners, and the outcome of any such conflict is far from certain,” the report states.

China’s communist leaders view the U.S. military bases and activities in the region as “hostile” and “threatening,” and have been preparing for a future U.S. intervention should China take military action against Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold

Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Shawn Cochran, Alexis Dale-Huang, David R. Frelinger, Edward Geist, Jeff Hagen, Elliot Ji, William Kim & Nina Miller

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Introduction, Research Themes, and Methodology

U.S. President Joseph Biden and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping have twice publicly pledged that “nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won.”1 As nice as this may sound, if a war between the two countries ever comes to pass, this pledge will be put to the test. Passing that test could be harder than anticipated, and the United States should plan today to avoid disaster tomorrow. How to pass the test would vary across differing war scenarios, so, to focus our work, we consider what the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) describes as its “pacing scenario”: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.2 For this scenario, we assume that the Chinese government’s decision to invade Taiwan would come after some unambiguous strategic warning, allowing the United States to prepare and mobilize forces.3 The United States has a long-standing policy to maintain “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait”—including “oppos[ing] any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side”—and specifically promises to “uphold . . . commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain . . . capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.”4 Thus, for this scenario, we assume that the United States will militarily intervene to seek to stop the invasion and end the conflict.

Historical Lessons of the Short War Temptation for Putin and Xi

Julian Spencer-Churchill

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It is now a truism that political leaders don’t initiate wars with the expectation that they will be protracted contests of attrition. It is an interesting counter-factual conjecture whether Russian President Vladimir Putin, if he had a crystal ball two or three years into the war in Ukraine, would have still started his war, even without evidence of his defeat. John Mearsheimer, in his 1984 Conventional Deterrence, has a slew of case studies where failed blitzkrieg offensives transformed themselves into intractable slogs. U.S. journalist William L. Shirer reported that Hitler knew of his short war-long war gamble, as he had warned his military staffers that if the ensuing war became protracted, Germany could only hold out for a few years. The same consideration applies to Chinese Communist General Secretary Xi Jinping’s conception of the time horizon to complete an invasion of Taiwan. Short wars are of course rational, as a fait accompli would pre-empt any response by a slow-mobilizing U.S. alliance. However, if the lightning attack fails, then Putin and Xi would risk becoming victims of regime change by the extent of the re-organization they would need to impose on their citizens and industry in order to strengthen their respective countries.

How allied are Iran and Russia really?

Emil Avdaliani

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Iran and Russia will likely sign a strategic partnership treaty in Moscow later this year, upgrading a partnership the sometimes allies, sometimes foes established in the early 2000s.

Though the two sides have extended the original agreement several times, both have recognized the need to renew it so that it better reflects contemporary global realities.

The war in Ukraine, the related deterioration of ties between Russia and the collective West and exacerbating tensions between the US and China have all impacted what were already complicated relations between Moscow and Tehran.

If Russia was historically always cautious not to provide sensitive technologies to the Islamic Republic, largely because of potential negative reactions from the West, the war in Ukraine has apparently shifted Russia’s perspective.

Moscow has pivoted in earnest to Asia and Iran has become a pivotal state in its geopolitical recalibration. As a likewise heavily sanctioned state and critical for Russia’s reach to the Indian Ocean and East Africa, Moscow increasingly sees Iran as a major partner.

The makings of a grand Trump deal in the Middle East

Jamie Dettmer

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“Iran is a de facto threshold nuclear power,” said former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. It could be just days or weeks away from being able to assemble a nuclear warhead; nine months to a year from weaponizing it.

And if this is the course of action Tehran chooses, no surgical airstrikes — by either Israel or the United States — would be able to significantly delay it.

Delivered during an exclusive interview with POLITICO, Barak’s somber warning prompts an interesting question: Could the circumstances be shaping up for a deal between Iran and the U.S. if — as seems likely — President-elect Donald Trump retains his interest in stopping wars?

Trump’s recent administrative picks suggest such a deal would be unlikely. Marco Rubio, his pick for secretary of state, has been an unrelenting hawk when it comes to Iran. After the country fired nearly 200 missiles at Israel last month, Rubio noted that: “Only threatening the survival of the regime through maximum pressure and direct and disproportionate measures has a chance to influence and alter their criminal activities.”

North Korea Is the Only Winner in the Russia-Ukraine War

Justin Hastings

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Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea has moved from vocal support of Russia and the invasion to shipping missiles and artillery shells to Russia to sending North Korean soldiers into combat with heavy artillery. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a gift dropped in North Korea’s lap, but it has run with it. The opportunity to test North Korean weapons, and give North Korean troops some actual combat experience is no doubt welcomed by Kim Jong-un, But their presence in Russia and potentially Ukraine has several implications that show that North Korea is in a better strategic position now than at any time since the Cold War.

Enforcement of United Nations sanctions against North Korea is well and truly over. Essentially everything North Korea is doing with Russia; weapons exports, any payment or aid from Russia for North Korea’s nuclear, missile, submarine, or drone programs, and deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russia, is a violation of United Nations sanctions. While the sanctions continue to exist on paper, they cannot change North Korea’s behavior or encourage it down more productive paths.

Chinese and Russian sanctions enforcement has been flagging since North Korea’s diplomatic offensive in 2018. Even as North Korea has become more sophisticated in its efforts, the strategies North Korea uses to evade sanctions have become less convoluted: North Korean ships now forthrightly spend months being repaired and disguised in Chinese shipyards, ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned goods take place frequently within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and ships sail directly from North Korea to Russian ports.

Why Ukraine is Establishing Unmanned Forces Across Its Defense Sector and What the United States Can Learn from It

Kateryna Bondar

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The war in Ukraine has shown that unmanned systems are now indispensable to modern war tactics. These systems—both platforms and software—are evolving at an extremely rapid pace, as new updates and technological advancements emerge sometimes within one or two days. Yet, the technology itself is only part of the story. Achieving success on the battlefield requires more than just advanced unmanned systems, it also demands their effective integration into military operations, proper deployment, personnel training, and support throughout their use.

This urgent need has pushed the Ukrainian military to institutionalize these support functions by creating a new branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine—the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). In addition, specialized teams started to form within frontline forces as bottom-up initiatives. These teams work to integrate unmanned systems into operations, providing support to warfighters by delivering the latest technological developments to the battlefield and training how to operate them. According to a report from CSIS, these changes significantly alter the institutional landscape within the Ukrainian military, enabling it to adapt to rapid innovations development and making it more resilient to the technological advancements of the enemy.

This article analyzes the Ukrainian experience by examining three examples of these newly formed structural units. Identifying commonalities across these three cases will draw lessons that should be learned and potentially implemented when expanding the arsenal of unmanned systems in the U.S. Army.

Navy needs industry all in on 3D printing parts for subs, or else

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

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Leading Navy admirals and officials now see additive manufacturing as a potential savior of the overstretched submarine force and its “exceptionally fragile” industrial base. But they need industry to get on board, ASAP.

3D printers are already churning out an ever-larger array of ever-larger parts, from simple plastic safety covers, to high-end specialty valves, to robust metal structures weighing a ton and a half. And while many companies are embracing the new approach, the service’s program executive officer for attack submarines (PEO-SSN) had stern words for the laggards.

“If you are a supplier, and your lead time is too long, and you refuse to work with us to give us your tech and help us figure out how to reverse-engineer it and how to manufacture it — not that we’re trying to take it from you — [but] we’re going to figure it out,” said Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker, the PEO-SSN. “[That’s] not a threat — [it’s] a fact of life.

“We’re going to figure out how to get these parts quicker,” he told a ballroom full of contractors at last week’s Naval Submarine League conference. “We need your help. We don’t have a choice. Time is not on our side.”

Germany at a Crossroads: Coalition Breakdown Portends Sweeping Change in 2025

Melanie Banerjee

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On November 6, shortly after the results of the 2024 US elections became clear, Germany was plunged into political uncertainty when Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a confidence vote for January 2025. Given the flagging popularity of the coalition government, the confidence vote is likely to result in snap elections in February, well ahead of the expected date of September 2025.

The catalyst for these events traces back to a leaked policy position paper from Finance Minister Christian Lindner of the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP), which proposed policies in stark contrast to the FDP’s coalition partners, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens. The paper, titled Economic Transition for Germany: Economic Concepts for Growth and Intergenerational Fairness, contradicts and negates key aspects of coalition policy, including climate action, social security, taxation, and Germany’s Sonderweg thesis (the ‘unique path’). The disclosure effectively fractured the coalition, with Chancellor Scholz dismissing FDP Finance Minister Christian Lindner, leaving the SPD and Greens to rule in as a minority government.

Now evidently heading into early elections, the question arises: How will Germany’s economic transformation be impacted if these ideas are given central political consideration? Let’s examine.

Moscow raises nuke tensions, adjusts policy - Is it worth it?

Nick Sorrentino

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In our previous post we argued that the Biden administration’s authorization of long range strikes from the Ukraine into Russia, with “western-made” missiles was not only a mistake, but an act of shortsighted ego driven policy. (At least that’s what it looks like to us.) In the wake of Trump’s win, and with it the assumption that Ukraine and Russia would soon be forced to the negotiation table to settle things, the Biden administration purposely upped the heat in Ukraine, causing as much chaos as possible before power is handed over in Washington. There are many people in the American foreign policy community who are all-in on Ukraine. That Putin would emerge from the conflict intact is just too much for them.

The argument we often hear (and from people for whom we have great respect) is that if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine using our money but Ukraine’s blood it will soon be NATO’s (and American) blood on the line as Putin rolls his way through The Continent. These people argue that total European dominance is Putin’s master plan.

We have little doubt that if it was possible Putin might just fancy such an idea. But at this point, barring some monumental development not yet on the geopolitical horizon, it’s not possible. Putin can’t at this point project power beyond the small slice of Ukraine that is the Donbas. The idea that the Russian army is going to roll into Warsaw, never mind Berlin or Paris appears to us to be ludicrous. Logistically it would be pretty much guaranteed suicide for Moscow. This, before even considering NATO’s wrath.

Deterring the Nuclear Dictators

Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller

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For more than three decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies faced no serious nuclear threats. Unfortunately, that is no longer the case. Russian President Vladimir Putin has been rattling his nuclear saber in a manner reminiscent of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed a dramatic buildup of China’s nuclear arsenal, a project whose size and scope the recently retired commander of U.S. Strategic Command has described as “breathtaking.” The Russian and Chinese leaders have also signed a treaty of “friendship without limits.” North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is supplying weapons and troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, and North Korea is improving its ability to strike both its neighbors and the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons, as it demonstrated with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launch on October 31.

These developments pose far-reaching challenges to U.S. national security. The United States no longer has the luxury of ignoring nuclear dangers and concentrating on deterring a single adversary. To address this new reality, the Biden administration has modified U.S. nuclear targeting guidance in order to be able to deter China and Russia simultaneously. It is also developing new nuclear delivery systems, platforms, and warheads. But Washington’s efforts to modernize the aging U.S. nuclear deterrent have been hampered by inadequate industrial base capacity, materials and labor shortages, and funding gaps. What needs to be done is clear: the next administration should dispense with undertaking an extensive review of either the nuclear deterrence policy or the modernization plans. There is a huge need to just get on with the work of modernization and fix the problems.

The Rise of Fragmentation. A New Economic Security Era?

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Multiple crises have shaken the foundations of the global economy, and the resulting instability has yet to recover. Instead, it has led to increasing fragmentation along political and ideological lines. The current geoeconomic order is increasingly defined by the use of advanced trade defense and economic security tools, such as tariffs, trade barriers, sanctions, and export restrictions, which have become more sophisticated. Major economies are adapting to this new reality by shaping their own definitions of economic security, particularly to safeguard critical and high-tech sectors. The EU, the US, and China are each calibrating their economic security strategies, seeking a balance between openness and protection that maximizes their respective advantages. However, in this shifting international landscape, new actors are emerging with the potential to influence the global balance of power.

What type of "new globalization" is emerging? Could economic security tools become the new normal in the global economy? What are the key economic security strategies adopted by the world's leading economies?

Language barriers and inexperience may hamper North Korean troops on Russia’s battlefield

Stella Kim and Mithil Aggarwal

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North Korea’s entry into Russia’s war against Ukraine is a major escalation in the grinding conflict, but Moscow may find it’s more trouble than it’s worth.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has sent thousands of soldiers to Russia, the U.S. and others say, stepping up his assistance against Ukraine as he and Russian President Vladimir Putin strengthen security ties.

With victory still elusive as the war nears the end of its third year, Putin welcomes more help from North Korea, which has already been providing weapons, experts say. But the inexperience of the North Korean soldiers as well as the language barrier between them and their Russian counterparts are likely to minimize their impact on the battlefield, military analysts told NBC News.

“The average Russian soldier is going to say, what are they doing here? I’m having to hold their hand. I’m tripping over their bodies,” said Sydney Seiler, the U.S. national intelligence officer for North Korea from 2020 to 2023.

My List of Weapons Europe Can Give Ukraine Now—Before It's Too Late

Michael Bohnert

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With Donald Trump returning to the U.S. presidency on Jan. 20, Europeans are asking what they can do to keep Ukraine armed if U.S. military aid were to be cut back.

At first glance, it might seem like not much; Europe has abdicated to the United States much of its security and industrial base since the end of the Cold War.

When I took a deeper look, however, I discovered that Europe can provide significant useful, albeit nontraditional, military aid even in this short time frame. But Ukraine cannot wait; Europe must act now.

Last May, I wrote about how much military materiel Ukraine needed and how much it would cost, reality-testing an analysis put out by the Estonian Ministry of Defense calling for member states to annually contribute 0.25 percent of GDP for four or more years.

My analysis calculated that without U.S. participation, an annual contribution of approximately 0.5 percent GDP by European NATO members would sufficiently support Ukraine's annual munitions needs for a defensive stalemate. Double that or more would be needed to support military restoration of Ukrainian territory.

Climate Diplomacy: Watch What Countries Do, Not What They Say

David M. Hart

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How is global climate diplomacy shaping up at the conference in Baku?

Not surprisingly, the mood in Azerbaijan, at the annual summit to review progress toward the Paris goals (known as COP29), is said to be gloomy, and with good reason. President-elect Donald Trump’s wholesale denial of the science of climate change and his promises to maximize U.S. fossil fuel output are extreme, even compared with leaders of petrostates, including this year’s host nation. During his previous tenure, Trump pulled the United States out of the Paris climate agreement, and he has promised to do so again when he takes office in January.

Yet, the American election is far from the determining factor in the global fight against climate change. Neither is what happens at this COP or the others that will be held during Trump’s second term. What matters is how fast clean energy and climate technologies can get cheaper and better. About a third of the emissions reductions needed to get to net zero are expected to come from technologies that are not currently on the market. If they do come down in price, governments—even the United States— will be willing to take more aggressive actions to cut emissions. If they don’t, climate diplomacy will mostly be hot air that barely nudges emissions levels.

COP29 Summit in Baku: What to Expect

Alice C. Hill and Priyanka Mahat

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Negotiators from across the globe will gather in Baku, Azerbaijan, for the twenty-ninth annual UN climate change conference on November 11. Their goal almost thirty years after the first Conference of the Parties (COP) in Berlin remains the same: increase international ambition to curb global warming below 1.5°C (2.7°F) pre-industrial levels to avoid catastrophic harm to the planet. Yet the world is perilously close to breaching that limit. At this year’s COP, countries will focus on pushing for more ambitious emissions reductions and identifying new sources of finance.

What’s at stake at this year’s summit?

COP29 takes place in the shadow of the upcoming deadline for nations to provide updated plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Paris Agreement by February 2025. These commitments, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), lie at the heart of the Paris Agreement’s goal of curbing the rise in global temperatures. To date, these voluntary commitments have not set the world on course to contain heating to 1.5°C, much less 2°C. Current policies put the planet on track to experience approximately a 2.6-3.1°C rise by 2100, according to UN estimates. Yet, with every tenth of a degree of warming comes much more extreme weather. Meanwhile, carbon dioxide and methane accumulation in the atmosphere is at the highest level ever recorded. The burning of fossil fuels by humans accounts for about 90 percent of these emissions. According to the chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the scientific group that advises the UN process, insufficient commitments paint a “bleak picture” for the future.

Biden’s green light for Ukraine to use ATACMS in Russia just raised the stakes in a war Trump will inherit

Nick Paton Walsh

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The decision by US President Joe Biden to allow Ukraine to use long-range American missiles in Russia follows a familiar pattern.

The White House refuses for months to grant a weapons request from Ukraine, fearing it would be escalatory. Kyiv loudly decries the refusal, and just when the request seems to have been parked, the Biden administration approves it.

Ukraine’s request for HIMARS, Abrams tanks, F16s – all followed a similar pattern of refuse and prevaricate, and then grant, almost at the moment when it is too late.

Is it too late for the US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, to make a difference if it hits targets deep inside Russia?

The answer is complex and perhaps explains some of the reluctance of the Biden administration to grant permission.

Firstly, there is a limited supply of ATACMS that Ukraine can get its hands on. So even Kyiv being able to hit deep inside Russia is not going to yield an overnight change in the battlefield. The White House did not specify the variant of ATACMS it has given permission to be fired into Russia, but the missile’s longest range can be up to 300 kilometers (190 miles), per the manufacturer’s website.

First Stand-In Attack Missile Delivered To USAF

Joseph Trevithick

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Flight testing of the U.S. Air Force’s Stand-In Attack Weapon (SiAW) missile is now set to begin following the delivery of an initial test article. Derived from the AGM-88G missile designed primarily to punch holes in enemy air defenses, SiAW is under development to offer a broader high-speed strike capability against time-sensitive ground targets, including ballistic and cruise missile launchers, air and missile defense nodes, electronic warfare systems, and even anti-satellite weapons.

Northrop Grumman, the prime contractor for the AGM-88G and SiAW, released a brief statement today about the delivery of the new test missile, “which is designed to verify that the launch aircraft can safely carry and separate the weapon,” along with a picture of it, seen at the top of this story. The company received its latest SiAW contract, valued at approximately $705 million, in September 2023. The U.S. Navy has already been leading the very active development of the AGM-88G, also known as the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range (AARGM-ER), for years now. The first AARGM-ER live-fire flight test occurred in 2021.

Specific details about range, speed, and other capabilities of the SiAW, as well as AGM-88G, remain limited. It is worth noting that Lockheed Martin unveiled a hypersonic missile called Mako, which it said was originally developed for the SiAW competition, earlier this year. We don’t know whether or not this means that SiAW (and by extension the AARGM-ER) might then also be capable of reaching hypersonic or near-hypersonic speeds, including in a terminal stage sprint.

Sweden's 'Doomsday Prep for Dummies' guide hits mailboxes today

Connor Jones

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Residents of Sweden are to receive a handy new guide this week that details how to prepare for various types of crisis situations or wartime should geopolitical events threaten the country.

The "If crisis or war comes" [PDF] guide received its first update in six years and its distribution to every Swedish household begins today. Citing factors such as war, terrorism, cyberattacks, and increasingly extreme weather events, the 32-page guide was commissioned by the government and calls for unity to secure the country's independence.

"To all residents of Sweden, we live in uncertain times," the brochure begins. "Armed conflicts are currently being waged in our corner of the world. Terrorism, cyberattacks, and disinformation campaigns are being used to undermine and influence us. To resist these threats, we must stand united. If Sweden is attacked, everyone must do their part to defend Sweden's independence – and our democracy.

Trump’s Place in US Political Cycles

George Friedman

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As I wrote in my most recent book, “The Storm Before the Calm,” we tend to use presidencies as benchmarks to help us locate where we are in time, but it would be a mistake to think that presidents and policies are the true agents of change. In truth, time is the ultimate arbiter of change, and what defines any era are the forces that impose themselves on presidents.

Presidents are elected by aligning with the pressures that already exist, and they govern in response to these pressures. Since the United States is a democracy, that should not be surprising. But even in democracies, there is a belief that presidents are free actors and, as such, design history. But that is not the case. The normal pattern in U.S. political history is that “ineffective” presidents are elected at the end of a 50-year cycle, and that their presidencies exist in social and economic chaos. These presidents usually, through no fault of their own, lose the ability to govern. And in the following election, a president who can change where we are and set the country in a new direction is elected.

Defining the Indefinable: A Critical Analysis of Current Irregular Warfare Doctrine

Duc DuClos

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Introduction

On November 1st, 2024, the Army University Press YouTube channel released a comprehensive examination of irregular warfare doctrine. This professionally produced video, part of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate's ongoing doctrinal review, weaves together combat footage, historical imagery, and dynamic graphics with insights from academic scholars, military practitioners, and senior leaders. While presenting an authoritative view of irregular warfare's doctrinal evolution, the video inadvertently demonstrates the SOF community's broader challenges in conceptualizing this complex form of conflict. Through its attempt to capture every aspect of irregular warfare, the video reflects the current definitional challenges facing military doctrine writers and practitioners.

The video's examination begins with Clausewitz's enduring principle that "the character and form of war are constantly changing, yet its fundamental nature remains the same." This observation proves particularly relevant as the U.S. military adapts irregular warfare capabilities—honed through two decades of counterterrorism operations—to address Great Power Competition. However, the video's subsequent attempts to define irregular warfare reveal definitional challenges shared by current joint doctrine, suggesting systemic issues in how the military conceptualizes irregular warfare. These challenges extend beyond mere terminology to fundamental questions about the nature of irregular warfare itself.