Indians Are Seeking Work in War Zones

Puja Changoiwala

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Afsan Mohammed, a 30-year-old from the southern Indian state of Telangana, could not find a job that matched his skills, despite having a business degree. While working a retail job with low pay, he found a YouTube channel that promised work in Moscow. He left India on Nov. 9, 2023, but instead of the job he had hoped for in Moscow, he found himself coerced into fighting in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He did not return alive.

His brother, Imran Mohammed, told me that his brother fell prey to the lure of better wages. “He was promised a monthly salary of 45,000 rupees [$532], which would increase to 150,000 rupees [$1,775] after three months, in addition to a Russian passport and citizenship,” he said.

Melting glaciers leave homes teetering in valley of jagged mountains

Caroline Davies

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Komal’s morning view was of jagged, forbidding mountains, the rush of the river dozens of metres below the family home on the cliff. That was until the water became a torrent and tore the ground away beneath their feet.

“It was a sunny day,” says Komal, 18.

For generations, her family had lived among the orchards and green lands in the heart of the Hunza valley in the Karakorum mountains of Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan region.

“In the morning everything was normal, I went to school,” Komal says, “but then my teacher told me that Hassanabad bridge had collapsed.”

Upstream, a glacial lake had formed, then suddenly burst - sending water, boulders and debris cascading down the valley and gathering speed. The ground trembled so violently some people thought there was an earthquake.

When the torrent hit the cement bridge that connected the two parts of the village, it turned it to rubble.

What an Even More Hawkish China Policy Could Look Like

Rishi Iyengar

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Competition with China has become the biggest through line of a highly polarized Washington over the past decade, and a bipartisan commission that advises U.S. lawmakers on China is calling for some drastic measures to help the United States win that competition.

Among the 32 recommendations from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s annual report to Congress, published on Tuesday, are revoking China’s bilateral free trade privileges; barring the import of technologies, including “autonomous humanoid robots,” from China; and creating a Manhattan Project to achieve artificial intelligence capable of surpassing human cognition.

Ron Paul: If Trump Didn’t Send Musk To Talk With The Iranians…He Should – OpEd

Ron Paul

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One of the most encouraging and promising things President-elect Trump said in his post-election acceptance speech was, “I’m not going to start a war. I’m going to stop wars…” We all understand that campaign promises often have a short shelf life after the election is over, but the Trump campaign’s repeated talk of peace over war at least demonstrates that he finds it a winning point to make to American voters.

Will that talk of peace turn into action in the second Trump presidency, especially with the hawks he has named to senior foreign policy positions in his incoming Administration? It is hard to say, but last week’s report that he sent Elon Musk to meet with the Iranian Ambassador to the UN would be a good sign if true. Iran has denied that any such meeting took place, and with rumors swirling of Trump talks with Putin and other world leaders it may just be a media creation.

But even if it is not true that Trump sent Musk to meet with the Iranians it would be a good idea to do so. Why Musk? Because Musk is not expected to take on a formal role in the incoming Trump Administration he can be seen as an informal advisor and friend of the President-elect. Plus, as a businessman Elon Musk speaks a different language than government diplomats.

Rethinking Defense Strategy for a New Era of Total War

Antonio Graceffo

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Nearly every day, the U.S. and its allies face cyber-attacks originating from some combination of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, along with other hostile actors. Russian and Chinese spies operate within Western societies as well as in key allied nations in Asia, such as Taiwan and Japan, much like during the Cold War era. And in more kinetic terms, the Houthis, an Iran-backed proxy, continue to routinely launch attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, damaging the supply line security of the wider global economy, and the Ukraine war rages in eastern Europe. In the financial realm, billions are being siphoned out of public coffers or laundered via crypto or financial crimes. And inter-state conflict is now reaching into outer space, where China and Russia are actively developing weapons able to target Western satellites critical for navigation, communication, and targeting systems.

Few could deny the veracity of the above trends; taken together, they are reflective of a new era, one where the boundaries of warfare have broadened, and conflicts extend far beyond traditional military engagements. This is a shift back toward ‘total war,’ where entire societies and economies are mobilized and in turn become targets. Once again technology is playing a leading role; for example, advances in drone warfare, cyber attacks, and space-based operations enabling novel ways to strike at military, economic, and civilian targets. Yet unlike the recent past, notably the 9/11 era where perceived threats were primarily land-based, today’s major geopolitical revolve around the sea, particularly in regions like the Indo-Pacific, where tensions between the United States and China play out, as well as in the Black and Red seas.

"De Oppresso Liber": What Trump's national security advisor pick means for Ukraine

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Last week I was honored to speak at the Kyiv Economic Forum about the U.S. elections, after President Trump had won. As we all know, U.S. support is critical for the future of Ukraine to defeat Russia and many in Kyiv are concerned whether this assistance would remain in place. Prior to the election, considerable uncertainty was about to who would be president. Now that this uncertainty has ended, there is now more uncertainty as to how Donald Trump and his administration will lead in relation to Ukraine. I suggested to the audience at the Forum and wrote in a column for Ukrinform to watch the four most important Trump appointees to help determine the future U.S. support. The four positions are the National Security Advisor (in the Biden administration it’s Jake Sullivan), the Secretary of Defense (currently Secretary Lloyd Austin), Secretary of State (currently Antony Blinken), and CIA Director (Currently Bill Burns). I spoke at length about the most important, in my opinion, of these four key positions with regards to Ukraine. And that’s the National Security Advisor.

This week the appointments have been announced but, again, there’s uncertainty as to what they will do once they are in the role on January 20. CIA Director will be John Ratcliffe, the former Director of National Intelligence during Donald Trump’s previous term. The Secretary of State will be Marco Rubio, a Senator from Florida. The Secretary of Defense will be Pete Hegseth. And the National Security Advisor will be Congressman Mike Waltz. All four are perceived as “hawks” against Russia, China, and Iran.

Addressing 4th, 5th Generation, and Hybrid Warfare Threats to the United States: The War Has Started

Ken Robinson

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Problem Statement

The United States faces an unprecedented array of threats stemming from the rapid evolution of modern warfare. Fourth and fifth-generation warfare, alongside hybrid tactics, are being weaponized by adversarial states and non-state actors to undermine U.S. security, global stability, and the rules-based international order.

Central to this threat matrix is the targeting of critical infrastructure, including undersea communication cables, which could severely disrupt command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities.

This jeopardizes strategic awareness and operational readiness, particularly as tensions escalate with Russia's recent deployment of 10,000 North Korean troops to the Kursk region and Ukraine's use of U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles within Russian territory.

Failure to address these threats effectively risks severe strategic surprise, undermining the ability of the United States and its allies to respond to aggression, maintain peace, and protect national sovereignty.

Water Can Be a Global Security Issue. This New Tool Will Help The Military Plan

David Roza

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From flooding in North Carolina to droughts in East Africa, changing water cycles exacerbated by climate change are driving instability around the world. Even in peacetime, mud or rain can slow troop movements, cancel sorties, and generally make life more difficult for U.S. military leaders.

But a new tool launched late last month aims to give leaders across the government better information at a faster tempo to predict and manage water-related risks when planning military operations, disaster response, environmental monitoring, resource management, and more.

The Global Hydro-Intelligence (GHI) system takes information from a wide range of sources, including satellites, ground-based sensors, and climate models, to give planners a “comprehensive picture of global water dynamics,” Lt. Col. Mickey Kirschenbaum, a public affairs officer for weather force management at Air Force Headquarters, told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

If it gets wet, it’ll likely be in the GHI system, which aims to provide accurate and timely information on soil moisture, snow cover, vegetation health, precipitation, and many things in between, both in the short term and the long run.

How Trump Can Build on Biden’s Successes in Asia

Michael J. Green

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U.S. Asia policy over the last 40 years has been a success. There have been no major interstate wars in East Asia since 1979. The United States has built a dense and increasingly collaborative network of alliances and partnerships that enjoys bipartisan support. American private sector investment in Asian countries with the region’s largest economies dwarfs that of any other country, and the United States is the primary destination for foreign direct investment from all major economies in Asia (except China). Even as democracy erodes elsewhere, many countries in the region remain vibrant democracies. And thanks to a strong basis of bipartisan agreement, U.S. policymaking in the region can often rise above the gridlock and polarization in Washington.

With his victory in the 2024 presidential election, Donald Trump will inherit a formidable Asia policy that has been passed down through Republican and Democratic administrations. President Joe Biden built his impressive record in the region around this consensus. The diplomatic partnership among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States known as the Quad, or Quadrilateral Dialogue, which Biden elevated from a ministerial-level forum to a leaders’ summit, began under George W. Bush’s administration as a joint task force to rescue victims of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and was revived by the Trump administration as a regular meeting of the members’ foreign ministers. (Biden acknowledged the Quad’s bipartisan lineage at the first summit held during his presidency.) Biden’s initiatives on U.S. military force posture, semiconductor technology controls, and trilateral relations with Japan and Korea all have roots in the Bush, Obama, or Trump administrations. And the new components his presidency added, such as AUKUS (the submarine and defense technology partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), enjoy broad support in Congress and will likely endure for administrations to come. Once in office, Trump will not lack for potential avenues for engagement in Asia.

How Ukraine's use of longer-range U.S. missiles might affect course of the war

Benjamin Jensen

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The outgoing Biden administration has authorized Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied longer-range missiles to strike deeper into Russian territory, according to reports citing White House officials.

The move comes amid concern in the West that Moscow -- aided by the influx of thousands of North Korean fighters -- might be preparing a major counteroffensive to regain lost territory in the Kursk region of Russia.

But how big a deal is the Biden decision? And could it change the trajectory of the conflict in Eastern Europe? The Conversation U.S. turned to Benjamin Jensen, a professor at American University and the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting, for answers.

What are the missiles the United States authorized Ukraine to use?

The Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, are short-range ballistic missiles that can travel a lot farther than the weapons previously at Kyiv's disposal.

North Koreans Are Not Russia’s Only Foreign Fighters in Ukraine

Kristiina Silvan

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The news about North Korean troops that have joined Russian forces to participate in Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine has spread quickly and generated a vivid debate within the expert community. While the exact number and role of the troops remain unclear, Pyongyang’s decision to deploy soldiers represents a pivotal moment of the war not only for Ukraine but also the international community.

However, North Koreans are not the first foreign citizens joining the war on the Russian side. Unlike the Ukrainian army, where the presence of international forces has been well documented, the Russian army has been portrayed as ethnically diverse but fully made up of Russian citizens. Ethnic minority Russians, such as the Buryats, Kazakhs, and Tuvans, are indeed not just present but overrepresented in the Russian army.

However, there have been persistent media reports about the recruitment and deployment of Central Asian migrants who either have no Russian citizenship or have recently received it through naturalization.

According to the Russian Interior Ministry, Russia currently hosts over 10 million labor migrants from Central Asia, primarily from the former Soviet states of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Many of these migrants are employed in low-skill positions in the shadow economy. Given the lack of economic opportunities in their countries of origin, the availability of jobs across Russia, and pre-existing migrant networks, the number of Central Asians in Russia is not declining despite the upsurge of anti-immigrant sentiment.

The Stakes of the Russia-North Korea Alliance

Carol R. Saivetz

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In early October 2024, Ukrainian intelligence announced that several thousand North Korean soldiers had begun training in Russia. The South Korean government and the United States corroborated the report. Then, on November 5, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated that Ukrainian forces had had their first encounter with the North Koreans. By the second week in November, speculation mounted that the Russians were preparing a counter-offensive against Ukrainian troops in Kursk that would include the same North Korean forces.

On the one hand, the deployment of the North Korean troops seems a logical follow-up to the mutual defense treaty signed by Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang in June. On the other hand, it raises a series of important questions.

What will be the impact of the deployment on Russia’s war effort? What does it say about the North Korean-Russian relationship? What are the implications for the Korean peninsula and Russo-Chinese relationship?

The treaty signed in June states that North Korea and Russia “shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay” if one party “is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states.”

A Military Strategy for Negotiations in Ukraine

Benjamin Jensen

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With talks of negotiations emerging, the United States needs a clear military strategy that supports the process and ensures Kyiv negotiates from a position of strength. This strategy should build on the recent, partial removal of long-range strike restrictions and drop outdated restrictions that limit weapons transfers that could actually save the U.S. taxpayer money and support continued economic growth.

First, there is a need to align weapons release authorities with the battlefield reality of the ongoing, multi-front, Russian ground offensive in Kursk and Eastern Ukraine. Russia is assuming significant risk to force and mission in an increasingly desperate race to seize more territory before the new year and inauguration in Washington. Battlefield casualties continue to make records despite an economy in free fall. In addition, North Korea has entered the fight, and Pyongyang is deploying additional long-range artillery to support the campaign alongside promises of up to 100,000 additional soldiers. There are also reports China is making lethal drones to support this final push. Russian glide bombs continue to batter trenches along the front line while drone and missile salvos saturate the skies over Ukrainian cities, targeting critical infrastructure.

The Double-Edged Sword of Semiconductor Export Controls: Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment

William Alan Reinsch, Jack Whitney, and Matthew Schleich

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Introduction

With geopolitical competition intensifying, U.S. economic security policy has undergone significant changes. Primarily, the United States has expanded economic security measures to take new defensive actions around critical and emerging technologies (CETs). Such efforts center on denying China access to key foundational technologies—particularly advanced semiconductors that support dual-use applications such as artificial intelligence (AI).

The administrations of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden have expanded economic security measures regarding China’s access to CETs. Export controls are an increasingly common tool in U.S. economic security efforts, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has called them a “new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit.”1 Under the Biden administration, the federal government has implemented two major rounds of semiconductor export controls, one in October 2022 and a second in October 2023. Additional controls may be forthcoming as the United States aims to use trade restrictions to deny China access to leading-edge semiconductors, thus limiting China’s ability to develop military and dual-use technologies such as advanced AI systems.2

The potential benefits of such a strategy to economic and national security are obvious. They include maintaining technological superiority for modern military capabilities and intelligence gathering. Washington sees clear, legitimate risks associated with the proliferation of highly advanced semiconductors among its adversaries. A sensible U.S. export control policy focused on preserving technological superiority is a measured response.

The Paradox of Israeli Deterrence

Carrie A. Lee

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Last April, it appeared as though escalation between Israel and Iran could plunge the entire Middle East into conflict. Israel’s strikes on the Iranian consulate in Damascus prompted Iran to retaliate by launching a barrage of missiles and rockets into Israel—the first time that Iran had openly attacked the country. But after Israel responded in a relatively muted way, both countries moved on from the confrontation. Observers, too, put aside their most acute worries, comforted by the fact that both countries had shown that they had no interest in a wider war.

This conclusion, however, was premature. In September, Israel intensified its campaign against Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed paramilitary group operating in Lebanon. This marked an important shift: it suggests that Israeli leaders decided they wanted to actively reshape the balance of power in the Middle East. Much more than its actions in Gaza, Israel’s war against Hezbollah threatens Iran’s ability to project power and profoundly diminishes its ability to deter Israeli interventions into its own domestic politics and nuclear program. The weakening of Iran’s position will benefit Israelis in the short term. But in the long term, it will significantly increase the risk of a regional war and even the likelihood that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. To avoid being dragged into yet more conflict in the Middle East, the United States must work to restrain further Israeli action and stabilize the balance of power.

Russia Broadens Conditions For Using Nuclear Weapons

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As the war in Ukraine entered its 1,000th day Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a revised nuclear doctrine stating that a conventional attack on Russia by any nation supported by a nuclear power is considered a joint attack and could trigger a nuclear response.

The proclamation came a day after U.S. President Joe Biden authorized Ukraine to use long-range weapons from the U.S. to attack military targets in Russia.

When Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov was asked if the revised doctrine was issued in response to the U.S. authorization, he said it was put forth “in a timely manner” and that Putin wanted it updated to be “in line with the current situation,” the Associated Press reported.

The doctrine states nuclear weapons could be used in case of a massive air attack involving ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft, drones and other flying vehicles.

It says an attack against Russia by a nonnuclear power with the “participation or support of a nuclear power” will be seen as their “joint attack on the Russian Federation.”

Europe’s Five Big Powers Commit To Ukraine Regardless Of US Policy

Claudia Ciobanu

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Foreign ministers of the five biggest powers in Europe together with the incoming top EU diplomat and host Poland held talks in Warsaw on Tuesday to reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine in its defence against Russian aggression.

“We were in agreement that imposing on Ukraine peace recipes contrary to its interests or unacceptable socially would have a negative impact on the stability of the country,” Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said after the meeting of Weimar Triangle foreign ministers (Germany, France and Poland) plus Italy, Spain and the UK.

“Any scenarios for finishing the war and putting an end to Russian aggression must be worked out in close cooperation with the Ukrainian government,” Sikorski added.

The meeting was called to allay fears that Ukraine would be sidelined once the newly elected US president Donald Trump takes office in January. Trump has repeatedly talked about bringing peace “in 24 hours” by imposing a solution that would likely be heavily weighted towards Russia.

Jitters were also caused by the decision of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to discuss the war with Russian President Vladimir Putin on a one-on-one call last week, the first since the full-scale invasion began. That call has been criticised by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, among others.

Deterrence 2027: Keeping the Threat at Bay

James Wirtz

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The year 2027 has been designated as a “year of maximum danger,” especially for the inhabitants of the island of Taiwan. This is not the first time, however, that a critical benchmark has emerged for American strategists and planners. Amid the shocks of the early Cold War, National Security Council Report-68 (NSC-68), drafted in April 1950 by a committee led by Paul H. Nitze, also identified a year of maximum danger, 1954.1 Nitze, who was the Director of Dean Acheson’s State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, estimated that this was the year that the Soviet Union would possess the capability to launch a disarming nuclear strike against U.S. forces, tempting the Kremlin “to strike swiftly and with stealth.” “In time,” noted Nitze, “the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we have now programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.”2 History does not repeat itself, but the reader might be forgiven for thinking that it does seem to rhyme.

Nitze’s time horizon was a bit longer than ours today and the nuclear threat he foresaw was more extreme than the circumstances generally associated with a People’s Liberation Army assault on Taiwan. His response to the looming threat of the 1950s, however, also was significantly different than today’s call to better prepare to engage in hostilities about three years hence. Nitze suggested that the United States should not focus on prevailing in a coming war; instead, he called for preventing the outbreak of war in the first place by making a significant effort to bolster the West’s deterrent posture.3 This raises two relevant questions. If there is little enthusiasm today about engaging in a naval showdown in the Taiwan Strait, why not concentrate on altering Beijing’s perception of the military and political setting so that the prospect of hostilities appears unattractive? Why do we not do everything in our power to bolster our maritime deterrent to spare the world a potentially catastrophic conflict in the western Pacific?

Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War

Benedict Vigers

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After more than two years of grinding conflict, Ukrainians are increasingly weary of the war with Russia. In Gallup’s latest surveys of Ukraine, conducted in August and October 2024, an average of 52% of Ukrainians would like to see their country negotiate an end to the war as soon as possible. Nearly four in 10 Ukrainians (38%) believe their country should keep fighting until victory.

Ukrainians’ current attitudes toward the war represent a decisive shift from where they stood after it began in late February 2022. Surveyed in the months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Ukrainians were defiant, with 73% preferring fighting until victory.

In 2023, support for fighting until victory slipped, but more than twice as many Ukrainians favored a continued fight (63%) over a negotiated peace (27%). Fatigue has intensified this year, with support for negotiated peace rising to 52%, the first time it has reached a majority.

Rising fatigue with the war comes at a time when its immediate future is in question. Russia has made military inroads on the front line in recent months, despite Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's "victory plan" to end the war, which includes joining NATO and using Western long-range missiles against Russian territory, also received mixed reactions from Western allies when presented last month -- overlapping the timing of Gallup's October fieldwork. In the past few days, outgoing President Joe Biden has given Ukraine the green light to strike inside Russia using long-range U.S. missiles.

Can Trump get a deal on Ukraine?

Lawrence Freedman

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Since Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election questions have been asked about whether he will push Ukraine into an unjust and unstable peace that will give Vladimir Putin all he wants, or that, even worse, he might just abandon Ukraine and leave it to cope as best it can without any help from the US. These questions matter enormously to Europe. Anxious discussions are already underway about whether and how Ukraine can be supported without the US, as it continues to resist Russian aggression. In the event of it being asked to accept an unsatisfactory deal, one precluding NATO membership, are there ways to give Ukraine confidence in its long-term security while it seeks to rebuild its economy and repair its cities?

We do not know the policies Trump will adopt on the war after 20 January and, in all probability, neither does he. This is not only because of his famed unpredictability, or the uncertainties surrounding the fighting, but also because Ukraine is nothing like as important to him as it is to Europeans. He has not appointed people to senior positions in his government with a Ukraine policy in mind. He has appointed them above all for their loyalty, to repay favours, and to demonstrate as sharp a break as possible with the liberal mainstream and the Biden administration. In the case of the Pentagon, the intelligence agencies, and the FBI his aim is to purge them of his actual and perceived enemies to prevent them thwarting his every move, which is what he believes they did during his first term in the White House.

Ukraine weapons: What arms are the US, UK and other nations supplying?

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US officials say President Biden has given Ukraine permission to fire long-range ATACMS missiles into Russian territory.

It is thought that the UK and France could follow suit by saying that Storm Shadow missiles can also be used against targets inside Russia.

Western nations have now donated more than $100bn (£79bn) of military aid to Ukraine.

Who has supplied the most military aid?

The US has been the biggest source of military aid to Ukraine, including weapons, equipment and financial assistance.

Between February 2022 and the end of August 2024, it gave $61.1bn (£48.4bn), according to German think tank the Kiel Institute.

Germany has given $11.4bn (£9bn) in military aid, the UK $10.1bn (£8bn), Denmark $7bn (£5.6bn), and the Netherlands $5.5bn (£4.4bn).

Securing the Digital Frontier: CIA Veteran’s Views on Cyber Intelligence

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In this exclusive interview, The Defense Post sits down with Darrell M. Blocker, a 28-year veteran of the CIA’s clandestine service and newly appointed Senior Advisor at Resecurity.

With a distinguished career that spans counterterrorism, global security operations, and leadership roles within the intelligence community, Blocker brings unparalleled expertise to the evolving field of cybersecurity.

As digital threats continue to escalate and cyberspace emerges as a critical domain in modern warfare, we explore Blocker’s insights on the integration of cyber intelligence with traditional intelligence disciplines, how private cybersecurity firms can collaborate with government agencies, and the future of global security in the digital age.

As cyberspace becomes a key area for warfare and espionage, how do you see cyber intelligence evolving in modern intelligence operations?

Cyberspace has been an integral part of warfare and espionage for decades. The number of Intelligence Collection Disciplines (INTs) specifically associated with tracking indications and warnings that uncover potential threats include but are not limited to SONAR, TELINT, and MASINT.

Lawmaker Demands Committee on Cartels in Push for Military Force

Billal Rahman

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ARepublican representative has urged the GOP to establish a dedicated committee to address the growing threat of drug cartels amid a push for military action against crime syndicates in Mexico.

Representative Dan Crenshaw, who serves Texas' 2nd Congressional District, is pushing for a specialized committee on cartels, seeking to bolster efforts to combat the escalating violence along the U.S.-Mexico border. The proposed legislation would allow the use of military force against the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels, NewsNation reported, as part of a broader strategy to suppress cartel activity and cross-border crime.

On November 15, Crenshaw wrote on X, formerly Twitter, that cartels were "the greatest near-term threat," as he called on House Speaker Mike Johnson to create a select committee to tackle the Mexican drug groups.

"We have solutions. But we don't have any authority. A select committee will have a better chance of moving these bills to the House floor and to a president who will sign them," he wrote in the post.

MoU with Cab-Hailing Apps: Unpacking the Cybersecurity Concerns

Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd)

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A podcast on social media about a MoU with a popular cab-hailing service has created a lot of controversy regarding cyber security. This was followed up by another X, formerly Twitter, posted by one of the panellists claiming that he had forwarded his concerns with some photographs to the Prime Minister and Raksha Mantri, and he claims that they had taken immediate action.

Leaving aside some of the cuss words and disrespect to armed forces by panellists who are no cyber security experts, the issue needs to be critically examined.

Armed forces officers and personnel are provided with government transport when they proceed on temporary duty, official engagements, or leave. Only the families would benefit from this MoU by ensuring various facilities like protection from surge rentals, discounts, accountability, honouring time-specific commitment, retrieving valuables inadvertently left behind in Cabs, security, etc.

Even if the MoU is not there, for example, in the Army, people will still use these cab-hailing apps. What is the difference? Knowing the address of military personnel in a well-protected Cantt/Military station is not a big deal. Even if you do not have an MoU, the app can still find the details if they wish by using simple data analytics.

The 'consumer AI revolution' will be powered by Big Tech's most familiar products

Rocio Fabbro

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Big Tech wants to put artificial intelligence in your pocket, your palms, and your home.

Meta (META), Apple (AAPL), Amazon (AMZN), and Google (GOOGL) are spending billions of dollars and marshaling vast resources to incorporate AI into some of the most familiar consumer technology products, as they look to benefit from and accelerate the rapid adoption — and business upside — of the new tech.

Meta has incorporated its AI chatbot into its popular social media platforms Instagram and Facebook. Apple finally rolled out its own AI suite, Apple Intelligence, in late October. Google has built AI summaries into its market-dominant search engine and rolled out its own chatbot, Gemini. And an AI upgrade to Amazon’s smart home device Alexa is in the works — though it has reportedly struggled to get it out the door.

“What is most important is that the user behavior needs to be established,” said Tejas Dessai, director of research at Global X, an investment management firm that issues exchange-traded funds. “What you’re seeing with so many people using tools like ChatGPT, for example, is that they’re getting accustomed to using these technologies on a regular basis. And once that happens, people start to build intuition for these functionalities.