21 November 2024

Indian police arrest suspect in $230 million WazirX crypto exchange hack

Daryna Antoniuk

Delhi police have arrested a suspect allegedly linked to the theft of at least $230 million worth of cryptocurrency from the India-based platform WazirX earlier this year.

The suspect, identified as Masud Alam from West Bengal, was detained on Thursday. The Indian newspaper Times of India described the arrest as “a significant breakthrough in the ongoing investigation” into the WazirX hack.

According to media reports, Alam allegedly created an account on WazirX using a false name and later sold it to another individual on Telegram. This account was then used to breach the exchange. The reports did not specify the potential punishment Alam could face.

The police investigation revealed that the cybercriminals behind the WazirX hack reportedly drained the platform’s “hot” wallet for transactions and attempted to breach its “cold” wallet, which stores funds offline with enhanced security measures.

The firm responsible for securing WazirX’s wallets, Singapore-based Liminal Custody, has reportedly refused to cooperate with the investigation or disclose the data requested by the police, hindering efforts to trace the stolen assets.

How Afghanistan’s Economy Can Survive Shrinking Shipments of U.N. Cash Aid

William Byrd, Ph.D.

Afghanistan’s precarious economy is facing a new set of multidimensional risks as humanitarian aid — delivered in massive shipments of U.S. cash dollars — shrinks rapidly amid competing demands from other crises around the world. The dollar inflows, moved under U.N. auspices, have helped stabilize the Afghan economy, cover its mammoth trade deficit, and inject monetary liquidity into commerce. With much smaller cash infusions, in line with a general reduction in aid, the suffering of Afghanistan’s poverty-stricken population is likely to increase.

Minimizing the potential economic damage will demand sound macroeconomic management by the Taliban regime. Among other measures, the country’s economic policymakers will need to organize a gradual depreciation of the excessively strong exchange rate and ensure that there are adequate amounts of Afghani currency notes in circulation.

Despite strongly disapproving of the Taliban's destructive policies on gender, other countries and international agencies can play a supportive role by facilitating production of more Afghani banknotes as needed and allowing investment income from the Afghan Fund in Switzerland (comprising part of Afghanistan's frozen foreign exchange reserves) to be used for macroeconomic stabilization. This can be done without turning any funds directly over to the Taliban.

Mapping a U.S. Strategy To Counter China’s CPEC Clout

Burak Elmali

As China continues to prioritize the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) within its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework and its regional ambitions, it becomes evident that Beijing is committed to its strategic regional connectivity objectives as a rising great power. Consequently, U.S. foreign policy should place a higher priority on addressing China’s influence in regional connectivity projects. The U.S. should develop a containment-based strategy and design infrastructure and connectivity initiatives to serve as significant strategic tools in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, all developments related to the CPEC should be closely monitored, taking into account the evolving dynamics between China and Pakistan. 

The CPEC, launched in 2015, represents the most expensive and ambitious connectivity initiative under China’s BRI, with an original estimated cost of $62 billion. The corridor spans approximately 3,000 kilometers (about 1,860 miles), commencing in China’s northwestern Xinjiang province and passing through Pakistani territory before reaching the Arabian Sea at the port city of Gwadar in Balochistan.

Over the past decade, the CPEC has come to mean different things for primary stakeholders China and Pakistan, as well as for the broader international community. For China, the project is a strategic move aimed at mitigating the “Malacca Dilemma,” a term describing the potential vulnerability posed by disruptions to China’s access to the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea in case of geopolitical tensions. “It also serves China as a critical conduit for reinforcing economic ties and expanding cooperation with the Persian Gulf region, an area where China’s economic engagement has intensified in recent years.”

The Power Vertical: Centralization in the PRC’s State Security System

Edward Schwarck

On September 25, 2024, newly promoted chiefs of provincial state security bureaus in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) gathered in Beijing for a “training course (培训班)” organized by the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Coverage of the event was characteristically sparse, yet a careful reading of Minister Chen Yixin’s (陈一新) speech at the opening session yields fresh evidence for reform of the PRC’s secret intelligence and counterespionage system (China Peace, September 25).

Chen used his address to analyze the “strengths and ‘shortcomings’ (优势和 ‘短缺’)” of provincial bureau appointees, describing them as “a team that the Party Committee of the MSS has comprehensively considered, carefully selected, and placed high hopes on (国家安全部党委通盘考虑、精心选拔、着力培养、寄予厚望的一支队伍).” Chen then exhorted his audience to “take the lead in implementing vertical management by the ministry’s Party Committee over the work of the entire [state security] system (带头落实部党委对全系统工作的垂直管理).” These comments are striking.


China’s Dilemmas Deepen as North Korea Enters Ukraine War

Carla Freeman, Ph.D. &  Naiyu Kuo

Until late October, the big questions about China’s role in the Ukraine conflict centered around whether Beijing would choose to expand its support for Russia to include lethal aid, or if it might engage in more active peacemaking to end the conflict. Then, on November 4, the Pentagon confirmed that North Korea sent more than 10,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk oblast, where Ukraine had captured some territory earlier this year. Days later, the State Department confirmed that North Korean soldiers had begun fighting Ukrainian troops.

North Korean combat troops’ support of Russia’s aggression has put an urgent set of new questions on the table for China: How might Beijing respond to this move by its North Korean ally amid the deepening Russia-North Korea partnership that it signals? What might Beijing do in response to requests from Washington and its allies to press Pyongyang to pull its troops home? Will China be able to sustain the distance it has sought to maintain from the conflict while providing support for Moscow? Or will Pyongyang’s role in the conflict change Beijing’s approach to the war in Ukraine?

Ukraine Is Now a Proxy War for Asian Powers

Jeffrey W. Hornung

Doubts over sustained U.S. support for Ukraine long predated Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election, and they have raised concerns over Kyiv’s ability to sustain its defense against Moscow’s war. These concerns have overshadowed another important dynamic in an already complicated conflict: the increasing involvement of East Asian powers in a European war. Besides the recent arrival of at least 10,000 North Korean soldiers on the Russian side, the evolving roles of China, Japan, and South Korea raise the question of whether a widening proxy war is being fought in Ukraine. By all indications, the answer is yes: The war is setting a new precedent for Indo-Pacific nations to compete for their interests on the global stage.

A proxy war is when two countries fight each other indirectly—by supporting warring participants in a third country. Classic examples from the Cold War era include the Congo crisis in the 1960s and the Angola crisis in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union and United States each backed warring factions in a civil war with money, weapons, and sometimes troops from yet other countries but never got directly involved in combat themselves.


The Pentagon faces an uncertain future with Trump

Justin Klawans

President-elect Donald Trump has been busy selecting potential Cabinet nominees, and there is perhaps no more consequential choice than the person he has nominated to run the Defense Department, Pete Hegseth. Trump has pledged to undertake a vast yet controversial overhaul of the federal government, and the Defense Department is no exception. This has some ranking members at the Pentagon worried about the next phase of America's defense policy with Hegseth as defense secretary.

Hegseth, a Fox News commentator and Army National Guard veteran, was close to Trump during his first term and emerged as a strong loyalist to the former (and now future) president. But his selection as defense secretary reportedly caught even Trump's closest allies off guard, and many are calling Hegseth unqualified for the job; It "appears that one of the main criteria that's being used is, how well do people defend Donald Trump on television?" Eric Edelman, the Pentagon's top policy official in the Bush administration, said to Politico. And a defense industry lobbyist offered another assessment to Politico, asking, "Who the fuck is this guy?" Hegseth has also been accused of sexual assault; he has denied these allegations but admitted to paying his accuser.

With Hegseth at the helm, he could determine how American military spending, defense policy and foreign policy are determined for the foreseeable future — or even whether soldiers are deployed on American streets.

1000 Days of War

Mick Ryan

Today, the war in Ukraine – or at least the time since the large-scale Russian invasion of 2022 – reaches the 1000-day mark.

At this point in the U.S. Civil War, the Union had gone through three commanders-in-chief and was on the cusp of launching the coordinated eastern and western campaigns under U.S. Grant. And at the 1000-day mark after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, coalition forces were at a low ebb as insurgent bombings plagued urban areas, and the President Bush admitted the invasion was based on faulty intelligence.

At the thousand-day mark of this phase of the war begun by Russia in 2014, Ukraine has suffered tens of thousands of military and civilian casualties, lost and regained large swathes of territory, and seen civilian infrastructure and priceless cultural artifacts destroyed. But it has also developed world-leading drone tactics and an entirely new strategic strike complex, employed extraordinarily effective strategic influence activities, re-invigorated its defence industry, and has become the first country to invade Russia in nearly a century.

French Navy carrier commander ponders data overload, battle at sea


Rear Adm. Jacques Mallard has led the French carrier strike group (FRSTRIKEFOR) since August 2023, focusing his efforts on enhancing how the naval formation shares information and trains in realistic battle conditions. In an interview during the Euronaval Talks, organized in the context of the Euronaval show in Paris earlier this month, Mallard commented on the new types of environments and competitors the strike group is up against, the complexities of applying lessons learned after missions, and feedback from a recent exercise with the Italian Navy.

Joe Biden’s long-range missile call helps Donald Trump

Tom Rogan

President Joe Biden has approved Ukraine’s use of long-range US weapons for strikes against military targets inside Russia. It might seem contradictory, but this decision actually helps his successor Donald Trump’s looming effort to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.

Biden’s actions will mean Ukraine can use the ATACMS missile system to reach targets up to 190 miles inside Russia. The UK and France, which have been pushing the US President to make this decision for more than a year now, are highly likely to provide Ukraine with approval to use their own Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles against Russian targets. They were hesitant to do so without prior US approval, due to the risk of allowing Vladimir Putin to fragment Nato’s deterrent posture. But what does this development mean for the future of the war?

At the tactical level, the main benefit for Ukraine is that it can now damage far more key targets in Russia. What’s more, the very threat of these weapons will force Russian and North Korean military units of all kinds to take far greater precautions in concealing their whereabouts.

Can the War in Gaza Be Won?

Noura Erakat, Josh Paul, Charles O. Blaha, and Luigi Daniele; John Spencer

The current war in Gaza is not an isolated conflict that began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas militants launched an attack inside Israel. Framing the war this way, as John Spencer does in a recent article in Foreign Affairs (“Israel Is Winning,” August 21, 2024), invites many dubious assertions about Israel’s purported progress toward its war aims and its supposed efforts to protect civilians. And it accepts without question the Israeli government’s official position that “Israel is fighting Hamas terrorists, not the Palestinian population,” as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in a speech in January. To simplify the conflict to a fight between Israel and Hamas is to ignore the on-the-ground realities that indicate Israel is waging an indiscriminate war on all Palestinians.

A more accurate understanding of the war must take its broader context into account. What is happening now in Gaza is one battle within the larger conflict that has shaped the Israeli-Palestinian relationship since the founding of Israel and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the new state’s territory in 1948. Today’s fight cannot be removed from that history and geography; gaining the upper hand in the current battle is not the same as winning the wider war. Spencer falls into this trap, miscasting Israel’s temporary tactical achievements as strategic victory and underestimating how Israel’s unwillingness to pursue a political resolution that recognizes the Palestinians’ right to self-determination will in the end diminish its chances of success.

Here’s a look at the number of women in military combat roles

LOLITA C. BALDOR

President-elect Donald Trump’s nominee for defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, has been outspoken about his opinion that women should not serve in combat roles.

Here’s a look at how many women are in such military roles, as of the 2024 budget year:

Women serving in special operations
  • Navy Special Warfare combat crew: 2
  • Air Force special operations: 3
  • Green Berets: Fewer than 10
  • Completed the Army Ranger course: more than 150
  • Total serving in Army Special Operations Command as special forces, civil affairs, psychological operations and helicopter pilots, including in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment: 260 to 270
Artillery, infantry and armor units

Thousands of women have served or currently are in jobs that until 2015 were male-only.
MARINES:
  • Officers in job categories previously restricted to men, including infantry, artillery and combat engineers: Nearly 192 
  • Enlisted Marine in those jobs: 410
  • That number has steadily increased since 2018.

Why did the US change its mind on Ukraine firing missiles into Russia? And will it impact the war?

John Hamilton

The lifting of US restrictions on the use of ATACMS ballistic missiles by Ukraine may help it repel Russian forces trying to retake Russian territory seized by Ukraine earlier this year. It could also strengthen Ukraine’s hand ahead of US President-elect Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House in January.

It may, however, be another case of too little, too late in Western support for Ukraine.

This week, the Biden Administration lifted restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US-supplied missiles known as ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile Systems). ATACMS have a range of around 300 kilometres. Previously, the US has told Ukraine only to use them against Russian forces on Ukrainian territory.

This has been a source of huge frustration to Ukraine, particularly as it could not use them against bases inside Russia that have launched ceaseless missile and drone assaults on Ukrainian cities.

Russian attacks on Ukraine in October killed 183 civilians and wounded another 903, according to the UN.

It is now more a question of can America defend Taiwan, not will it

Stephen Kuper

It is not hyperbole to say that the United States dodged a bullet in the aftermath of the recent election – there was no major outbreak of civil unrest and no collapse of the American republic.

Equally, it is safe to say that the world dodged a bullet at the same time, as any potential US civil unrest would have had truly global ramifications, particularly for key geopolitical and strategic flashpoints like the Middle East and Eastern Europe, particularly holding their breath.

However, by far, the most pivotal flashpoint to impact the future peace, prosperity and stability of the global environment and most consequential for Australia’s own enduring peace and security is the Taiwanese flashpoint.

In recognising this, many policymakers, strategic thinkers and historians have raised major concerns about America’s resolve, particularly in the new Trump era, to defend the island democracy of Taiwan.

Most recently, Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey, in a piece for The Weekend Australian titled The US has the strongest incentive to prevent Taiwan from being captured by China, focused on the important question about the enduring US will in the new world.

Russia is expanding its solid-propellant motor-production facilities

Fabian Hinz

Russia is engaged in what US officials describe as the ‘most ambitious expansion in military manufacturing since the Soviet era’. Satellite imagery suggests that solid-propellant rocket motor-production capacity appears to be one focus of this effort.

Substantial development activity is visible at five sites associated with the production of solid propellants. Recent satellite imagery suggests building work is taking place at multiple locations, including possible refurbishment of dormant Soviet-era facilities and the construction of new infrastructure. This work is noteworthy given that for the last 30 years there has been little evidence of expansion or refurbishment. Only in 2023, three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, did substantial investment appear to be underway.

Solid-propellant missile systems are central to Russia’s strategic arsenal and to its tactical ground-launched shorter-range weapons. Russia has used short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) widely in its war against Ukraine. The Russian Armed Forces have deployed multiple types of surface-to-surface missiles, including the 9K720 Iskander-M (RS-SS-26 Stone) SRBM and rockets fired by the Tornado-S multiple rocket launcher system (MRL), targeting both high-value Ukrainian military assets and critical infrastructure. Additionally, surface-to-air missile systems, such as the S-300P(RS-SA-20 Gargoyle) and S-400 (RS-SA-21 Growler), are central elements of Russia’s ground-based air-defence architecture, which it has also utilised in secondary ground-attack roles. Larger composite solid-propellant motors are also utilised in a large proportion of Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and its newer submarine-launched ballistic missiles that form the central pillar of Moscow’s strategic nuclear deterrent.

Turkiye’s Defence Industry: Which Way Forward?

Çağlar Kurç, Sıtkı Egeli, Arda Mevlütoğlu & Serhat Güvenç

Turkiye’s defence industry is directly impacted by the country’s foreign-policy orientation, and now finds itself at a critical juncture. Decisions taken in the next few years will shape the future of its armaments sector for decades to come. There are two crucial issues for poli­cymakers to assess: which countries should be Turkiye’s closest partners, and which defence-industrial sectors should be prioritised.

There are broadly five possible foreign-policy direc­tions that Ankara could take. Each has its own historical roots, whether recent or more distant. The five direc­tions can be categorised as ‘Isolationist’, ‘New Horizons’, ‘Shifting Course’, ‘Hedging’ and ‘Return to the West’.

An Isolationist approach would be the most damag­ing for Turkiye’s defence industry, placing it in a simi­lar bracket to those of Iran and North Korea. Because the industry is highly integrated into the Western defence-industrial ecosystem, severing relations with Western partners would severely reduce the country’s defence-industrial capacity.

A New Horizons approach would build on the engagement with the Global South – principally the Middle East, Africa and Asia – that began in the mid-1960s and has been built on, more recently, by military diplomacy and defence exports. It is highly likely that this will remain a strand of Turkish policy going forward.

There Should Not Be a Ceasefire Deal with Russia

Pavel Luzin

On November 13, the Russian government suddenly decreased payments for soldiers injured in combat. Only a portion of wounded soldiers can expect the “standard” three million rubles (around $30,000) of compensation. Depending on the injury class, others will only receive either one million rubles (around $10,000) or 100,000 rubles (around $1,000). This does not mean that the Russian state is running out of money. Rather, it indicates that intentional wounds are widespread in the Russian army to make money and escape from the battlefield at the cost of personal health (Publication.pravo.gov.ru, November 13). This demonstrates that many Russian soldiers do not want to fight in Ukraine and are willing to cause personal injury to get out of combat, illustrating that they do not truly believe in the fight for their motherland. Additionally, the State Duma has passed a law enhancing the financial liability of members of volunteer formations for damages and loss of military equipment. This law indicates troubles with combat motivation and discipline (Kommersant, November 13; Sozd.duma.gov.ru, accessed November 14). Despite the disillusionment of the Russian people and many in the Russian military with this war, Russia is still committed to its strategic foreign and military purposes set forth for 2024.

Long-range Capabilities Continue to be Key Deterrent for Ukraine

Yuri Lapaiev

In the early morning hours of November 6, drones attacked a Russian naval base near Kaspiisk City, Republic of Dagestan, Russia. Later, it was reported that it was an operation carried out by Ukrainian Defense Intelligence and that Ukrainian-made Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat drones were used. The distance from the state border of Ukraine to the site of the attack was more than 1,500 kilometers (930 miles). As reported, two Gepard-class frigates (project 11661) and a Buyan-class corvette (project 21631) could be damaged due to the attack (NV, November 6). This attack was yet another episode in a series of regular long-range strikes by the Ukrainian Defense Forces against targets deep in Russian territory. These deep strikes went from an extremely rare event at the beginning of the full-scale invasion to a routine in 2024. Moreover, the frequency, scale, and range of attacks constantly increase. According to official information for 2022–2023, the Armed Forces of Ukraine conducted 17 long-range strikes in 2022–2023. In contrast, in January–September 2024, they conducted more than 30 long-range strikes (Texty, October 22). Ukraine’s capability to carry out long-range strikes on Russian targets provides an opportunity to weaken the Russian armed forces at their source, enabling a more proactive and assertive defense of its sovereignty.


Understanding Climate Migration

Shelly Culbertson

Representatives from countries around the world are convened in Baku, Azerbaijan, through Friday (November 22) for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, commonly known as the COP29, for ongoing talks on carbon emission reductions and the mitigation of climate-change-induced droughts, heatwaves, and rain. Among the long list of topics is what happens to people who live in the hardest-hit locations. We have already seen the impacts in the United States.

News reports suggest that after back-to-back Hurricanes Helene and Milton, some coastal residents of the southeast are ready to pack up and move. And yet, between 2021 and 2023, despite well-known risks from climate change, property values there continued to rise. Florida, in fact, was the fastest-growing state in the United States. Likewise, despite unprecedented heat waves and increasingly strained water supply, Arizona’s population has also continued to increase.

Storms, droughts, flooding, heat—all these can affect people’s decisions about where to live or relocate, a phenomenon known as climate migration. However, as the push and pull of Florida’s weather on Americans shows, the relationship between climate change and migration is not direct or linear.

“Drill, Baby, Drill” Won’t Bring a Flood of Crude

Greg Priddy

Much of the commentary in the political press since Donald Trump won the election on November 5 has touted the supposed flood of U.S. crude oil production, which his new industry-friendly policies will unleash. Gasoline will be cheaper. The Saudis, Iranians, and Russians will go broke. U.S. energy dominance will reign supreme. Even a highbrow Washington-insider news outlet like Semafor ran headlines like “Trump Wins, Oil Slumps” and “Gulf Governments may prefer Trump, but they can’t afford him.”

The truth is a lot more mundane, however, and we are more likely to see a plateau in U.S. production rather than a surge in 2025 for reasons having nothing to do with American politics.

It is true that the Biden administration did some things that were not welcomed by the oil industry. Biden raised the royalty costs for drilling on public lands and sharply curtailed the amount of new acreage awarded by as much as 95 percent. The outgoing administration has also almost halted the award of new offshore acreage in the Gulf of Mexico and has made regulatory changes that put the smaller companies that dominate shallow-water offshore production at a disadvantage.

South Korea Best Off Balancing Deterrence And Diplomacy With The North – Analysis

Rachel Minyoung Lee

Unification is a perennial topic of interest among Korea watchers, but it has been particularly popular — and confusing — in recent months, with North and South Korea each sending diametrically opposed signals.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol delivered a rare speech dedicated to unification on Liberation Day, 15 August 2024, reaffirming Seoul’s commitment to unification and even telling Pyongyang that South Korea would ‘keep the door to inter-Korean dialogue wide open’. This was despite Kim Jong-un’s announcement at the end of 2023 of a new two Koreas policy, which defined North and South Korea as ‘two belligerent states’ and discarded the decades-long policy of peaceful unification.

There was much speculation following the October 7–8 session of the North Korean parliament, the Supreme People’s Assembly, about whether the assembly had indeed revised the constitution to remove unification-related language and define North Korean territory according to Kim’s instructions in early 2024. Pyongyang subsequently implied that it made at least one revision related to inter-Korean issues — defining South Korea as ‘a hostile state’ — but it remains unknown whether it made other related amendments.

Is Climate Activism Working?

Cameron Abadi and Adam Tooze

Last year, Germany’s Constitutional Court rejected 60 billion euro ($65 billion) fund set aside for renewable energy investments. Ever since, the country’s climate policy has been set adrift, with political parties struggling to agree on how to achieve Germany’s climate targets. In response, the country’s climate activist movement has tried taking matters into its own hands.

What theories of political change do climate activists have? Can fears of the apocalypse be reconciled with democratic compromise? And is there any precedent for the sweeping economic and social changes that meeting the West’s official climate goals would require?

Ransomware gang Akira leaks unprecedented number of victims’ data in one day

Alexander Martin

Akira, a ransomware-as-a-service gang with a growing profile in the cybercrime underworld, has published a record number of new victims to its darknet leak site in a single day, with 35 published on Monday as of writing, and more apparently still being added.

The criminals, who offer a platform to hackers to enable them to extort victims by stealing and encrypting data, emerged in March 2023 according to the FBI. In its first year of operations, Akira made $42 million from around 250 attacks, the agency said.

The group’s large number of attacks shortly after emerging led experts to believe it is made up of experienced ransomware actors, and it claimed a steady stream of incidents last year, including an attack on cloud hosting services provider Tietoevry.

Named after the Japanese cyberpunk manga, the gang’s leak site is styled like the command line interface on a monochrome computer popular in the 1980s. It contains a “news” section used to extort recent victims and a “leaks” section where data is published if the extortion process fails.

War and Peace in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Henry A. Kissinger, Eric Schmidt, and Craig Mundie

From the recalibration of military strategy to the reconstitution of diplomacy, artificial intelligence will become a key determinant of order in the world. Immune to fear and favor, AI introduces a new possibility of objectivity in strategic decision-making. But that objectivity, harnessed by both the warfighter and the peacemaker, should preserve human subjectivity, which is essential for the responsible exercise of force. AI in war will illuminate the best and worst expressions of humanity. It will serve as the means both to wage war and to end it.

Humanity’s long-standing struggle to constitute itself in ever-more complex arrangements, so that no state gains absolute mastery over others, has achieved the status of a continuous, uninterrupted law of nature. In a world where the major actors are still human—even if equipped with AI to inform, consult, and advise them—countries should still enjoy a degree of stability based on shared norms of conduct, subject to the tunings and adjustments of time.

But if AI emerges as a practically independent political, diplomatic, and military set of entities, that would force the exchange of the age-old balance of power for a new, uncharted disequilibrium. The international concert of nation-states—a tenuous and shifting equilibrium achieved in the last few centuries—has held in part because of the inherent equality of the players. A world of severe asymmetry—for instance, if some states adopted AI at the highest level more readily than others—would be far less predictable. In cases where some humans might face off militarily or diplomatically against a highly AI-enabled state, or against AI itself, humans could struggle to survive, much less compete. Such an intermediate order could witness an internal implosion of societies and an uncontrollable explosion of external conflicts.

Generating an Edge


The autonomous vehicles navigated the unforgiving terrain of the 2,000-square-kilometer Cultana Training Area in South Australia, conducting simulated long-range precision fires and other missions. Defense scientists, meanwhile, sought to disrupt the uncrewed jeeps and trucks with electronic warfare and electro-optical laser attacks on their position, navigation and timing systems.

The Trusted Operation of Robotic Vehicles in a Contested Environment (TORVICE) trials in late 2023 incorporated experts and technology from Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to evaluate the resilience of artificial intelligence (AI) in such assets — one of a slate of AI-capability initiatives under the allies’ AUKUS security partnership. “TORVICE tested the ability of autonomous vehicles to complete their missions and preserve network connectivity in a contested environment,” an Australian Defence Department spokesperson told FORUM. “The trial takes us a step closer to adopting these technologies in the land domain.”

Emerging capabilities such as AI and machine learning are transforming strategic cooperation, competition and conflict throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond, military commanders and defense analysts say. From protecting global shipping against missile strikes to augmenting war gaming and scenario modeling to employing large language models (LLM) such as ChatGPT to dig through mountains of raw intelligence, AI systems accelerate decision-making and allow forces to project power while reducing the risk to troops and noncombatants.