Indian Strategic Studies: 11/11/24

11 November 2024

India-China Border Agreement: A Tactical Step, No Strategic Reset

Paulo Aguiar

In late October 2024, India and China made a cautious but significant move to de-escalate their ongoing border dispute along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), their longstanding, loosely defined boundary. The two countries announced they would pull troops back, dismantle temporary infrastructure, and resume pre-2020 patrols in contested areas like Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh. While the agreement represents a diplomatic success, it does not fully address the deeply rooted strategic mistrust and competition between the two powers. This tentative détente, driven by practical needs, underscores a complex balance of regional interests, economic pragmatism, and a shared awareness of the risks involved in allowing border tensions to spiral.

Historical Tensions

The border between India and China has been a source of friction since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when unresolved boundary lines crystallized into animosity, especially along the LAC. The border dispute, a legacy of colonial-era boundary decisions, has remained unresolved despite decades of diplomacy. Since then, the two countries have experienced sporadic skirmishes, the most severe of which occurred in June 2020 in the Galwan Valley. That clash, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers, represented the first fatal border conflict in over 40 years and marked a dramatic escalation in hostilities. The use of hand-to-hand combat, in line with a 1996 agreement prohibiting firearms in these disputed zones, underscored the fragility of peace.

Daily Memo: German Government Reshuffle, Myanmar-China Relations

On the brink. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz dismissed his finance minister on Wednesday, a move that could trigger snap elections. With the firing of Christian Lindner, who represents the pro-market Free Democratic Party, the governing coalition led by Scholz’s Social Democrats is on the brink of collapse. Scholz said Germany needed an “effective government that has the strength to make the necessary decisions for our country,” adding that he would call for a confidence vote in January.

First China trip. Myanmar’s junta leader Min Aung Hlaing paid his first visit to China since coming to power in a 2021 coup that exacerbated an armed insurgency that has been searing ever since. On the sidelines of the Greater Mekong Subregion Summit in the southern Chinese city of Kunming, he met on Wednesday with Chinese Premier Li Qiang. Li said China would continue to support Myanmar and deepen strategic cooperation, while Min expressed his gratitude for China’s economic and social assistance and its role in peace and reconciliation efforts.

China’s Gray-Zone Offensive Against Taiwan Is Backfiring

David Sacks

In mid-October, China conducted yet another round of large-scale military drills in the Taiwan Strait, including practicing a blockade of Taiwanese ports. This time, the trigger was a series of unremarkable comments by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te on the occasion of Taiwan’s National Day a few days prior. Beijing “has no right to represent Taiwan,” Lai had asserted, describing Taiwan as a place where “democracy and freedom are growing and thriving.” Although Lai gave no indication that he would pursue independence or seek to change Taiwan’s international status, Beijing used his remarks as a new pretext to ramp up the pressure.

Over the past two years, major Chinese military exercises around Taiwan have gone from comparatively rare to almost routine. Beijing launched major drills after former U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August 2022; when Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, briefly stopped in the United States in April 2023; and again after Lai’s inauguration in May 2024. But rather than isolated actions responding to specific events, these high-profile military drills should be viewed as a core component of China’s larger campaign of “gray-zone” operations against Taiwan—coercive activities that fall below the threshold of armed force. As part of these tactics, China has levied tariffs and embargoes on Taiwanese exports, sought to increase Taiwan’s international isolation, and employed disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks meant to destabilize its people and government.

That Ship Will Sail

Richard Byno

The growing frequency of Chinese incursions near Australian waters underscores an escalating threat to Australia’s national security and regional stability. Chinese naval forces and fishing fleets have engaged in activities near Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), raising concerns about sovereignty and resource security. Australia has recognized the need to expand its naval capabilities to deter these incursions; however, critical questions remain on the structure and effectiveness of its maritime defense strategy. To counter these emerging threats, Australia must enhance its maritime defense and amphibious capabilities by adopting a structured approach grounded in U.S. Navy and Marine Corps principles—specifically, sea control, power projection, and expeditionary logistics.

Current gaps in Australia’s defense posture reveal the pressing need for new capabilities. These gaps include the lack of offshore staging areas for force projection and sustainment, insufficient platforms for reconnaissance, and an inadequate fleet of amphibious support ships. Without these assets, Australia faces limitations in both reach and resilience, making it challenging to maintain an effective defense stance in its surrounding waters.

Should Donald Trump Risk the U.S. Navy in a War Against China?

James Holmes

When should you hazard pricey, hard-to-replace capital ships in battle? That question has vexed wartime naval commanders as long as there have been navies to command. Nor is it hard to see why. Societies sink inordinate resources into ships of war. Cruisers, destroyers, and submarines are what economists term “lumpy capital,” costing taxpayers upwards—commonly well upwards—of $1 billion per copy. Aircraft carriers are the lumpiest of them all. Any sane commander would think twice before sending a $13.3 billion ship of the line like a Ford-class nuclear-powered carrier in harm’s way.

That’s a lot of public capital to wager—and perhaps lose—in an afternoon. That America’s standing in the world depends on sea power only compounds commanders' qualms before giving the order dispatching major combatants into a fleet action.

That being the case, fashioning a risk calculus ahead of time is no idle exercise. Senior uniformed and civilian leaders warn that the balloon could go up in the Western Pacific in the next two or three years. Many within the Beltway bandy about 2027 as the prime danger zone. When and if it breaks out, a new Pacific war would presumably see a domineering China mount a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. Chinese Communist Party supremo Xi Jinping has certainly ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready for military action by 2027, while confounding aggression and preserving the island’s de facto independence would be the point of U.S. and friendly military intervention.

Was an Israeli F-35 Shot Down By Iranian Radar?

Cameron Curtis

The Attack

Analysts have been puzzled by the limited nature of Israel’s October 25/26 attack on Iran. Various theories have been presented. Certainly, the NSA intelligence leak of October 17 had an effect, forcing the Israelis to initially cancel the attack. They then proceeded with an alternative plan.

Now, anecdotal information from Israeli sources suggests that the F-35s flying fighter escort for the strike package found themselves locked by engagement radars over Iraqi airspace. That means the Russians and Iranians could have shot them down at long range. It might have been several hundred miles, at the edge of the capability of ROCKS ALBMs that Israel meant to use on the enemy radar sites. This was a shock to the Israelis. According to this theory, the Israelis were so unnerved that they launched their missiles, turned around, and went home

It also accounts for the sober expressions Netanyahu and Gallant wore in the Israeli command bunker. The senior Israeli officers around the table were wringing their hands and biting their nails.

Army’s long-range assault aircraft fuselages to be built in Kansas

Jen Judson

Bell Textron will build the U.S. Army’s Future Long Range Assault Aircraft, or FLRAA, fuselages in Wichita, Kansas, the company announced this week.

The company won the Army’s bid to build FLRAA in late 2022 following a competition in which it and a Sikorsky-Boeing team flew technology demonstrators for several years to evaluate aircraft capabilities and drive out risk to a future program of record.

Bell will use an existing facility near Textron Aviation Defense and plans to start work there “in the next several months,” according to a statement.

The company will also conduct supporting work at several of its advanced manufacturing facilities in Texas, like its Advanced Composite Center in Fort Worth. Final assembly will take place in Amarillo.

Navy fires CO of Naval Information Warfare Training Group San Diego

Diana Stancy

The Navy removed the commanding officer of the Naval Information Warfare Training Group San Diego on Thursday.

Cmdr. Cayanne McFarlane was ousted from her leadership role due to a “loss of confidence in her ability to command,” according to the service. She has been temporarily reassigned to Naval Information Forces.

McFarlane is the second commanding officer the Navy has fired this week. On Wednesday, the service announced the relief of Capt. Lester Brown, Jr., the commanding officer of Navy Leadership and Ethics Command San Diego.

McFarlane assumed command of Naval Information Warfare Training Group San Diego in April 2023, and previously served as the executive officer of Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Sicily, according to her official Navy biography.

Israel signs $5.2 billion deal for 25 new F-15 fighter jets

Seth J. Frantzmanon

The Israel Ministry of Defense has signed what it called a “landmark transaction” to acquire 25 more F-15 fighter aircraft in a deal worth $5.2 billion, the ministry announced today. The warplanes will be delivered beginning in 2031, and it will take around five years for them all to arrive.

The deal was widely expected and has been in the process of finalization throughout the year as Israel has been fighting a multi-front war against Iran-backed proxies in Gaza, Lebanon and Yemen. Israel used F-15s in its long-range strike on Yemen in July. The US has also deployed F-15s to the region amid Israel-Iran tensions, illustrating how the Boeing-made plane, which first flew in the 1970s, is increasingly relevant today.

The deal was finalized Wednesday “following negotiations between the Israel Ministry of Defense’s Mission to the U.S. and Boeing in collaboration with the Israeli Air Force,” the Israeli MoD said in its announcement, adding that Director General of the Israel Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eyal Zamir signed an earlier “procurement authorization” during a visit to the US last month.

How Navy SEAL candidates recover after Hell Week

Frumentarius

Some of the most frequent questions I receive about my time as a Navy SEAL involve Hell Week, that well-known and brutal crucible of BUD/S First Phase that all SEALs must successfully pass before one day earning their SEAL Trident. The five-day ordeal includes non-stop physical activity, which ranges in intensity from running to obstacle courses to paddling rubber boats for miles on end. The only rest provided is during meals and on those extremely brief – and rare – occasions when the instructors allow the students to nap.

Those catnap-quality sleep sessions add up, for the week, to anywhere from about 45 minutes for the average student to a maximum of about two hours for those boat crews that might be able to win every race and come first in every evolution. Rarely ever is a block of sleep more than about 20 minutes long. In other words, Hell Week is excruciatingly exhausting, and, at the end, BUD/S students are physically, mentally, and emotionally drained.

Trump’s Pentagon overhaul: 8 policy changes he’s expected to make

Connor O’Brien and Joe Gould

Joe Biden’s first days in the Oval Office were spent undoing a number of Donald Trump’s most divisive changes at the Pentagon. Now, President-elect Trump is ready to do the same.

The full extent of Trump’s plans for the Pentagon are not entirely clear after the former president defeated Vice President Kamala Harris. But he’s likely to begin the process of reversing some of the policies Republicans have been gunning for — and reinstating some of his own from four years ago.

Trump’s opponents are foremost concerned that he will politicize the military and use it domestically against his political opponents. Should he follow through on his rhetoric, that could spark a fight over reining in his authorities to deploy troops on U.S. shores.

Trump may quickly win applause from defense hawks and social conservatives by reinstating his administration’s more restrictive policies on transgender people serving the military and scrapping initiatives aimed at helping troops access abortion.

Congress must demand a study of America’s cyber forces

Dr. Erica Lonergan & RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery

In an era of political polarization, congressional efforts to shore up America’s cybersecurity offer a rare beacon of bipartisanship. But these legislative efforts are currently under threat.

Recently, the Defense Department asked lawmakers to kill a bipartisan proposal — across both chambers of Congress — that would mandate an independent study of the readiness of America’s cyber forces. As cybersecurity leaders, we know that the two oceans that have long deterred a physical invasion of our homeland do not protect us in cyberspace. Our adversaries are already compromising our critical infrastructure, conducting covert cyber activities in our networks, inserting malicious software payloads, and gathering information from government and the private sector, all to gain a competitive advantage and prepare for potential conflict. Congress is right to ask for an independent study to ascertain whether the United States is appropriately postured to recruit, train, and retain the personnel needed to overpower and outmaneuver our adversaries in cyberspace.

This is not just a federal government or military issue. Cyberattacks overwhelmingly impact state and local governments — like New York — and the companies, corporations, organizations, and individuals within their jurisdictions. For example, in September 2022, Suffolk County, N.Y., the largest county outside of New York City, was hit with a devastating cyberattack that took several months and over $25 million to fully recover from.

What Donald Trump's Win Will Mean for Big Tech

Lauren Goode, Paresh Dave & Will Knight

On Wednesday, the chief executives of the leading Big Tech companies congratulated the US president-elect. Sundar Pichai (Alphabet), Mark Zuckerberg (Meta), Tim Cook (Apple), Andy Jassy (Amazon), and Satya Nadella (Microsoft) have all sparred with Donald Trump before, but they were quick to get behind him as their companies face a fresh four years of operating under an influential politician who has proved volatile.

Trump has shown disdain for Big Tech companies, and he’s been vocal about pursuing policies that increase the cost of doing business for Big Tech and subject them to more unfavorable regulations. Ahead of the election, business leaders and venture capitalists expressed concern that an unpredictable administration would undermine the stability of their businesses.

At the same time, Trump has vowed to back out of policies that might have hobbled growth for certain tech companies. The president-elect may also take a more hands-off approach when it comes to some tech mergers and acquisitions, analysts say.

The Perfect Has Become the Enemy of the Good in Ukraine

Richard Haass

Well into the September 10 debate between the U.S. presidential candidates, ABC News anchor David Muir posed a question to Republican nominee Donald Trump: “Do you want Ukraine to win this war?”

Trump refused to answer directly. “I want the war to stop,” he said. When Muir repeated the question, Trump again evaded: “I think it’s in the U.S. best interest to get this war finished and just get it done.”

Many observers were critical of Trump’s refusal to espouse support for Ukraine in its war against Russian aggression. Yet the former president is hardly the only person refusing to directly answer such a query. Most American national security experts, including U.S. President Joe Biden’s foreign policy team, have said they want Ukraine to defeat Russia. But they have refused to define what, exactly, that means, often saying it is for Ukraine to decide.

Ukrainian military’s anti-drone GPS spoofing spills into civilians’ phones

Daryna Antoniuk

For Ukrainian tech specialist Roman, Tuesday morning didn’t go as planned. He spent half the night lying in bed, listening to explosions from yet another Russian drone attack on Kyiv. Then, he couldn’t get a taxi to make it to his early workout at the gym. When he finally arrived, he discovered he was more than an hour late because his phone had been using a different time zone.

Roman — who asked not to be identified — said he was initially confused and thought something was wrong with his phone. He went to grab a cup of coffee instead of attending his missed workout class, and he realized that many Ukrainians had faced similar disruptions.

Some arrived late to work, others overslept, and some missed important calls. The cause? Their devices had suddenly switched locations from Kyiv to Russian cities like Moscow, Bryansk, Kursk or Belgorod, which are in a Russian time zone to the east.

Following the confusion, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces issued a statement explaining that disruptions to smartphone clocks or GPS signals may occur due to the use of electronic warfare (EW) systems to counter Russian air attacks.

Why America Stopped Winning Wars

Dan Zamansky

To find a way out of its current security crisis, the United States must recognize some hard truths. Most important among these is understanding why America stopped winning wars. The last American war to date ended, in substance, a decade ago, when the U.S. formally concluded its combat operations in Afghanistan. Since then, a country forged in war, and sustained to a large degree by victories in numerous highly consequential wars which followed, has lost sight of the fundamental fact that there is often no alternative to war, and no alternative to victory.

For the United States to emerge as a country in the first place, of course, it needed to gain its independence from the British Empire, which was not inclined to let the Colonies go. On April 19, 1775, the colonists took to their muskets at Lexington and Concord, and began the multiyear Revolutionary War. It was in this war that America’s Declaration of Independence was born, and its excoriation of the king includes the charge that he “has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.”

Within less than two months of the declaration’s signing, British regulars nearly destroyed George Washington’s Continental Army on Brooklyn Heights, and forced him to retreat hastily in the dead of night. The war only ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1783. If the colonists had not persevered, for years, against what was then the world’s richest empire, there would have been no United States of America.

Trump wins: time for a new European defence policy?

Javier Villamor

The European Union faces a crucial dilemma in its attempt to create an independent defence policy. As the geopolitical environment becomes more unstable, the EU seeks to develop a security structure capable of protecting its interests, reducing its dependence on the US and providing a robust response to threats that cross its borders.

However, the re-election of Donald Trump could drastically turn these efforts around, exposing – even more – European defence vulnerabilities.

Trump has been explicit in his stance towards NATO and its European allies. During his first term in office he openly questioned the Atlantic organisation’s mutual defence commitment and pressed member states to assume greater financial and operational responsibility for security.

At the time, he was labelled a “madman”. Biden proposed the same, and suddenly everyone agreed. Now no one denies that it is an imperative.

The End of America's Well-Intentioned Empire - Opinion

Dan Perry

The world was hugely interested in the U.S. presidential election—and everywhere people are wondering what the return of Donald Trump will mean in geopolitics. But is America interested in the world? Increasingly, and certainly judging by the inwardly focused campaign, not so much.

Which is a serious departure from the post-World War II consensus.

American voters were rarely much animated by foreign policy, but the political establishment certainly was. And if you hear speeches by presidents from Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower to George W. Bush and Barack Obama you will observe a striking bipartisan consensus about using American might to further democracy, freedom, and liberal values.

"Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace, to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity, and integrity among peoples and among nations," said the Republican Eisenhower, in his 1961 farewell address. "We dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope, and we will help to make it so," said the Democrat Lyndon Johnson, in 1967.

Economic woes collapse Germany’s governing coalition

Molly O'Neal

Divisions among the members of Germany’s fractious and unpopular governing coalition have reached a breaking point over the proposed budget for 2025. The conflict exposed the starkly different economic policy outlooks of the junior coalition parties — Greens and Liberals (FDP) — with the Social Democrat (SPD) Chancellor Olaf Scholz attempting furiously to mediate a compromise.

After an inconclusive make-or-break meeting on November 6 with the two feuding ministers — Finance Minister Christian Lindner (FDP) and Economics Minister Robert Habeck (Greens) — Scholz announced the firing of Lindner and the collapse of the governing coalition. A caretaker government of SPD and Greens would continue in power through December, with a vote of confidence in January and new elections in March.

The stubborn persistence until now of this much unloved coalition almost certainly reflected the reluctance of all three parties to face what could be a harsh reckoning in early elections, which, if the coalition had survived, would have been held next September.

Yes, Retired Generals Deserve a Voice Too

Andrew Song

As Americans cast ballots for their 47th President, considerable discussion has emerged regarding the outburst in partisan rhetoric displayed by retired flag and general officers (FOGOs). Recently, former retired Marine Corps Gen. John Kelly delivered scathing criticism of his former boss. Labeling him a “fascist”, the former White House Chief of Staff cautioned Americans about ramifications of a second Trump administration and emphasized his alarming totalitarian disposition. His proactive commentary stands in stark contrast to the silent philosophy espoused by his counterparts like former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey. To that end, like-minded officials desire the introduction of articles into the Uniform Code of Military Justice that would restrict officers from exercising partisan speech post-service. These examples reach certain extremes as one former Navy Captain proclaims that Congress should forbid retired FOGOs from running for office for three years and disallow four-star equivalent officials from publicly endorsing candidates, lest they lose their pension. The author and such proponents suggest that instituting bans would reinforce the public’s image of military non-partisanship and thereby reverse trends in eroding public trust in the U.S. military.

How Trump may shake up DOD: an insider’s view

PATRICK TUCKER

Few people, if any, have a better window into Donald Trump’s plans for the Pentagon than Christopher Miller, the final acting defense secretary of Trump’s first term and architect of the defense chapter of the Project 2025 document.

Two people with knowledge of the Trump campaign’s internal deliberations told Defense One that Miller is well-placed to play a key role in the next White House’s national security apparatus. And while Trump sought to distance himself from the Heritage Foundation document after its many controversial elements rose to public attention, it was written largely by his former appointees and staff and mirrors many of his policy proposals.

Although he has acted as one, Chris Miller is no one’s idea of a defense secretary—not even Chris Miller’s. A retired Army Special Forces colonel who later ran the National Counterterrorism Center, he lacks the defining qualities of a Washington political operator. He shows no enthusiasm for delivering talking points or speeches; takes no joy in commanding large budgets; expresses no interest in waging culture-war battles in front of cameras. He shares Trump’s extemporaneous, unscripted speaking style but none of his former boss’s vindictiveness. Miller is far more likely to extend praise to those in the security space whose work he admires than complain about people.

SMALL STATES MUST THINK BIGGER ABOUT THEIR DEFENSE

Garri Hendell

The U.S. has alliances with many smaller nations. Their military planning is almost wholly defensive and, surprisingly, appears somewhat constrained by their American alliance. There is a better way.

To wit, over the course of his military career, the author has had the opportunity to work with three relatively small, allied armies on their defensive planning. There have been a surprising number of similarities in these experiences. Smaller armies, unlike America’s, don’t really plan for expeditionary operations. They basically have one mission and one plan: national territorial defense. These countries’ plans include integrating allied forces as part of their overall defense although all have the capability, at least to a certain extent, to defend their national territory in the absence of foreign forces.

A more troubling aspect of these plans is their almost wholly reactive nature. Consistent with international law, it is understandable that countries allied with the United States do not plan to invade foreign nations or to instigate regional war. Not only do we consider ourselves, collectively, to be the good guys, but smaller countries don’t typically pick fights with their larger neighbors, even if the small country is a US ally. As a result, these smaller armies, lacking an expeditionary character, are understandably focused on the map of their own national territory. That having been said, being small(er) is no excuse to completely surrender the initiative in maneuver warfare. This is especially the case if smaller nations can expect to act in concert with regional allies in the course of hostilities. Maneuver can be just as important supporting the defense as it is in the offense.

Demonstrated Destruction Is Deterrence

Chris McInnes

U.S. and Israeli air strikes in the last month underlined the unrivalled ability of sophisticated air forces to reach and destroy sensitive targets.

The devastating attacks contrasted sharply with ineffectual Iranian and Houthi missile and drone attacks. Critically, the demonstrated power of the strikes strengthened deterrence.

Australia should pay attention as it develops strike capabilities for its strategy of deterrence by denial. The key capability implication for the ADF is the centrality of sophisticated air forces in degrading and penetrating air defences and delivering the firepower needed destroy hard targets. The critical policy insight is that a proven ability to destroy sensitive targets at will is a far more compelling deterrent than visions of future capability.

On 27 September Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, as he met with senior Hezbollah leaders in a bunker buried nearly 20 metres under four high-rise buildings in southern Beirut. Israeli aircraft reportedly dropped 80 precision-guided penetrating weapons with 900kg-class warheads. The weapons were dropped at precise angles and the warheads were fuzed to detonate at specific heights to collapse the high-rise buildings and penetrate Nasrallah’s bunker. While there are questions about the strike’s proportionality, its sophistication and effectiveness are unquestioned.

NRO chief: “You can’t hide” from our new swarm of SpaceX-built spy satellites

Stephen Clark

The director of the National Reconnaissance Office has a message for US adversaries around the world.

"You can’t hide, because we’re constantly looking," said Chris Scolese, a longtime NASA engineer who took the helm of the US government's spy satellite agency in 2019.

The NRO is taking advantage of SpaceX's Starlink satellite assembly line to build a network of at least 100 satellites, and perhaps many more, to monitor adversaries around the world. So far, more than 80 of these SpaceX-made spacecraft, each a little less than a ton in mass, have launched on four Falcon 9 rockets. There are more to come.

A large number of these mass-produced satellites, or what the NRO calls a "proliferated architecture," will provide regularly updated imagery of foreign military installations and other sites of interest to US intelligence agencies. Scolese said the new swarm of satellites will "get us reasonably high-resolution imagery of the Earth, at a high rate of speed."

The Navy’s Newest Warship Is Already Flying a Fresh Battle Flag at Sea

Jared Keller

The future USS John Basilone may not have officially joined the Navy’s surface fleet just yet, but the warship is apparently already flying a brand-new battle flag as a tribute to its decorated Marine namesake.

In photos published to social media on Friday, the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer is shown sailing down the Kennebec River from the General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipyard in Bath, Maine, with what appears to be a fresh battle ensign flapping in the wind ahead of its commissioning in New York City next week.

The Basilone is named for the legendary Marine Corps Gunnery Sgt. John Basilone, who received both the Medal of Honor for his "extraordinary heroism and conspicuous gallantry" during the Guadalcanal campaign and a posthumous Navy Cross for his valor during the Battle of Iwo Jima during World War II -- the only enlisted Marine to receive both decorations during the conflict.