Indian Strategic Studies: 11/07/24

7 November 2024

US Election Results 2024: Donald Trump Returns To White House Which May Upset World Order; Good Omen For India But Bad News For China

Donald Trump survived an assassin’s attempt to eliminate him on September 15, 2024 as he was destined to be the 47th President of America which is a done deal now.

Trump’s potential return to the White House in 2024 sparks a torrent of questions about the future of NATO, the American economy, relationships with allies, and the trajectory of the Ukraine war. Trump’s previous tenure exhibited a strong tilt toward "America First" policies, frequently challenging long-standing global alliances and multilateral commitments.

A Trump-led presidency, therefore, could dramatically shift the geopolitical landscape, leaving allies like NATO in uncertainty, reorienting America’s economic policies, testing India’s balancing act, and redefining China relations.

Interestingly, Vladimir Putin must be smiling and rejoicing the Trump’s possible victory as he can dream of full annexation of Ukraine as new incumbent in White House may reverse Biden’s policy of defence aid to Volodymyr Zelensesy especially when he dwelt upon during campaign trail about his fantasy of stopping war in one day if he became president.

Against this backdrop, Chinese scholars and analysts had made a strange prediction in government controlled media that Trump win will prove blessings in disguise for Beijing as he is likely to alienate America from majority of the world nations which is evident from his previous track record of presidency from 2016 to 2020.

India to deploy Integrated Battle Groups to counter China days after border truce

Shivani Sharma

The Indian Army is stepping up its efforts to counter China's increasing military presence along the border with a new tactical response, the Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). According to sources, the draft proposal for IBG formation has already been sent to the government and the implementation could begin as early as 2025.

This comes after India, on October 21, announced that it reached an agreement with China on patrolling along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), marking a breakthrough in ending the over four-year-long military standoff, which began following the deadly clashes between the troops of both countries in June 2020 in Galwan Valley.

Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi has confirmed the IBG initiative, saying that these units will bolster India's strategic readiness in response to China's restructured forces.

RESPONSE TO CHINA'S WESTERN THEATRE COMMAND

China has reorganised its military zones into five theatre commands, with the Western Theatre Command specifically overseeing operations near the Indian border. This command structure includes both ground and air forces stationed along the border, providing a rapid response capability.

Additionally, China has transformed several of its divisions into Combined Armed Brigades (CABs) to enhance operational cohesion and combat effectiveness. According to defence experts, India's IBGs are intended to match and counterbalance this growing Chinese presence.

China’s Forever War: What If a Taiwan Invasion Fails?

Joel Wuthnow

As the prospects of a war across the Taiwan Strait increase, more attention is being paid to the ramifications of conflict for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the region. Analysts have pondered what a PRC victory over Taiwan could imply for the regional military balance and the broader security architecture.1 Others have calculated the economic disruptions that a war would cause for China as well as for the global economy.2 Such assessments underscore the costs of conflict and thus the need to find ways to prevent war by deterring aggression.

Fewer analysts have considered the results of a failed attempt by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to seize Taiwan. U.S. policy seeks to attain a credible capability to thwart a PLA invasion if deterrence fails, but the resulting “peace,” some contend, would neither be peaceful nor stable. Lonnie Henley argues that the PLA would respond to a defeat by implementing a long-term, high-intensity blockade designed to starve Taiwan into submission.3 Others view political instability in China as a real possibility, with those who “lost” Taiwan “moved out in favor of a new group of leaders.”4 Still others believe that China would retain its military capabilities as well as the “very irredentist, aggressive leadership that started the as-yet hypothetical Taiwan war in the first place.”5

In Fencing China Out, Is Washington Fencing Itself In? – OpEd

Dr. Imran Khalid

As Washington doubles down on its semiconductor embargoes, a troubling paradox emerges: in trying to stymie China’s technological advances, the United States might just be fencing itself in. Each successive restriction aims to choke off China’s progress, specifically in artificial intelligence and high-performance chips. Yet these measures risk isolating the United States from global tech supply chains, harming its own industry and allies.

Take the new U.S. Treasury rule, effective January 2025, which tightens restrictions on American investments in Chinese semiconductors and quantum computing. Although the Biden administration’s objective is clear—to kneecap China’s semiconductor ascent—this gambit is not likely to work. The complexity of today’s tech landscape, with its entangled supply lines and “gray channels” of unofficial trade, underscores the futility of isolating China. Chinese firms continue advancing, with the support of both local innovation and resilient demand for tech alternatives.

Despite escalating sanctions designed to strangle China’s chip industry, the true costs of these measures ripple far beyond Beijing. American allies find themselves isolated, and domestic companies feel the sting of lost revenues. Take Nvidia, for instance. The American AI chip giant introduced its groundbreaking Blackwell architecture in March but offered a downgraded version to maintain ties with the Chinese market, a reluctant acknowledgment of a complex interdependence that persists despite Washington’s aspirations.

These efforts to stem China’s progress are as much a commentary on America’s anxiety over competition as they are on Beijing’s resilience in pushing forward, innovating, and navigating the geopolitical minefield. Even American firms like Semianalysis, which advocates for the strictest sanctions, concede that China is now advancing past the United States in achieving intelligent computing capabilities. The “wall” designed to keep China out is riddled with gaps. China’s resourcefulness exploits these gaps. With substantial clean energy reserves to power vast computing clusters, where the United States often struggles with shortages, China is less beholden to America’s chip arsenal. Although its H20 chips fall short of Nvidia’s H200, innovative local firms are rapidly narrowing the gap. Meanwhile, U.S. attempts to regulate global trade through restricted entity lists has proven little more than a game of “whack-a-mole,” where new avenues emerge faster than they can be closed.

China’s Expanding Role In The Middle East – Analysis

Mauricio D. Aceves

Extensive discourse is taking place regarding the power vacuum in the Middle East following the waning presence of the U.S. In this frame, regional actors have increased their influence over the specific issue of stability. Hence, it is crucial for all countries to diversify their ties when seeking a new balance, beyond their familiar stakes of economic interest and energy security.

In this scenario, China offers an alternative, furthering its early strategic engagement around investments, bilateral and multilateral cooperation and geopolitical calibrations, to fit smoothly alongside a new, multipolar order narrative. The echoes of this strategy are also heard in other latitudes. In parallel, China has also increased its presence in Latin America, primarily through investments in communications, technology, and infrastructure for connectivity.

The role of China in the Middle East can be categorized into a troika of domains—the economic and geopolitical scope includes the supply chain, financial systems, investments, technology and technical knowledge transfers, trade and energy security. The second refers to bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, including the convergence inside organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the many displays of diplomacy, from the cultural to the military. The third reflects the political approach with non-state actors and the open communications channels through the political labyrinth of the region. China does not aim to control regional dynamics or guarantee security. China’s policy is to be the master of economic dialogue and the use of incentives while avoiding direct involvement in conflicts and creating adversaries. Economic development is the sword, and pragmatism the road.

The Middle East has historically stood at the crossroads of geopolitics, even for China’s vision. The Persian Gulf provides China with over a third of the oil it imports;[1] Qatar is China’s most significant source of imported gas, and Turkmenistan is the second.[2] Nowadays, China is the largest trade partner of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia.[3] The region became an essential destination for Chinese exports and services linked with infrastructure, communications and information technologies. More than 60% of maritime trade between Europe and China[4] crosses the many seas of the region: the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Oman, the Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz Straits.

What Is China’s United Front And How Does It Operate? – Analysis

Paul Eckert

Evidence is mounting of clandestine Chinese influence operations in the heart of America.

Just in the last few months, a former aide to the governor of New York state and her husband were arrested for alleged illicit activities promoting the interests of China; a Chinese democracy activist was arrested and accused of spying for China; and a historian was convicted of being an agent for Beijing.

The three separate cases of former Albany functionary Linda Sun, dissident Yuanjun Tang and author Wang Shujun took place in New York alone. And they were not the first cases of alleged Chinese influence operations targeting immigrants from China in the Big Apple.

Those cases came to light as a detailed investigation by the Washington Postrevealed that China’s diplomats and pro-Beijing diaspora were behind demonstrations in San Francisco that attacked opponents during President Xi Jinping’s visit to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, summit last November.

Iran And Russia Seek To Reshape Global Hegemony With New Bilateral Agreement – Analysis

Dr. Emil Avdaliani

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met in Kazan, Russia, during the latest BRICS (a loose political economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit, held on October 22–24 (Kremlin.ru, October 23; see EDM, October 28). This follows an earlier meeting between the two leaders on bilateral ties in Ashgabat on October 11 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 11).

Given that Iran has recently inaugurated a new president who seeks to improve foreign relations, the bilateral agenda was quite expansive, accounting for both countries’ interest in developing closer ties in light of their respective conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Both sides have found themselves in a similar position—isolated by the West, targeted by sanctions, and eager for new allies—and look to establish closer political and military cooperation. Moscow and Tehran are motivated to introduce an agreement that would reflect their changing preferences and underline their shared opposition to the collective West.

Cooperation between the two countries has seen incremental improvement across various fronts since 2022 despite mutual distrust. This trend is expected to culminate in the signing of a comprehensive agreement that promises to redefine the scope of their strategic partnership (Amwaj, September 19). Although an exact date for such a signing has not yet been established, both Moscow and Tehran will likely look to ratify some sort of treaty by the end of the year, as both sides are eager to quickly sign an agreement, demonstrated by their ambitious designs in bilateral ties (see EDM, September 18).

The exact contents of what would be in this agreement are unknown. Compared with a previous treaty signed by the two countries more than twenty years ago, the expected agreements will likely involve much more extensive political, economic, and cultural ties (Russian Council, July 22, 2021). A heavy emphasis will likely be placed on military and security cooperation, as this is the cornerstone of their expanding relationship (see EDM, July 22, December 12, 2022, March 6, 2023, February 22).

Iran’s Nuclear Program Can’t Be Bombed Away

Benjamin Giltner

The Middle East is on the brink of full-scale regional war. Israel recently launched retaliatory strikes against Iran. While Israel avoided targeting Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities, there is still a risk that Israel’s and Iran’s back-and-forth missile strikes will drag the United States into yet another war in the Middle East.

An array of individuals, such as former prime minister Naftali Bennett and John Bolton, have encouraged—and continue to encourage—Israel’s military to attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities. With the JCPOA dead in the water, hawks argue that Israel’s only option for stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is war. However, the arguments in favor of a strike against Iran’s nuclear capabilities are misplaced. An attack would not set the program back dramatically and would likely convince Iran that it needs nuclear weapons to be secure. At the end of the day, while Iran acquiring nuclear capabilities is not ideal, it would not spell disaster for Israel or the United States.

Supporters of preemptively striking Iran grossly overestimate Israel’s ability to destroy all of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Military intelligence is always imperfect, making it unlikely that Israel could know where all of Iran’s nuclear capabilities are located. For instance, Iran has likely dispersed its nuclear research technology and centers across the country to make targeting more difficult. Though Iran only has two enrichment sites capable of enriching its uranium to levels needed to possess a nuclear weapon, Iran has hardened its nuclear facilities—with at least one buried so deep underground that even U.S. airstrikes would be unlikely to destroy it. This makes detecting and destroying these nuclear capabilities more difficult for Israel and would require U.S. participation to have a higher chance of destroying them.

Israel’s strike has Iran facing a stark nuclear option

Behnam Ben Taleblu

Israel’s long-awaited retaliation against Iran has highlighted the clerical regime’s conventional military weakness and sense of strategic vulnerability. Designed to make Iran “pay” for its Oct. 1 missile barrage — which marked the largest single-day ballistic missile operation in history — Israel struck more than 20 military targets in three essentially uncontested waves of attack. It remains unclear, however, if these strikes will be sufficient to elicit a change in the right direction from Tehran.

In the wee hours of Oct. 26, Iranian authorities watched as Israel gutted two of their traditional pillars of deterrence — the ability to “deny” an adversary the chance to land a blow, and their ability to “punish” an aggressor.

Iranian radars, as well as air and missile defenses such as Russian-provided S-300 platforms, were reportedly taken offline or destroyed. So too, were several ballistic missile facilities tied to solid-propellant missile production, such as those at Parchin, Khojir, and Shahroud, as well as other sites believed to support Iran’s domestic missile supply chain.

While Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles — assessed by the U.S. intelligence community to be the largest in the Middle East — numbers around 3,000, it appears to have been untouched by the recent strike. Instead, Israel targeted Tehran’s ability to produce over time more medium-range systems capable of reaching the Jewish State from Iranian territory.

Houthis Say They Will Not End Red Sea Blockade

Adam Makary and Ahmed Tolba

Yemen’s Houthis said on Sunday they would maintain their maritime blockade against Israeli vessels in response to “intelligence information” regarding Israeli shipping companies selling their assets to other companies.

The Iran-aligned Houthis have said they are intensifying their attacks to support Hamas and Hezbollah in their resistance against Israeli actions in the region.

“Intelligence information confirms that many companies operating in maritime shipping affiliated to the Israeli enemy are working to sell their assets and transfer their properties from shipping and maritime transport ships to other companies,”

said Yahya Sarea, military spokesperson of the group.

The Houthis will not recognize any changes of ownership and warned against any collaboration with these companies, Sarea said in a televised address.

Sarea also said the Houthis will continue imposing their naval blockade on Israel and would target any ships belonging to, linked to, or heading to Israel.

How will the war in Lebanon end? - Opinion

Hussain Abdul-Hussain

After some optimism that lasted less than 24 hours, Hezbollah and Israel seem as far from a ceasefire as ever, which begs the question: How else will the war end?

Earlier in the week, the Israeli army had declared its mission accomplished and removed protective barriers it had set up against Hezbollah’s Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) in Israel’s northernmost towns, near the Lebanese border.

The moves signaled Israel’s confidence that its campaign to neutralize the Iran-backed militia’s threat was going as planned. Yet Hezbollah’s high-trajectory fire continued. Israel, in effect, has been fighting two wars against the Iran-backed Lebanese militia.

The first war, now seemingly over, was particular to Israeli communities that live within of 5,500 meters (3.4 miles) from the border, the range of Hezbollah’s hand-held ATGMs. The border itself posed another threat.

After Hamas burst out of the Gaza Strip and massacred 1,200 Israelis, on October 7, 2023, Israelis lost faith in security fences like the one that separated them from Lebanon.

Iran’s Nuclear Program Can’t Be Bombed Away

Benjamin Giltner

The Middle East is on the brink of full-scale regional war. Israel recently launched retaliatory strikes against Iran. While Israel avoided targeting Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities, there is still a risk that Israel’s and Iran’s back-and-forth missile strikes will drag the United States into yet another war in the Middle East.

An array of individuals, such as former prime minister Naftali Bennett and John Bolton, have encouraged—and continue to encourage—Israel’s military to attack Iran’s nuclear capabilities. With the JCPOA dead in the water, hawks argue that Israel’s only option for stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is war. However, the arguments in favor of a strike against Iran’s nuclear capabilities are misplaced. An attack would not set the program back dramatically and would likely convince Iran that it needs nuclear weapons to be secure. At the end of the day, while Iran acquiring nuclear capabilities is not ideal, it would not spell disaster for Israel or the United States.

Early Peace Plan Shows Russia’s Intent To Neutralize Ukraine – Analysis

Yelizaveta Surnacheva and Systema

(RFE/RL) — Early in peace talks that began days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow proposed a treaty whose one-sided conditions amounted to Kyiv’s surrender, according to a draft obtained by Systema, RFE/RL’s Russian investigative unit.

Acceptance of the proposal would have left Ukraine a neutral nation with a tiny, toothless army, no recourse to protection by NATO states, and no chance of regaining control over Crimea or the Donbas, where it would have had to recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in their entirety, including the large portions still under Kyiv’s control at the time.

The proposed pact sheds light on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goals in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, none of which he has publicly renounced, and which he has repeatedly asserted will be achieved. It comes as the all-out war heads toward its fourth year with no clear sign of an end in sight but amid indications that peace talks could potentially be in the cards in 2025 or later.

The draft — titled Treaty On The Resolution Of The Situation In Ukraine And The Neutrality Of Ukraine — is dated March 7, 2022, 11 days after Russia launched the invasion and a week after talks between Ukraine and Russia began.Composed in Moscow and handed to the Ukrainian delegation that day, at the third round of talks, in a town in the Belavezha forest in Belarus, it is the first known document laying out Russia’s conditions for a peace deal after the start of the full-scale invasion.

At UN, US Confronts Russia Over North Korean Troops For Ukraine

Margaret Besheer

Russia refused to confirm its plans for North Korean troops it reportedly plans to deploy in its fight against Ukraine, during a confrontation with the United States Monday at the U.N. Security Council.

“I heard the statement [of the Russian envoy], as did others in this room, but the one question still remains that that statement does not address, and that is whether there are DPRK troops on the ground in Russia,” U.S. Deputy U.N. Ambassador Robert Wood told council members, using the abbreviation for North Korea’s formal name.

“And my question still stands, and I hope that the Russian Federation will answer that simple question,” he said.

Wood was referring to intelligence indicating that an estimated 10,000 North Korean troops have been sent to Russia for training and deployment to fight alongside the Kremlin’s troops in Ukraine, with some of the North Koreans believed to be heading to Ukraine in the coming days.

“We’re not in a court here, and the question of the United States, in the spirit of an interrogation, is not something I intend to answer,” said Russian Deputy Ambassador Anna Evstigneeva.

U.S. officials estimate that more than a half-million Russian troops have been killed or wounded in Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale illegal invasion on February 24, 2022. Russia, they say, is now turning to pariah state North Korea to bolster its forces.

Ambassador Wood said the Russians have trained the North Koreans in artillery and drone operations, and basic infantry operations.

“The nature of the training Russia is providing to these forces, to include trench clearing, indicates Russia intends to use these forces in front line operations,” he said.

The Next U.S. President Will Find a Europe Much Changed From Four Years Ago

Daniel Kochis

If Donald Trump wins the election on Tuesday, he will encounter a Europe far different from the one he knew during his first term both in terms of personnel and policy.

A second Trump term could very well be a baptism by fire for new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. After a decade of leadership by Jens Stoltenberg, whom some regarded as a Trump whisperer, NATO has turned to a leader known for being a quiet builder of consensus.

The G7 has also seen significant turnover. Think back to the infamous photo from the 2018 summit, wherein German Chancellor Angela Merkel is leaning on a table toward a seated and smirking Donald Trump. Of the five world leaders pictured, only French President Emmanuel Macron remains.

Chancellor Merkel is long gone; so are former British Prime Minister Theresa May and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was tragically assassinated in 2022. And today’s weaker Macron is a stark contrast to the Macron of Trump’s first term, who commanded the French political scene.

The United Kingdom has a new Labour government and a different monarch on the throne. In Germany, Social Democratic Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s traffic light coalition looks to be on its last legs. Friedrich Merz, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union and very likely next chancellor, is a conservative who has expressed his desire to increase German defense spending, an openness to reversing Merkel’s shuttering of Germany’s nuclear power plants, and a promise to halt mass migration.

The world waits on America

TIM ROSS

It may be the end of the beginning.

After the most dramatic of election contests, in which one candidate dropped out with barely three months to go and his rival was almost assassinated, the campaign to become the next president of the United States will soon be over.

Over, that is, bar the counting. And the likely recounting, legal challenges, contested rulings, appeals, angry protests and wild conspiracy theories to explain how the losing side was robbed of victory.

On Monday night, the two candidates closed their campaigns by focusing on the biggest prize of all the battleground states: Pennsylvania. With 19 votes in the U.S. electoral college up for grabs, the state is expected to be decisive, offering the winner a clear path to power.

A packed final rally for Vice President Kamala Harris in Philadelphia, the state’s biggest city, featured music from Ricky Martin and Lady Gaga, and a speech from Harris’ husband Doug Emhoff. TV megastar Oprah Winfrey also spoke, introducing Harris to an ecstatic crowd.

The audience, numbering in the tens of thousands, joined in the singing at the “Rocky Steps” leading up to the Museum of Art, the city landmark made famous by Sylvester Stallone’s boxing film. People had waited around four hours for the vice president.

The Wagner Group’s Little Black Book: Decoding Command and Control of Russia’s Irregular Forces

Candace Rondeaux & Ben Dalton

I. A Question of Control

From the moment the Wagner Group surfaced in Ukraine amid Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, two critical questions have persisted: Who was in charge of Wagner? How much control did the Kremlin have over the paramilitary? These questions are not just academic—they go to the heart of accountability for war crimes and atrocities committed by Wagner forces in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa.

It turns out that partial answers are encoded in leaked phone directory data, calendar entries, personnel records, and internal documents, which reveal that Wagner’s command structure was far more state-directed than previously thought. While Wagner was publicly framed as a private military company (PMC), evidence suggests that it functioned more like a Kremlin-directed paramilitary force, with its leadership coordinating with Russian officials at the highest levels. Andrei Troshev, Wagner’s director, was just as central to its operations as founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and commander Dmitry Utkin, orchestrating missions that aligned with the Kremlin’s strategic objectives.

In fact, Troshev sat at the very center of the Wagner Group’s long hidden command and control structure from 2014 to 2021, overseeing the hiring, firing, payment, injury and death benefits, deployment, and discipline of some 1,915 individuals categorized as commanders in Wagner’s personnel records. On Troshev’s watch, at least 13,100 men deployed to six countries across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Troshev continued to play a leading role in Wagner’s operations.

Biden’s Biggest Foreign Policy Legacy Will Be in Economic Warfare - Opinion

Hal Brands

Joe Biden’s foreign policy will be remembered for many things: the humiliating exit from Afghanistan, the stalwart response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the struggle to contain the fallout from Oct. 7 in the Middle East. But Biden has cast his longest shadow by shaping a new era of economic warfare likely to intensify in the years ahead.

Economic warfare has figured in great competitions and conflicts since the ancient age. As every reader of Thucydides knows, the Megarian Decree — a trade embargo imposed by Athens — was a signpost on the road to the Peloponnesian War. In 1941, a US oil embargo against Japan helped to trigger the attack on Pearl Harbor and globalize World War II. During the Cold War, the free world contained the Soviet Union in economic as well as military terms.

After the Cold War, the US mostly used sanctions against rogue states and terrorist groups, while hoping that economic integration could lead to great-power peace. But amid escalating geopolitical rivalries, first Donald Trump and now, more systematically, Joe Biden, have increasingly wielded economic weapons.

Adapting for Agility: How Flexible Funding in Defense Addresses Emerging Threats

Introduction

In the ever-evolving defense landscape, where threats and technologies develop faster than traditional processes can accommodate, agility in resource allocation has become paramount. This need for rapid adaptation has been underscored by thought leaders like Army Under Secretary Gabe Camarillo, who has advocated for a more flexible spending model within defense acquisitions. This model, which allows funds to be grouped into broader categories rather than assigned to specific systems, holds promise for enhancing the U.S. military’s responsiveness to emerging threats and technological advancements. This article delves into how flexible funding can address defense challenges, with a focus on its potential for organizations like the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its alignment with the recent Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform Commission recommendations.

The Current State of Defense Spending

Traditional defense funding practices follow rigid budget cycles and structured allocations, designed in an era when military threats and innovations advanced at a slower pace. Historically, budgets have been assigned to specific programs or systems years in advance, a practice that, while thorough, struggles to keep up with modern, dynamic threats. For instance, the current defense budget process is less effective in rapidly funding new initiatives or reallocating resources as technologies evolve. This inflexibility can result in inefficiencies, where funds become locked into legacy projects, and by the time they are deployed, the relevance of those systems may have diminished.

America’s Crisis of Leadership

Walter Russell Mead

The biggest single crisis facing the United States on the eve of the election does not come from Kamala Harris or Donald Trump. It does not come from our enemies abroad. It does not come from our dissensions at home. It does not come from unfunded entitlement commitments. It does not come from climate change. Our greatest and most dangerous crisis is the decay of effective leadership at all levels of our national life, something that makes both our foreign and domestic problems, serious as they are, significantly more daunting than they should be.

Average confidence in institutions ranging from higher education to organized religion rests at historic lows, with fewer than 30% of respondents telling Gallup pollsters that they have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in major American institutions. Only small business, the military, and the police inspire majorities of the public with a high degree of confidence; less than a fifth of Americans express “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in newspapers, big business, television news, and Congress.

Much of the country’s political and intellectual establishment responds defensively to numbers like this, blaming falling confidence on the corrosive effects of social media or the general backwardness and racism of the American public. The East German communist hacks Bertolt Brecht satirized also blamed their failings on the shortcomings of the masses: “The people have lost the confidence of the government and can only regain it through redoubled work.”

Thirty years of ‘normal’ politicians have led Western nations to decline

Ralph Schoellhammer

There can be no doubt about it: Donald Trump is not a normal candidate – which is precisely why you should vote for him. The strength of a democratic system is not just its supposed moral superiority – which is a topic for a different column – but its ability to allow for renewal and revitalization within the system. Contrary to one-party states or military dictatorships one does not have to overthrow the entire government to create change, but one can simply vote in a new one. It is this element of democracy that must be protected at all cost, because if a growing number of people feel that they can no longer vote out those who are currently in charge, at some point their anger will be pointed not just at the government, but the very system itself.

Political parties and bureaucratic agencies tend to entrench their power and shield themselves from the will of the voters, and that is neither new nor surprising but a natural element of human nature. Once you find yourself in a cushy position, you do not want to give it up, and ideally ensure that you can hold that position as long as possible. This gradually leads to the emergence of vested interests who benefit from a maintenance of the status quo and are resisting change, which in turn leads to “institutional sclerosis” as laid out by Mancur Olson in his 1982 book The Rise and Decline of Nations. Think about it like barnacles attaching themselves to the hull of a ship: as they accumulate, they drag the ship and force it to burn more fuel, even though it does not pick up speed or becomes easier to manoeuvre.

Game Plan: After Ukraine

Edward Lucas

Ukraine is not yet defeated. But Russia has already won the battle that matters most: with the West. Decision-makers in Washington DC, London, Berlin, and Brussels (to name just a few capitals) had the chance to counter Russian imperialism alongside a big, strong, determined country. They decided instead to drip-feed aid and soft-pedal sanctions, for fear of the risks of Russian defeat. Ukraine’s thousand days of sacrifice bought Europe time to rebuild its defenses. It wasted that too.

The price of that is now huge. The Kremlin’s war machine will not stop in Ukraine. The next target is NATO, probably in the Baltic states. Thanks to some fine investigative work by Polish, Lithuanian, and Estonian journalists, we now have a better idea of what is underway. They have used open-source satellite imagery to build a picture of Russia’s military bases in the region and quizzed current and former military leaders to interpret the results.

Nothing will happen immediately. Russia’s presence is heavily depleted. The Baltic Fleet’s landing capability has gone. Barracks, training grounds, and car parks are empty. Huge amounts of equipment and spare parts went to Ukraine. We still have time. But not much.

The Horn Of Africa States: A Resource Rich Region – OpEd

Dr. Suleiman Walhad

When discussing the economies of the Horn of Africa States region, as is the case with the rest of Africa, almost all analysts always talk in terms of unverified and unfiltered bad economic indicators. Major topics include among others anaemic economic growth levels, low per capita incomes, widespread poverty, and low GDP numbers. These reports are stubbornly repeated, which colors the region as eternally sick.

This leads to the continuous political upheavals in the region, which take on different colors, mostly ethnic, but also religious at times, such as the terrorism in the region would indicate. It is a sad story of the region, but the rest of Africa is not much different, in this respect.

The Horn of Africa States region is home to over some 160 million people and they all still live and thrive, and the number is still growing. This must be an indication that this large population is still engaged in different kinds of economic activities – trade, farming, agro-pastoralism, fishing and some kind of manufacturing and services. The measures reported, therefore, do not truly represent the actual economic activities of the region, as at least a majority of the economic activities of the population are not reported which, therefore, falsifies and negates the numbers given on the region and elsewhere in Africa.

Zelensky's Ukraine Braces for Darkest Hour

Brendan Cole

Pessimism pervades Kyiv and Washington about Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine as President Volodymr Zelensky tries to steer his country through the war's third winter.

That assessment by intelligence officials, cited by The New York Times, follows Russian advances in the Donetsk region and concern about what the outcome of the U.S. election on Tuesday will mean for U.S. support for Kyiv.

It also comes ahead of Ukrainians enduring the cold months ahead with their energy infrastructure damaged by Moscow's drone strikes which have intensified from 350 in July to 2,000 in October, according to Kyiv. Ukraine's Sumy and Poltava regions were left without power last week after Russian airstrikes.

Oleksii Brekht, acting CEO of national grid operator Ukrenergo warned continuous massive shelling of the country's infrastructure, transmission network and generation facilities, mean daily power consumption restrictions this winter could last up to eight hours.

Using drone swarms with manoeuvre units

Marius Halsør, Dan Helge Bentsen, Aleksander Skjerlie Simonsen & Håvard Stien

Introduction

With drones playing an increasingly important part on the battlefield, it is important to examine how we best can use such assets - as well as what we need to do when we face such a threat ourselves. The simplest drones operate individually and are remote controlled, usually requiring one person (at least) to operate one drone. A more advanced utilization of drones involve swarms, consisting of many drones working together. This requires the drones to have some level of autonomy, in order to make it possible for one operator to control the entire swarm. What kind of autonomy is required to operate swarms of different sizes, how such swarms should be used to give the best impact on the battlefield, and how an operator best can control such swarms, are questions we address in this report.

FFIs project "Future Force" examines how unmanned systems may be used in future conflicts. FFI is also developing our own technology for using unmanned systems, which is showcased at annual experiments called LandX. See [1] for the experiment carried out in 2022, where uncrewed systems were the main focus. Among the things FFI is developing, is a drone swarm behaviour system and user interface. See [2] for a description of the Flamingo UAV. Our intention has been to support the development of this technology, and also to study how a swarm of small drones can be used to support a military unit on low tactical level.